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A country vicar's son born in Somerset, who entered the East India Company's service in 1828, John Jacob died in his adopted country thirty years later; and there on the Upper Sind Frontier, in the folk-tales of the people whom he chastised and loved, protected and enriched, he is revered as a being more than mortal. To this wild region he brought the rule of law: here the man first distinguished as a brilliant gunner and cavalry leader put into constant practice his ideals as a Benthamite reformer, reclaiming predatory tribes by moral power and desert wastes by his irrigation canals.

Here, seven years before its occurrence, he publicly foretold the outbreak of an Indian Mutiny, unless the defects in the Bengal Army which he denounced were amended in time. In contrast he claimed that Indian soldiers organized under his own system, perfected in the Scinde Horse, would remain staunch under any trial — and so in the event it proved. So, too, his plan for permanently securing North-West India from the menace of Russian aggression, rejected in his life-time, had to be adopted twenty years later.

The author himself has a first-hand knowledge of this arduous country. As Deputy Commissioner of the Upper Sind Frontier he 'sat in Jacob's chair', and this book fills a gap in the documentation of this period in India's history. When first published in 1960 by Cassell & Co. it was acclaimed in the Times Literary Supplement as 'this outstanding work of mature scholarship'

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


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JOHN JACOB OF JACOBABAD



BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. JACOB, C.B.

Aide-de-Camp to the Queen, &c: Commandant Scinde Irregular Horse, and Political Superintendent of the Frontier of Upper Scinde.

(From the engraving by T. L. Atkinson after the original portrait.)

John Jacob of Jacobabad

by

H. T. LAMBRICK

SECOND EDITION

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To the Peoples of Sind and Baluchistan

Preface

to the Second Edition

Preparation of a new edition of this biography of General John Jacob has afforded the opportunity to include the illustrations designed for it when first published, in 1960. The great majority of these are from photographs specially taken by the author during 1934-1936, in such a way as to show nothing changed or added since Jacob's life-time.

The original text is presented here without alteration, but

one or two new footnotes have been added.

The letter which follows, quoted in extract, testifies to the vitality of the Jacob 'legend'. It was addressed to me, and arrived not long after this biography had been accepted for publication. A friend had communicated the news, that it was to appear, to a Baluch landowner of Upper Sind Frontier District whom I had known well while serving there. He had then been conspicuous, in the generally conservative Baluch community, for his radical views in politics, including even (!) membership of the Congress Party. Here is what that former fire-brand wrote to me, about John Jacob, on 10 October 1958:

... No Englishman can assess fully our feeling so far this benefactor of ours is concerned.

You know I took the most leading part in Congress movement in Sindh... but I shall be the last person to give up my love and regard for England and its people, because

of this great man.

life of our Jacob Sahib. He is ours even after death! I was at Karachi when Jacob centenary was celebrated at Jacobabad. Some foolish fellows wrote to me calling this a day of national calamity. To them Jacob was a tool in the hands of

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

his Government. He was tool no doubt, but tool in the hands of God, who did strive to raise our people and gave them internal peace and order. He was a law-giver and a nationbuilder. He did utmost to give new life to the Baluch people. No political or racial blackmail can rob us of our Jacob Sahib!

I wish we could build a monument to the sacred memory of this noble soul (who accidentally came, to fight the battles on behalf of England), which should recall all that he achieved here! He is living in death, while there are people

in England who are dead in life.

Another development worthy of mention relates to John Jacob's tomb. On page 395 it is stated that the great stone slab (which is shown in the plate opposite page 373) had by 1940 suffered severe damage from the action of efflorescent salt. Thereafter, at some time prior to the year 1968, it was decided—by whom I am not aware—to take thorough-going measures to put Jacob's resting-place in decent order. In place of the slab, a much narrower tombstone embodying a large Cross in high relief was

Now the promoters of this 'restoration' probably assumed that John Jacob, being an Englishman—indeed, the son of a clergyman of the Church of England and buried according to its rites in the Christian cemetery at Jacobabad which he himself had founded — must have held the Christian faith. But readers of this biography will find that by the year 1855, and probably long before that, he had in fact publicly repudiated Christianity, and had evolved out of his understanding of and reasoning from Natural Science a personal system of religion which satisfied his ideals—ideals which in their nobility surely cannot suffer from comparison with those of any orthodox creed.

It may seem a curious irony that the man who wrote to his brother the letter reproduced in full on pages 364 to 366 should have the symbol of Christianity set over his grave, a century after his death. But, what matter! — it was he too who had written... 'the Sign of the Cross... many ages older than the

reign of Augustus'.

October 1974

H. T. L.

Preface

THIS book results from some twenty-five years' intermittent study of its subject; and if this has enabled me to produce a truer picture and appraisal of John Jacob and his work than has hitherto been available, I shall be well content.

The Life is based largely on manuscript material; in particular, Jacob's official and semi-official correspondence filed in the unpublished Records of the Commissioner in Sind, now part of the Pakistan Government archives at Karachi. These I was allowed to consult ad libitum by the Commissioners in Sind and subsequently by the Provincial Government, and I am duly grateful for their permission.

I have also drawn extensively on Jacob's private correspondence with members of his family and with friends such as Sir James Outram, Lord Melville and Sir Bartle Frere. This was formerly in possession of the late Major-General A. Le G. Jacob, C.B., C.M.G., C.I.E., C.B.E., D.S.O.; and I am glad to record my deep obligations to him for placing it unreservedly at my disposal, together with a quantity of other papers belonging or relating to his great-uncle, John Jacob, and for communicating a great deal of information. Similarly I acknowledge with gratitude the help and material given me after the General's death by his sister, the late Mrs. Ashe King. I much regret that these two members of the Jacob family did not live to see in print the work in which they took so great an interest.

My thanks are due to Mr. Stephen de Mowbray for the loan of the holograph letters written by John Jacob to his lieutenant and close

friend Henry Green, and some connected papers.

Among the many Baluch and Sindhi zemindars and other residents of Upper Sind who communicated orally or in writing anecdotes and traditions regarding John Jacob cherished in their respective families, I must mention particularly the late Wadero Allahbakhsh Lashari, a descendant of one of Jacob's contractors, and the late Khan Bahadur Dil Murad Khan Khoso.

Once again it is my pleasing duty to thank the doyen of historians of

PREFACE

the British Indian Army, Sir Patrick Cadell, for contributing with characteristic enthusiasm and generosity during more than twenty years, items from the vast stores of his knowledge which have supplied

many deficiencies in my own.

I am grateful to those friends in Sind and elsewhere who, aware long since of the fact that I was writing this book, and sharing my feeling that John Jacob's achievement should be better known, have constantly encouraged me. I hope that the work may not fall short of their expectations.

Finally I thankfully acknowledge my indebtedness to my wife, not only for undertaking on several occasions much tedious labour, but for criticism which enabled me to improve the book in some important

respects.

A few passages in the chapter on the Sind battles are identical with the text of the corresponding portion of my book, Sir Charles Napier and Sind. It did not seem to me necessary, when I had to cover the same ground, to try to alter altogether the wording of my first description.

H. T. L.

29th June 1959

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NOTE ON THE ILLUSTRATIONS

The frontispiece reproduces the well-known engraved portrait of General Jacob. John Jacob Hoghunting is taken from the original sketch, now in the author's possession. The plates facing pages 186 and 238 are from coloured prints published by Ackermann about the middle of the last century. The remaining twenty illustrations are all from photographs taken by the author in the years 1934 - 1936.

PART ONE

"... Riding, shooting, and speaking the truth."

Herodotus, History I, 136

The Making of a Soldier

CHAPTER I

Woolavington-Addiscombe1

JOHN JACOB, destined to pre-eminence in a family which for well over a century has afforded continuously one of England's most notable examples of hereditary talent,* was born at Woolavington in Somerset

on 11th January 1812.

The connexion with the West Country was fortuitous, his father being vicar of the parish at the time; until the end of the eighteenth century his branch of the Jacobs had been domiciled in Kent, where as minor landowners for more than four hundred years they had become allied with many of the oldest families of the county. They could trace their line back to the brother of Archbishop Chichele and for centuries enjoyed the rights of 'founder's kin' at All Souls College, Oxford. We read also in the family tree of loyal services in the Civil War honoured by King Charles II; the Borough of Canterbury returned a Jacob to Parliament, and elected another as Mayor; they acquired the lordship of two manors and other estates in the neighbourhood. What chiefly distinguished the family from the typical lesser landed gentry was that almost all its prominent members during the eighteenth century practised as physicians or surgeons.

The second son of one of these doctor squires, Stephen Long Jacob, after some years at Oxford as Fellow and Tutor of Worcester College, took to wife a Kentish lady, Susanna Bond, who numbered among her forbears the famous Dutch Admiral De Ruyter, and retired to the country living of Woolavington. John, the subject of this biography, was their seventh child and fifth son, and three more sons followed him

^{*} Among collateral descendants of John Jacob at the time of writing are Lieut.-Genera Sir Ian Jacob, K.B.E., C.B., until 1959 Director-General of the British Broadcasting Corporation: Professor Ernest Jacob, the historian: and Doctor Gordon Jacob, the composer.

JOHN JACOB OF JACOBABAD


into the world. The vicar's younger brother, who inherited a small family estate in Kent, reared five sons and four daughters. Eight of the boys from these two households were to enter the fighting services,

the first of many generations of Jacobs to do so.

All that can be gleaned from John Jacob's earliest letters tends to show that the children at Woolavington spent their time much as did those of us who grew up in country vicarages before the First World War. The house is pleasantly situated on rising ground leading up to the Polden hills, and the family were of the first consequence in the village beneath. By the time John was ten years old the bent of his character had begun to manifest itself. He was constantly organizing mimic battles among the Woolavington boys, armed with wooden sword and buckler, appropriating for himself the roles of Bruce, Wallace and such heroes. He was dubbed 'the Warrior' by his elder brother George, and became generally known by this name in his family and in the village. On John's eleventh birthday his triumphs were celebrated by George in a mock-heroic poem in three cantos, under this title. That morning appeared on the door of the vicarage parlour a play-bill of the evening's entertainments devised in his honour by the young people, and surmounting it, enclosed in a wreath of laurel, lines which after his death were recalled by one of his sisters as 2 prophecy fulfilled2:

Let all rejoice!—this mighty day gave birth
To one whose fame shall spread through all the earth,
And bursting through each opposition, shed
Its blooming honours on his glorious head.

A year later George describes one of John's exploits in a letter to their elder brother Herbert, then in India, a subaltern in the Bombay Army: "The boys and I got into a bit of a row a short time since with John Wall, about our going into his field and (as he said) pulling down his haystack; the truth was the Warrior and his men went into one of his fields to do battle with me, and some of them got at top of the haystack, but did it no harm. John Wall came up and seized the Warrior while I was at a further end of the field, and carried him off; as soon as I perceived it I ran and rescued him, which put Jacky in such a passion. Then after storming at us for some time he swore that he would have a summons for us from Master Rippon. However, we have heard nothing about it since.' In this same letter George mentions that one of the East India Directors had offered a nomination for himself to the Company's service, but that his father thought best to



WOOLAVINGTON VICARAGE, SOMERSET John Jacob's birthplace.

WOOLAVINGTON—ADDISCOMBE

decline it, as he was rather old for Addiscombe, and had asked Mr.

Millett to transfer his patronage to John later on.

The vicar's eldest son, a midshipman, died in January 1824. Philip, who succeeded him as future head of the family, was to be a doctor like so many of his forbears; George, the kindly playmate of young John in his holidays from Exeter School, was reading for a scholarship to Oxford; and William Stephen, born a year after John, now became his closest ally, and shared the growing scientific bent of his mind. There is mention of a cross-bow and a bullet-mould, and one is tempted to wonder whether the future artillerist and ballistician modified them to improved designs of his own. He went for some time to a dame-school at Milverton, but lessons at home had a greater influence on his life, and not the least those learnt over a carpenter's bench and in the saddle; he was long remembered as the best young horseman in the whole countryside. Thus the first steps towards eminence as an engineer and cavalry leader were taken before he was

nominated to a cadetship at Addiscombe.

John Jacob was just fourteen when he made the long journey up to London alone by coach, in February 1826. He was to be sponsored at the India House and at Addiscombe by his cousin William Jacob of the Bombay Artillery, who was now on leave in London in all the glory of a brevet-captaincy. He tells his uncle of the pleasure he found in explaining all that they saw together to so intelligent a boy, while John writing to a sister a few days later says coolly, 'London did not seem a bit odd to me . . . it seemed exactly like Bridgwater.' The same independence appears in his account of the entrance examination at Addiscombe which he passed with éclat: 'There were four others examined at the same time and only one of them passed, and he was very bad: all that we had to do was an easy sum in vulgar and decimal fractions and to construe a few lines of Caesar'-so much for a test which William Jacob says lasted two hours. But there was one untoward feature in his success. 'The man who examined us asked me whether I always stammered, and said he was obliged to make a report of it.' Of course he was at once told by the other cadets that he would certainly be sent away on this account, and the prospect of being rejected for the Army preyed on his mind. Though the impediment was not so great as to cause him to be 'sent back' for six months, like others, it was not cured; we know that the handicap remained to oppress him for the rest of his life, and it had no little influence on his career.

The Honourable East India Company's Military Seminary was then, in 1826, entering upon the period of its greatest success. Among John

Jacob's contemporaries many subsequently achieved high distinction; the careers of Robert Montgomery, Eldred Pottinger, Robert Napier, Henry Durand, Richmond Shakespeare and Vincent Eyre testify to the soundness of Addiscombe's curriculum. Out of study hours, on the other hand, the place in Jacob's time was a perfect bear-garden, the masters taking little or no cognizance of what went on. There were two separate codes of rules; the written or official, enforced through the orderly officers and staff sergeants, and the unwritten, administered by the cadet-corporals. The Commandant, Colonel Houston, instead of making use of the latter to maintain the tone and general discipline of Addiscombe introduced a system of virtual espionage through his staff sergeants. Of course the effect was to encourage the more reckless cadets-and corporals among them-to pit their wits against authority, and commit, out of bravado, offences which they might otherwise never have thought of. Robert Fitzgerald, who afterwards served under Jacob at Miani, escaped being caught smoking by jumping without hesitation down a well, the only cover available; and more than one anonymous leader of men bonneted a sergeant with his cloak to effect

a headlong escape from an ale-house.

Jacob's comments on the indecorous behaviour of his brother cadets at prayers and in church, the incessant noise of single-stick play, swearing, smashing of furniture, constant surreptitious smoking and drunkenness, the 'chumming'-appropriation and destruction-of his few possessions, are such as would be expected of a boy straight from a country vicarage. Most tiresome of all was the practical impossibility of being alone for a moment. However, the senior orderly officer, Lieutenant Ritherden and other members of the staff, old Bombay acquaintances of John's cousin William, took a benevolent interest in the boy and soon found that he repaid attention. He was keen and quick to learn and resisted all attempts of the cadets to keep him from his books out of study hours. In a letter subsequently written from Bombay to his brother William who had followed him to the College he says, 'They tell me you are dreadfully housted at Addiscombe but never you mind it, everybody is housted who mugs, particularly while they are probos; they used to do the same to me and even worse. . . . Never make any row in study or in the ranks whatever they may do to you, but don't stand any kind of nonsense out of study. I always found hat the best way when I was there.'

In fact, though studious and quiet, John Jacob showed plenty of spirit, and his smallness of stature did not deter him from retaliating when attacked, whatever the odds, even in his first term. He enjoyed hockey and rowing on the canal; as to the drill, he was out of the

WOOLAVINGTON—ADDISCOMBE

awkward squad in a fortnight. Ten hours of study daily in four periods did not seem too long to him and he passed for promotion from the fourth to the third class in half the allotted time. We find him writing enthusiastically to his brother William of the evening lectures on electricity, given by the celebrated William Sturgeon. His first report had shown him as 'good' in each subject, and his 'general conduct correct and attentive'.

For a whole year from April 1826 his letters to his family are missing and there are few other sources of information for this period of development. Colonel Vibart, the historian of Addiscombe writes, in reference to the many cadets destined to eminence who passed out of the seminary shortly afterwards, 'Three most highly distinguished . . . were frequently on the extra drill list. The list was at that time read out by the sergeant-major, and very often contained the names of Mr. Pottinger, Mr. Jacob, and Mr. Napier, who afterwards became celebrated as Eldred Pottinger of Herat, John Jacob of Jacob's Horse, and Robert Napier of Magdala.'3

It happened that Pottinger's wildness had the accidental effect of virtually determining Jacob's career. The latter mentions, shortly after being promoted to the first class, his interest in the construction of a battery in the College grounds. From a gun in this battery Pottinger, during his last term, fired a shell of his own devising. The Commandant took a serious view of this unauthorized experiment. The self-confessed culprit is commended by Sir John Kaye for his firmness, 'It well-righ cost him his commission, but nothing would induce him to give up the names of those who were implicated with him in the affair of the shell.' It is clear on the other hand that cadets merely suspected of complicity in the business—of whom Jacob was one—suffered more than Pottinger himself.

It should be explained that those standing at the head of the list after the final examination at Addiscombe qualified to enter the Artillery of the East India Company's three armies, according to the numbers required; and of these again the first in merit, after a second examination, were selected for the Engineers and went through a further short course at Chatham. Pottinger passed for the Artillery, and duly entered it; there is nothing to show that he aspired to the Engineers. But this latter branch of the service had long been John Jacob's aim and he had the best reasons for expecting to attain it. Now, as one of those merely suspected of participating in Pottinger's offence, he was treated most unjustly; Ritherden turned against him, and Woolavington received a most damning report of his alleged misbehaviour through his brother Philip, who was then walking a London hospital. The letter in which

JOHN JACOB OF JACOBABAD

John answers his father's remonstrances gives so just an indication of his strength of character at the age of fifteen that it deserves to be quoted at some length.

Addiscombe, Nov. 26th 1827.

My dear Father

which he told Philip, as he told him that I had been associating with the worst fellows in the College, which is not true; now the only foundation which I can think of for this is because I had been rather friendly with one of the Cadets in the first class, who was expelled the other day for having gunpowder in his drawer and who was therefore suspected of having fired the shell; he was one of the most gentlemanly young men here, and how was I to know anything about his having gunpowder in his drawer? I will not say anything about the unjustness of his punishment, as the Col: seems to think that it is much worse to have a little gunpowder in his drawer, than to steal.

As to my extra drills, nearly all my Officer's drills were for leaving my keys in my desk, and as for the Corporal's drills which I certainly might have avoided getting, it does not signify so much about, as they are never put down in the report. You seem to think I have had more than I have, but I have only had six down to my name yet this half year. I am very sorry I did not work harder at Drawing, this half, but the masters never care about anyone who cannot draw well, and I must have been nearly last, whatever I had done. I have not been idle in anything else, and am 4th in mathematics, which is very high considering that all who were recommended with me have done the whole of their

course before. . . .

He states his belief that the sergeants had given his name, as one likely to have been concerned in the shell affair, because he had not tipped them after passing for the Artillery. He nevertheless still hoped to be

about fifth on the Engineers list.

His brother Philip wrote home, 'I think there is at least an equal chance of his getting into the Engineers, and only said in my last letter that the worst that could happen to him was that he would be in the Artillery. . . . Capt. R. said that with the exception of drawing John had been diligent in his studies, and with regard to general conduct it seems hard to have made so much of the mere suspicion of a fact which John positively denies knowing anything about.'

WOOLAVINGTON—ADDISCOMBE

But the injustice was done: in spite of his high place in the passing out examination he was excluded from the Engineers, and after an unhappy Christmas at Woolavington was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant in the Bombay Artillery on his sixteenth birthday, 11th January 1828.⁵ However keen his own regrets, and however brilliant the work he might have done as a Sapper, India and the Army cannot but be grateful for the chance which gave them the creator of a successful frontier policy, and the protagonist of a new military system. An unjust decision made him a Gunner, and he became the most progressive Gunner of his time; it could not prevent him from achieving, within a limited field, as profitable engineering works as any of his contemporaries.

The few remaining weeks at Chatham and in London quickly passed; on the boards of Covent Garden Theatre Madame Vestris put her little corps of young lady 'Invincibles' through their drill under the critical eyes of the boy subaltern. Then came the final hurried journey to Portsmouth whence the Honourable Company's ship Captain Cook sailed on 26th April 1828; and John Jacob looked his last

on England.

CHAPTER II

Bombay and its Army in the Eighteen Thirties

THOUGH his country and his home saw him no more, John Jacob was not altogether cut off from his family. His elder brother Herbert and two of his cousins, William and George, were all three serving in the Bombay Army, and his younger brother William Stephen was soon to follow him. From these two brothers and from his cousin William, descend the majority of those Jacobs who have since distinguished themselves in every branch of the Indian Service, and have raised the name to the first rank among English families connected with the

country.

John set foot in Bombay6 three inches taller than he was when he left England six months before, with much of a cadet's rawness already worn off, for after some chaffing from the captain, that he should have command of the ship's armament in the event of an attack by pirates, he had taken a more practical opportunity of making himself useful by drilling a squad of recruits bound to join the Company's Bombay European Regiment. When they entered on their respective duties in India both parties found that the time had been well spent. Jacob writes, 'I find the benefit, as it has accustomed me to give the word better than I should otherwise have done; for if a chap is not pretty well used to giving the word he is sure to get confused when in front of the line. . . .

Bombay was far from being the 'Gateway of India' in those days: only one-sixth of the passengers sailing via the Cape landed there. Calcutta handled three times its commerce, and the waterway of the Ganges was the great artery of communication with Upper India. The Western Presidency had however recently assumed a place of increased importance in the Honourable East India Company's hierarchy. Its territories had been relatively small in extent prior to 1820, in which



THE FORT, BOMBAY Jacob's first station in India.

BOMBAY AND ITS ARMY IN THE 1830S

year the dominions of the Peshwa, defeated by Lord Hastings in his attempt to destroy the British through a revival of the old Maratha confederacy, had been annexed to it. Bombay now joined hands with Bengal by the Tapti valley and Bundelkhand, and with Madras through the Southern Maratha country and Karnatak. British dominion was paramount over the whole Indian peninsula and the north-east; only the basin of the Indus remained outside the charmed circle.

The new commitments of the Bombay Army—not merely military, for the administration and development of the vast accretions of territory could not be entirely undertaken by the slender cadre of the Civil Service—produced the same results as the long rolls of casualties sustained by the Madras and Bengal Armies in ten years of war from Nepal to Burma. A very large number of officers had to be recruited in a short time; it was made up by direct 'nominations' as well as by cadets passed through Addiscombe; and when augmentations are made in haste, blocks in promotion have to be digested at leisure. If we examine the History of Services of Jacob and Outram, substantive rank is found lagging far behind brevet rank; thus Jacob only became a regimental captain after nineteen years' service. An officer joining at this period could not expect to rise to command of his corps in less than forty years unless there was a phenomenal incidence of disease or a hard fought campaign to remove a large number of his seniors and contemporaries. This made regimental service an intolerable trial of endurance to the ambitious officer. The reorganization of the Company's armies in 1824 was designed partly to alleviate this cause of dissatisfaction. The old double battalions were separated and renumbered as independent regiments. Their union had long been little more than nominal, but with a colonel commanding the whole the battalion commanders' authority could not but be lessened. The new single battalions provided double the former number of regimental commands; on the other hand the new position lost much of its attraction. Sir John Malcolm, Governor of Bombay at the time, might still repeat that the command of a corps should be a 'more desired station than any staff appointment except the headship of a department',7 but how could it be made so without reviving out of date perquisites, when there were such powerful temptations to look outside the regular service for promotion? It was almost inevitable that only the 'refuse'—Malcolm's own word—should be left for regimental duty.

In the newly acquired territories there were roads and bridges to be built, surveys to be made, land revenue to be settled and districts to be administered. In 1830 many of the Collectors of land revenue in the Deccan were soldiers and, we are told, performed their duties very

satisfactorily. But the particular sphere in which the well-educated soldier was becoming indispensable was the political; the conduct of diplomatic relations with Indian states, and an increasing number of missions to the independent countries to the north-west. The Company offered rewards for passing examinations in Indian languages, a minute of the Governor-General in 1828 having shown how few had done so. The result was a tendency for every clever subaltern to perfect himself in Marathi or Persian, and then donning a 'black coat' to set forth to plumb the depths of Durbar intrigues, to spy out lands forgotten since the days of Alexander, or to spend long strenuous months with theodolite, staff and chain, in hills and jungles where the face of a white man had never been seen. Soon John Jacob's cousin George was one of those borne away by the tide which set strongly towards assistant Residentships at native courts.

As soon as the necessary extent of development in administrative machinery was realized, came retrenchment in expenditure. The Company was alarmed at the outlay of capital demanded for its conquests, which at first seemed out of all proportion to prospective increases in revenue: new cantonments, magazines and roads, and with them new appointments and additional allowances. Experience had long proved it impossible to keep down the scale of pay for special posts, for which the supply of suitable officers was limited; the axe therefore fell with double force on the regimental soldier, adding the

final motive for able men to escape.

Lord William Bentinck, who assumed charge as Governor-General in succession to Lord Amherst a few months before John Jacob set foot in the country, was sent out with a definite mandate for economy; but while implementing this he did not let it impede the realization of his ideas as a liberal and progressive reformer. So the officers of the Company's armies had to pay, indirectly, for the medical schools at the three Presidency towns, and much else besides. In accordance with his instructions Bentinck ordered the reduction by half of officers' batta, an allowance granted primarily for field service but also drawn in up-country stations where officers had to provide quarters for themselves. They had of course come to regard batta in the light of pay, and felt its loss as such. It is significant of the spirit of insubordination already existing in the Bengal Army that commanding officers in Calcutta took the lead in a social boycott of the Governor-General. The Bengal sepoys on the other hand, finding that only the European officers were to be mulcted, 'twirled their moustaches, strutted about with a lordly swaggering air, and gave every indication that they had formed an overweening estimate of their own importance's-which opinion

was soon confirmed by Bentinck's order, apparently inspired by Exeter Hall, abolishing flogging as a punishment for native troops, while it was retained for British soldiers of the Royal Army. An old subadar remarked that the sepoys' respect for authority was gone; and Bengal discipline deteriorated fast in the fifteen years during which they

enjoyed their privileged position.

The cut in batta applied to officers of the Bombay Army equally with those of Bengal, but was loyally accepted and endured with nothing more than individual grumbling such as we find in John Jacob's letters to his family. This was only one of many shrewd blows of the axe of retrenchment wielded in Bombay by Sir John Malcolm. The reduction of two lieutenants and one ensign in every corps slowed up by years prospects of promotion. Jacob only just escaped relegation as a supernumerary. Then the tent allowance which like batta had come to be regarded as an integral portion of an officer's pay was cut by half, and a second lieutenant of the artillery like Jacob found himself worse off, when stationed in Bombay where every reduction applied though it was the dearest station, than a newly landed infantry cadet. It was like insult added to injury when a change in the uniform of his corps was ordered and put him out of pocket to the extent of two months' pay.

The Bombay officers' discipline did not falter under these trials, though Sir John Malcolm was allowed to depart on the expiry of his term of office 'in a death-like silence'. By the irony of circumstance, he whose minutes showed an unrivalled understanding of the needs of the Indian Armies, the greatest being to make officers look to command of their regiments as the height of ambition, was forced to make these retrenchments which could only impart an added impulse to officers to escape to the multiplicity of 'staff employ'. It had become all but impossible for a subaltern serving with his corps to live on his pay. He was forced either to incur debt and relinquish all hopes of furlough without a sick certificate, or look outside regimental soldiering for

advancement.

For ordinary furloughs an officer had to pay for the double passage, which was so expensive that it was impossible for a subaltern or junior captain without private means to take advantage of the privilege. The Company paid for sea voyages on sick leave as far as the Cape of Good Hope, at which place while outward bound John met his cousin George Le Grand Jacob. But leave to England on sick certificate involved relinquishment of any staff appointment held, six months being the limit of absence allowed from these. We shall hereafter find John Jacob the advocate of a liberal system of leave

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upon which was based that enjoyed by many future generations. The Bombay Army of this period was cantoned in a large number of small stations scattered over the country from Bhuj in Cutch to Belgaum in the southern Maratha country. The artillery consisted of four troops of horse and two battalions of foot: and John Jacob belonged to the latter. These were wholly European corps, though Indian gun-lascars were attached to the foot artillery; in addition there was a battalion of Indian artillerymen, known as Golandaz, under European officers. The Bombay establishment had a European regiment of the line dating from 1668. The ranks of the native infantry, twenty-six battalions, were filled in almost equal numbers by Konkani Marathas, in the older regiments, and by Mussulmans, Rajputs and Jats from Hindustan in those raised after 1817.9 This latter element had first been recruited in large numbers for the regiments of Regular cavalry, of which there were two at this period. In addition there was the Poona Auxiliary Horse, a corps organized on a different principle, which will be described hereafter.

Though about half of the rank and file of the Bombay Army came from the Bengal Presidency, the spirit of caste exclusiveness, first tolerated and then encouraged in the Bengal Army, was ridiculed even by high caste men in Bombay: the Brahman and the Parwari or 'untouchable' shared the same tent, each feeling that he stood upon his merits as a soldier of the State.¹⁰

From among these soldiers, the dull-seeming but tenacious and devoted Maratha, and the frank and chivalrous men of Hindustan, the Native officers were drawn; not by seniority alone, as in Bengal, but by selection in which seniority was but one qualification. The large number of European officers on the strength of each regiment curtailed the scope of the Native officer's responsibility, as the newly joined ensign was in theory senior to the subadar major.* But the Indian

* It is not possible to equate exactly the ranks of Indian officers and men in the East India Company's Army, and of Viceroy-commissioned officers and other ranks in the British Indian Army prior to 1947, with ranks in the British Service. The table below may be helpful in respect of the principal ranks.

Roughly equivalent Indian Infantry British rank Indian Cavalry Subadar Majort Rissaldar Majort Major Rissaldar \ † Subadart Captain Russaidar J Jemadart Lieutenant Jemadart and Lieutenant Havildar Duffadar Sergeant Naik Corporal Naik Trooper or Sepoy Sowar Private

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officers of the Bombay Army formed a far more efficient link in the chain of command than their brethren in Bengal. Prior to 1796 there had been but eight European officers to a battalion and we shall find Jacob later advocating a system by which their number should be reduced even further. His contemporary opinion of the Indian troops generally at this time shows his esprit de corps: 'It is notorious that the Native Infantry is at least equal to the Royal Army in every respect, except the national qualities of the men and the appearance of their dress and accourrements, which latter are served out to them of an inferior quality'—and he argues his case by illustrations of slack discipline in a

British regiment then in Bombay.

Actually there was too much assimilation with European models imposed on the Indian troops in details of dress and equipment; the sepoy had to wear tight trousers, a stock, and a shako, otherwise, it was thought, he would feel himself unduly inferior to the European soldier. As to arms, the infantry were armed with 'Brown Bess', the smoothbore muzzle loading musket, and the Regular cavalry, also clothed in European uniforms, carried either lances or carbines and the curved cutting sabre which was soon to be replaced by the straight sword adopted for the cavalry of the Royal Army. The artillery consisted mainly of 6-pounder field guns and 24-pounder howitzers, smooth bore and muzzle loading, with an effective range of about 1200 yards. The guns of the foot artillery were drawn by mules or oxen. Commissariat arrangements in the field were made in time-honoured fashion, by which a large 'bazar' attached itself to the army and moved with it, giving an appearance of chaotic confusion out of which the commissaries conjured unfailing supplies.

One corps of the Bombay Army was organized on a different principle, deriving from the traditional military system of the country. It requires to be described in detail, as the turning point in John Jacob's career came when he received the command of a regiment for which this, the Poona Auxiliary Horse, provided the nucleus. The men themselves found their horses, arms, clothing and equipment, which remained their private property, placed at the disposal of the state in return for pay calculated to provide for the maintenance of horse as

well as rider.

In practice not every trooper owned the horse he rode. A proportion,

[†] Only in the 'Irregular' Regiments. In the 'Regulars', with a full complement of British officers, these ranks corresponded more nearly as to duties and responsibility with British non-commissioned ranks, viz., regimental sergeant major, sergeant major, colour sergeant.

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called bargirs, were mounted by other members of the corps or by persons connected with it, who drew the 'pay' of the horse, and were known as silladars. An assami—the horse's place in the regiment—was property marketable under certain conditions. There were several corps organized on this 'silladari system' in the Bengal Army and in the Nizam's Contingent, and they were commonly designated Irregular Horse.

They had an establishment of not more than three or four European officers, seconded by selection from any of the three Regular Arms in the Company's service, the commandant often being a mere lieutenant in regimental rank. The Indian officers though nominally only equal in rank to those of the Regular cavalry similarly designated, enjoyed in practice far superior status; the juniormost rissaldar held command of a troop, which in a Regular regiment would be under a senior European subaltern, if not a captain; and he could look forward eventually to obtaining a squadron, a major's command in the Regular

cavalry.

The internal organization, drill and horse management of Irregular corps naturally tended to be less polished and consistent than among regulars; but though rougher, they were in some important respects readier. They were independent of commissariat and military transport, for the silladars had to maintain their own baggage animals, and they found all remounts apart from the replacement of horses killed or lost on active service. The Government provided ammunition and medical stores, but nothing else beyond the regimental pay; thus an Irregular corps cost the State only half as much as a Regular cavalry regiment. The commandant exercised his discretion with regard to the arms, clothing and equipment of his corps; if he required them of uniform pattern he would usually order them himself, recovering the cost by monthly stoppages from the men's pay. A regiment of Irregular Horse was thus constituted on a contract between the Government, the commandant and the men.

Since the Maratha war and the small campaigns in Cutch and the Persian Gulf, opportunities for active service in the Bombay Army had been confined to a few punitive expeditions against rebels within the Presidency, undertaken by small field forces raised from troops stationed nearest to the seat of disorder. At this period a substantial portion of the booty taken in war was distributed to the King's and Company's troops actively employed; there was little to be gained from such affairs, and Jacob makes a rueful reference to the windfall enjoyed by the men of the Madras Army engaged in the petty war against the Raja of Coorg. Other features of the period touched upon

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in his letters are a suttee in Gujarat, which the local officers failed to prevent, and murders on the highroad in broad daylight by Thugs,

the victims being men of his own corps.

The first effective steps towards the suppression of suttee and thuggee had already been taken by Lord William Bentinck in 1829. These years in fact saw the beginnings of modern India, with Macaulay's work for European education and his codification of the criminal law, the establishment of the overland route via Suez with the aid of steam navigation, and Metcalfe's promotion of the liberty of the Press. It was in 1833, with the renewal of the East India Company's charter, that the momentous words were written: 'No native . . . shall, by reason only of his religion, place of birth, descent, colour, or any of them, be disabled from holding any place, office or employment under the Company.'

In Bombay Lord Clare, Malcolm's successor, gave effect to this by appointing a number of non-official Indians, mostly Hindu merchants, as Justices of the Peace. Jacob's comment is characteristic: 'The experiment should have been tried among the moofussil Moosulmans, who are sometimes really honest fellows, while it is a matter of doubt whether a single Hindoo be in existence who has the smallest regard for truth; the same may be said of the native merchants of all castes—

it is seldom indeed that they affect to have any.

Bentinck himself was the initiator of most of the liberal and scientific development for which his term of office is memorable; but he may be held a mere agent in the ill-conceived foreign policy which began to take shape in his time. Palmerston dinned into the ears of the Directors the danger of a Russian advance on Herat and Kandahar; the Government of India were apprehensive rather of the military power of Ranjit Singh, the Lion of the Panjab. Jacob refers once in his early letters home to a move on this chess-board, 'A new station has been opened at A tock on the Indus: with the Russians encroaching from the North and we from the South, some day we may meet.' And this possibility became the governing factor in his career.

Before we follow his fortunes further, extracts from the writings of two great men may ser : to sum up contemporary opinion on the

armies of India.

Malcolm, who had served with all three of the Company's armies and was the highest authority at the time, wrote, 'Native troops are the real strength of our Empire. There is no danger of the Native Army being corrupted unless in the improbable case of our becoming too presumptuous in what we may deem our intrinsic strength, confiding too exclusively in our European troops and undervaluing our Native

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Army. From the day of that fatal error (should we ever commit it) we

may date the downfall of our Eastern Empire.'11

Metcalfe too thought highly of the native armies' efficiency; but he felt forebodings. 'We are to all appearance more powerful in India than we ever were: nevertheless, our downfall may be short work... the cause of this precariousness is that our power does not rest on actual strength but upon impression... we have ceased to be the wonder we were to the Natives; our greatest danger is not from a Russian Army, but the fading of the impression of our invincibility from the minds of the Native inhabitants of India.'12

We shall see John Jacob put forward a penetrating analysis of that decline in prestige lamented by Metcalfe, and simultaneously claim that the regimental system he had himself evolved, by application and development of Malcolm's views, only needed to be extended throughout the armies of India to avert the dangers they foresaw. But his

authority was only recognized after the storm had burst.

CHAPTER III

Bombay-Deccan-Gujarat"

THE first ten years of John Jacob's army service passed in the routine of peace-time soldiering in the Bombay Presidency, with one brief period in civil employ. An ample record of his life during this time has survived in his correspondence with his family, but as the whole of his subsequent career was cast elsewhere it will suffice to trace the formative

influences of these early years.

If one of his brother subalterns had been asked what distinguished Jacob from his fellows, he would certainly have pointed to his excellence as a horseman, particularly in hog-hunting, and his skill as a mechanic. It was in his first station at Matunga near Bombay that he began experiments to improve the crude rifle of those days, from which he ultimately developed a weapon of incomparable power and efficiency. In the monsoon at Bombay-a liverish, quarrelsome, dissipated, suicidal season, when duels were not uncommon—Jacob kept himself fit with boxing gloves, and busy with tools and a turning lathe which he made himself. He hated the Presidency town, 'there is nothing like a gallop or hunt to be had without going six or seven miles for it': on the other hand Ahmednagar, the other headquarters of his corps, on the rolling plateau of the Deccan, was a hog-hunter's paradise. Here Jacob spent the happiest hours of his early service, in emulation of the prowess of James Outram, whom he idolized as yet from afar. An Arab charger he had been given by his cousin William now proved his worth. Under fourteen hands, but of great depth and size of body, and up to any weight (Jacob rode eleven stone), 'Bags' and his master soon made themselves supreme in the 'Nagar hunt. Among such keen hands as filled it, this pre-eminence was not to be retained with impunity, and along with the 'first spears' gained came many a fall. A broken leg, a fractured shoulder blade, are hardly set before he is in the saddle again; winning back his place at the head of

the hunt. His letters home were so full of the wild boar that his father remonstrated with him, and had to be assured that he was kept well occupied with duty, 'two parades a day with the charge of a European and a Native Company are no sinecure.' He responds playfully to the praises of his romantic sister Sophy, 'The truth is, that with a hog in Front of him he must be a very coward who would not ride over the


"ould enemy" himself if he stood in his path."

Long years afterwards we learn of some of his other exploits in the saddle, recorded solely as proofs of the excellence of the Arab horse. 'He [Bags] carried me, eleven stone, forty miles in three hours at a trot. I swam the Godave y on him at Kopargaun, in the highest of the monsoon, when the ferry boat had been carried away by the stream, which was running so strong that no other boatman could be persuaded again to attempt the passage. . . . 'He also ran an antelope to death on him, a performance which at the time was thought beyond

the powers of any horse.14

In the very midst of his triumphant course as a hunter came the news of his mother's death. He refers to it in curiously conventional terms. Though periodical meetings with two of his brothers kept alive the feeling of family unity, his sense of loss was doubtless dulled by the conviction that had already grown upon him that he would never see England again. Life in his own world was vivid and exacting, and new ties of friendship had begun to absorb his affections. His stammer made him averse from general society, but the few who penetrated beyond the ordinary camaraderie of the regiment found a warm disposition and unbounded loyalty. He gave up part of a sick-leave and marched two hundred miles to bid farewell to two friends, Woosnam and Baily, 'my more than brother', who were sailing for England: it was when the topsails of their ship dipped below the horizon that he felt himself alone in the world.

Some further light is thrown on his personality in letters to his sisters. The characteristic unorthodoxies of his maturity are foreshadowed in eloquent attacks on kings and privileged orders, if not in hi: 'mortal antipathy to the business of flogging boys to make them learn'-his brother George had just become a schoolmaster. As to reading, he did not care for novels but delighted in poetry, of which his sisters sent him not only books but their own copious anthologies in manuscript. Byron was second only to Homer in his estimation, utterly eclipsing Scott, his earlier favourite. Regarding military history, Napier's Peninsular War was 'certainly the best book of its kind in the English language.' He was destined to pillory later works by this author for their innumerable perversions of the truth.



Jacob's highest ambition at this time was to be employed with the artillery on field-service under Outram, who was more than once entrusted with punitive operations in Mahi Kantha, at the northern extremity of the territories of the Bombay Presidency. These hopes were disappointed: and the only opportunity of independent command that came his way, in conducting detachments of Golandaz to a training camp in Gujarat, afforded nothing more than useful experience in the handling of animals and men—including the practice of 'a little vene-section' on a fever-stricken junior officer. Three months at this training camp kept him very busy, but he had also the satisfaction of showing the Gujarat hog-hunters the way across their own country—'The riders in these parts are not like the Deccanees, and old Bags got me the spear with ease.' He was now gazetted first lieutenant, after seven and a half years' service, and celebrated his promotion with two months' leave in Cutch State, on a hog-hunting tour which took him and his


party as far as the border of Sind.

Jacob had often been face to face with death in the chase of the wild boar, but the narrowest of all his escapes was from drowning. The circumstances were characteristic. He had been on a visit to friends in Ahmedabad, riding the seventy-two miles from Baroda in eight hours - 'such time had never been heard of before'—and he had had to swim the flooded Mahi river en route. On his return journey he found the country flooded in all directions and at length arrived on the bank of a small river running in spate. He felt certain that it was impracticable, but remembering that he had been 'a 'Nuggur rider' spurred his pony in: the unfortunate beast was unable to support him, clad as he was in heavy hunting kit, and they went to the bottom. Jacob let the pony go, but though himself a strong swimmer could only gain the surface for a moment before going down again. 'The water was dark over me and I gave up all idea of getting out alive; I pulled off my cap, but though perfectly cool could not succeed in getting rid of anything else, all was tightly buckled on. . . . Emerging for another instant he found 'a gigantic native' swimming to his assistance, but this man had overestimated his own strength and instead dragged Jacob down again, leaving him at the bottom with some twenty-five feet of water over his head. A third time he reached the surface and fortunately another man swam out with a large earthern pot, by means of which he was able to reach the shore. Jacob's father, on receiving an account of this adventure, wrote to him in terms which may be inferred from the son's reply. 'It is not according to my genius to say much about these things, but I was very grateful for my preservation from drowning last year. My attempt was not however so foolhardy as you imagine

for I have more than once swum the Goor in the monsoon . . . and had I been on my own good horse I believe I could have crossed the Merce equally well . . . I hope that I should not hesitate to try the Merce again if it came in my way.' His father had offered him pecuniary assistance to take his furlough, but John felt that this would entail a sacrifice which he could not fairly accept, the more as he was in hopes of getting out of debt by his own efforts. He had allowed his younger brother William of the Bombay Engineers to recommend him for employment on the Survey, and in July 1838 received notice of his appointment as 'Superintendent of Experiments in Boring for water in Guzerat'. The post was well paid and he could hope in a few years to have saved enough to pay for his furlough. In fact he held the appointment only for a few months, but this was long enough for him to make his mark: in addition to his main duties the services of Lieutenant Jacob were reported to be 'in the highest degree useful, in improving and repairing tanks, and in various other useful works.'15

The break came with the sudden fulfilment of his hopes of active service; not in petty operations within the Presidency but on a distant campaign from which a new life began for him. At twenty-six he stood on the threshold of his fame, a slim, wiry figure, five feet ten inches in height, as strong in character as in constitution, with first-class brains and nerves of steel. Only opportunity was needed to prove that he was not only a scientific and practical officer, as Gunner and engineer, but a born leader of men. And the ten quiet years of seed-

time brought twice that number for the harvest.



CHAPTER IV

The Afghan War and Sind16

To appreciate that policy which by sending an army into Central Asia determined the fate of Sind and the career of John Jacob it is necessary to go back to the year of his arrival in India. The year 1828 marks the beginning of Russophobia, when a Bombay newspaper warned its readers that the neighing of the Cossack would soon be heard at their doors. England had done too little, and that too late, to protect Persia from Russian aggression under her treaty of 1812; the victor's influence became paramount at Teheran and the Shah was encouraged to look eastward for compensation for his losses in the north. Afghanistan presented a favourable field for intrigue and aggression. Up till 1809 the country had been united under the Sadozai dynasty. In that year the chiefs of the Barakzais, Dost Mahomed and his brothers, had expelled Shah Shuja and usurped the government of Kabul and Kandahar; but a minor Sadozai prince still ruled in Herat in the west. He went in fear of aggression from the Barakzais; and the Shah of Persia was prepared to assert his own claims to Herat as part of the heritage of the great Nadir Shah.

The Baluch Mirs of Sind, of the Talpur tribe, had originally been tributaries of the Sadozais, but since 1809 had been treated by the British government as independent sovereigns. They had divided the country which they won from the Kalhoras in 1783 into three portions; different branches of the clan ruling Upper, Lower and South-Eastern Sind from their capitals at Khairpur, Hyderabad and Mirpur respectively. The Mirpur principality was unimportant and that of Khairpur poor in comparison with the dominions of Hyderabad. But the whole country and its capabilities were very little known, the Mirs' dearest wish being to preserve their isolation. They ruled their country in patriarchal fashion through their Baluch feudatories and with a sur-

prising degree of amity among themselves.

At the time that misgivings arose in London and Calcutta at the advance of Russia and the proceedings of her catspaw Persia, Sind was attracting attention for commercial purposes. Lord William Bentinck was full of enthusiasm for the development of steam navigation, and what nobler channel for trade could be imagined than the unknown but classic Indus?

In 1831 a pretext was found for exploring the river; next year the Mirs were persuaded to open the Indus to commerce. It was stipulated in this treaty that no military stores or armed vessels were to be admitted. A further agreement fixed a tariff of tolls, and it was followed by a naval survey of the coast in 1836. It also became necessary for the British government at this time to take vigorous diplomatic action to protect the Mirs from aggression by Maharaja Ranjit Singh the ruler of the Panjab, who had all orbed one by one most of the outlying provinces of the old Durani Afghan Empire, and coveted Shikarpur in Upper Sind, which the Talpurs had similarly appropriated for themselves

In this same year 1836 Palmerston warned Lord Auckland of the danger of Russian intrigues in Persia, urging him to raise 'a timely barrier against the encroachments of Russian influence'. It had to be decided whether support should be given to the Barakzai chieftains, Dost Mahomed and his brothers, the de facto rulers of Afghanistan; or to Shah Shuja, the de jure sovereign of the Sadozai dynasty, since 1809 an exile in India. Lord William Bentinck had looked with sympathy on an attempt by Shah Shuja to regain his throne in 1833-4; but this expedition had ended in utter failure. While Dost Mahomed was occupied at Kandahar in repelling it, Ranjit Singh had seized the Afghan city of Peshawar. Dost Mahomed's protests were disregarded by Bentinck, who could not risk a breach with his powerful Sikh ally. Dost Mahomed thereupon made overtures to Persia and this caused Palmerston to spur Auckland to action. Alexander Burnes was sent to Kabul, but as he could not hold out any hope of getting Peshawar restored to Dost Mahomed his mission failed. A Russian envoy made his appearance at Kabul and the Persians, under Russian persuasion, had already advanced to besiege Herat. Auckland came to the conclusion that the best means of carrying out Palmerston's instructions was to restore Shah Shuja to the throne of Kabul. This being in accordance with the conclusions simultaneously reached in England, a Tripartite Treaty between the Government of India, Ranjit Singh and Shah Shuja was arranged. Ranjit Singh did not wish the expedition to pass through his territory en route for the Khyber pass, so the alternative line via Upper Sind and the Bolan, taken by Shah Shuja in 1833-4, was

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adopted. This also had the apparent advantage of affording the British Government an excuse for establishing their influence more firmly over Sind. Shah Shuja's ancient suzerainty over the Mirs was to be revived, only to be extinguished in return for a heavy cash payment which would help to finance the expedition.

Burnes and Henry Pottinger were sent to Khairpur and Hyderabad, the capitals respectively of Upper and Lower Sind, to persuade their Talpur rulers to submit. The Mirs were informed that the article of the treaty of 1832, forbidding the passage of troops or military stores through their country, was to be suspended in view of the threatening danger in the north-west. Letters from the Hyderabad Court apparently soliciting the countenance of the Shah of Persia in their difficulties were construed as treachery; and Pottinger received discretion to threaten the Mirs with deposition if they did not acquiesce in all the demands made on them. When the Mirs produced documents signed by Shah Shuja formally releasing them from all tribute and renouncing all claims of suzerainty over them, they were told these engagements could not be held valid in the existing circumstances.

By this time it had been decided to give Shah Shuja the support of a British Army on his expedition, one division of which was to be drawn from Bombay and to proceed up the Indus. Lord Auckland published a manifesto on 1st October 1838, explaining his objects and justifying their necessity, the strongest ground being the Persian aggression in besieging Herat. Almost immediately afterwards news reached him that the Persian army had raised the siege and retired from Afghanistan. This was due to the obstinate defence of Herat organized by Eldred Pottinger, backed by Palmerston's diplomatic pressure through his envoy, McNeill, at Teheran, and a small naval demonstration in the Persian Gulf. Auckland could now have extricated himself from his awkward position; but he decided to proceed, 'with a view to the substitution of a friendly for a hostile power in the Eastern Province of Afghanistan, and to the establishment of a permanent barrier against schemes of aggression against our North West Frontier.

The Mirs were told that a British subsidiary force was to be posted in Sind for the duration of the war, and to be paid by them; by this time the Bengal and Bombay divisions of the expeditionary force were close enough to apply persuasion in a tangible shape. Lieutenant Eastwick presented a new treaty, embodying all the British demands in twenty-three articles; the Mirs protested and at length treated the envoy with contumely. Arguments other than words were employed to still their 'obstinate questionings': the Bombay Division drew yet

nearer to Hyderabad; a strong column from the Bengal Division moved south from Rohri: the Mirs assembled their Baluchis: Mir Sher Mahomed of Mirpur brought his coffin and shroud to Hyderabad, to show his determination to fight to the last: but the courage of the others failed. Mir Rustam Khan of Khairpur had already made his peace with Burnes, and the Hyderabad chiefs submitted. On the very day that they signed the treaty, 1st February 1839, a reserve force, ordered up by Pottinger, took possession of the sea port of Karachi, one of the key points to be occupied under the new treaty. Troops were stationed also at Jherrak and Tatta; cantonments were soon in process of being built; and the main body of the troops marched up the country en route for Afghanistan.

CHAPTER V

Sukkur-Upper Sind

THE Gujarat detachment of foot artillery with which John Jacob was serving reached the base camp of the Army of the Indus near the mouth of the river on 3rd December 1838. First impressions of Sind were depressing—not a tree to be seen above the dead level horizon fringed with tamarisk jungle, and the air full of dust from the salt flats along the creeks. Cholera and suicide brought the first casualties; the impending toll of fever and sunstroke was scarcely imaginable in a climate which seemed to differ from India mainly in its intense cold. But each march up the country brought fresh matters of interest: speculations as to Alexander's route—though the appearance of the 'classic' Indus was a disappointment; the abundance of small game; the suspicious dearness of all provisions; and above all, rumours and hopes that hostilities would break out, when the vanity of the rabble Baluch horsemen and the insolence of their rulers' emissaries would be easily chastised, and mulcted with abundant prize money from the fort of Hyderabad. 17

In all but commissariat the army was well-found. Young Holdsworth of the Queen's wrote to his father of the 'splendid band of auxiliary Horse from Cutch, the finest looking fellows I ever saw. . . . They are dressed in green garments edged with gold, and red turbans tied under the chin like the old Mahratta soldiers; their arms are match-lock, lance, scimitar and pistols, and they appear to be excellent and practical riders. They are quite an independent corps, each man finding his own horse, arms, accoutrements etc., and they take good care to be excellently mounted. They have a few European officers attached to them from the Bombay establishment.' Such was the first appearance in Sind of the nucleus of the corps which, as the Scinde Irregular Horse, was destined under John Jacob to become the most efficient cavalry of

the three armies of India.

The Bombay Division reached Larkana in good order, and here Brigadier Gordon's infantry brigade, including the detachment of artillery to which Jacob belonged, were detailed for the garrison of Sukkur on the Indus, the advanced base of the expedition. The remainder marched across the desert from Shahdadkot to join the main line of advance through the Bolan pass. So John Jacob perforce parted company from Outram, with whom at long last he had become acquainted; and was left to curse his fate at being relegated to the line of communication.

Nearly in midstream opposite Sukkur rose the fortified island of Bukkur, the citadel of Mir Rustam Khan, which though contemptible in intrinsic strength commanded the passage of the river. The Political Officer, Alexander Burnes, had persuaded the old chief to surrender it 'for the duration of the war'. Here the river was spanned by a bridge of boats, over which the Bengal Division had passed from the left bank to the right. The fort was to be used as a depot for ordnance stores, and John Jacob was given the duty of organizing it, on 22nd March. A few days afterwards a sudden rise in the river swept away the bridge of boats, and the communications with the Bengal Presidency were cut off.

Having continually to move stores to and fro, Jacob asked the military engineer, a lieutenant of the Bengal service, to construct a flying bridge. After a month nothing had been done, and Jacob to his great surprise found that both the engineer and the officers of the Indian Navy had reported it to be impossible. Jacob writes, 'I went to the Brigadier and told him that I wanted no assistance whatever, and that I was willing to make the bridge with such materials as I could myself procure. I had only 20 store lascars but they worked like devils and . . . on the third day I had the end of a seven inch cable fast to each shore; I was then told that thousands of men employed for months would not stretch it, but neither asking nor accepting any assistance or advice that same evening I had the rope as taut as a bar. The bridge now . . . fully answers the purpose of an enormously expensive bridge of boats; the work would have been nothing if the men of science had not said it was impossible.' Jacob was officially commended for his energy in making the bridge and forming the ordnance depot while exposed to the intense heat of the season; 20 the climate of Upper Sind was now found to be severe beyond all Indian experience. The whole affair-an Artillery officer, exceptionally gifted, doing an Engineer's work-was typical of the campaign which had begun with the General's aide-de-camp, James Outram, scouring the country for camels which the commissaries had failed to provide. The insufficiency



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of the staff at Sukkur was the subject of general complaint, and zealous as John Jacob proved himself he was disgusted with the expedition, which seemed to hold out no promise of fighting to those left below

the passes, and wished he were back in Gujarat.

In spite of the virtual absence of resistance to its advance, the army was barely able to overcome the inertia of its own defective organization. The resources of Kachhi had been greatly over-estimated and the local chiefs were alienated by the heavy demands on their grain stores. Moreover the elementary fact that the spring harvest above the passes came two months later than in the plains seems to have been overlooked entirely. The army, after a toilful progress up the Bolan, living from hand to mouth, discovered at the eleventh hour that it would have to be fed from Sind, two hundred miles in the rear: and the Political Agent there was called upon to make good the failure of the commissaries. At Sukkur meanwhile the sudden rise in the Indus which had carried away the bridge of boats had destroyed vast quantities of grain which had been thrown carelessly on the foreshore. Lieutenant W. J. Eastwick was holding charge of the Upper Sind Agency at the time and exerted himself in procuring grain and camels, and in winning over some of the haughty and mistrustful chiefs whose tribesmen had begun to harass the lines of communication. There were murders and robberies every day, and only a few hundred infantry to provide escorts in a land in which every bold spirit was a horseman.21

We may here take an extended view of the country which was to

be the scene of John Jacob's future labours.

At the point where the Panjab meets Sind, the western mountain barrier recedes from the Indus valley, curving round to enclose the Kelat province of Kachhi, a plain some six thousand square miles in extent, and separated from Upper Sind by a desert twenty or thirty miles across. The southern edge of this desert was generally recognized as the boundary between the territories of the Khan of Kelat to the north and of the Mirs of Hyderabad and Khairpur to the south. Sind in fact extended as far as the waters of the Indus would reach in their annual inundation.

The physical aspect of this flat country is tame and depressing even now, when Upper Sind is intensively cultivated and vast tracts of the desert have been reclaimed by irrigation. Kachhi still remains, and may always remain, much as it was in 1839, a burnt-up dusty plain of reddish brown earth, diversified by sandhills and low scrub jungle here and there, and intersected by the beds of occasional torrents from the hills that hem it in on three sides. The fertility of the soil is discounted by want of water, the crops depending on precarious rainfall.

To the officers of the Army of the Indus, accustomed to the fertility of Gujarat, or the North-West Provinces, Kachhi was little better than a desert. Yet it was a favoured land compared with the desert proper which separates it from Sind. No more forbidding region exists than those two thousand square miles of emptiness; a dead brown level of indurated soil, not only devoid of animal life or vegetation in any form, but unrelieved by the slightest irregularity in the ground. Here, as nowhere else but on a calm sea, the curvature of the earth is plain to the eye; here the travellers' tales are everyday realities—the dust storm which turns day into fearful night; the mirage in which a few bones assume the semblance of a walled city, and salt crystals a blue lake; the simoom beneath whose poisonous blast the springs of life are dried up and man or horse fall black and shrivelled in their tracks. From March to October the whole tract-Kachhi, the desert and Upper Sindswelters under heat indescribable; the unrelenting sun has drained the country of colour, half-tones only remain; the dull grey-green of the tamarisk, the grey-brown of the inhospitable hills and the dun of the parched earth. On each side of the border Baluchis preponderate in the population. In the towns, if a few large and squalid villages may be so called, the Hindu banias* congregate under the contemptuous protection of the dominant race.

Most of the land was parcelled out among the Baluch tribes and cultivated by Jat or Sindhi peasantry. The chiefs in Upper Sind owed allegiance to the Mirs of Khairpur and Hyderabad, but the control of their overlords was very ineffective. In Kachhi each of the Baluch clans occupied a defined district, held on feudal tenure from the Khan of Kelat. Broadly speaking, those of western Kachhi, and the Khosa tribe in Upper Sind, behaved well from the first entrance of the British into these regions; the remainder were passively or actively hostile.

A Baluch can generally be controlled if a personal ascendancy is gained over his chief, who exercises patriarchal authority; but in 1839 conditions were exceptional. For many years the Khan's hold on the tribes of Kachhi had been feeble and a kinsman of the Dombki chief, Bijar Khan by name, had thrown off his tribal allegiance and set up as an independent robber baron. He was now leader of a section of his own tribe, and of an allied tribe, the Jakhranis, and was established at Phulaji and Chattar in eastern Kachhi, from which he had driven out the legitimate owners, the Jat tribe of Khyheris. The Syeds of Shahpur, farther to the south, and within striking distance of the Talpurs' frontier beyond the desert, were also under Bijar Khan's influence.

From this favourable position the two predatory tribes carried fire and

^{*} The shopkeeper class: also often moneylenders.

sword to the west and south. The Talpurs had never obtained effective control of the Shikarpur territories in which they had supplanted Afghan rule, and did little more than hire Baluchis of one tribe to guard their borders against Baluchis of another—a futile expedient, as the British were to find later. They also attempted to buy off Bijar Khan by the grant of a jagir near Khangarh and a dress of honour. But he was not to be cajoled, and the depredations of his men completely upset the traditional system of insurance for consignments of goods sent through Kachhi to and from Central Asia, by which each of the tribes en route received payment for safe condict through their territory. This transit trade was at a standstill when the inadequately guarded British convoys came to offer an even richer harvest for the marauders.

Their attacks led the British authorities in Upper Sind to suppose that the whole country was in arms against them, which was by no means the fact. There was however some excuse for the misapprehension. Even when the truth was at length discovered it seemed incredible that bands so few in number could be so ubiquitous and come such distances over the pathless desert. The Dombki and Jakhrani raiders were tribes of horsemen who thought nothing of covering sixty miles without a halt, to arrive at daybreak at the rendezvous, when they would give their horses a rest and then drive off camels from a grazing ground, cut up postal sowars, or surprise small convoys of stores and treasure. Their retreat, through the intense heat of the day, soon distanced all pursuit. The Baluch is indeed well fitted by constitution and physique to perform such feats of endurance. No race in the world can endure without water for such long hours under a burning sun. It was as allies not enemies that they taught the British these lessons; more than one Baluch guide was accused of treachery because he led troops on and on when there were water holes within reach at easier stages. 'I and my horse were quite fresh,' was the answer of such men. 'How was I to know that your men would be done up so soon?' From the first it was clear that no ordinary soldiers could match the Baluch in hardiness, though constant frustration tended to produce among the troops an equal ferocity.22

The most daring of the leaders of the Dombki and Jakhrani marauders, who probably never mustered much above a thousand men all told, were Darya Khan, Turk Ali and Jani, all of the Jakhrani tribe. Their operations were directed by Bijar Khan, and the political authorities sought to solve their problems by taking the chief himself into British pay and making him answerable for the safety of their convoys. The offer of a free pardon for past offences and three thousand

rupees per mensem for the future was made through the chief of the Khosa tribe who was already earning a small stipend for protecting the route through his territory; Bijar Khan rejected the overture with scorn.

A convoy of 2600 camels which crossed the desert in the middle of April was harassed incessantly by the raiders, and the escort lost more than fifty horses in fruitless attempts to close with the elusive enemy. In retaliation a detachment of troops was sent to attack a small fort on the edge of the desert in which some of the loot was reported to have been deposited. Unfortunately the place was in fact occupied by cultivators of the friendly Khosa tribe, nearly a hundred of whom were killed and wounded before the mistake was realized; the affair procured for the British a reputation for indiscrimination which only increased their difficulties. Khangarh, the name of this little fort, was later to become much better known as Jacobabad.²³

Shortly after this incident W. J. Eastwick gave up his charge as Political Agent in Upper Sind to the substantive incumbent Ross Bell, the man whose proceedings during the next two years gave a foretaste of the hectoring which found a tragic consummation on the field of Miani. His policy was to allow no discretion to the military authorities, who were to be mere instruments of his will. Having decided that Bijar Khan must be attacked in Phulaji, he ordered this operation to be combined with another, the escort of a final great caravan of supplies across the desert to the main army, now almost starving in Quetta.

The commander of the April convoy, reporting the sufferings of himself and his men from heat and want of water, had declared that it would be madness to attempt to send another.²⁴ It was now the end of May, but the attempt had to be made. An officer of the escort wrote afterwards, 'Nothing but the most dire necessity could have justified an immense kafila such as ours was, consisting of 4500 camels, 400 cavalry, 600 infantry, and numerous camp followers, being sent when it was doubtful even if water was to be obtained at some of the stages.' The water was in fact so bad and the heat so great—115° to 124° in the tents—at Barshori, the first halting place beyond the desert, that cholera broke out and within two or three more marches three British officers, three other Europeans and about 120 Indian soldiers had died.²⁵

The escorting force was thus utterly incapacitated for operations against Phulaji; and a similar disaster overtook another detachment which was to have co-operated. Of this John Jacob can speak.

Being now the sole Gunner officer in Upper Sind he was ordered to form a company of artillery out of the heterogeneous remnant of British soldiers left behind in Sukkur from the main army. These men

were of course the worst possible material for a serious enterprise; as Jacob said, they comprised those who could not march, who were troublesome, disorderly, discontented, or feeble. He chose twenty of the least useless and Lieutenant Corry, a Queen's officer, got together twenty infantry men. The battery was sent forward by water to Shikarpur, the low lying tract between that place and Sukkur being flooded by the seasonal inundation of the Indus. Heavy stores and artillery therefore were sent up the river in boats to the head of the Sind canal, and down that irrigation artery to within a few miles of Shikarpur. As to the route by land, it was easy enough even in the fair season to lose one's way among the many tracks wandering through the dense jungle; but now, with every canal flowing and unbridged, and extensive areas flooded to a depth of several feet, the twenty-three miles in direct line might be protracted to double that distance, and marches begun at nightfall, as is the rule in the hot season, might not reach the halting place till midday. Such was Jacob's

experience, and it proved fatal to his detachment.

He marched on the night of 3rd June. Corry with the infantry detachment lost his way, was exposed to the sun most of the next day, and died on the following morning. Seven of his men had been struck down as they toiled through the jungle; four others, sent back to Sukkur in camel litters, died on the way or in hospital. The appalled survivors murmured that to proceed was certain destruction, but Jacob managed to bring them into Shikarpur in two more marches, with the loss of four more men. The brigade major at Shikarpur at first assumed that the officer in command was at fault, but Jacob's report put the affair in its proper light. On the first march his commissariat had strayed and thereafter he had found it impossible to cover more than eight miles through the flooded ground between eight o'clock in the evening and sunrise. In the furnace of the afternoon the men naturally tried to cool themselves by bathing as 'the effect of the close heat in the tents although sheltered by trees seems to be equally fatal with the direct influence of the sun. Neither bleeding nor anything else seems to have any effect on the fever.' Jacob's report ends, 'I have not closed my eyes or slept a moment since we left Sucker, my attention has been occupied all day in endeavouring to prevent the deadly effects of the heat and in keeping the men from leaving the tents; and we have been marching all night." As for himself, he was proceeding that same evening to disembark his battery with a fresh working party of Indian soldiers. His conduct and devotion to duty was warmly commended by the Brigadier.26

The expedition against Phulaji was perforce abandoned; to employ Regular troops in the field between the months of April and October

was now understood to be courting disaster. Thus a detachment posted at Rojhan where the route to the Bolan entered the desert had hardly any men fit for duty, owing to cholera and the intense heat; most of the workmen engaged to build huts for the troops absconded and the

remainder had to be employed in burying the dead.

Regular troops were therefore withdrawn from the outposts and the arduous duty of keeping open the lines of communication over some ninety miles between Shikarpur and Bagh in northern Kachhi was entrusted to the Baluch Levy, a body of irregular horsemen which Eastwick had begun to raise before he handed over charge to Ross Bell. The name of this corps was a misnomer, for there was not a single Baluch among them. It was composed mainly of local Pathans and about two hundred of the Khyheri tribe, who looked to the British to restore them to their ancestral lands usurped by the Dombkis and Jakhranis. There was some good material in the Levy but its commander, Lieutenant Amiel, lacked the gift of imposing discipline and system among them. On the whole, however, the Levy did useful service in keeping up a show of opposition to Bijar Khan's men during the season when the Regulars could not move, and in obtaining for the political officers some knowledge of the border country and the character of the Baluch tribes.27

Jacob meanwhile returned to his work in charge of the depot at Sukkur. Ross Bell and the Brigadier were now violently at odds; the Political Agent was also laying up trouble for the future by unscrupulously fomenting dissensions among the Talpur princes of Upper Sind. The management of the Baluch clans he deputed to one of his assistants, Lieutenant Postans, who with the co-operation of Amiel succeeded in laying by the heels some of the most notorious characters of the Burdi tribe, whose country lay north-east of Shikarpur. Postans was ordered to inform Bijar Khan, through Amiel and the Syeds of Shahpur, that he was at liberty to surrender unconditionally. It was perhaps hoped that the chief's confidence would be shaken by events above the passes, which now began to produce an effect on affairs in Upper Sind. In August came news of the fall of Ghazni, which the Afghans and Baluchis had been taught to believe impregnable; this was followed by Dost Mahomed's flight and finally Shah Shuja's triumphant entry into Kabul.

It was now decided that the Khan of Kelat should be punished for the losses his subjects had inflicted on the army during its advance, his direct responsibility being assumed from certain intercepted letters bearing his seal. His most valuable provinces, Kachhi, Quetta and Shal—through which the army's line of communication passed—were

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decreed to be annexed to the 'Durani Empire' lately inaugurated with Shah Shuja's installation, by British bayonets, on the throne of his ancestors. The coercion of Bijar Khan had only been postponed till the cold season, and a stroke of the pen in Simla had now made him a subject of the British protégé. The hot weather was at last almost over. The thrill of those October mornings and evenings in Upper Sind when 'the breath of winter comes from far away' was never more gladsome than in 1839, for men denied the laurels of Ghazni and the invigorating air of Afghanistan, who had lingered out a miserable existence in tents and sheds in the worst climate in the world, harassed not only by elusive enemies, but by impossible demands from the advance, while Brigadier and Political Agent wrangled over their bodies—to these the prospect of an expedition gave an additional relish to the changing season.

CHAPTER VI

The First Indian Frontier Hill Campaign

OVERLOOKING the abodes of Bijar Khan and his freebooters, in Eastern Kachhi, stands a rugged mountain mass, a huge bastion to the gateway of the Bolan. This forbidding region is divided between the most warlike of all the Baluch tribes, the Marris to the north and the Bugtis to the south; their respective headquarters, Kahan and Dera, being situated in two upland valleys separated by a broad range. The only access to the interior of this country from the west is through the intricate defiles by which these valleys drain down to the plain; from the south the Bugti country can be penetrated by the pass of Duz Khushtak, but on this side it is protected by miles of sandy wilderness

and several formidable ranges must be passed.

The characteristics of India's great western barrier are here found in all their grimness; sharp foothills rising from a wilderness of drift sand: long stony plateaux intersected by water courses full of boulders and shingle: ranges thrusting up almost perpendicularly and deeply cleft by avulsion or the passage of torrents: naked saddlebacks scored by innumerable ravines. In this harsh land there is little vegetation, yet the sparse grazing supports large numbers of sheep, goats and cattle; cultivation is confined to patches of alluvium in the valleys, some of them watered by small perennial streams. The Bugtis were accustomed to sell the produce of their flocks and herds in Sind, purchasing cloth, grain and other necessaries in return; but their livelihood depended largely, and the Marris' almost wholly, on loot.

The two tribes were nominally vassals of the Khan of Kelat, but since the death of the celebrated Mir Nasir Khan, in 1794, they had enjoyed a stormy independence and had earned in the surrounding countries the reputation of being invincible on their own ground. For an invader their country was one in which large armies would starve

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and small armies would be beaten. The Marris in particular were renowned as swordsmen. In 1839 their chief was a shrewd old man, Doda Khan by name, who had done much to raise the tribe's prestige,

extending its territories at the expense of the Pathans.²⁸

The Bugtis, if less notorious than their northern neighbours, were equally formidable and their chief Bibarak was famed for his victories over successive invaders of his country. Thus the Mazari Baluchis of the Indus valley to the eastward, and later their overlords the Sikhs, the Khan of Kelat himself, and Mir Sohrab Khan Talpur of Khairpur in Upper Sind, were all defeated in attempts to punish the Bugtis for plundering in the plains.²⁹ The raids which provoked these abortive reprisals were mainly carried out by the Kalpar section of the tribe, who live in comparative isolation in the foothills abutting on Upper

Sind: they alone of the Bugtis were horsemen.

It is noteworthy that some of Bijar Khan's Dombkis and Jakhranis led by the celebrated Turk Ali took part both in the Khan's and the Mir's unsuccessful expeditions. Normally much of the plunder gained by the Jakhranis and Dombkis was passed through the Bugti hills to be disposed of among the Hindu merchants of Harrand and Dajil, and Bibarak received a share in transit. In return he tolerated the occasional presence of the two predatory tribes in the outskirts of his country when they were hard pressed; but he could entertain no very friendly feeling towards a set of robbers who had thrown off the control of their hereditary chief and twice sold their swords to join in attacks upon him. When he refused, in September 1839, to give Bijar Khan shelter in his territory, the British authorities supposed that he did so in fear of their wrath; but it was almost certainly owing to his own dislike of the marauders.

Amiel and Postans, though unaware of the minutiæ of these relationships, were on firm ground in reporting that the Bugtis disposed of the plunder garnered by the Dombkis and Jakhranis. Ross Bell's plan was to send a force of Regular troops to punish the latter and capture or kill their leaders; and at the same time to summon Doda Khan Marri and Bibarak Bugti into his presence, to obtain their submission to Shah Shuja, the restoration of as much plunder as could be recovered, and finally security for their future conduct. Amiel was sent with his Baluch Levy to clear the way, establish magazines, and proclaim in the villages occupied by the Jakhranis and Bijar Khan's section of the Dombkis that they were restored to the possession of the ci-devant owners, the Khyheri tribe.

The backbone of the force was meanwhile organized at Sukkur. It consisted of a wing of the 1st Bombay Grenadiers, about 450 strong,

commanded by Captain Raitt; the Light Company of the 5th Bombay Native Infantry, mustering eighty bayonets, under Captain Lewis Brown; and a bullock battery of two 24-pounder howitzers and a 6pounder gun. This battery was formed by John Jacob from men of the 5th Regiment on a nucleus of a few Golandaz sepoys and gun lascars. He also organized a company of pioneers about fifty strong from tent and store lascars, and speedily brought the improvised unit to a high state of efficiency. The whole force was under the command of Major Billamore of the Bombay Grenadiers. There were no European troops

among them.31

Supplies for the expedition were still not complete when Billamore crossed the desert at the beginning of November. The marauders were keeping up their usual raids westward over the desert, easily evading the attempts of Amiel and his Levy to intercept them, and embarrassing Ross Bell who was now in Kachhi with a strong escort engaged in making arrangements for the political settlement of Shah Shuja's new province. The Bugti and Marri chiefs were now called upon, to their great astonishment, to pay the 'usual share' of one-third of their produce to the King of Kabul, and to acknowledge his sovereignty. The two tribes had never paid the Khan tax or tribute, and could seldom be induced to admit the most vague and nominal suzerainty of Kelat.

Billamore with his force now quartered in Chattar and Phulaji employed the period of waiting for further orders in reconnoitring the ground in which he might have to operate, and sent Jacob and Brown into the skirts of the hill country day after day to ascertain whether it was practicable for artillery. He had the lowest opinion of Amiel's Levy, and applied to Ross Bell for the services of some disciplined

cavalry.32

While the collection of supplies continued, the Bugti chief attempted to stave off the occupation of his headquarters by sending one of his sons to Amiel, offering to acknowledge himself the subject of the British Government and to co-operate in evicting the Jakhranis from his territory. Shortly afterwards information was brought into Phulaji that the marauders had entered the plains close at hand for another raid. Billamore and Amiel both set forth to intercept them. Amiel, who was not under Billamore's command, galloped ahead with his Levy and on emerging from some jungle suddenly found himself in the presence of Bijar Khan at the head of some five hundred men, horse and foot. His Khyheris leading the tumultuous advance turned and fled; Bijar Khan's horseman charged, and though Amiel kept some of his better men together he had to retreat at a most undignified speed;

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and before the Levy reached the shelter of the jungle more than twenty of them had been killed, without inflicting the slightest harm upon the enemy. The chief was too good a tactician to continue the pursuit into the jungle, and Billamore on clearing it had no more than a distant view of the enemy as they filed over the first low hills. He told Amiel to keep his cowardly rascals in the fort at Phulaji and reiterated his application for some reliable cavalry. The need was urgent, for Bijar Khan promptly resumed his threats to the main line of communications through Kachhi.³³

However, the period of the plunderers' success was nearing its end. Two troops of the lately formed Scinde Irregular Horse had been ordered up from Lower Sind, and on arrival were placed at Billamore's

disposal, Amiel being relegated with his Levy to Shahpur.

It was the Scinde Horse that had so greatly impressed Lieutenant Holdsworth when he saw them on arrival at the mouth of the Indus in the previous year. The detachment was under the command of Lieutenant Walpole Clarke of the Bombay Grenadiers, and had hardly arrived at Chattar when information came in that a strong body of Bijar Khan's horsemen had left the hills in the evening to plunder. Fortunately a guide was forthcoming who had been robbed in an earlier raid. Clarke set forth at midnight with some ninety men. Just before dawn he came upon the Dombkis, in number about three hundred, dismounted in a cornfield to share out their loot. They had only just time to spring on their mares when Clarke charged, routing and pursuing them up the dry bed of the Tegaf. Fifty of the tribesmen were killed, eleven taken prisoner and almost all the plunder recovered; Clarke had not lost a man, and this exploit thus more than counterbalanced Bijar Khan's success against the ill-disciplined Baluch Levy. The chief however transferred his operations to Amiel's neighbourhood, and the Levy lost some more men at the hands of one of the notorious Jakhrani leaders, Jani.

Billamore decided to take up the hunt in person and marched on Uch, the place where the tribesmen were reported to have assembled, with thirty infantry and sixty of the Scinde Horse; Jacob was attached

to the cavalry for the occasion.


Uch is a narrow valley in the foothills of the Kalpar country, with several perennial springs which make it green and moist, in agreeable contrast to the sandy and rocky wilderness all around. The Baluch vedettes were in time to give the alarm as the force approached and their horsemen, in number about one hundred, were able to make good their retreat before Billamore could reach their camp. He did his best to overtake them, but soon lost contact. There remained an equal

number of Baluch warriors on foot who, by the time the British had galloped back had climbed one of the hills, and securing their women and children in some caves, opened a smart fire with their matchlocks. Billamore with the other officers and a party of Clarke's horsemen dismounted and then attacked the position out of hand. The Baluchis fought desperately, for they were still ignorant of the British usages in warfare, and probably expected no quarter: it was not till their women had been captured and some twenty of their men killed, with others

wounded, that the remainder surrendered.

Billamore on learning from the prisoners that the daring Jani and Rahmat Jakhranis were the leaders of their horsemen decided to dispense with his infantry and sent them back to Shahpur in charge of the captured men and cattle. The next day brought disappointment. Billamore led his handful of cavalry for miles over the waste of rock and sand searching in vain for some trace of the enemy. At length they returned to Uch. Here the party were watering their horses when suddenly from an opening in the hills on the farther side of the valley a hundred Baluch horsemen appeared and drew up in line as if to charge. In an instant the detachment were in the saddle, formed, and riding towards the enemy. The Baluchis drew their swords and advanced with a shout of defiance. The British increased their speed and it seemed as if a classic cavalry action, almost a joust of the days of chivalry, was to take place on the level green sward; but suddenly their line wavered and came to a standstill as every horse pecked and floundered over hocks, to the girth, men falling this way and that, all in confusion, in the quicksand into which the Baluchis had drawn them. Jacob himself, on his famous hunter from the Deccan, struggled on; at last he emerged upon firmer ground and rode alone at the enemy; but Jani carelessly or generously let pass the opportunity of killing or capturing a British officer, wheeled his men round, and with a laugh of derision left the scene as rapidly as he had appeared. Billamore's horses were unequal to another pursuit and he returned to Shahpur.34

Ross Bell now ordered that as the time allowed to the Marri and Bugti chiefs for making submission to him in person had expired, Billamore was to reduce them and their tribes by force of arms. If they surrendered they were to be sent to the Political Agent's camp under escort, but not nominally as prisoners. Bijar Khan and the Jakhrani chiefs, on the other hand, would only be allowed to surrender unconditionally. Now came the news of the storming of Kelat and the death of the Khan. The British indeed seemed to be irresistible. On 19th December Bibarak Bugti made his appearance in Postans's camp at Chattar. He denied all knowledge of the whereabouts of Bijar Khan



Scanned by CamScanner

and his men, but offered vaguely to help in securing them; he admitted in some bewilderment the sovereignty of Shah Shuja; and with great reluctance consented to the march of the troops to Dera, his headquarters. He flatly refused to go to Ross Bell's camp and Postans did not press the point, after obtaining as a hostage the chief's principal adviser, Mir Hassan, together with guides for the troops. Bibarak therefore returned to Dera. Doda Khan Marri sent letters excusing himself, as an old and infirm man, from visiting Ross Bell in the plains, but expressed entire submission and agreed to do all required of him. He too sent a guide to

conduct the troops to Kahan, his capital.35

The march into the hills could at last be undertaken. Jacob had just written to his father, 'We are out wandering about the country after plundering tribes of Beloochees where never was European before. It is a most harassing and disagreeable service, we have taken and cut up a few of the scoundrels who are the most cruel bloodthirsty cowards imaginable, but the business will not be settled for a long time I fear: to make things worse, I have undertaken to make a map of the country we pass through and have succeeded pretty well as yet, but it is no child's play I assure you. . . . 'He was in hopes of seeing 'a little honest fighting' if the mountain tribes decided to resist—'if I do not get shot, which is not improbable (as I cannot take an observation in the hills without having several matchlock balls singing by my ears) I will shortly send you a full account of our deeds of arms, together with many erudite criticisms on the policy of our great men in the East.'

The force was divided into two columns: one, commanded by Billamore himself and consisting of two companies of infantry, the artillery under Jacob, and 120 of the Scinde Horse under Clarke, was to move on Dera Bugti: Captain Raitt was to march independently on Kahan in command of the other, made up of the main body of his regiment and eighty Scinde Horsemen. Under the political authorities' instructions the guides were to be held responsible for the attitude of the mountain tribes, and it was explained to the representatives of the two chiefs, who accompanied the columns, that so long as their people behaved peaceably they would be treated as friends, but any sign of treachery or opposition would draw down on them signal punish-

ment.36

The artillery was to be drawn and supplies carried by bullocks; only a month's rations, a week's forage and one 24-pounder howitzer could be transported. It was supposed that the chiefs would make good their undertaking to produce supplies on payment. Jacob's retrospect of the spirit which inspired the officers of the force reads more pleasantly than his contemporary grumbles about the 'harassing and disagreeable

service'. 'There was little experience indeed, for all were on their first campaign; but the officers were . . . thrilling with those chivalrous thoughts of military service which . . . cause fatigue, hardship, danger,

difficulty and impossibility itself to disappear before them.'


The two detachments marched on 22nd December 1839. Billamore's column met with no symptoms of hostility beyond an occasional shot from the high ground overlooking his route through the intricate Gori pass; but every morning when the rearguard left camp large bodies of tribesmen appeared in every direction and sent notice of the movement of the troops by signal fires repeated to a great distance along the mountains. Jacob probably had the closest view of their activities, for when not superintending the passage of his gun through the defiles—and many were the places where ropes and manpower had to be applied—he was up as high upon the adjoining hills as he could climb in an hour or two, compass, glass and sketch book in hand, with an improvised plane-table, engaged in mapping the country.

Postans had accompanied the troops on their first march into the hills and shortly after his return reaped the first fruits of the campaign: Darya Khan, Turk Ali and the other Jakhrani leaders arrived at his camp and surrendered unconditionally.³⁷ On their suggestion Postans, with Ross Bell's approval, sent word to Bijar Khan that his life would

be spared if he gave himself up, and the chief duly came in.

Meanwhile Billamore's column after six marches through winding defiles entered a more open valley stretching away to the eastward, threaded by the Siahaf stream and bounded by double ranges on either hand. Islam Khan, Bibarak's eldest son, here met the troops with profuse assurances of friendship and conducted them for the rest of the way to Dera. The place proved to be nothing but a small village enclosed in mud walls twenty feet high, in the open plain. Bibarak received Major Billamore with apparent good will, but expressed his surprise at the slender numbers of the detachment, frankly remarking that he had twice as many warriors in the place itself, and two thousand more among the adjoining highlands.

The British camp had hardly been pitched, about half a mile to the east of Dera near a small stream, before symptoms of passive hostility appeared. Such supplies as were evidently abundant locally were either priced extravagantly or altogether denied; the Baluch warriors did not disguise their contempt and every day more of them left the town. Complaints were made that the sepoys were disturbing the bazaar; Billamore's remedy, in placing a guard at the gate to keep them out, was doubtless misunderstood. In all probability the guide on whom he depended, Mir Hassan Nothani, told Bibarak that the British intended



TRAKI, BUGTI ILLAQA, BALUCHISTAN

The stronghold of the Bugti tribe. The rider is more than a quarter of a mile from the cliffs, which are nearly vertical and not far short of 1000 feet in height.

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to seize him and annex his country: the Baluchis' plans, which he communicated to Billamore, were to anticipate this. As Mir Hassan fore-told, Islam Khan departed secretly after a visit to the commander in which he was particularly profuse in expressions of friendship; Bibarak was to follow on being told that his son's preparations were complete—the preparations being for a night attack on the British camp. Billamore therefore moved his camp up to the walls of Dera on 3rd January 1840, just in time for his sentries to frustrate the chief's attempt to

escape. Bibarak was then kept under surveillance.

Most opportunely, Raitt arrived on that day from Kahan, where his experiences had been similar. He had not been able to get any supplies from the Marris and so had obtained permission from Billamore to join him with all but one company of his detachment, which was left strongly posted in a small fort under Lieutenant Peacocke. At daybreak, after a night spent under arms, the videttes came in to announce that the Bugtis were advancing in force, and Billamore drew up his men under the walls of Dera. The Baluchis came on in line, about eight hundred strong. A few horsemen made a bold attempt to rescue Bibarak, who had been allowed to move out to a short distance with his guards. The move was foiled by Clarke and the Bugtis opened fire just outside musket range. Jacob was ordered to reply and after several shots the Bugtis, wholly unaccustomed to artillery, swerved off towards the hills and halted behind some rising ground about a mile and a half from Dera. It appeared that they were preparing another attack; and though their position was beyond the ordinary range of artillery, Jacob succeeded in pitching a shell from his howitzer into their midst, inflicting more than thirty casualties on the tribesmen, who at once dispersed.38

Hostilities having thus broken out, Billamore took possession of Dera and declared all property found in it to be lawful prize. The Baluchis occupied the surrounding hills and diverted the stream which supplied Dera with water; a party was sent out and after inflicting casualties on the tribesmen in a skirmish, succeeded in turning the stream so that it filled a large pit close to the walls, thus preventing further interruptions of the supply. The force had now to find its own fuel and forage, and parties had to be sent out for this to a distance of several miles. The Bugtis were in hopes that if they opposed the foragers in great strength the British would send the howitzer with the next expedition, and that in its absence a second band might succeed in escalading Dera and recapturing Bibarak. Billamore, getting wind of their intentions, kept the gun at Dera and greatly increased the infantry and cavalry strength of the next foraging party. They had loaded up their animals and were

about to return to Dera, seven miles away, when the Bugtis who had been gathering behind a screen of hills rushed down sword in hand on the party, which they outnumbered by five to one. They were not checked by the steady fire of the infantry, but Clarke charging at the head of a hundred Scinde Horsemen broke and dispersed the tribesmen, nearly eighty of whom were killed and many wounded. The British

casualties were four dead and about thirty wounded.


The Bugtis did not again hazard an attack in force. Billamore felt that his work in their country was done and that it was time to deal with the Marris. Lieutenant Peacocke, the officer left near Kahan, sent word that the Marris had disappeared from the surrounding country with their cattle, and that he intended to close upon Dera, as his supplies were almost exhausted. Billamore was anxious to take the howitzer into the Marri country; but Raitt declared that for artillery the route by which he had come was utterly impassable. Jacob was sceptical; he had shown what this word was worth when he constructed his flying bridge at Sukkur; so he was ordered to make a personal reconnaissance with a company of infantry and a troop of the Horse under Clarke.

The track passed through a defile and up an ascent of four miles and then entered the Marav plain, covered with cornfields, flocks and herds. Jacob and his men were fired on by a small party of Bugtis, of whom they killed one, and then proceeded to round up the cattle to the number of about a thousand, and more than three times as many sheep; these they were able to hand over on the morrow-Jacob's twenty-eighth birthday-to Peacocke, who met them on his march to Dera. Jacob then followed the track on to the northward as far as a point beyond which Raitt had reported the route to be passable, and then retraced his steps to deal systematically with the difficulties of the first ten miles. After three days' hard work with his extemporized pioneers Jacob felt that he could take his howitzer and gun carriages over the worst of the route without serious delay. Bugtis and Marris had both sniped his camp at night, but attempted nothing serious; and on returning to Dera he reported that the artillery could reach Kahan in two marches.

Under orders received from Ross Bell, Bibarak was sent to the plains under the guard of sixty horsemen, the Bugtis being informed that their chief would be shot if they attempted to rescue him. The party was not molested and Bibarak joined the Dombkis and Jakhranis in

Bukkur Fort.

Jacob had continued to sketch and map the country while he made his road, and from Dera made a rough survey of some ten miles of the



route which leads southward into Sind. Billamore now decided to leave Raitt in Dera with the main body of the Bombay Grenadiers, and himself marched on Kahan with two companies of infantry, the artillery, and a troop of the Scinde Horse. The distance was forty-five miles and in spite of the roughness of the ground Jacob succeeded in making good his undertaking that it could be accomplished in two marches. Kahan was found entirely deserted and was occupied by the troops. Billamore sent messages to Doda Khan Marri, who was far away in the northern valleys of his country; the chief in reply refused to place himself in Bibarak's position. No fresh orders were forthcoming from the plains, where Ross Bell was absorbed in making his arrangements for the administration of Kelat; Billamore would not have been justified in proceeding on a wild goose chase after Doda Khan, and with little prospect of obtaining supplies he could not remain in occupation of Kahan. It remained to decide by what route he should return to the plains. The route by which Raitt had originally reached Kahan was circuitous and most difficult; Jacob, putting together his rough plans of the country, saw that they must now be within twenty miles of the spot where the Dera column had cleared the outer defiles of the hill country and entered the valley of the Siahaf. The route between would indeed lead over mountains higher than any that the troops had yet passed, but the greater the obstacle the deeper the impression made on the Marris, whose scouts were observing all that went on. If they saw the artillery cross their southern frontier, they would not soon forget that it might return.

A Bugti guide was forthcoming, who said that there was in fact a path over the ranges. Jacob went with him to explore. It was a mere sheep-walk, barely passable for a single horseman; but Jacob's expert eye soon saw how boulders could be rolled away, outcrops broken down, chasms filled up, and traverses cut; until at the summit, after four miles of steady climbing, the word 'impossible' was as far as ever from his mind. The descent of the southern face of the mountain was far steeper and rougher; but he could use ropes and manpower to lower his gun, as he had already done in ravines in the outer defiles. From the crest he could see the path almost directly beneath, a white ribbon winding south-westward over a brown tableland, beyond which there must be a further descent into the Siahaf valley; but this his guide said presented no difficulty comparable with Naffusk, the ridge on which they stood—a name which was soon to sound heavily on British ears.

He returned to Kahan and told Billamore that he could accomplish the task. He then set his pioneers, with all the camp followers, to work. The Marris collected on the hill sides in large numbers to see the fun


and showed some disposition to attack the working party until driven off to a distance by the guard, after which they were content to take random shots at Jacob and his men, which did no damage. In three days the 'road' was pronounced practicable and on the fourth the howitzer and its carriages were dragged up the mountain and lowered down the southern side to the camp on the plateau. Over this the detachment marched the next day to Sartaf, where the tableland falls a thousand feet or more to a valley connected with the Siahaf. The descent proved to be gradual though steep and the track traced out by Jacob, in regular zig-zags down the open flank of the mountain, has been used by the Baluchis ever since. In four more marches the column emerged at Phulaji, Raitt following it from Dera Bugti. They had spent a little more than seven weeks in the hills.

Viewed by itself as an isolated campaign and not as the first step towards the occupation of this difficult country, Billamore's expedition had been eminently successful. He had indeed failed to bring the Marri chief to terms, but had taught him that his country was not inaccessible to artillery. The conflict at Dera, for which he was later blamed in letters to the Press, was brought on by the machinations of the guide, Mir Hassan; and in inflicting punishment on the Bugtis he did no more than carry out his orders. The most important achievement was to have enforced the surrender of the predatory tribes of the plains; for this, as Brigadier Gordon acknowledged, immediately produced quiet in the border country. But for subsequent political mis-

management that tranquillity might have been lasting.

For Jacob himself this, his first campaign, had brought most varied and valuable experience. It was during these few months that he laid the foundations of his fame as an incomparable swordsman, dreaded in single combat. A little later Outram writes to him promising fighting -hammer and tongs work sufficient to satisfy even a glutton like you'.39 Jacob in his treatises on cavalry casually mentions his personal experiences of running men through as compared with cutting them down, and a reviewer of his pamphlets observes, as a fact well known in India, that he had had such practice with the sword as few could hope to attain. He excluded such deeds of arms from his plain narrative of the campaign. After his death one writer recalled a critical moment when, galloping alone after several Baluch horsemen, Jacob's horse fell and left him stunned; but such was the terror of his arm that none dared turn upon him as he lay unconscious. 40 Responsibilities already heavy enough could not yet repress entirely the rash impetuosity which had carried him to supremacy in the 'Nagar Hunt.

But he had gained much more than such opportunities for personal



SARTAF MOUNTAIN, IN THE BUGTI ILLAQA, SOUTH SIDE The photograph was taken from about the scene of Walpole Clarke's death in action. The zig-zag 'road' made by Jacob can be seen on the right.

THE FIRST INDIAN FRONTIER HILL CAMPAIGN

prowess. He had learnt something of the handling and care of cavalry; he had solved problems of transport in a difficult and barren country; he had obtained an insight into the peculiar qualities of the Baluch race, their method of warfare and the workings of their minds. Above all, he had qualified himself for his life's work of getting the best out of the Indian soldier. From the raw material given him he had fashioned an efficient body of pioneers and artillerymen who showed by their achievements that they took a pride in their work and their commander.

Not without reason did he look back on this little force of seven hundred Indian soldiers, with eight British officers, as a perfect military instrument in its independence and efficiency. From this time his conviction grew that for warfare in these border countries the sepoy, properly trained, was to be preferred to the European soldier.

The operations of course brought his name to notice again. He received Billamore's particular thanks in orders, 'for the very able and efficient manner in which he conducted his battery over an unknown and difficult country, offering obstacles of no ordinary nature.' Brigadier Gordon too commended his 'active exertions'. His own improvised repair of the carriage of his howitzer, which split on firing its first round, was thought worthy of mention in an official report on the performance of the artillery during the Afghan Campaign, and was reproduced in the Madras Artillery Records. His History of Services makes mention of his survey of the country; and two years after the campaign a map by John Jacob of the Marri-Bugti hills appeared in Arrowsmith's Atlas of India. 122

CHAPTER VII

Service under Outram, 1840-1842

JACOB returned to his old post at Sukkur, in charge of the ordnance stores at Bukkur Fort. Here were Bibarak Bugti, Bijar Khan Dombki and Darya Khan Jakhrani, held in custody as hostages for the good conduct of their respective clans. Turk Ali with twenty-five Jakhrani horsemen had been taken into British service and attached to Amiel at Shikarpur, but most of the rank and file of the predatory tribes who had surrendered with their chiefs remained recalcitrant and were set to work on the Sukkur roads in chain-gangs. Phulaji and Chattar were restored to their former owners, the Khyheri tribe. Ross Bell also decided that an infantry post should be left in occupation of Kahan, but Billamore was back in Sukkur before the orders leached him. 43

In the orders for the break-up of the Bombay Division of the 'Army of the Indus' which had returned from Afghanistan in the previous November, the Upper Sind Brigade was to be composed of the same three regiments of Bombay Native Infantry as before, with detachments of three Irregular cavalry corps, amounting to 500 sabres in all, and details of artillery. The brigade was left without Engineers or experienced staff officers, and commissariat and artillery were on a most reduced scale.

This reflected the conviction of those in high places that recent events had overawed all opposition and that the hot weather would pass quietly. There was a general exodus of all who could obtain leave. Ross Bell himself proceeded 'on medical certificate' to Simla, whence he was still to exercise supreme control over Upper Sind and Baluchistan, at a distance of six hundred miles, or three weeks' return post by express courier. Postans was left in charge of the routine work of the Agency, but with a minimum of discretionary powers. In emergencies he was to refer to Outram, now at Hyderabad as Political Agent, Lower Sind.

SERVICE UNDER OUTRAM, 1840-42

A more faulty arrangement could hardly have been conceived. 45

Jacob's painful experience of his march from Sukkur to Shikarpur in the previous June impelled him to draw up a scheme for connecting the two places by a canal, the earth excavated from which was to form a raised road along its bank. 46 But he seems to have shared the common belief that there was no chance of field-service with the Upper Sind Brigade, for about the end of April he obtained a re-transfer to his former appointment in the Survey department in Gujarat, and started off down the Indus.

Under Lord Keane's orders, the cavalry and horse artillery returning from Sind to the Bombay Presidency had proceeded overland, crossing the Thar or Great Indian Desert. The reports on the routes followed were not encouraging, and as the monsoon practically closed the sea passage between Bombay and Sind for four months of the year, Outram was directed to get a more southerly land route surveyed. Jacob opportunely called at the Residency on his way down the river and at

Outram's request readily undertook the duty.

The Mirs' government was helpful and Jacob set forth with three bullock carts to carry his kit instead of camels—an experiment by which the practicability of the route for artillery could be roughly ascertained. The Thar desert is very different from the flat waste which separates Upper Sind from Kachhi. It is made up of immense billows of sand sparsely clothed with brushwood and scrub, stretching away in endless parallel succession from south-west to north-east, the direction of the prevailing wind. The difficulties for wheeled traffic are great, but at least Jacob found the inhabitants friendly and the headmen of the villages helpful, though he had to pass through the country of the predatory Khosa tribe of Baluchis who cared little for the Mirs' authority. His report gave exhaustive notes of the water supply available, the resources of the country and the route; and Outram forwarded it with an encomium on Jacob, 'a scientific and enterprising officer', for his zeal and intrepidity in undertaking such a difficult journey through unknown country, unguarded, at the height of the hot weather. Jacob told his father that this praise 'from the most valuable statesman and best soldier in India' had not been lightly earned.47

Meanwhile stirring events were taking place in Upper Sind. In implementation of Ross Bell's orders, a small force commanded by Captain Lewis Brown was sent to reoccupy Kahan to overawe the Marris; only half the necessary supplies could be taken and Walpore Clarke returned with the transport animals to bring up the remainder from the plains. Clarke in over-confidence sent back from Naffusk the company of infantry which Brown had added to his escort, and this

party was annihilated on its way thence to Kahan. The victorious Marris went in pursuit of Clarke, overtook him, and after an obstinate struggle put him and almost all his troops to the sword, a handful only

escaping to the plains.

Kahan was now left 'in the air', and the political officers in Upper Sind saw the house of cards built to the order of their absent chief tumble to the ground. The criminal folly that allowed Ross Bell to remain 'in charge' at Simla, and the inadequacy of the Upper Sind Brigade, were now apparent. The torch raised by the Marris was carried to the Kakars, the Kajjaks and the Brahuis; Quetta was attacked, Kelat retaken, and no immediate counter-move could be made.

At the end of August a force of all Arms nearly a thousand strong, with a large convoy of supplies, marched to the relief of Kahan under the command of Major Clibborn. He found the Naffusk Pass held in strength by the Marris. The storming party dispatched up the mountain under covering fire of the artillery was counter-attacked by the tribesmen and driven back to rally on the guns. The Marris followed them up and with a determined charge all but overwhelmed the entire force. Four British officers were among the killed; the heat was appalling and men and animals were almost mad with thirst. The guide-the same Mir Hassan who had accompanied Billamore—offered to show where water could be found, and Clibborn sent off his artillery horses with a party which was ambushed and destroyed. At nightfall Clibborn knew that he had been betrayed. His men were exhausted and the Marris still occupied the pass. Other tribesmen had partially dispersed the convoy despite the vigilance of the Scinde Horse under their newly appointed adjutant, George Malcolm. There was nothing for it but to abandon stores, treasure and the guns, which were spiked, and to retreat by forced marches. At the descent of Sartaf the baggage and followers were cut up by unidentified foes and it was only by the most praiseworthy exertions that Clibborn extricated the remainder of his force to the plains. His casualties numbered 179 killed and 92 wounded.

Brown maintained a brave front in Kahan and the Marris, having suffered severely in the fight, were glad to make terms to get rid of the last vestige of British authority. A truce was made under which Brown proceeded unmolested to the plains, bringing his guns with him, though

he and his sepoys were almost starving.48

The political authorities now attempted to appease the Baluchis by releasing Bibarak Bugti, Bijar Khan and the other captured freebooters. The Jakhranis and Dombkis were allowed once more to dispossess the recently restored Khyheris, and their leaders with some of their men were persuaded to enter British service alongside their old associate,

Turk Ali. Bijar Khan accepted, at a greatly reduced rate of pay, the position which he had scornfully rejected in the previous year.49

News of Clibborn's defeat reached Jacob in Gujarat in a letter from Outram—the first among those that have survived. He urged Jacob to apply to return to Sind with the next reinforcement, as he could promise plenty of fighting-'So come along, old boy, we'll have no mere promenade like last year.'50 Jacob at once applied to revert to military employ and at the end of October was appointed to conduct a body of troops, consisting of all Arms and drafted from four different stations, across the desert to Sukkur. In a letter to his father he thus describes the upshot: 'Precious work I had of it. Arrangements of all kinds, even Medical, Commissariat, etc. were thrown on my hands.' The route was that recently surveyed by him, and the inevitable difficulties were increased by the unco-operative attitude of the commanding officers of the several units-some refusing to obey orders and referring all kinds of absurdities to Head Quarters, then declaring the route ordered impracticable . . . you may imagine the labour I had . . . to conduct our march in anything like decent style.' However he triumphed over all obstacles and so important was this service reckoned that he received the thanks of the Governments of Bombay and India, and of the Court of Directors of the East India Company. 51

While Jacob was engaged on this duty, the boy prince of Kelat, Nasir Khan, asserted himself. His supporters had retaken his capital from the British protégé, Shah Nawaz, in June, and Nasir Khan now invaded Kachhi, taking advantage of the discontent caused there by Ross Bell's' summary proceedings. The Brahuis were forced back into their hills and tranquillity restored after three months' operations by an expeditionary force sent from Sukkur, the Scinde Horse distinguishing themselves in several actions; General Nott acting independently from

Quetta retook Kelat, and Nasir Khan was left a fugitive.

The troops which had proceeded to Sukkur under John Jacob's direction were too late to take part in the Brahui campaign, being the last feinforcements to arrive. Jacob was now ordered to join the 4th Troop Horse Artillery, destined for Quetta, and arrived at Dadar at the foot of the Bolan Pass at the beginning of February 1841. The political authorities had shortly before demanded some arrears of revenue, in the name of Shah Shuja, from the inhabitants of the Sibi district, who refused to pay and assembled their fighting men in the town of Kajjak. A small force of all Arms was sent to apply coercion, and being defied attacked the place, but was repulsed with heavy loss. Jacob was with the reinforcements hastily sent up; they arrived to find the place deserted, and General Brooks gave orders for it to be

destroyed, 'a shameful business on the part of our worthy General, and worthy only of a Beloochee Chief.' One of Jacob's gunner friends was among those killed in the action and his grief was acute: 'Why should he have died? Everything was couleur de rose to him; yet when all is dark to a man and he seeks only for death, and cannot find it . . . but where am I running to?'52

The shadow of some great personal sorrow seems to have lain upon Jacob at this time. What its cause was can only be conjectured; a hopeless passion, scorned by the object, or sacrificed to duty? It would seem to have been revived, if it did not originate, in the five months' sojourn

in Gujarat.

About the end of April 1841 he proceeded up the Bolan with the last column of the reinforcements from Sind. At Quetta Ross Bell was trying to establish friendly contact with young Nasir Khan; the Brahui rebellion having convinced him that it was necessary to reverse his Kelat policy. Jacob's period of service at Quetta seems to have been uneventful. We find in the Bombay Times signed letters from him dated from the place on 18th and 19th June 1841, in refutation of 'a correspondent'—possibly Postans—who had criticized Major Billamore's conduct towards the Bugtis in the first hill campaign. It was characteristic of Jacob to come forward openly to defend his old commander, who was now in his grave; and it is worth noting as an example of the latitude allowed in those days to serving political and military officers vis-d-vis the Press.

At the end of July the overtures to Nasir Khan at last bore fruit, but Ross Bell died before any meeting could take place and Outram hurried up from Hyderabad to assume charge of the combined Political Agency of Baluchistan and Sind, in which he was shortly afterwards confirmed. On 7th October a treaty between the British Government and Kelat was signed in which the Khan acknowledged vassalage to Shah Shuja, agreed to be guided by British advice, and conceded the right to station troops in his territory when considered necessary. He was to protect merchants and not allow excessive exactions to be made from them. In return, Kachhi was restored to him, but Shal, the valley of Quetta, remained in British occupation on behalf of Shah Shuja. The British Government also undertook to render assistance to Kelat if judged necessary, in the event of external aggression or dispute.

About this time the 4th Troop of Horse Artillery was ordered to the plains and Outram obtained Jacob's services for yet another survey duty in Kachhi, with the object of improving facilities for water along the main line of communications from Shikarpur to Dadar, 'and to impress on the tribes of this region the benevolent aspect of our rule'—which

under Ross Bell's régime had been conspicuously absent. Jacob had expected to return to his civil appointment in Gujarat, and to reconcile him to the postponement of his wishes Outram recommended the grant of an allowance which with his military pay would somewhat exceed

the emoluments of the Gujarat post. 58

Within three weeks Jacob had finished his survey and map of the Nari river, which has a course of nearly 100 miles through Kachhi, the bed of the stream being generally dry, and ending in the desert. He recommended that large storage tanks should be dug to a depth considerably below the level of the river, which by the flow of a few hours might be filled with water sufficient for a year; these tanks were to be situated at the villages which were the regular halting places along the Kachhi high-route. He supports his scheme with arguments which foreshadow his achievements in Upper Sind: 'Next to security of person and property, a sufficient supply of water is the greatest boon which could be granted them by man.' Outram cordially approved the plan and proposed to the Government that the Khan should be induced to bear half the expense. But Jacob soon found that the Khan's officials were turning the people against the scheme, telling them that the cost would be recovered from them with interest. He was hampered also by want of instruments and of sufficient tools, and the political officers, with a view to conciliating the Brahuis, had arbitrarily fixed wages at double the market rate.⁵⁴ He struggled on with the first of his tanks, but before the work was half done was called away to more urgent duties and shortly afterwards it had to be abandoned altogether. For there was bad news from the north.

The revolt at Kabul, which tore the heart out of the web laboriously spun by the Government of India over Afghanistan, Baluchistan and Sind, shook its every fibre. Outram's plans for the regeneration of Kelat vanished with Macnaghten's Durani Empire. The 'Lord Sahib's' unwisely scattered gold and vainly delivered blows; the bickering of his 'Politicals' with the Army; Shah Shuja's frigid indifference to his subjects, the livestock on his family estate; Sikh guards at the Bala Hissar and infidels picnicking at the tomb of Babur; slack discipline; blind confidence and suspicion equally misplaced—with these the cup of Auckland's enterprise was now full, and had to be drained.

On the very day, as it chanced, that rebellion raised its head at Kabul—2nd November 1841—Outram wrote to Jacob that he had recommended him for the command of the Scinde Irregular Horse. The substantive commandant, Captain Curtis, had proceeded on sick leave and it soon appeared that he was unlikely to resume the appointment. Outram seems to have been dissatisfied with the second-in-command,


Lieutenant Hervey, and Jacob, as he records a little later in a letter to his father, was 'impudent enough' to ask Outram to recommend him, the post being in the gift of the civil as distinct from the military depart-

ment of the Bombay Government.55

The die was soon cast; the ties of Gujarat were finally unloosed and he was ready to follow his fate in Baluchistan and Sind. The door closed on a prospect of conventional military life and civil employ in the old stations of the Bombay Army, and opened on the predestined vine-yard of his labours. With the regiment he was to pass from Outram to Charles Napier, from Napier to Bartle Frere, from Frere again to Outram; seventeen years of continuous command, direct and indirect, of the corps identified for ever with his name. They were to be years of experiment and struggle, creation and prophecy, in many fields; what he sought at the time was simply 'a Moss-Trooper's Life, which this will be to the letter, and in these warlike times [I] could not have a better position.' For he was not yet thirty.

Outram however intended that Jacob should be much more than a cavalry commander. He recommended him as a 'most able and zealous officer, whose duties as surveyor will rather be advanced than retarded by the charge of the Horse, all the important posts of which are situated in Upper Scinde and Cutchee . . . the advantage of such a man as Jacob is that he can always be turned to account as an Artillery man with the mountain train in the Hills, which he is better acquainted with than any man . . . to secure his services permanently for Scinde I shall recommend Jacob to be placed on the list of 3rd Assistants, and indeed his usefulness in the Horse will be further enhanced by Political Powers. . . . '56

The mountain train was not in fact brought into action, as fortunately Outram's negotiations with the Marri tribe were brought to a satisfactory conclusion before news of the Kabul rebellion reached them. Outram heard the bad news on 17th November, but as late as 10th January 1842 he could write to Postans in Upper Sind, 'Do not relax in the canals and other public works: we must show that nothing can discompose us down here.'57 So Jacob struggled on with his tanks and designed defensible travellers' bungalows for the stages on the 'high road'. Isolation in the wilds of such a country was not without its dangers and the officer engaged upon a work at Sibi was assassinated. Other symptoms of unrest appeared. The celebrated Jakhrani leader, Turk Ali, who had been serving for nearly two years with the Baluch Levy, decamped, probably intending to join raiders of the Bugti tribe; he was overtaken with the help of Baluch Khan the Dombki chief and Outram with (as it proved) misplaced generosity pardoned him. Before Jacob was confirmed in the command of the Scinde Horse,



FORTIFIED HOUSE AT MIRPUR, UPPER SIND FRONTIER Typical of the period before Jacob put down the chronic disorder in the country.

Outram relieved him of his survey work so that he could give all his attention to the question of what disposition of troops would best provide for the defence of Kachhi. The Horse at this time mustered 475 officers and men. The frontier to be guarded, from Sibi to the vicinity of Shikarpur, was approximately 120 miles in length. As auxiliaries there were the Jakhrani and Dombki horsemen, under their chiefs.

Turk Ali had demonstrated his unreliability; Darya Khan had proved faithful beyond expectation; Bijar Khan, as 'police master in Kachhi', had acquitted himself tolerably well, when his duties did not conflict with his personal and tribal loyalties. The Bugtis, particularly the predatory Kalpar clan, were constantly harrying the Dombkis and Jakhranis, though a compact of peace had previously been made. The main burden of Jacob's work would be in the centre and south of his charge, to curb the Kalpars and prevent a general relapse in imitation of them on the part of the Jakhranis and Dombkis. The hill Bugtis, too, were

likely to become aggressive at any moment.

Such was the situation before Jacob assumed charge. It was rendered far more pregnant with danger as the British disasters at Kabul and elsewhere became known; not only in the direct effect on the tribes, but in the probability that they would be instigated from the British rear. Outram already suspected that some intrigue was in progress between Sawanmal the Governor of Multan and the Mirs of Sind. He counselled Jacob so to place his men that in the event of an insurrection they could be rapidly concentrated at headquarters—Chattar; and on the detail of arrangements made a number of practical suggestions. He had already communicated the views of his assistants at Sibi and Shikarpur-French and Postans-together with Hervey's proposed dispositions, which had overweighted the north of the area and provided for an excessive number of small posts. Jacob's scheme, sent in on the last day of 1841, allowed for two hundred men at Chattar, his headquarters, and not less than a hundred under his second-in-command, George Malcolm, at Khangarh; there were to be only three minor posts along the 'high road', while Baluch Horse would be mainly stationed at the watering places on the borders of the Kalpar country to give information of plunderers. 58 This plan provided defence in depth and was approved by Outram—'I should hardly have asked you all to banish yourselves in this manner, however I doubt not one year of vigilance and vigorous thwarting to marauders will make them mind their manners. His foresight was well displayed when early in February news came of the annihilation of the British Army in the retreat from Kabul, and of the failure of the first efforts to relieve Sale at Jelalabad. 'If we have to evacuate Afghanistan I think it very probable the desert will be our boundary

hereafter, and Khangur our frontier post'; and he suggested that houses for two of the three British officers of the corps should be built at this

place, with the main horse-lines and fodder stores.50

However, there was to be no withdrawal yet, and Chattar accordingly became Jacob's headquarters. He had been formally gazetted as Commandant of the Scinde Horse on 20th December 1841, and an Assistant in the Sind and Baluchistan Political Agency in charge of the

Kachhi frontier, early in January 1842.60

There was still much reorganization to be done, and for nearly four months Jacob had only one British officer-Malcolm-to assist him. At the end of March Robert Fitzgerald, a contemporary of Jacob at Addiscombe, was appointed to the adjutancy left vacant by Malcolm on his promotion in Hervey's place. Meanwhile the Upper Sind brigadier wanted horsemen for escort duty on the main line of communication; Jacob asked for infantry, who might hold the post at Chattar while he was out acting with his cavalry; neither at first could agree to spare the men. Then there was the problem of the no-man'sland eastward of Shikarpur, which was Postans' particular concern; the existing strength of the corps was inadequate for its new responsibilities and it had to be augmented to six hundred sabres; the new commandant was dissatisfied with the miscellaneous firearms of his men and re-equipped them with carbines which had to be privately purchased in Bombay. The correspondence of Jacob and Outram shows how speedily every difficulty was met and the solution found, all under pressure of the prime necessity of preventing disorder and giving confidence to the well-disposed.

While Jacob's mental and physical energies were thus kept at full stretch, the mysterious shadow that had overcast his spirits for more than a year was not yet dispelled. His father had written in great anxiety about a riding accident mentioned by him in a letter from Quetta, and for once John drops his usual reserve, 'Would to God nothing worse had ever befallen me than the worst physical evil which can be imagined! I should then esteem myself the happiest man on earth. . . . Heaven knows I do not value my life as a "pin's fee", we can but die once, and it is better to depart when, however young, one has lived long enough to hope for nothing.' Characteristically, this outburst is followed by a shrewd appreciation of the state of affairs in Afghanistan. 'Perseverance in the attempt to burden the resources of India with wars extending from the Red Sea to China will lead to nothing but ruin. The disasters at Cabool may soon be repaired, but permanent tranquillity can only be restored and maintained by a sufficient army. . . . The Mussulmans have made a religious war of it, and their cry is spreading far and wide.

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Let them howl! Wise heads and stout hearts would soon put all to rights again, and we have a host in Major Outram, now the highest authority west of the Indus. And I do sincerely trust we shall have no more timidity. It is nevertheless certain that the Company have succeeded in disgusting their European Officers, and it is wonderful things have not turned out worse than they are. Their army has, for four years past, carried on a foreign war at an expense to individuals perfectly ruinous, without the slightest assistance or compensation for losses . . . save a donation of six months' batta to part of Lord Keane's army, which suffered less than any. The Bengalees are loud and bold in their complaints. The Bombay Army is more silent, but not the less sensible of the ill treatment it has met with. This is the worst of all; if our Indian Army became generally, seriously discontented, God help us!'61

By the middle of February the fortified post at Chattar had been completed, and the brigadier had placed a company of infantry and two field guns under Jacob's command. It was well that all was in readiness, for towards the end of the month Turk Ali Jakhrani repeated his escapade of the previous November. He deserted from the Baluch Horse with his quota of followers and joined the Kalpars and other outlaws, who had lately begun to make headway once more, driving off a convoy of two hundred camels carrying grain to the troops. Jacob replaced the deserters with Dombkis who had remained loyal to their

tribal chief, Baluch Khan.

He was in favour of the policy suggested by French, the Assistant Political Agent at Sibi, of helping the Khan of Kelat to exact from all the chiefs of the tribes in Kachhi the due performance of their feudal duties; he could hardly keep his Dombkis and Jakhranis from entering the hills to retaliate on the Bugtis who plundered their cattle. With moral support the Khan's government could, he thought, make the hill men 'suffer severely in their own homes for their misdeeds (and for those of all whom they harbour in their country) in the plains.' As to his own charge, 'It is not in overcoming open opposition that, I believe, we need expect any difficulty on the Cutchee frontier; but the country is and I fear will be perpetually harassed by petty inroads from the hills in spite of our utmost efforts to prevent them, if these efforts are confined to the plains.'62

That the outlaws were not to be despised as open foes appeared, however, on the very day that Jacob wrote this letter-27th February. A patrol of eight of the Scinde Horse was attacked in the middle of Kachhi by a band of about fifty Baluch caterans. One trooper was killed and five wounded, but the party killed three of the Baluchis, wounded several, and finally beat them off and resumed their route,

bringing off their dead and wounded. It is worthy of note that all these brave men were Hindus.68

For due appreciation of Jacob's task in Kachhi in the earlier part of

1842 we require a view of the general situation.

After the failure of the first attempts to relieve Sir Robert Sale at Jelalabad Lord Auckland did his best to assemble a new striking force at Peshawar for General Pollock; but the Commander-in-Chief argued against a renewal of the contest, in view of the danger of a rising in India while almost the whole of the Madras Army was employed in the China

Auckland therefore threw upon George Clerk, his Political Agent at Peshawar, the responsibility of deciding how far, if at all, Pollock should advance; General Nott commanding at Kandahar was similarly empowered to act at his discretion—if he decided to fall back on Quetta he was to bring off the garrisons of Kelat-i-Ghilzai and Ghazni. Outram meanwhile moved the small force under the command of Brigadier England, Brooks's successor, up the Bolan, a measure equally necessary whether for Nott's withdrawal or advance.

Lord Ellenborough took charge as Governor-General on the last day of February, and a fortnight later declared his intention of re-establishing the British military reputation by a signal blow at the Afghans. Once it was evident that the army could, if necessary, maintain itself in Afghanistan, the damaging moral effect of a withdrawal would be

diminished.

On 28th March, unfortunately, Brigadier England, contrary to Outram's advice and Nott's orders, advanced from Quetta before his force had been completed by its last detachment, then marching up the Bolan; confronted by the Afghans at Haikalzai he made a feeble attack, was repulsed and retreated to Quetta. Ellenborough on his way up the country heard of this together with the news of Pollock's entry into Ali Masjid and Sale's final victory over Mahomed Akbar before Jelalabad. Weighing the success against the failure he seems to have decided not to take further risks. Nott was to withdraw the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilzai, to retire to Quetta, and thence at the end of the hot weather to fall back on Sukkur, where he would be reinforced-which might be interpreted as indicating that the Governor-General intended to secure Sind, at least, from the wreckage of his predecessor's enterprises. Pollock was similarly to withdraw as soon as practicable.

These orders were consistent with the Commander-in-Chief's advice to Lord Auckland. Moreover, Shah Shuja had been murdered, so there was no longer a royal protégé to support in or extricate from Kabul. There were indeed the British captives, but it was arguable that nothing

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would endanger them more than an advance; and Ellenborough held

Dost Mahomed to offer in exchange for them.

Meanwhile Jacob was alert in Kachhi's inferno of heat, glare, dust and sandflies, whether in his mud hut within the walls of his Chattar post, or far more often in the saddle scouring the plains for robbers, and inspiring confidence among the people so that camels and supplies could be procured and sent up the passes to Nott. Outram had come down to Sukkur, and a humorous letter addressed to 'Messrs. Jacob and Stanley,* Border Reivers' reflects the cheerfulness produced by Ellenborough's earlier orders, calling for a signal blow against the Afghans. The Khan of Kelat, counselled by one of Outram's assistants, had held a conference of his tribal chieftains at which all agreed to be responsible for the good conduct of their people, and to assist in maintaining tranquillity in the country. Bijar Khan was authorized by the Khan to make reprisals on the Bugtis, and captured a number of their camels. But Outram had little faith in the Khan's arrangements, and cautioned Jacob to be 'always prepared . . . in case of squalls.'64 Jacob was in fact steadily maintaining and extending his control over the tribes, and not long afterwards Outram expressed his delight at his success in counteracting Turk Ali's endeavours to raise the country—the old rebel had joined the Bugtis, and emerged from the hills at the head of a body of tribesmen numbering some 1500 men; but on Jacob advancing upon them at Uch the robbers dispersed.65

Ellenborough's orders for retreat reached Outram early in May, but he continued to write to Clerk, to the Secretary to the Government of India, and to other authorities, advocating a simultaneous advance on Kabul by Nott's and Pollock's armies. He was certain that the Governor-General over-estimated the risks-which Nott declared would be greater in retreating than in advancing-and Brigadier England's column had now reached Kandahar at the second attempt, with all the treasure, ammunition and stores that Nott required. But as ordered, Outram returned to Quetta to make arrangements for the withdrawal, inspecting Jacob's posts at Khangarh, Chattar and Sibi on the way. Provision had also to be made for the future of the Kelat State, and Outram took it on himself to restore to the Khan the province of Shal, as Shah Shuja, to whom it had been assigned, was now dead. Outram had waited in vain for a reply to his letters recommending this arrangement as just and necessary, and as it was broadly in accord with Lord Auckland's later policy, he took his superior's silence to mean consent, and informed the Khan that he had authority to make over the province

^{*} Lieut. H. Stanley of the 5th Bombay Native Infantry had been appointed adjutant of the Scinde Horse, but does not appear to have joined.

to him. Ellenborough censured Outram severely for 'resort to fiction in communications to a native chief': he had lately informed him that he was to be appointed Envoy on the Lower Indus, to adjust relations with Sind after the evacuation of the upper country. Though he quickly recognized the propriety of Outram's action, he could not forgive the manner of it and now resolved to dispense with his services as soon as

Shortly afterwards Outram succeeded in breaking up a confederacy, the object of which was to raise the Brahui clans and the Kakars against the British, by capturing one of the leaders, Mahomed Sharif. This man, the Khan's former governor of Kachhi, had been in custody at Sukkur, from which he escaped with the aid of Mir Rustam Khan's minister. The a hir showed incidentally how strong was the moral ascendancy gained by Jacob in Kachhi, for Mahomed Sharif had successively visited Bibarak Bugti and Bijar Khan to persuade them to join in his conspiracy, but they felt obliged to remain aloof. In fact, Jacob was over-confident, and it was well that Outram refused his applications to be allowed to bring a detachment of his regiment up the Bolan, to take part in the final campaign under Nott. 'Certainly you are more required below,' he was told. 'I wish you to be as strong as possible to keep the border clear.'67

Early in July the Governor-General decided to adopt the plan vigorously advocated by Outram ever since March. Nott was to 'retire' by way of Kabul, and General England to withdraw to the plains through Quetta and the Bolan, with the impedimenta not required by

Nott's army. By the end of August Jacob's vigilance was most required in the southern half of his charge. He writes from Khangarh on 25th August, 'All is quiet here and about Chuttur &c., and I think there will be no row, anywhere in Sinde, unless General England is opposed successfully, which I suppose is now impossible. There are however large assemblages of warriors in different parts of the country, and a close league exists between all the tribes of the Hill and plain about Eastern Cutchee. I am quite ready to pounce on any of them committing open acts of violence.' He believed that the Mirs of Sind were the secret instigators of all the evil in the country, but that their courage would 'sink marvellously the moment troops begin to move down from Shawl. At present they are high and mighty, their agents openly give out that they are only awaiting the signal to destroy our troops at Shikarpoor and Sukkur to a man . . . my friends the Boogties, Dhoomkies, &c. &c. are to do the same kind office for me and mine, so you see it is all nicely arranged and we are all in a proportional state of abject fear. . . . 'In

other words, he assessed the bluster of the rulers of Sind at its true value.68

The marches of Generals Nott and England in opposite directions were now in progress. England's column had arrived at Quetta when Outram, on hearing from Jacob that the Mazari tribe were threatening inroads into the country east of Shikarpur, wrote to caution him against following fleeing hordes into broken country; and he was also to beware of acting against them with minute parties. 'A single check will ruin the whole of the Northern hill tribes, whereas so long as you meet with none, the Belooch tribes whose chiefs are in our pay will at least remain neuter.'

Outram, at the head of his Brahui auxiliaries, personally super-intended General England's passage down the most dangerous part of the Bolan pass, and then rode on ahead to Sukkur to report himself to Sir Charles Napier who had just arrived there from Lower Sind. It fell to Jacob to provide the flank guard to England's columns as they passed slowly through Kachhi, and so well was the task performed that the General wrote to him from Bagh on 17th October, 'Since leaving Dadar we have not seen nor heard of an enemy, and I can only attribute the marvellous tranquillity of the country to your exertions.'69

An unconscious tribute to Jacob and his men is found in Napier's journal for 23rd October. Sir Charles had ridden out to meet England's column on the march. 'With a single troop of Hussars opposed to this second column I would have destroyed the whole convoy; a string of camels for miles and miles, with guards dotted here and there like moving milestones. Had England been regularly attacked nothing could have saved him.' Jacob had in fact seen the column safely past Khanghar and then concentrated his regiment there, together with the two companies of infantry and the two guns under his command.⁷⁰

A few days later Outram received through Napier orders of the Governor-General remanding him to his regiment. The Sind-Baluchistan Political Department had been abolished in toto; not a word was said as to the appointment of an Envoy to the States on the Lower Indus, but he learned that Sir Charles Napier was to discharge these functions. In a letter informing Jacob of this he remarked, 'All is to be managed by a General Officer and his A.D.C.s—I am hoping as Sir C. Napier will remain it will be done well, but after that I question whether the system will work well, left to every chance senior officer. . . . I am happy to tell you that Sir Charles determined to keep on your Corps whether Shikarpoor is retained or not.'71 Outram was himself about to proceed to Bombay and thence to England. Jacob replied, '. . . about the abolition of the Politicals. As far as we small fry are concerned, it must

be a matter of perfect indifference, I should think, to all; but everyone must be indignant at the . . . way in which you have been treated. . . . Pray accept my best thanks for all your kindness to me. One thing you may be sure of, namely, that no man was ever looked upon with more profound respect and admiration than yourself, not only by your friends, but the very party against you. They might as well try to put out the sun as to throw your services in the shade!'72

Jacob could not attend the farewell dinner given to Outram at Sukkur on 5th November, when nearly one hundred officers were present, and Sir Charles Napier toasted the guest of honour as 'the Bayard of India'. A few days later Outram sent his friend an official acknowledgment of

his services.

'For the first time within the memory of man, Cutchee and Upper Scinde have been for a whole year entirely free from the irruptions of the hill-tribes. . . . Large bands of freebooters were at one time assembled for the purpose under some of the most noted of their former leaders; but in vain they strove to effect their objects, which were solely counteracted by the indomitable zeal with which you, your officers and men, so constantly exposed yourselves especially through the hot months. ... I am bound accordingly to attribute to the Scinde Irregular Horse the profound tranquillity which has been preserved in Upper Sind and Cutchee, and I hope you will accept yourself, and convey to your

officers and men, my grateful thanks."73

It may be felt that the worth of the two men's mutual praise must be discounted somewhat by the warm friendship subsisting between them. Yet General England's retrograde march of three hundred miles from Kandahar to the Indus without mishap was the clearest proof of the value of their work above and below the passes, where such humiliations had previously been incurred. In contrast, the combined armies of Pollock and Nott, with Sale's detechment, were unable to extricate themselves by the Khyber route without the loss of men, transport animals and even guns; coming back to Peshawar : Napier had foretold, 'like Tam O'Shanter's mare with the loss of his tail'.74

Jacob's friendship with and admiration for Outram continued for many years to be the most important influence in his life; his views on public affairs were in great measure guided and coloured by those of the older man. Not that he surrendered his independence of judgment: but he found, and history has confirmed, that Outram's judgment was

generally right.

'The Seidlitz of the Sind Army'

CHAPTER VIII

Sir Charles Napier and the Mirs of Sind⁷⁵

THE withdrawal from Afghanistan had been dictated by evident necessity; but Lord Ellenborough was not disposed to abandon also the position in Sind taken up by his predecessor. He recognized that the hopes of extending commerce on the Indus had been much exaggerated; but for strategic reasons and still more on grounds of prestige

Sind must continue to be occupied.

The hostile intrigues of the Mirs and their constant petty breaches of the commercial provisions of the existing treaty were considered to give fair grounds for imposing new and more rigorous terms on them, and the Governor-General adopted broadly recommendations already made by Outram that the more important places occupied since 1839 should be acquired in full sovereignty, all tribute being remitted in lieu. To facilitate the future conduct of British relations, the position of Rais, or senior chief, was to be revived in Lower Sind in the person of Mir Sobdar Khan, who had been uniformly loyal; in Upper Sind, where the aged Mir Rustam was Rais, the succession should pass on his death to his younger brother Mir Ali Murad, who had recently behaved well and appeared fitter to rule than Rustam's son Mahomed Hussein. Such an arrangement was not inconsistent with Baluch custom. The commercial provisions of the old treaty, intended to free trade on the Indus, were to be redefined so as to preclude all further cavil by the

Ellenborough for his part decided to introduce British coinage into Sind and to transfer to the Nawab of Bahawalpur, as a reward for his loyalty, Sabzalkot and other territory in Upper Sind which the Mirs had seized from him some thirty years before. The proofs of delinquencies by the Talpurs which were to justify the presentation of a new treaty were to be supplied by Sir Charles Napier, the recently appointed

supreme military and political authority in Sind and Baluchistan. Napier was a distinguished veteran of the Peninsular War and had also served in the American campaign of 1813. Subsequently he had been Resident in Cephalonia, one of the Ionian Islands, where he had carried out important public works; and he had held with great credit the difficult Command of the Northern District in England during the Chartist agitation of 1839-41. He was known to be a thorough soldier, a student of his profession, shrewd and resolute; and he had earned also the reputation of being extremely impatient of opposition and 'difficult'

in a subordinate post.

His complex character unfolds itself for us in his inimitable journal, edited by his brother William, the historian of the Peninsular War. Charles Napier recognized many of his own 'sins of temper'; his habitual use of coarse expletives, his intermittent parsimony, his inordinate ambition, his arbitrary nature. He claimed for the men of his race that their violence was momentary only, though himself and William he admitted to be revengeful.76 Withal he was a religious man in whom periods of self-exaltation, when he believed himself a chosen instrument working in the Divine purpose, were chequered with intervals of humility. He felt, and but feebly resisted, the influence of coincidences and portents; he had grown to trust absolutely to certain principles of action to which his mind would adapt, while distorting, the facts in hand; anything inconvenient or incompatible he would brush aside, careless of the consequences.

Beginning his Indian career at the age of sixty, Napier's opinions on most subjects were naturally fixed; and a few months' service at Poona did not dispel his prejudice against the Company's government; he persuaded himself that long experience of the country was an overrated qualification for ruling it and that the policy of supporting native princes on their thrones was entirely wrong and unjust to their subjects.

Napier was a determined champion of the under-dog; he had shown it in Cephalonia and in the Northern Command. Yet his radical views jostled with the instincts of a born dictator. Men should be freed from their oppressors; the fruits of the earth and of their labour should be at the disposal of all mankind: but it were well if this were left to his own benevolent despotism to achieve and maintain. Now for the first time in his life he was to enjoy authority almost commensurate with his ambition. His command was to extend from the Khojak Pass to the sea and in it he was to be supreme in political as in military matters.

Napier went to Sind conscious of the need to repress his own unsatisfied ambition for military glory; but very soon after his arrival he had convinced himself that the Mirs might have to be 'thrashed into sense'. The country and the common people appeared to him capable of great development, but not so long as they remained crushed under the ignorant tyranny of their rulers. For his negotiations with the Mirs the General proceeded steadily on the principle, 'Barbaric chiefs must be bullied or they think you afraid: they do not understand benevolence or magnanimity.'77 Thus, when Mir Rustam put off an appointment to visit him at Sukkur, under a misapprehension, Napier declined the old man's subsequent invitations to meet him; and the frequent military exercises which he ordered, both on account of the bad state of discipline in General England's force and to show the hopelessness of resistance, increased the Mirs' alarm.

Napier was soon engaged in his first diplomatic duty—the investigation of the genuineness of two intercepted letters, selected by Ellenborough as instances of the hostile intentions of Nasir Khan of Hyderabad and Rustam of Khairpur. These, if proved, were to be the main basis for the new treaty. Ellenborough had expressed his entire confidence in Napier's sense of justice; but the investigation from which the general decided that the letters were authentic was entirely ex parte, and the only expert opinion seems to have been that of the Head Munshi of the Residency. This man, Mirza Ali Akbar, was in close touch with Sheikh Ali Hussein, the minister of Rustam's younger brother Mir Ali Murad, who was deeply interested in the terms on which Upper Sind was to be settled.

Ali Murad now obtained an interview with Napier and was assured that he would be supported in his claims to the Turban or Rais-ship of Upper Sind, after the death of Mir Rustam, or earlier if the latter forfeited the Governor-General's protection. The General was as favourably impressed with Ali Murad as he was irritated by Mir Rustam's vacillations; from this moment British policy was dangerously compromised. The 'intelligence' which was already derived from sources mainly hostile to the Mirs seems thenceforth to have been manipulated by Ali Murad against Rustam and his other relations.

Napier and Ellenborough were soon at one in the opinion that some application of force would be required before the Mirs would accept the new treaty. Sir Charles paid a visit to Shikarpur, which he had recommended Ellenborough to retain as a British possession, and took occasion to call in Jacob with the Scinde Horse from Khangarh, and they arrived at Sukkur on 20th November.

On 3rd December the General held a review of Jacob's regiment and though it was almost the first time that the whole corps had paraded together, having been split up for outpost and detachment duty on continuous field service since its first formation, the evolutions were so

well performed that the General expressed himself highly pleased. Cavalry was the only arm in which he had hitherto felt his army deficient.⁷⁸

Napier now sent the new draft treaties to the Courts of Khairpur and Hyderabad for their acceptance, informing Mir Rustam that he would at once occupy the whole country on the left bank of the Indus from Rohri up to the Bahawalpur frontier, as though the treaty had been ratified. This territory was specified by Lord Ellenborough under a misconception; it far exceeded what he intended to transfer to the Nawab of Bahawalpur, and conscious of his own defective information the Governor-General gave Napier full discretion to adjust it equitably. But though Outram, according to his own account, had pointed out the error before he left, the General ignored it. The Mirs agreed to accept the treaty, but only under protest. Napier thereupon proceeded to pass part of his army, including the Scinde Horse, over the Indus to Rohri; thence the Bengal regiments under Colonel Wallace marched through this north-east territory en route for Ferozepur. They found it entirely quiet; but from other parts of the country reports flowed in of the assemblage of the Mirs' feudal levies. The English mails were robbed; and Napier addressed a succession of menacing letters to Mir Rustam informing him that he would march on his capital Khairpur, and directing him to go to his brother Ali Murad and be guided by his advice. This last letter was written in reply to a message alleged to have been received from Mir Rustam by a munshi of Sir Charles's office, to the effect that the old chief wished to take refuge in the General's camp. It is highly improbable that Rustam sent it; but be this as it may, the old chief went as recommended to Ali Murad's fortress at Kot Diji. A few days later Ali Murad informed the General that Rustam had resigned the Turban to him: and when Napier said that he must interview the old chief Ali Murad reported that he had fled. The General at once suspected that Ali Murad had extorted the Turban by force or fraud. This was soon confirmed categorically in a letter from Rustam himself; but Napier would not now forgo the opportunity of establishing at once the corner-stone of his policy—the elevation of Mir Ali Murad as Rais—and refused to investigate Rustam's complaint.

The Intelligence Department received numerous reports of warlike preparations by the younger Mirs of Upper Sind, and of a league between them and their cousins of Hyderabad. Napier left three regiments to secure Sukkur from attack and felt free to move with the remainder of his army to bring the Talpurs to reason. He decided first to march to Imamgarh, a strong fortress in the desert sixty miles southeastward from Khairpur, belonging to one of the junior Mirs, his object

being to show the fugitives that no retreat was secure. Thence he intended to march on Hyderabad; the Mirs, he told himself, would flee over the Indus and British rule would be established all down the left bank.

So ended the year 1842, and Jacob records how the Mirs' civil officials in the ceded districts applied to know to whom they were to give over charge of their various departments, 'When lo! these things had positively never been thought of, much less had any of the necessary arrangements been made!'79 For Napier had almost shrugged off the chafing trammels of his diplomatic duties. Outram was on his way back to Sind, recalled to assist him in the irksome business of arranging details of the treaties; and Sir Charles turned gladly to be general of a fine army operating against unknown forces believed to be hostile. War was not declared, 'nor is it necessary that it should be'; he would march on Imamgarh.⁸⁰ The General rebutted Rustam's complaints in an indignant proclamation, declaring that he would treat with no one who did not recognize Ali Murad as lawful Rais.

At midnight on 5th January Napier marched from Diji with 350 men of Her Majesty's 22nd Regiment, mounted in pairs on camels, 200 sabres of the Scinde Horse and two 24-pounder howitzers drawn by camels. Mir Ali Murad and Outram, who had just rejoined, accompanied the force. After the first march Jacob found that forage was too scarce for the horses of two whole squadrons and the General allowed him to send head all her 66.

him to send back all but fifty of his men.81

Mir Rustam was encamped with his followers not far from Napier's line of march and Outram was permitted to visit him. Rustam declared publicly that his resignation of the Turban had been extorted. He did not feel equal to going to meet the General but sent one of his sons, who was told that Rustam might keep his own lands and lose only what appertained to the Turban. He was also told that Imamgarh would be

put in charge of Ali Murad.

The British force continued on its way, Jacob with the troop of Scinde Horse forming the advance guard. The last four marches led over immense waves of the sea of sand, and as many as sixty infantrymen and fourteen camels were constantly put to the duty of hauling each gun up them. Not an enemy was seen, and on 12th January they came in sight of Imamgarh; a square fort with round towers at the angles, the walls forty feet high. It was utterly deserted and Napier might well congratulate himself that it was so, as his guns could have made but little impression on the huge walls.

There was a great deal of gunpowder in the fort, and the General, reflecting that the place might again become a refuge for rebels,

determined to blow it up. He went through the farce of obtaining Ali Murad's consent in writing to the destruction of his nephew's property; the small store of grain left by the absent garrison was served out as rations; Major Waddington skilfully disposed his charges; and Imamgarh ceased to exist.⁸²

Intended as an example to the Mirs of the hopelessness of resistance, the destruction of Imamgarh, which was witnessed by one of Rustam's servants, must have convinced them that no submission would secure

them from violence.

Napier now detached Jacob's second-in-command, FitzGerald, with a small escort of the Scinde Horse, to survey the route across the desert to Balmir; he was to return via Umarkot and Hyderabad. The Upper Sind Talpurs were directed to send their representatives to Khairpur, whither Outram also proceeded, to arrange the details of the new treaty. But the Mirs neither attended themselves nor sent plenipotentiaries.

Outram found that with the unauthorized exactions in favour of Bahawalpur and the adjustments necessitated by the bestowal of the Turban on Ali Murad, the effect would be to reduce the revenues of Mir Rustam, his nephews and their sons and feudatory chiefs by nearly two-thirds. He declared that on such terms a peaceful settlement was impossible. Napier, having convinced himself that the Talpurs were attempting to spin out time till the favourable moment for attacking him, was inexorable. I see but two parties with one interest: my own country and the population of Scinde. The Rais I consider a convenience: the Talpoor family I do not consider at all, or see why we should support their unjust power. Outram, believing that Napier was strictly carrying out Lord Ellenborough's instructions, wrote to him in despair that such a policy was 'most tyrannical, positive robbery: I consider that every life that may hereafter be lost in consequence will be a murder.'83

Until the expedition to Imamgarh, John Jacob had to perform nothing more than routine duties as commander of a regiment in camp and on the march. But the General had seen enough of him and his men to be greatly impressed by their efficiency, and when a special service was to be done he selected them in preference to the Regular cavalry. Napier's information was that the Khairpur Mirs were collecting troops to oppose him and he wanted to prevent them from dispersing and taking refuge in the desert. In detaching the Scinde Horse his instructions to Jacob were to proceed southward skirting the desert as closely as possible until he arrived at or near Syedpur where he was to halt until further orders. If he came within reach of Mir Rustam he was to pay every attention to him; and should a meeting take place after 1st February he was to send the chief to headquarters with a strong

escort or, if a rescue attempt appeared probable, with his whole corps. He was to avoid if possible any collision with the Khairpur troops and Rustam was to be assured that no restraint would be put upon him other than enforcement of his residence at a place of his own selection within his own estates. If Jacob heard of or met any armed bodies he was to disarm them if possible; and if they refused, to attack them after fair warning, unless they were troops of Ali Murad or Mir Sobdar

Khan, who should be ordered to accompany him.84

These orders were written on 27th January, when Napier was still encamped at Abu Bakr. Jacob marched via Lalu and reached Kumb Lima on 2nd February, about seventy miles in advance of the main army and within a march of Mir Rustam's camp at Kunhera. In a letter to his brother Philip, Jacob describes the difficulties of his route through semi-desert country, yielding no forage, and water only in consequence of recent rain. 'The Genl.'s intention in detaching me was to prevent the Ameers from flying to the Desert while he was marching southward—a most childish idea considering that the Desert extends more than 300 miles in length, so that their Highnesses might have reached some of their private retreats within it before I could have known of their movement.'85 Mir Rustam at Kunhera was in fact on the edge of the desert still; and whatever rabble he had with him, he never dreamed of attacking Jacob who was encamped in the open with little over five hundred men, unsupported by either infantry or guns, and seventy miles distant from the army. Rustam does not even seem to have tried to prevent supplies from reaching the camp and the country people brought them in abundance. But he wrote to Jacob, both before that officer had reached Kumb Lima and at that place, imploring his and the General's mercy.86

On 30th January the envoys of the Hyderabad Mirs waited on Napier at Naushahro, bearing their master's seals, with full powers to treat. Napier however directed them to return and take the Mirs of Khairpur with them to Hyderabad, where they should meet Outram. They were told that unless the General heard on the 5th that the Khairpur Mirs had started he would march against them; and he would in any case attack any organized bodies of armed men that he met. It is not surprising that the most influential of the vakils,* Mirza Khusru, wrote to his

master, 'The General is bent on war, so get ready.'87

On 3rd February Napier wrote to Jacob, 'I hope Roostum will spare you, and not realize the fears of the Vukeels, and cut you to pieces! I suspect you have put him into an exceeding state of terror by your march to Leemah-ka-Koomb: he is a miserable idiot. . . !' Major

^{*} Accredited agents.

MacPherson, Napier's Military Secretary, wrote in the same enclosure, 'The General requests me to add that Meer Roostum has with him between 6000-7000 men, and hopes that you will keep a good look out till you hear again from him. . . . Roostum declares he won't send Wukkeels unless the General restores to him the Turban, and repairs all the injury he has done to him. The old fool, I wish he may get it!'

Next day Sir Charles wrote again, 'I am at this moment told that 1500 men are proceeding to join Meer Roostum and will pass by your quarters. This is very insufferable in Meer Roostum, if the imbecile has any power, which is doubtful; but it shows that he must be put down. However, as I have promised to make no movement before the 6th inst., and as I wish to avoid killing any of these vagabonds if possible, you must let them pass unmolested.' He added that if they insulted him, Jacob was to give them the thrashing they sought to get; but that the fifteen hundred probably meant three hundred men in fact; he concluded by expressing his confidence in Jacob's discretion, and his own desire to avoid hostilities.⁸⁸

The influence of Outram's views now appears in Jacob's letter to his

brother:

Such is the absurd state of Sir C. Napier's 'Intelligence Department' that he writes to me almost daily about these wretched Ameers assembling forces in my immediate neighbourhood, and is in a dreadful state of alarm as to our safety. One day 1500 men have gone to join some warlike Chief within ten miles of me! On another 7000 warriors are hard by in our neighbourhood, and about to cut us all into very little pieces! with abundance of stuff of the same description. Never was there such cramming as that practised on the unhappy Griffin General, especially by his friend Ameer Ali Morad, Sir Charles and his Royal staff, mind you, being utterly unable to hold communication with 'the BLACKS' save through their moonshees, the said moonshees being all great rascals and privately in pay of Mr. Ali Morad, the king elect of Sinde! I have frequently when asked for my opinion given it pretty freely to the General touching the manner in which things are proceeding; but it is difficult to persuade a man that he has been made an ass of, when he fancies he has been displaying profound wisdom, and I suppose Napier will continue a 'Wictim o' Gammon' to the end.

I have now written to him that his information is entirely false and that his informants are purposely misinforming and misleading him; that the Ameers are remaining quietly at Hyderabad and are neither collecting nor moving troops; that 1500 Sindees would not venture to attack my 500 horsemen and that if the 7000 he talked of did so, we should certainly beat them. . . . I have received no answer to this yet, and do not know how the old man takes it. . . . I expect however to hear of his being in full march with his whole force in a day or two to attack the imaginary army assembled to oppose him.89

But though the Mirs of Hyderabad had not, probably, sent orders to assemble their forces at the time Jacob wrote his replies to Napier, they did so immediately after Mirza Khusru's return to Hyderabad on about 4th February. Even so, the messages were sent only to particular chiefs; it was not a regular feudal levy and the measure was still a precautionary one taken because the General seemed 'bent on war'.

Sir Charles marched from Naushahro on 6th February, as he had said he would do unless he received word that the Mirs of Khairpur had started for Hyderabad. Rustam had in fact actually reached that place on the 4th and the southern Talpurs now sent an urgent appeal remonstrating with the General; Mir Rustam had arrived in a deplorable condition and had suffered gross injustice, which they would explain to Major Outram when he arrived; meanwhile a further advance of the army would be unfriendly, for the force at Kunhera was only for the protection of the baggage and families of Mir Rustam. 90

However, the General marched on this and on the next four days; and the Mirs were confirmed in the belief that he intended their destruction. Outram on his arrival in Hyderabad on the 8th held a conference with the Mirs of both Upper and Lower Sind. The chiefs of

Hyderabad began by denying the acts on which the new treaty was grounded and said that if their Baluchis heard that the British army was advancing they would plunder the whole country. However, they declared that they would sign the treaty, as would also their cousins of Khairpur, if Rustam Khan were restored to his rights. Rustam himself explained in the full Durbar the manner in which the Turban was extorted from him; and Mir Mahomed Khan inquired what fault he had committed that his fort of Imamgarh should be destroyed. Outram replied as best he could, declaring that the treaties must be signed and that subsequently Rustam might petition the General in regard to the

Nothing was definitely settled that night but on the following afternoon, in response to Outram's urgent instance, the Mirs sent deputies to sign a document by which they undertook to accept the treaty. Outram sent this to the General by the hand of FitzGerald who had arrived in Hyderabad on his return from Balmir, and with it a letter

Rais-ship.

requesting Napier to halt for one day. He informed the Mirs of Upper Sind that they must sign the treaty on the 10th. Rustam answered that he was willing to sign on that day but requested postponement till the 11th, as the previous day was the last and holiest of the Mohurram mourning which was observed very strictly by the Mirs. Outram desired the General to halt another day and he consented, telling Outram to inform the Mirs that he did so at their request, though to Ellenborough he wrote that he halted to give his tired camels a rest after five consecutive marches.

On the 11th the vakils of the Mirs of Upper Sind came to the Residency and signed the treaty on behalf of their masters. That afternoon the light company of H.M.'s 22nd landed at the Residency. They had been sent down the river by Sir Charles who was convinced, partly by what he heard from FitzGerald, that the Mirs intended to fight, and that Outram was hopelessly outwitted by them and in great personal danger. Outram thought only of the disturbing effect the unprecedented arrival of a strong escort of British troops would have on the minds of the Mirs and their followers. The chiefs had undertaken to disband their levies and promised to repeat the orders issued, but information that the General intended to advance from Sakrand reached them on the 12th and threw them into consternation. Outram wrote to Sir Charles that should he advance beyond Hala, if he came so far, they would probably re-assemble their forces in self-defence, 'in the idea that we are determined to destroy them, notwithstanding their submission.'91 It seems certain that the Baluch sardars who had been summoned to be present on the 9th would have disobeyed any orders to return home as long as the Feringhi general appeared to act in the desire of measuring the strength of his small army against them. It was very unsatisfactory, Outram wrote, being unable to give a decided pledge to the Talpurs that the General would not advance, but only to express a hope that he might halt on hearing that the treaty had been signed, for, 'they cannot understand any motive for hesitation but deception.'92

This last observation perhaps produced on Sir Charles an effect contrary to that intended. Delay would endanger his army—he would

march to show that he had no hesitation.

On the evening of the 12th February Outram held another conference with the Mirs at which they again brought forward the stumbling block of Mir Rustam's case. In Jacob's words—based of course on Outram's account and written just after Miani:

The Hyderabad Ameers protested against the injustice committed

by the General in setting up one Ameer over another as in the case of Ali Morad and Meer Roostum. . . . They said (and with reason I think) that their agreeing to this involved a principle which rendered not only their sovereignties but the jaghires of all the chiefs in Sinde insecure—that they were willing and ready to agree to all Lord Ellenborough's demands without exception as set forth in the draft of the treaty which was now offered to them: but that they could not submit to acknowledge the right of the British Government to set up Ali Morad in the Principality of Khyrpoor to the injury of the rightful prince Meer Roostum; this was not included in the treaty and even if the Hyderabad Ameers should personally submit to Meer Roostum's degradation they could not control the warlike chiefs under them who would all lose or fear to lose their lands by the proposed arrangement. If Ali Morad's elevation were insisted on they must try their fortune in war whether they would or no, for their Beloochee chiefs would compel them to fight.

At last they signed and sealed everything demanded of them (Ali Morad's business they were told they had nothing to do with, and it was not mentioned in the draft treaty) on Outram's promise to do his best to prevent the further advance of our army towards Hyderabad. They could not understand how it was that Outram had not the power positively to promise this, naturally remarking that on all similar occasions before, the army had always obeyed the orders of the diplomatist who represented the British Government at their Court, and that if this were not the case, they had no security against military violence from the General after that they should have disbanded their own army according to Outram's demands. . . . 93

All the Mirs of Hyderabad had now affixed their seals to the treaty, as also Rustam Khan and Mir Mahomed Khan of Khairpur. Mir Nasir Khan of Khairpur not having his seal with him promised to send it on the following day. On leaving the Durbar that evening Outram and his companions had to pass through a dense crowd of infuriated Baluchis, but were protected from serious injury or insult by a strong guard of horsemen sent by the Mirs. The tribesmen had been flocking into the capital since the night of the 11th, inflamed with indignation for the wrong inflicted on Mir Rustam and determined to fight for the independence of their country. That night the feudatory Sardars swore on the Koran that as Mir Rustam was not to be restored to his rights

they would fight the British whether the Mirs sanctioned hostilities or

On this momentous day, 12th February, an incident occurred which was the proximate cause of the bloodshed in Sind. Jacob was encamped at Nakur, whither he had moved for convenience of forage, six miles from Sakrand where the main army was halted. For some days he had been aware of unusual movements of mounted men through the country near him. What now followed may be told in his own words:

A party of 25 well dressed and well mounted horsemen were stopped by my pickets; they were all armed to the teeth, had servants etc. with them, and appeared men of some consequence. It was rather too good a joke to let them pass through my camp, and I therefore ordered them to lay down their arms, and go to the Genl.'s camp. This however they positively refused to do, they dismounted and stood together with ... atchlocks presented, declaring they would all die rather than give up their arms. I had not sufficient eloquence to persuade them to alter their determination, although I had 100 carbineers drawn up in line in front of them, and the least sign from me would have caused their instant death. I did not like to kill the rascals, who were really brave fellows with some stalwart old red-bearded warriors among them, so at last I went into the middle of them and told them to keep their arms and come with me, and if they perceived treachery they might shoot me; they were pleased at this and came with me into my lines where I left them with a strong guard over them and reported to the Genl. His reply did not reach me for four hours and before that time the Beloochee courage had been cooled by their remaining seated in the sun exposed to the ridicule of my sowars, and they sent to say that they would give up their arms and go where I pleased.94

Napier had just heard from Outram that the Mirs had solemnly promised to sign the treaty on the 11th; and his reply to Jacob read, 'This is the most provoking accident which could well have occurred; however it is not to be avoided . . . you have done perfectly right in not forcing them. I wish there had been 500 instead of 25, and then there would be no difficulty.' He sent a whole squadron of the 9th Bengal Cavalry to help in persuading the Baluchis to surrender without resistance and Jacob sent them to Sakrand in their charge. The men proved to be Hyat Khan, a headman of part of the Marri tribe settled in Sind, with other notables. Their followers, to the number of about

five hundred, were at the time in a village four miles away and on hearing of their leaders' capture dispersed to their homes. ⁹⁵ All had been on their way to join the Mirs and on Hyat Khan a note was found from Mir Mahomed Khan of Hyderabad, ordering him to assemble every male able to wield a sword and bring them to the rendezvous at Miani, some

ten miles north of the capital, on the 9th.

Sir Charles was now convinced that the Talpurs had been carefully planning his annihilation, spinning out time by insincere negotiation until their full strength was mustered; that they had been and still were 'humbugging Outram'. 'He says "not a man in arms is at Hyderabad." Why, they have been marching on that place from many directions, and thousands have got there: all our spies are agreed on this. I am puzzled. He prays me not to move. I must move. What work he makes about Roostum's nerves! but I have my soldiers' health and safety and my own character to think of. I have driven these wolves into a sack, and will not be their dupe."

On the afternoon of 13th February the Mirs' deputies met Outram in a third conference. They begged him for some pledge that Mir Rustam Khan would receive justice. Outram answered much against his own feelings and strictly according to his instructions. The Mirs' emissaries protested that their masters had agreed to everything the British Government had demanded—'Why oppress hem any further?' The obstacle remained, and at length they departed saying that unless some assurance with regard to the rights of the Khairpur chiefs were given, they had no hopes of allaying the excitement of the Baluchis.

On the 14th Napier advanced to Syedabad and Jacob joined him. On the same date the Mirs gave up hope of a peaceful settlement. Nasir Khan and Mahomed Khan of Hyderabad wrote to their Governor of Karachi that they, together with Mirs Sobdar, Shahdad and Hussein Ali, intended that day to take the field against the English who 'seem

desirous of possessing themselves of our dominions.'97

Outram had just informed Sir Charles that he believed 'all their vaunting would end in smoke'; but when he heard, on the morning of the 14th, of the capture of Hyat Khan Marri and the rest, he sent word that hostilities were now almost certain to break out. He also wrote an express to the commander of H.M.'s 41st Regiment, then on its way to Bombay from the north via Tatta and Karachi, to halt in case the General should need it. To the Mirs of Hyderabad he wrote, advising them to dissociate themselves from the proceedings of the Khairpur Chiefs, whom they should persuade to leave the Hyderabad territories. So passed 14th February. Outram was warned that the Residency would be attacked and was begged by the Mirs to leave,

but he remained at his post until he should hear further from Napier.98

Jacob's narrative of the events may now be resumed.

Outram had with him only the Light Company of the 22nd, and even that small party had little ammunition; he had informed the General of this and in the evening we (the S.I.H.) were started off to Hala with 50 sepoys and a lot of ammunition, there to embark on board of the 'Satellite' steamer supposed to be waiting at Halabunder; by way of assisting me the Genl. insisted on sending two of Hutt's guns with me, which delayed our march so much that we did not reach Old Hala till 3 o'clock A.M. on the 15th when lo! no steamer was there. The army arriving at New Hala (some two miles from the other) at about 9 o'clock, we rejoined them, and after a great deal of disputing about the steamer it was discovered that the Genl. had ordered her away three days before and had forgotten all about it . . . 18 hours on horseback this day for nothing! Next day, the 16th, we marched to Muttari and here the most alarming reports reached the Genl. apparently from authentic sources (letters from the Native Doctor of the Hyderabad Agency)—the Residency had been attacked by immense numbers, the buildings destroyed by artillery, that Outram's party had lost many men but effected their escape to the steamer, that the enemy had turned their guns on the steamer and sunk her with all aboard.

Having perfect confidence myself that Outram would be reserved for greater things (Caesarem vehis et Caesaris fortunas) I did not believe a word of it, although the General did not doubt its truth. However in the evening Outram made his appearance in our camp having left his party safe on board of the steamer not far off. They had been attacked by some 8000 men, and artillery had been brought against them, but after a most gallant defence Outram effected his retreat to the steamer losing only a man or two, and one shot only striking the vessel afterwards: 60 of the Beloochees were killed in their attack on the house and gardens besides others slain by grape from the steamer's guns. No rest for us; we (S.I.H.) were sent out in the evening to look for the Beloochee army said to have advanced towards us from Hyderabad; we did not return till past one A.M., having found the enemy within 8 or 9 miles of us.... 99

Meanwhile Sir Charles Napier allowed Outram to proceed with two hundred convalescent sepoys to create a diversion by burning the woods

SIR CHARLES NAPIER AND THE MIRS OF SIND

near the position in which the main force of the enemy was said to be. He warned the General that the battle would be severe.

The Baluch vassals of the Mirs of Sind were indeed assembled in their thousands, eager for battle. The mother of young Hussein Ali clothed him in a coat of mail and bade him fight for his race and his religion. Nasir Khan's reluctance to commit himself as long as there seemed the least hope of a peaceful settlement was misrepresented by his angry Sardars; disdainfully they presented him with a woman's dress. The imputation of cowardice was enough. Nasir Khan rode out with the others. The time had come to fulfil the words he had spoken not long since: 'We obtained this country by the sword; and if it is to pass from us, it shall not do so without the sword.'100

CHAPTER IX

Miani—Hyderabad—Shahdadpur101

At four o'clock in the morning of 17th February reveille sounded in the British camp near Matiari and for the last time began the slow process of getting en route three thousand troops and thrice that number of followers in the chilly darkness. As usual, the Scinde Horse had been told off to lead the advance guard; the men awoke dog-tired after the long hours of fatiguing duty on the two previous days, and Jacob had some difficulty in getting them to turn out to time. However, once in the saddle the regiment became brisk again and marched, followed by a company of Madras sappers and a working party of a hundred sepoys, to prepare passages through the numerous nullahs and canal beds for the

artillery. Two 9-pounders completed the advance guard.

After seven miles the track converged on the dry bed of the Fuleli, a branch of the Indus running at this point nearly due south; a little farther on, when the sun had risen, the sound of a distant cannon was heard. The General, who was with the advance guard, halted it and then ordered Jacob forward to discover the enemy's position. The Fuleli here passed between two shikargahs* enclosed within mud walls; Jacob detached a squadron under FitzGerald to skirt round that on the farther bank and himself with the rest of his regiment moved forward and somewhat to the left to reconnoitre beyond the nearer of the two, the wall of which ran on obliquely across the previous line of march. He had gone on at a trot for a mile or more when some country people told him that the whole Baluch army was in front of him, and this was soon confirmed by immense clouds of dust and firing of artillery. Jacob sent back word to Sir Charles, who followed him up with the rest of the advance guard till he too came within sight of the enemy's position, at about a mile's distance. Here he halted to await the arrival of the main

^{*} Hunting preserves of the Talpur rulers of Sind.

body of his army. Meanwhile Jacob led his regiment on to within five hundred yards' distance from the Baluchis; here he formed line and halted, and himself went forward to reconnoitre their position. The main body appeared to occupy a space extending some seven hundred yards between the shikargah and a village with enclosures in its front. Several cannon were drawn up in front of the line and opened on the Scinde Horse with round shot; Jacob approaching to within two hundred yards drew matchlock fire both from the shikargah and the village, revealing that both flanks were occupied in advance of the centre. He now retired and sent back a note to the General of what he had seen. 102 What he had not seen—for even from two hundred yards it was invisible—was that behind the front line of the Baluchis lay the bed of the Fuleli, here running at right angles to its former course; and in it vast numbers of the enemy were concealed.

FitzGerald now rejoined with the detached squadron. What followed

may be told in Jacob's own words, in a letter to his father. 103

The enemy several times advanced a little as if to attack us, but on my moving our line forward also they returned to their former position and resumed their artillery fire. Our right was within musket range of the wall of the Shikargah, they advanced a party behind it and opened fire on us; many horsemen too here and there singly advanced to the front, and dismounting fired at us with deliberate aim; however, though we were under fire of their artillery at little more than point-blank range for nearly two hours without intermission and the guns were really not badly directed, only six of our horses were killed by round shot. The musketry hurt no one although the balls whistled about fast enough. It would have done your heart good to see how steady my fellows were under it although every minute a shot struck close to their horses' feet.

At last up came the whole force and after what seemed to us a very long time the line was formed in our rear, Artillery on the right, Infantry in echelon at company distance, 9th Cavalry—reserve. Our Artillery opened their fire with some effect and then the whole advanced; shortly afterwards I was ordered to clear the front of the infantry and protect their left. I accordingly formed column of squadrons and advanced almost directly on the village. . . .


The 22nd leading the echelon came first into action and the infantry except the Grenadiers were soon all hotly engaged. Our artillery from the confined space had great difficulty in getting into

action and only four guns were unlimbered at all, the leading horses were shot the moment they showed their heads at the bank of the river and the Beloochees were swarming about Hutt's muzzles, however he got a 12-pounder howitzer run up by main force and fired obliquely backwards into the enclosure of the Shikargah whence the Beloochees were crowding round the angle of the wall to turn our right, another gun fired across the muzzle of this one; and the others into the enemy's camp and Horse in the rear; the execution done by Hutt's two guns first mentioned was fearful, the fellows fell in heaps at every discharge, each round knocked over twenty or thirty and I firmly believe that old Hutt saved the right of our line from being overwhelmed altogether. [Here Jacob the artillery man is speaking.]

But to return to the infantry with whom of course must rest the strength of the battle: the struggle along the bank of the river was fearful, our fellows three times recoiled and thrice honestly renewed the fight although at one time the 22nd would not advance even when the old General cap in hand with Majors Waddington and Wyllie stood before them and entreated them to make one more charge! The victory was worse than doubtful for many minutes and the Grenadiers sounded the retreat (Clibborn declares he only took up the sound from someone else!) However on they rush again, 22nd, 25th and 12th and the combat which had never ceased becomes more furious than before, the close fire of musketry is one continued roar (you could not even hear the

artillery firing!) and the crest of the bersa is won.

Now for ourselves: when we had advanced close to the village I found that the Grenadiers were completely in our rear while the others were engaged on our right front. I thought of course some party had been ordered to carry the village, the key of the position, and naturally supposed that this task had been allotted to the Grenadiers. Accordingly I went left and pushed my horsemen into the most awfully difficult ground you can imagine, we had so many falls that more than fifty horses were on their heads at once, and at the same time the fire from the village not sixty yards distant was tremendous, every nullah also was lined with matchlock men concealed in and firing through the thorns. A great number of our men and horses were shot here. My horse, a firstrate hunter was mortally wounded through the belly and lungs, other balls struck my sword scabbard etc. To my disgust the ground to the left of the village was absolutely impassable, and the Grenadiers did not attack the village! While we were still halted



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under fire endeavouring to form in ground that would admit of no order or arrangement a staff officer came to me saying we were wanted in front, and that the 9th Cavalry had refused to charge or would not charge (these were his words, with their truth I have nothing to do). I immediately pushed on at the trot, passed close under the right of the village, and charged shortly after crossing the river; we passed the Bengal Cavalry halted, one squadron in line on the left and the remainder dispersed about the village firing pistols into it. We charged right through the enemy's camp, slew more than a hundred of them and took Nusseer Khan's standard (a very old green flag with a lion and sword and Nusseer's name on it). The Beloochees did not run; to a man they smote sternly to the last as my fellows closed with them. I had just begun to reform after the charge when Major Waddington came galloping up to say that we were wanted in the rear to repel a threatened attack on the baggage guard; accordingly back Russell and I went with what men we could get together, but FitzGerald not hearing my trumpets continued the pursuit and slew many more of the enemy. Their cavalry seeing our charge and us in full possession of their camp fled altogether and never came into action at all; there were at least 5000 of them! Our charge decided the battle (the General told me so on the ground). Our rear was not attacked, and thus ended one of the hardest and most honestly fought battles ever recorded in history.

The British losses at Miani were 6 British officers killed, and 13, with 3 Indian officers, wounded; 54 other ranks killed and 177 wounded; about one-ninth of the total force actually engaged. The Scinde Horse had 17 sowars wounded, some mortally, 23 horses killed and 21 wounded. The losses of the Bengal cavalry were less in horses killed but heavier among the soldiers and included one British officer killed and 4 wounded. The difference may be ascribed to their assault dismounted on the village and the slower speed, as compared with Jacob's, of their mounted attack.¹⁰⁴

The casualties in the Mirs' host were fearfully severe, particularly in killed. Jacob says, 'The dead men were lying literally in heaps; I counted one of 80 and another of 50 in front of where the 22nd fought and they were lying nearly as thickly in front of the other corps.' The Talpurs themselves probably exaggerated their losses in admitting, as Jacob records, 5000 killed or died of wounds.

During the night Outram returned from his expedition to the riverain shikargahs. He had succeeded in partially burning the woods

towards the Indus, and the smoke had been seen during the battle; but his party had been too exhausted to carry out his plan of emerging to

create a diversion on the flank and rear of the Baluch army.

In the early morning of the 18th Mir Sobdar sent his munshi, Awatrai by name, with a letter informing Sir Charles that he had taken no part in the hostilities. Jacob was with the pickets when the munshi approached, and on obtaining the General's leave to bring him to his tent asked him whether he had any arms concealed. Awatrai replied that he had not and great was his consternation when a search revealed a sword underneath the camel saddle, which his driver had hidden there without his knowledge. Jacob however took this in good part, and produced the munshi before Sir Charles, who expressed his satisfaction with Sobdar's message, but desired his representative to bring in all the belligerent Mirs, who were to surrender in person before noon, failing which Hyderabad would be attacked. Nasir Khan and his allies decided to reject the alternative heroic measures recommended by some of their counsellors, to defend the fort with the troops who had returned from the battle and the fresh levies which had gathered, or to cross the river with them and renew the struggle in western Sind; for there was no time to remove their women and children and the treasure. Nasir Khan, Shahdad and the young Hussein Ali Khan, who had been present in the battle accompanied Awatrai back to Miani. Jacob conducted the Mirs to the tent pitched for their reception. 105 Napier returned their swords and spoke kindly to them, saying that their ultimate disposal rested with the Governor-General, but that until his orders were received they would be treated with all consideration consistent with security. Outram persuaded the General to allow Hussein Ali to return to the fort on parole.

Napier also wrote to Mir Sobdar Khan, telling him to remain perfectly at his ease, and to take care of the fort and town of Hyderabad. Outram at the same time sent word to Mir Rustam Khan that he would

be well advised to make his submission.

While this was going forward an emissary from Mir Sher Mahomed, the independent prince of Mirpur, was in the camp. His master had advanced with a considerable force to within six miles of Miani, and wished to be informed what were the General's intentions towards himself. After consulting Outram Sir Charles wrote in reply, 'If you disperse your troops and keep no one with you, I shall reckon you just the same as before.' Sher Mahomed withdrew to his own territories, but decided to watch further events before making his peace. 106

Napier this day wrote his dispatch on the battle of Miani. Of Jacob and the Scinde Horse he says, 'To this able soldier and his regiment I

am indebted for the most active services, long previous to and during the combat. He won the enemy's camp, from which he drove a body of three or four thousand cavalry.' But passing over the well deserved eulogies of the troops and the description of the battle, the dispatch is particularly remarkable for an error in a date, on which Napier founded his accusation of deliberate treachery on the part of the Mirs in attacking Outram; to this was mainly due the subsequent annexation of Sind by the Governor-General. Napier writes that the Talpurs signed the treaty on 14th February; that this was immediately followed by a hostile demonstration by the Baluchis, and that next morning the Residency was attacked. It may be recollected that the signing of the draft treaty and the demonstration against Outram took place on the night of the 12th: the demonstration being the immediate result, as Mir Nasir Khan later showed, of the arrival at Hyderabad of news of the seizure by Jacob of Hyat Khan Marri and his men that morning. This incident was looked upon by the Baluch sardars as a final declaration of war by the General who, disregarding the fact that the Mirs had agreed to sign the treaty, which was reported to him on the 10th, would be satisfied with nothing but possession of the fort of Hyderabad. Nasir Khan himself only abandoned hope of averting hostilities on the 14th and had meanwhile urged Outram to rejoin the General, as he might find himself unable to restrain the fury of the Baluchis.

Outram himself declares that he at once pointed out to Sir Charles the mistake in ascribing to 14th February events which really occurred on the 12th, and protested against the injustice of the implication that the Talpurs had acted with deliberate treachery: but the despatch went

off to Lord Ellenborough unaltered. 107

On the night of the 18th Jacob, who had employed his scanty leisure in making a survey of the field of Miani, was sent with his regiment and the 9th Cavalry to Hyderabad in charge of the British wounded. The rest of the army followed next morning and the whole encamped near the ruined Residency. Here Jacob found time to write to his father a brief account of the battle. He was 'somewhat tired'. 'For the last four nights I have not slept an instant and have been on horseback almost without intermission for the last 30 hours.' 108

Rustam Khan and the other Khairpur Mirs now surrendered and were installed with their cousins in a garden within the perimeter of the camp occupied by the army, entrenchment of which was immediately

begun.

On the 20th Napier issued a stern order to put down plundering by the camp followers and also directed Mir Sobdar to dismiss all armed Baluchis from the fort, town and suburbs. The Mir obeyed, evidently

without apprehension of the sequel designed; Outram too supposed that Sir Charles only intended to place a strong guard over the fort gate.

This day Outram relinquished his charge as Commissioner, handing over to Napier a letter which he had written on 27th January, but held back till the General should dispense with his services. He therein stated that as within his terms of reference he saw no hope of effecting any good as Commissioner, he would not draw the pay allotted to the post but simply his allowance as a captain of the army in the field. This quixotry was intended as a pointed reflection on Lord Ellenborough: for Outram at the time and for many months afterwards supposed that Napier had done no more than carry out the Governor-General's instructions.

Whatever regrets Jacob may have felt for the departure of his friend, he fully understood the intolerable position in which he had been placed and was in complete agreement with him on the iniquities of the Sind policy; he had just written to his father that Outram did well to go—'He cannot serve under such a man as my Lord Ellenborough.'109

They were not to meet again for fourteen years.

Outram dropped down the river en route for Bombay and England, his heart and mind tormented by thoughts of the injustice which he had tried in vain to avert. From Tatta he wrote to his old subordinate Brown, imploring him to do all in his power to alleviate the hard lot of the Mirs and to assure them of his active sympathy. But the next step to their prejudice had already been taken. Hardly had he stepped on board the steamer when Napier issued a general order for a detachment to occupy the fort and city of Hyderabad, accompanied by prize agents who were to take possession of all public treasure, 'till the decision of the Governor-General is received'. The part of the fort where the Mirs' families resided was not to be entered, and the strictest discipline was to be observed towards the peaceable people of the town.

The Mirs or their representatives now produced their treasures. Next, the prize agents ordered that the Talpur families should be moved out of the zenanas, a period of three days being allowed to the ladies to remove themselves and their belongings. The palanquins in which they were conveyed were not searched and they were thus able to secure some of their personal jewellery; but as their slave girls were subjected to search at the gate by a common woman in the keeping of one of the officers, a great deal fell into the hands of the agents. Moreover many of the Mirs' confidential servants had been imprisoned, and there was no means of moving furniture and other personal belongings.

On 23rd February Mir Mir Mahomed Khan, who had compromised

himself in a letter written together with Nasir Khan to their governor in Karachi, was sent to join the other captive princes, and he was followed next day by the bed-ridden Mir Sobdar. Neither had taken part in the battle but their feudatories had fought alongside the others.

Napier now issued general orders for the despatch of business. Among these, 'everything relative to Prizes' was referable 'to the Prize Agents'. He had written to Ellenborough shortly after appointing them, urging that they should be allowed to report direct to the Governor-General's secretary, and that he himself should have nothing to do with the matter. Left to their own discretion the agents, after securing the gold, jewels, valuable arms and similar treasure, laid hands on the personal household belongings of the Talpur families, no distinction being made between State and private property; and by the beginning of March regular auctions were held to convert the miscellaneous contents of the fort into cash.

On a few occasions Jacob went to the scene in order to examine some horses among the prize property which his men wished to purchase to supply the places of the large number disabled in the battle. There he saw heaps of silk embroidery, many pieces half finished and with the needles still in the work; ladies' dresses, infants' clothing and caps, ladies' work baskets and boxes, toilettes, carpets, furniture, beds and bedding, children's cots, and immense quantities of crockery and glass, lying exposed for sale. Jacob made no secret of his indignation at the prize agents' proceedings, arguing openly that no conquest conferred a right over the private personal property of individuals, particularly women and children.

The Mirs and their ministers more than once complained to the General; but he would seem to have professed ignorance of the transactions and always referred the petitioners to the prize agents, 'whose business it is to settle such questions'—as if these same agents were not the very people complained against. In one instance Jacob records an appeal being made successfully to E. J. Brown, who had become Civil Secretary to Napier: he overruled the prize agent who had refused the request of one of the Mirs' ladies, who was expecting a child, for a favourite bedstead which was plated with gold. 110

The General now had occasion to issue more stringent orders to put down plundering by the camp followers; remarking that such conduct would not only prevent the Beloochees from becoming our friends,

but turn the Scindians against us.'

The Baluch warriors had in fact been rallying to Mir Sher Mahomed of Mirpur ever since Miani, and on 3rd March Napier sent him an ultimatum to disband them and come in to prove his own innocence,

or expect to be attacked. But the Mir was well informed of all that was passing in Hyderabad and had no intention of proceeding there. He decided to maintain his ground with as strong an army as possible, but to remain on the defensive. Napier's own position was at this time far from secure, with the fort and the incomplete entrenched camp, four miles apart, both to be guarded, and the Talpur prisoners on his hands. But having his base on the river he could wait for reinforcements which he had summoned both from Karachi and Sukkur; Ellenborough too had dispatched troops from Ferozepur on hearing of the outbreak of hostilities. Meanwhile Sher Mahomed's men interrupted the mail route via Cutch and other bands of Baluchis were active along the lower Indus.

The Mir was aware of the approach of reinforcements and saw that his position was becoming dangerous. On 15th March he sent a blustering message: if the General released his prisoners and restored his plunder, he would be allowed to evacuate the country unmolested. The envoy had scarcely delivered his message when the evening gun sounded; this, said Napier, was his answer. Sir Charles was however still anxious for his reinforcements, and being led to believe that the captive princes were in constant communication with Sher Mahomed through their attendants, vented his wrath on them in a menacing letter. On the same day—the 18th—he went out on a reconnaissance with Jacob and the Scinde Horse to show Mir Sher Mahomed that he was not afraid of leaving his entrenched position, and also to divert his attention from the body of troops now approaching Hyderabad by the land route from Rohri. On a second reconnaissance, on the 20th, Napier observed the position—a very strong one—occupied by the Mir at Tando Jam Ali. On his return he issued a general order to the troops, declaring his intention of marching against Sher Mahomed on the 24th. 111

On 21st March boats came up the Indus bringing artillery officers with recruits, some supplies, money and ammunition from Karachi; and almost simultaneously the 21st Bombay Native Infantry arrived by river from Sukkur. The final reinforcement—a small brigade consisting of the 1st Troop Horse Artillery, the 3rd Bombay Cavalry and the 8th Bombay Native Infantry, under the command of Major Stack was now within a long march of Hyderabad. Sir Charles sent out McMurdo with the Poona Horse under Lieutenant Tait, who joined Stack at Matiari. Marching on the 22nd, Stack had passed the field of Miani when the enemy appeared on his left front and subsequently advanced in considerable force on the left rear of the column, but were driven back by a sharp cannonade from the Horse Artillery. About the time the firing ceased, Jacob arrived with his corps, having been sent out by

the General to meet Stack at Miani, and the Scinde Horse formed the

rear guard of the column on its final march into the camp. 112

Napier gave the new arrivals a day's rest on the 23rd and in the evening brigaded and manœuvred the rest of his troops. Envoys from Sher Mahomed once more arrived to demand the General's surrender, but he took them along the line and told them to report to their master all that they saw. He then passed across the Fuleli an advanced force, joining it with the main army at day-break. Before marching against Sher Mahomed he caused the Governor-General's gazette on the battle of Miani, which had just reached him from Bombay, to be read out to the troops. Victory had placed at the disposal of the British Government 'the country on both banks of the Indus, from Sukkur to the sea, with the exception of such portions thereof as may belong to Meer Ali Murad, of Khyrpore, and to any other of the Ameers who may have remained faithful to his engagements.' Lord Ellenborough continued, 'The Governor-General cannot forgive a treacherous attack upon a representative of the British Government, nor can he forgive hostile aggression prepared by those who were in the act of signing a treaty.' Napier had thus achieved his object.

The gazette also announced that the Scinde Horse was to be permanently attached, on its existing establishment, to the Army of Bombay, and it was among the units receiving the battle honour 'Hyderabad 1843'. And on 24th March, when the army marched at dawn to attack Mir Sher Mahomed, it was once more Jacob and his corps that formed

the advance guard.113

Napier had taken the precaution of placing the captive Talpurs in a steamer under the guard of the Indian Navy, and he left five hundred men to garrison the fort and eight hundred for the entrenched camp, mainly recruits, convalescents and men who had been wounded at Miani. There remained at his disposal rather more than five thousand men, the strength of the infantry and artillery being double that at Miani. Every man, from the general to the latest joined sepoy, was confident of victory.

The march was directed towards the east, but after four miles a peasant brought word that the Mir had shifted his position and was some two miles to the northward. Sir Charles at once sent on the Scinde Horse to reconnoitre and ordered the column to wheel to the left and follow the direction he himself took as he galloped after Jacob. The latter established contact and formed line within cannon shot of the enemy; the main body of the army soon came up, but as at Miani its formation into line of battle was a lengthy process. The left, formed within 1200 yards of the enemy, was galled by their artillery and while

the General in person was employed in directing its withdrawal and the consequent re-dressing of the whole, he ordered Major Waddington and other staff officers forward to examine the Baluch position, which

they did from three hundred yards' distance.

The British army was drawn up with cavalry on either flank and details of artillery dispersed between the infantry corps in the centre. The Scinde Horse were on the extreme right of the line and next to them the 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry. The left rested on the bank of the Fuleli, the bed of which was deep at this point, with mud and pools of water. Beyond it was a thick grove of trees and to the front, on the nearer bank, the tops of other trees were visible over a high bank of earth, which ran continuously for well over a mile to the right. From behind this bank came the flashes and smoke of the enemy's cannon, and the heads and flourished weapons of the Baluchis could be seen at intervals all along it. It was clearly an entrenched position with no discernible weak spot, though it was impossible from the front to judge in what strength it was held. Its extent to the left was ill-defined, but about two miles from the Fuleli there was a grove which Napier suspected to be held by the enemy; if so, there might be danger to his own right flank when he advanced his line. Napier now ordered his artillery to open fire, but as the enemy's guns continued to be plied as vigorously as before he soon felt it necessary to lessen the range by a general advance of five hundred yards. From the new position all the British batteries kept up a heavy cannonade for nearly an hour, and succeeded in blowing up several of the Baluch ammunition tumbrils. Though their guns were by no means silenced, Napier felt that longer preparation would only cool the spirit of his troops and resolved to launch his attack.

This was to be directed first against the point near the bank of the Fuleli where the appearance of trees behind the embankment seemed to indicate a village corresponding with that at Miani, for as yet there was nothing to show that it was occupied. When Leslie's troop of Horse Artillery began to advance, supported by the cavalry on their left and on their right by the 22nd, the Baluchis were seen to move rapidly towards the point menaced, which confirmed the General's belief that it was the most lightly held. Leslie was ordered to advance in 'bounds', at each halt firing obliquely on the centre and left of the enemy's line, while the rest of the artillery crossed their fire. The infantry were to attack in echelon from the left, so that the right of the line, partially refused, would not be taken in flank by any counter-attack that might be made from the wood on that side.

As soon as the Horse Artillery and the 22nd had advanced within

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musket range of the entrenchments they came under a heavy fire of matchlocks; Napier had in fact selected the strongest point in the Baluch position for his attack, as the village—Nareja—immediately in the rear was also full of the enemy. There was nothing to be done but press home the attack; but just at this moment a messenger hastened up to tell the General that the cavalry on his right wing were charging; he instantly galloped off to see what had occurred.

While Major Stack, as commander of this cavalry brigade, must have given the order for the charge, what we know of his military qualities suggests that the initiative came from one or other of his regimental commanders—John Jacob of the Scinde Horse or Captain Delamain of the 3rd Bombay Cavalry. Delamain had shown his mettle in Afghanistan, and Jacob after his charge at Miani knew perfectly what

his men could achieve against Baluch warriors. 114

The opportunity came as Leslie's shrapnel began to enfilade the enemy's position, causing some disorganized movement among the tribesmen in the centre of their line. But there were no signs of turbans or flourished swords above the sector of the embankment immediately to the front of the cavalry brigade; it thus seemed likely that it was not held and that the enemy's line did not extend to the wood. Now the two regiments were put in motion, and swept forward with Delamain well in advance of the whole line: they breasted the embankment, crossed the channel behind it, which was unoccupied, and streamed over the higher bank beyond. They now came in sight of the real left wing of the Baluch army posted in and behind a second trench running at an oblique angle from the first; and bringing up their right shoulders charged straight at it. The Baluchis fired off their matchlocks and then had scarcely time to draw their swords as the horsemen came crashing in amongst them, overturning and cutting them down; in a short and fierce struggle they were destroyed as a military body. The two regiments, rapidly re-forming, now charged Sher Mahomed's horsemen, posted in reserve; they fled at once, and a running fight ensued over several miles in which the Baluchis, horse and foot, were cut down or shot in a succession of mêlées. Jacob, who had not himself struck a blow at Miani, now had to use his sword freely in personal combat.115 At length the pursuers caught sight of Mir Sher Mahomed himself, making the best of his way out of the battle. FitzGerald and Delamain pressed on in the hope of capturing him, but were overtaken by Colonel Pattle, Napier's second-in-command, who checked the pursuit, thinking that the two corps were too far dispersed and might be needed in the main battle.

By the time they rejoined the serious fighting was over. Sir Charles

quickly perceived that the charge of Stack's brigade was likely to be successful and was no longer anxious for his right flank, though he was at first annoyed that the cavalry had acted without his orders. His infantry attack in echelon from the left was, at any rate, appropriate in the circumstances, and he galloped back to lead it. The 22nd advancing at his word under a severe fire were ordered to withhold their own until they were forty paces from the entrenchment; they then poured in a volley and plunged into it. A mass of swordsmen attacked them in front and on their flanks. Overcoming these in a fierce struggle and with heavy loss, they forced their way up the high parados and down into a second entrenched channel, far wider and deeper; again tulwar and bayonet clashed in hand to hand combat. On their right the artillery under Hutt advanced to the edge of the first entrenchment dealing fearful destruction at point blank range; to their right again the 25th, 21st and 12th Bombay Native Infantry came into action, supported by Whitlie's battery; the remaining brigade in the echelon consisting of the 8th and 1st Grenadiers had at first to withhold their fire, as a portion of the Scinde Horse and the 3rd Cavalry were seen to be in front of them, after destroying the enemy's left wing. 116

Meanwhile on the left of the 22nd Leslie brought his guns up under heavy fire to the brink of the Fuleli and on to the high parapet of the entrenchment, whence they raked the village of Nareja. Farther to the left, the Poona Horse and 9th Cavalry descended into the Fuleli and found their way past the village, completely turning the Baluchis' right flank.

By this time the irresistible 22nd had forced its way, with the loss of one-third of its numbers, over the second channel, and turned left on the village, the 25th and 21st Native Infantry conforming to its movement. The General was in the midst of a final fierce struggle among the houses; a magazine blew up, and at length the enemy were expelled and retreated sullenly. Napier put himself at the head of the cavalry of the left wing, and prevented the retiring Baluchis from gaining the shelter of the forests along the Indus, where they might have rallied; they were thrown back on to the swords of Stack's brigade as it returned, and completely dispersed.

The casualties of the British army were 39 killed and 231 wounded—more than half the loss being borne by Her Majesty's 22nd. The Scinde Horse had a non-commissioned officer and seventeen men wounded, and thirteen horses killed. The Baluchis were supposed to have lost about two thousand men killed and wounded.¹¹⁷

On 26th March Napier marched the army eastward to Tando Allayar, and next day went on himself with Jacob and the Scinde

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Horse to Mirpur, Sher Mahomed's unfortified capital, which the Mir had abandoned. From this place he sent FitzGerald with one squadron to reconnoitre the fort of Umarkot, on the edge of the desert; on his return from Balmir, early in February, FitzGerald had visited this place and believed it to have been provisioned by the Talpurs as a rallying point. Meanwhile in accordance with general orders received from Lord Ellenborough Napier formally presented to the Scinde Horse in front of the other troops the standard taken by them at 'the ever memorable battle of Meeanee, in which that regiment by its distinguished conduct earned for itself the honour of being hereafter permanently attached to the Bombay Army.'

At the same time John Jacob received a personal distinction; Lord Ellenborough appointed him an honorary aide-de-camp to himself, 'as a public testimony of the high approbation with which, as head of the

Government of India, I regard your services'. 118

Napier reinforced FitzGerald, who had halted at Gherur, with some infantry and artillery, and Jacob marched with this detachment. Information that Umarkot was strongly garrisoned and that a rise in the Indus was filling the canals between Mirpur and Hyderabad caused the General to countermand a further advance; but almost at once it was found that both dangers had been exaggerated, and the detachment was further reinforced and allowed to proceed. On 4th April Umarkot, after a short parley, was surrendered without a shot fired on either side. FitzGerald was left in charge of the fort with his squadron of the Scinde Horse and a company of infantry, and the other troops returned to Mirpur. Napier now marched the main body back to Hyderabad leaving two detachments at Mirpur and Tando Allayar. These, with that at Umarkot, he placed under the command of John Jacob, his head-quarters being at Mirpur.

Jacob's orders, dated 10th April, were to strengthen and repair the fort at Mirpur, to take any measures he thought necessary to keep the country tranquil, and to put down any collection of armed Baluchis, if he could reach them without endangering the safety of his post. He

was to send in weekly reports of his proceedings. 119

Jacob could hear of no assemblage of Baluchis nearer than at Naokot, a fort near the edge of the desert some sixty-five miles to the south of Mirpur. A body of Sher Mahomed's men here cut off the line of communication between Bombay and Sind by way of Cutch. Jacob thought he could surprise them if he moved without delay, and so marched from Mirpur with two squadrons of his regiment, simply informing the General what he was about. He was overtaken while on the march, nearly half-way to Naokot, by an express message from Sir Charles,

disapproving of the move and ordering him to return at once to Mirpur. Jacob countermarched, and wrote expressing regret at having acted contrary to the General's wishes, explaining that he thought his instructions justified the attempt.

Napier replied that while he approved in principle of the move, his own plans had been upset by Jacob's marching without orders 'which must never be done except when cut off, and when it is impossible to wait for orders . . . if the enemy are within reach and are likely to

escape by delay, you can use your judgment.'

The Naokot business was not emergent—and unfortunately the commander of a small force designed to take possession of Tando Mahomed Khan, twenty miles south of Hyderabad, had meanwhile found the place held by hostile Baluchis and had retreated. Napier seems to have supposed that Jacob would have reached Naokot before his messenger could overtake him, 'However I know you are a careful commander and will go bridle in hand.' Two days later, on 25th April, he wrote, still supposing that Jacob had gone on, 'I am exceedingly anxious to have the result of your expedition: not that I have any doubt of your keeping clear of mistakes, but I wish to hear whether the Beloochee has really so strong a force in that part as he is said to have; and if so what your opinion is about the country, for I much fear that the inundation will render it impassable for troops.'120

But the opportunity had been lost and Jacob was obliged to remain at his headquarters. He obtained the General's permission to reduce the garrison of Umarkot and to send FitzGerald to Sukkur to bring down the families of the Scinde Horsemen who had been left there. His old second-in-command, Malcolm, was on his way back from leave to rejoin the regiment; and on his arrival Russell returned to his former corps, complimented with a highly gratifying regimental order from

his commandant.

Sir Charles Napier was disappointed in his supposition that Sher Mahomed, being cut off from any base in the desert, would flee to the Panjab. The Mir kept the field, for the country people were devoted to his cause, supplied him freely with grain and with information of the proceedings of the British, while concealing from the latter what they

knew of his movements and plans. 121

Napier had been allowed to send the captive Talpurs out of the country and they were removed to Bombay at the end of April; but with Sher Mahomed at large the conquest of Sind was by no means complete. Moreover, the Mir's brother Shah Mahomed was raising the country on the right bank of the Indus in middle Sind and Ali Murad's rabble, which was first sent to deal with him, had little stomach for the

task. The General summoned Colonel Roberts down from Sukkur with detachments of the 6th, 15th and 20th Bombay Native Infantry, some artillery, and a troop of the 3rd Cavalry, the duty of this brigade being first to crush Shah Mahomed and then cross the river which was patrolled by steamers of the Indian Navy, and operate in Sher Mahomed's rear.

To Jacob was committed the task of preventing Sher Mahomed from breaking back towards the desert, while Napier himself advanced

northwards from Hyderabad.

At the beginning of June the General informed Jacob of his part in the plan. He was concerned, and with good reason, at the increasing difficulties of active operations. Not only did the canals, now filled by the inundation, hamper swift movement, but the heat was fearful; he had already been prostrated himself and the troops in Hyderabad were suffering. What of those in the 'jungle'? Could not Jacob thatch his tents? Jacob wrote back cheerfully, 'We have no tents to thatch except a few belonging to some of the Native Officers, but I doubt not but that we shall weather it out.' He would be able, he thought, to make a most effective demonstration against Sher Mahomed from Mirpur; if the General would give him two guns, in addition to the four companies of infantry he had suggested, the Mir would consider the force an army. Napier agreed, but for some days he was perplexed by conflicting reports of Sher Mahomed's whereabouts and strength. Jacob had meanwhile heard that the Mir had dispatched a body of horse to collect men and seize grain from a place only twenty-five miles to the north of Mirpur; he sent a party to obtain more information, but could find out little enough; the one certain piece of news being that three hundred Baluchis had left the vicinity of Mirpur itself to join Sher Mahomed. 122

On 9th June a subaltern of the 20th Bombay Native Infantry joined Jacob with four companies of his regiment and two guns, and a letter from Sir Charles arrived next day telling Jacob that he might advance. His latest information was that Sher Mahomed was at Hala. Napier gave his views on the Mir's probable intentions. His own plan was to pin him to the river bank if possible; when between three converging forces—Roberts's, Jacob's and his own—Sher Mahomed must be destroyed or surrender, for the Indian Navy would prevent him from crossing the Indus. Jacob's part was to head him off from the desert. Napier had kept back this letter in the expectation of hearing from Roberts and was able to add that that officer had surprised Shah Mahomed's camp at Pir Ari, west of the river, and captured the Mir: 'Roberts will be across this evening, and will bother brother Shere, I suspect, who will —— and you will hunt him by the scent. Between

you and Roberts, Shere Mahomed has a good chance of being picked

up.'128

Jacob marched that evening, but experienced great difficulty with his transport. The baggage camels were useless, worn out animals, and of the number carrying water-skins which had been sent only a few arrived. As usual, Jacob overcame all his difficulties before reporting them, and the General was highly pleased at his progress. His nephew William Napier wrote on the 12th, 'You have Sir Charles' permission to rob, murder, steal, hang and anything else to procure carriage; you may do anything if you can but catch Shere Mahomed: do this and all your crimes will be pardoned. Roberts is at Sukkurund to-day or to-morrow. By to-morrow night you will not be far from Koheran. Shere Mahomed's followers have mostly abandoned him, and he will try to bolt to the desert. He fears the river and Koheran, and I don't think he will venture south. . . .'

On the morning of the 13th Jacob arrived with his little force at the village of Shahdadpur, where he received information that Sher Mahomed had marched from Hala towards the south-east. He heard nothing from Roberts, but supposed that the Mir's movement might well be the result of that officer's crossing the river in his rear. With the General now moving up towards Nasarpur, the Mir would almost certainly attempt to break through to the east, and Jacob calculated that Shahdadpur was a suitable place at which to watch for his next move.

At eleven o'clock that night a Brahmin servant of Sher Mahomed came into Jacob's camp and told him that his master was marching to attack him with his whole force, said to amount to between eight thousand and ten thousand men. Jacob pushed out his picquets, which about 3 a.m. sent back word that the enemy was coming on in considerable force. He sent out several parties to reconnoitre and finding that the Baluchis advanced very slowly, decided to attack them. He left a troop of the Scinde Horse and a company of the infantry to protect the camp and marched forward with the remainder, about eight hundred men of all arms.

The Baluch force was taken by surprise and hastily formed up on the bank of a nullah, horse, foot and artillery, in imposing numbers, and opened fire with three guns on Jacob's column. He in turn formed his line and replied with his artillery. The light was still poor and every movement on the powdery white soil raised volumes of dust. Sher Mahomed and his subordinate leaders seem to have lost contact with each other, and their confidence evaporated. A rumour spread that another British force was about to attack them in flank. A sudden panic seized the Baluchis; they broke their ranks and began to withdraw from

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their position. Jacob, seeing this irresolution, advanced with the Scinde Horse, whereupon they dispersed and fled in every direction. The ground in their front was extremely rugged, and intersected with deep ravines; by the time Jacob had found a way across these obstacles the Mir and his men were well on their way to safety, and among the jungles, sandhills and canals running full of water effective pursuit was impracticable; but a few prisoners were taken.

The victory was all but bloodless: five or six Baluchis had been killed by Jacob's artillery fire and two of his horses by that of the enemy. But the Mir left on the field several standards and three well-equipped brass guns. The prisoners stated the number of their force actually present as 4000, the remainder with another gun having lagged behind or deserted. Among their sardars was a younger brother of Sher Mahomed, Mir Mahomed son of Mir Rustam, and a brother-in-law of Mir Nasir Khan—proof enough that the hopes of all the Talpur race had lain in this last venture.

In reporting this affair, Jacob stated his opinion that Sher Mahomed would not again attempt to take refuge in the desert. It appeared that he had fled back towards the river, beyond which his family had taken refuge in Ranikot fort in the hills. The natural assumption was that he was now certain to be caught between Roberts, Napier and the Indian Navy.¹²⁴

But Sher Mahomed, though now powerless, still had the sympathy of the country people; he was able to slip away to the north, for Roberts, his whole force in great distress from the appalling heat, had not been able to cross the river and remained at Sehwan till many days after the affair at Shahdadpur. Napier too did not reach Nasarpur, twenty miles northward from Hyderabad, till the night of the 14th. The General had intended to push on to Jacob's assistance with his cavalry and artillery, but next morning he was himself incapacitated with heat-stroke and unable to move. He was lying half conscious when Jacob's dispatch arrived and it, in the words of his nephew William Napier, 'did him as much good as Doctor Gibbon.'125 Her Majesty's 28th Regiment, which formed part of his force, had meanwhile lost one officer and thirty-one men dead from heat apoplexy. Sir Charles, at the age of sixty-one, doubtless owed his survival to his hard and abstemious life. He was carried back to Hyderabad in a palanquin, recalling the whole of the force with which he had advanced: eighteen more men of the 28th died there. His own recovery was rapid, and William Napier wrote to Jacob again, 'Your defeat of Sher Mahomed cured him.'

In his dispatch Jacob had remarked, 'The conduct of all officers and men under my command has been most steady and excellent

throughout, but in an action such as that of this morning there is no room for the display of much military prowess.' But Napier recognized the value of the stroke at such a time. Mir Ali Murad's conduct had begun to arouse his suspicions and no one knew better than himself that Regular troops could not keep the field in that season without fearful losses from the heat. Three weeks later, when Jacob arrived in Hyderabad, after capturing two more of Sher Mahomed's guns, the General told him that he had prevented a Pindari war in Sind. 126

CHAPTER X

Sind under Napier

When Jacob brought his regiment into Hyderabad on 7th July the great heat was past: and soon rain came like the real monsoon of Gujarat and the Deccan—enough to encourage the cultivators to sow their fields although many of the canals would give no water, not having been cleared out at the due season when the Mirs, their officers and feudatory chiefs had more urgent calls on their resources. By some the rain was hailed as a sign of Divine approval of the overthrow of the Talpurs. Certainly, it added to the miseries of the Mirs' ladies, huddled together in leaky huts in Tando Yusif village within sight of the fort where they had lived in splendour—Mrs. Richardson who visited them observed in some distress the wretchedness of their accommodation. 127

Not that the conquerors were housed in luxury. A few had weatherproof lodging in the Mirs' houses within the fort: here the General, now Governor, took up his quarters in Mir Nasir Khan's palace, where Lord Lake in his red coat still looks down from the walls of the painted chamber. Jacob and his men were quartered in a village near the fort to the south; the majority of the troops were still in tents in the en-

trenched camp on the Indus three miles away.

There were over a hundred British officers in Hyderabad and the exhilaration of conquest had not yet passed off. The sales of prize property were still going on as if the contents of the fort were inexhaustible. Jacob, as we have seen, was one of a minority who were disgusted by these proceedings, and vehemently argued that no conquest gave any right over the private personal property of individuals, particularly of women and children.

During Jacob's absence in the field the editor of the Bombay Times, Dr. Buist, had been informed that officers of the army had taken former inmates of the Talpurs' harem into keeping, and published an absurd

and libellous article, bewailing the decay of chivalry and censuring the breach of private and public morality. Sir Charles issued a categorical refutation, signed by all the officers present in Hyderabad. Thus began Napier's hatred of Buist and his newspaper, which is so apparent in his journal and his brother's writings. The article was probably based on a misconception of an unsavoury episode in the proceedings of the prize agents: a country prostitute kept by Leeson, the baggage master of the army, had been employed to search the maid-servants of the Talpur families whenever they left the fort, to ensure that they did not smuggle out jewellery. Napier himself did not come to know of this till later; he had intended to give Leeson a good appointment, but this lost him his chance.¹²⁸

It was a joyful day when the officers of the army found that Sir Charles had been allowed unrestricted patronage in the staffing of his civil government, and was by no means inclined to bring in civilians. Napier had been discussing with Jacob a plan to augment the Scinde Horse, and Jacob had told Lieutenant Marston that he would be glad to get him appointed to the corps. Greatly daring, Marston went to ask the General whether he could accept this offer. There was an explosion-'Who the hell is Jacob to offer you anything?'—and the applicant was sent to raise a police force in Karachi. 129 The Collectorships of Sukkur and Karachi went to Captains Pope and Preedy, who had long been on the staff at these places: as for Hyderabad, Napier chose Lieutenant Rathborne, a man with a quick wit and racy tongue, affable to those Baluchis who had begun to court the English and full of ideas on civil government. But though the plums were soon picked, there was hope of a second crop, and round the mess tables was a constant flow of speculation and banter only giving place, as the wine began its second tour, to the 'Baluch hunting'-the tale of who killed how many at Miani and Dubba-which was soon to prove as boring to a newcomer as that hardy perennial of the British dining-room, Waterloo. 180

Napier at first intended to employ the Scinde Horse for internal security duties, by posting strong detachments at strategic points to support the new police, and with a headquarters at Hyderabad equal to the combined strength of the outposts, to provide reliefs. Though this plan was not brought into effect, the augmentation of the corps which

it demanded was approved.

It took two years of correspondence to settle the details of the reorganization. The Governor-General was determined on principle to assimilate the Scinde Horse with the Irregular cavalry of Bengal; and this involved some reduction in the pay of several grades among the Indian officers and N.C.O.s, and of the non-combatant establishment.

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Jacob fought a stout battle for his men's rights and prospects, and for the organization on which he was convinced the efficiency of the corps must depend. Over and over again he explained how the conditions of service in Sind—the heavy expense of maintaining horses, the distance from the men's homes, the superiority of the equipment they had to

keep up-made the Bengal rates of pay insufficient.

'There is no doubt but that any number of human beings mounted on some description of quadrupeds might be maintained at these rates even in Scinde, but it is certainly an error to suppose that anything like efficient soldiers, efficiently mounted and armed, could be supported on the proposed rates of pay. . . . 'While the hospital and other non-combatant establishments would remain a dead letter as men simply could not be obtained for service in Sind, or even Bombay, on the rates allowed.

He implored Napier to save the regiment from utter ruin, and to protect the 'honest old soldiers who had fought and bled' under his command; and when orders reached him that the new pay scales were to be brought into effect at once, renewed his appeal in even stronger terms. Sir Charles seems to have obtained a postponement, and another six months passed before the Governor-General brought up

the matter again.

Meanwhile, Jacob had had to struggle for his own rights. While acting commandant in Captain Curtis's place, his emoluments under the operation of 'staff' regulations had actually been less than those of his own second-in-command. He had applied to Napier for an increase of pay and on the very day that Miani was fought the Governor-General appointed him substantive commandant, but on a reduced consolidated allowance of eight hundred rupees. This letter never reached Napier: it seems to have been assumed that the commandant was entitled to a thousand rupees as before. For a whole year the audit department failed to notice the irregularity, and then suddenly demanded a refund of the excess drawn.


Jacob protested in another characteristic letter. To mount himself properly he had had to purchase three horses for eleven hundred rupees each, his cavalry uniform and accoutrements had cost him four thousand rupees more, and he had inevitably incurred debt. 'The fact is that though I am certainly not given to luxurious habits and am willing to pass my life in the saddle, the salary of 1000 rupees per mensem is but little more than sufficient to cover my necessary monthly expenses. I have always kept up camels and a marching establishment ready to move to any distance at a moment's warning. . . .' Sir Charles replied that he felt sure that the Governor-General must have acted under a

misapprehension; 'I cannot suppose that he would order an unjust act towards yourself, whom he has so honoured as to make you his aidede-camp, and most deservedly so honoured; for I have no hesitation in telling you now, though I never did before, that I consider you one of the best officers I ever met in my life; and it was only a few days ago that, writing to my brother General Napier in Guernsey, I called you the Scidlitz of the Scinde Army. . . . I will write to the Governor-General, and am confident he will do justice. '132 Nevertheless, it was many months before Sir Charles succeeded in getting the commandant's pay raised to the former figure, and longer still before refund of the sums he had been mistakenly allowed to draw in excess was remitted. The relations between Napier and his 'old Advance Guard' continued to be cordial. In matters relating to the regiment Jacob found the General always open to conviction, though with his short experience of

Indian soldiers he required ample explanation.

The Scinde Horse had been quartered at Hyderabad for little more than a month when the long-awaited Gazette of Honours for the Sind battles was published. Sir Charles was advanced from his Knight Commandership to the Grand Cross of the Bath, as he had expected, and Outram was among the twenty-five Companionships. Most of the officers of Napier's staff and those of the rank of captain and above, commanding or second-in-command of units which had taken part in the battles, received the distinction. Napier expressed his dissatisfaction with the list, and prevailed on Lord Ellenborough to add Captains Hutt and Henderson, but it seems that he was even more vexed by the omission of Jacob. A Gazette of 13th August 1843 however stated that the conduct of Jacob, and of Lieutenant Tait who commanded a detachment of the Poona Horse, was considered to have entitled them to the distinction, which could not then be conferred on account of their want of rank. 'His Grace the Commander in Chief has however announced his intention of recommending both these officers for the brevet rank of Major and for the Companionship of the Order of the Bath, after they shall have been promoted to the Regimental rank of Captain.' Sir Charles seems to have considered this inadequate and, according to Jacob, wrote to him that he deserved to be promoted lieutenant-colonel for Shahdadpur: and that he would endeavour to obtain this for him, as no more than justice. Later Napier denied that he had written in these terms. 133

Early in September Sir Charles quitted Hyderabad for Karachi, henceforth the capital of the new province. His civil administration had extended into the districts and the whole country was quiet. He had opened the new régime with proclamations, one of which, issued under



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orders from Lord Ellenborough, abolished the transit duties levied by the Mirs on goods within their territories. A sequel to this gave Jacob a

disagreeable impression of Napier's government.

While he was at Mirpur in April, a copy of this proclamation was sent to him, as the only magistrate at the place, for publication, but after he had done this the country people complained that the dues were still being collected. The tax gatherer was called up and produced orders signed and sealed by the Collector of Hyderabad. These Jacob assumed, in face of the proclamation, to be forgeries; he arrested the man and informed Captain Rathborne the Collector. The latter however replied that the order was genuine and that the taxes would be levied, though the proclamation abolishing transit dues was still being published far and wide. It appears that though Ellenborough's intention was to abolish inland customs and town duties, Napier interpreted the order to apply

only to goods sent through Sind from frontier to frontier. 134

In September 1843 the Scinde Horse moved out of the suburb in which it had been quartered and encamped on the hill to the north of Hyderabad city. Here permanent lines for the Scinde Horse were begun. Jacob designed and built for himself a remarkable house overlooking the lines. The Collector and other officers were content to have run up for themselves the usual one-storied bungalows with walls of sun-dried brick and roof of mud plaster needing constant patching. Jacob's house was like a small English mansion of good burnt brick throughout; twostoried, with windows-regular windows with sills-taking the place of the ordinary Indian lattice-closed arches reaching to the ground: with interior staircases and two substantial round towers at the corners on the eastern side. It was an unusual home; 135 and here Jacob dwelt with his lieutenants. There were changes and comings and goings; Fitz-Gerald went off to Karachi to command Sir Charles's escort, which the General chose from his 'old Advance Guard'. Then Malcolm succumbed to the temptation of a Deputy Collectorship, carrying with him a farewell order from the commandant full of warm praise for his services and regret for his loss. But after six months Malcolm found that civil administration was not his métier and rejoined the corps. At the beginning of 1844 Lieutenant William Merewether of the 21st Bombay Infantry was at Jacob's request appointed as adjutant in the place of FitzGerald, whom Sir Charles had placed in command of his new Camel Corps. 136 Merewether was junior to his commandant by some thirteen years; and the friendship which grew up between them brought to Jacob the greatest happiness of his life. It was the complement of his friendship with Outram; Merewether felt for him much of the admiration and affectionate hero-worship that Jacob bestowed on the 'Bayard

of India', while Jacob's devotion to his lieutenant was that of a father to

his gallant son.

And what of Outram? He was now back in India, and under a cloud: for the differences of opinion between Sir Charles Napier and himself had developed into public controversy, and for the time being full official support had been given to the contentions of Ellenborough and Napier. Jacob, who had shared Outram's views on the impolicy and injustice of Sir Charles's proceedings before Miani, and disliked much that he had seen in Sind since, wrote to express his sympathy with him in the undeserved misrepresentation and official 'disgrace' under which he laboured, and assuring him of his undiminished regard. 'You are a good honest fellow,' Outram replied, 'for writing to a discarded and (apparently) discomfited and degraded man.'137 He explained how in England he had pleaded the cause of the Mirs and in so doing caused great embarrassment to the British Government, Lord Ellenborough and Sir Charles Napier, by referring to official documents of critical importance which Napier had failed to transmit to the Governor-General. He had never been entirely despondent but felt bound to refrain from publishing without leave the justification of his own proceedings which he had written, as it dealt with transactions in which he was concerned under official trust, and might be injurious to Government as well as to individuals, 'seeing that the evil of which I complained could not perhaps be undone without producing greater evils.' Sir Charles had recently published a letter written by him to Outram in July of the previous year, the tendency of which was to show that Outram had forced him, against his will, to reveal his Commissioner's inefficiency as a negotiator; but Outram was officially prohibited from publishing the reply he had sent in vindication of himself and controverting Napier's arguments.

Yet he had the full support of the directors of the East India Company; and in June 1844 they startled England and India by recalling Lord Ellenborough; this, Outram writes to Jacob, 'proves that I did not kick a dead lion (Jackass?)'. 138 It was not known for some time that Ellenborough's successor, Sir Henry Hardinge, was sent out with a mandate

to uphold his predecessor's Sind policy.

One argument which Outram had brought forward in his interviews with the authorities in England, on the impolicy of the annexation of Sind, was the exposure of troops employed to guard the north-west frontier which he and Jacob knew so well. He alludes to this in a letter to Jacob dated 28th February 1844; for the truth of his warning had for some time been apparent, in renewed plundering by the predatory Dombki and Jakhrani tribes.

The abolition of the Baluch Levy, of the payments to the 'loyal' Baluch chiefs of the Shikarpur area, and the discharge of Bijar Khan Dombki and Darya Khan Jakhrani from service as guides were logical consequences of the Ellenborough policy of withdrawal to the Indus. If the British possessions in Upper Sind were to be limited to Sukkur, the policing of the border beyond Shikarpur would again become the responsibility of the Mirs' Government. But with the 'conquest', it had now devolved permanently on the British; and Sir Charles did not yet understand the character of the 'independent' tribes of Kachhi. He seems to have assumed, from the remarkable tranquillity which followed the rout of Sher Mahomed by Jacob, and the ready acquiescence in British rule of most of the Baluch sardars in Sind—when they found their jagirs secured to them—that his own prestige as conqueror of Sind was in itself almost enough to overawe the border robbers.

But as we have seen these border tribes cared little for any authority that did not make its material power felt by them personally. They cared nothing for the fate of their neighbours who were foolish enough to oppose the British in a pitched battle. What they saw was that the

wonted area of their maraudings was inadequately guarded.

The raids had begun on Ali Murad's wrongfully appropriated territory of Burdika as early as May 1843; and though next month Napier sent some Irregular cavalry to Shikarpur, the country round Larkana, to the southward—thirty-five miles inside the British border and nearly one hundred from the Dombkis' headquarters—was raided in ever increasing force in the latter part of the year, and camels were carried off from the immediate neighbourhood of Shikarpur itself. Next, the Bugtis began to torment the country to the north-east of Shikarpur; the culmination was their sack of Mian Sahib, only seventeen miles distant. The raiders were nearly one thousand strong, and committed horrible atrocities.

Napier was anxious to strike an effective blow in reprisal and gave conditional approval to a plan of FitzGerald's to capture the archenemy Bijar Khan, by a coup-de-main on Phulaji, which place he had got to know well when serving under Jacob in 1842. He was ordered to stand fast until General Simpson arrived to arrange for supports, but FitzGerald, fearing that the plan would become known, persuaded Lieutenant Tait, his senior officer, to make the raid, trusting that a spectacular success would condone the disobedience of orders. The result was a fiasco. The expedition reached its objective too late, an attack directed against the gate instead of the much weaker walls was beaten off with heavy loss, and Tait withdrew the force. 139

After this, Shikarpur itself was threatened; Mir Sher Mahomed was

reported to be in the Marri country at the head of fifteen hundred men. The whole of the cavalry in Upper Sind was concentrated at Shikarpur to repel an invasion, and at this anxious moment the 64th Bengal Regiment, recently posted there, broke into open mutiny. This was the sequel to a mutinous combination of other Bengal troops which had refused to march to Sind unless they were granted the special allowance for service west of the Indus, which had recently been abolished. The commander of the 64th had induced his men to march by making some imprudent promises which could not be fulfilled. The mutiny was suppressed but almost immediately afterwards another disaster overtook the troops in Upper Sind. The grass cutters of the 6th Bengal Irregular Cavalry had gone for forage some eleven miles from Khangarh, their headquarters, accompanied by a strong escort. They were surprised by a party of Bijar Khan's marauders and a panic ensued. The grass cutters were slaughtered to a man, and many of the escort cut down in their flight; in all two hundred were killed, and fifty of the cavalry who escaped were wounded. The Baluchis apparently suffered no loss.

Napier did not mince his words in the general order he issued, extending his censure to the commanding officer, Captain McKenzie, who had not been present and was told, 'The European Officer who commands at an outpost must be eternally on his horse with his sword in his hand: he should eat, drink and sleep in the saddle . . . it remains for the 6th Irregular Horse to retrieve the disgrace by alertness and

discipline.'140

Meanwhile the freebooters again turned their attention to the rich district of Larkana; in the last of three inroads during July and August a gang of two hundred sacked the prosperous town of Kambar. Fitz-Gerald's Camel Corps, being posted on the south side of the unbridged Ghar Canal, at this season flowing full, could do nothing to protect the country to the north and westward from the well mounted tribesmen.¹⁴¹

In August came a chance for McKenzie to avenge the previous disaster to his men: he received timely intelligence of a raid, but on reaching the spot unfortunately mistook for enemies some Khosa villagers and Burdis of Ali Murad's territory, who had turned out on foot with their arms to oppose the marauders. These he charged, killing many of them: and after he had gone on in pursuit of the mounted raiders, many of the survivors of the first clash were put to the sword in cold blood by his rear guard. McKenzie remained in ignorance of, or at least ignored, the identity of those barbarously slain and on his report Napier issued a congratulatory general order. But he soon found it necessary to hold a court of inquiry, which disclosed part of the truth. The effect on the predatory tribes was of course the opposite of that

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hoped by Sir Charles, and they were soon raiding again the very area in which they were supposed to have suffered the punishment which had in fact fallen upon the local peasantry. As Jacob remarked sardonically, 'Captain McKenzie never surprised anyone but his friends.'142

The General had decided to take the field in person during the cold season: meanwhile he persuaded the Magsi and Chandia tribes to cross the desert and harass the Dombkis, with whom they had a blood feud. This, as Jacob pointed out later, was the most pernicious policy that could be adopted for securing the frontier; the practice of private warfare and the perpetuation of blood feuds were the main causes of its chronic disorder. The Magsis and Chandias did in fact advance to Phulaji at the end of September, but were worsted and returned.

Preparations for a campaign beyond the frontier were now going forward. In sanctioning this policy the Governor-General had remarked, 'It may probably be most advisable to combine measures of a permanent and preventive character with some of the retributory description which have first occurred to Your Excellency.' It was to be a war to end war. 143

The Scinde Horse were warned for service on 22nd October and next month marched to join Napier's headquarters at his camp at Pokhran, in the western hills. The General noted in his journal that he now reckoned on the Scinde Horse as a powerful arm. 'Jacob its Commandant is an officer nearly spoiled by living with the politicals, who all imagine themselves generals, with Outram at their head.' What caused this spleen? Jacob, anxious for the condition of his horses, had vainly asked to be allowed to join the column at Sehwan, and may have used some rather over-strong expressions about the route ordered. Perhaps, too, he had spoken warmly of Outram's brilliant services in the Kolhapur rebellion then in progress. But Sir Charles in his heart appreciated Jacob's worth, and reposed complete trust in him. The extent of this confidence is shown in the letters which a little later passed between them while Jacob was encamped in Larkana and the General at Sukkur.

Referring to Jacob's own map of the Bugti hills, Napier asked him to answer twelve separate questions about the character of the country, the probable attitude of the Marri tribe, and the number of troops sufficient for penetrating the hills, 'in spite of Beejah Khan'. He proceeded to outline his probable plan of campaign—a double advance from the eastern and western entrances to the hills to 'jam the Boogtees', capture cattle, and destroy Dera: but nothing could be decided finally till his negotiations with the Khan of Kelat were completed. The letter

ends, 'I wrote very strongly to Hardinge and pressed the cause of the

Scinde Horse as a personal favour.

Jacob's reply gives full and minute information of the topography of the hills and the probable behaviour of the tribes. He thought the Marris might well be persuaded to render assistance, and that if they agreed to do so, they would keep their word. 'I do not think that it would be wise to march through the hills with less than 1000 infantry and six guns. If the fellows fight it will be in places where cavalry cannot move. A good body of pioneers will be invaluable, and plenty of artificers should accompany the artillery . . . ample means of repairing all kinds of damages should be taken with the battery—the smashes that occur are awful. . . . There is no doubt but that by destroying Deyrah and taking cattle, etc., such injury could be done to the Boogtee tribe as might sicken them of plundering within British territory, but after all, the loss of their leaders is the only loss which these predatory tribes severely feel.' The letter ends, 'Pray accept my thanks for what you say about my regiment. Assimilation with the practice in Bengal will be the ruin of the Bombay Army.'

Napier replied, on 8th January 1845, 'Your letter I have to thank you for; it told me what I wanted to know.'145 He proceeded to explain the whole of his plans and the movement of each of the columns on a broad front. The loyal Chandio chief was to set out first with his tribesmen, as a stalking horse for the army. Jacob would march next with his regiment, the Camel Corps, the volunteer British troops mounted on camels, and two guns. 'When I hear that you have started from Larkana I shall move with the headquarters by regular marches (or forced, if you send back to hurry me) to Poolijee. The necessity of keeping all quiet at present makes me avoid making much preparation, for all depends on your rapidity. . . . My old Advance Guard and its Commander will bring the old luck I hope.' Jacob was told that if two thousand cavalry were sent he would not be superseded in his command. It was left to him to decide with reference to Wali Mahomed Chandio's movements, on which day he should himself march. 'Whatever you arrange make known quick to the Governor, as his movements will hinge on yours.

Jacob seems to have expressed doubt whether he could fully carry out Sir Charles' intentions without some authority delegated to him for use in emergency. Napier promptly sent back, to this 'Officer half spoiled by living with politicals' the following down and

by living with politicals', the following document.

Sukkur, 11th January 1845

Sir

Charged with an especial duty as you are, which admits of no

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loss of time for reference to higher authority, I hereby invest you with the fullest extent of power I possess . . . all commissariat arrangements are to be executed as you direct, and you are to be obeyed by everybody to whom you issue orders, the same as if I issued them myself, up to the date of my joining you. . . .

Jacob preferred the earlier date for his march and Napier issued all his orders accordingly, together with a manifesto giving the reasons why he was 'invading the territory of our friend the Khan of Kelat' for which

he had secured the ruler's permission. 146

The opening move of the campaign was sufficiently promising. Jacob marched from Larkana on the morning of the 13th and reached Garhi Khairo Jamali forty miles distant the same evening. The water was insufficient even for the men with him-about two hundred British and a thousand Indian troops-and the camels and horses got none. Next day the march was to Rojhan, twenty-four miles to the north-east, where the force arrived at noon. The water here too was hopelessly inadequate-Jacob learned that the wells had not been cleared out since he left the frontier in October 1842-he had to lend his own men's buckets to the Camel Corps who had come quite unprovided. The European volunteers, stiff and saddle-sore, were also tramelling his movements. He obtained permission from Sir Charles, now ten miles away to the eastward at Khangarh, to let them close on him; and marched at noon on the 15th with his own regiment and two 3-pounder guns across the desert, leaving nine of his horses behind dying from thirst.

At half-past eleven that night he was about two miles from Shahpur and learnt that Bijar Khan's son Wazir Khan was at that place with a large body of men. In his dispatch he writes, 'I pushed on at a trot and completely surrounded the village of Shahpoor before the alarm was given or anyone could escape; and knowing the place well I at once galloped into a sort of enclosure on one side of the village where the Jekrane horsemen usually resided. There was however no one there but a number of Jutts and herdsmen: the enemy had that night occupied the houses inside the village and now opened a heavy fire of matchlocks on us from a high tower and from the houses. I immediately picketed a troop and took the men into the village on foot, when all opposition ceased, and the robbers were only anxious to hide their arms. I seized 62 prisoners, well-armed, whose matchlocks had almost all been used that night-Jekranees, Boordees and Doomkees, among whom are several sardars.' Wazir Khan himself, hearing the report of guns at Uch about half an hour previously had escaped. The Scinde Horse lost

a duffudar, two sowars and three horses killed by the fire from the

village, with three sowars and three horses wounded.

Salter, at the head of the 6th Cavalry marching from Khangarh had been equally successful in a dash upon Uch, and Napier issued a special general order to the troops on the two affairs, drawing attention to circumstances which excited his admiration. 'In the prompt and dangerous attack for cavalry on a village like Shahpoor, in the highest degree defensible, and built for defence, and which was defended, that Captain Jacob and his men carried it with the rapidity of lightning, and while losing men did not injure one of the defenders, but captured them all. This is a very rare and a very glorious instance of perfect discipline as well as courage on the part of the Scinde Horse . . . it stamps both the Scinde Horse and its Commandant as first rate soldiers—prompt, resolute, obedient and humane . . . setting an example so honourable to themselves and to the army.'147

Jacob characteristically applied his practical mechanical skill to making handcuffs for his prisoners out of their own matchlocks, to the admiration of Brown and McMurdo. The Scinde Horse were now ordered to Lahri, and arrived there together with their two guns without opposition. Jacob's duty was to blockade the western entrances to the hills and to maintain the communications with the Chandio and Magsi chiefs.

Now, at the very opening of the campaign, Napier's commissariat arrangements broke down, and Jacob was called upon to seize and forward grain and other supplies. He remarked afterwards that it seemed to have been forgotten that money was necessary to carry on war. 'The discovery was suddenly made that both the military treasure chest and the Collector's treasury were empty.' He exerted himself to supply the deficiencies of the commissariat, but there was little grain to be had locally and many days passed before Sir Charles was able to move. 148

A further responsibility was now laid upon Jacob by the General. In a long letter dated 22nd January, and beginning, 'Fancy my making a "Political"!—yet such I am going to make of you,' Napier propounded his views for the permanent settlement of the frontier. The first requisite was a transfer of the inhabitants: the lands from Lahri to Shahpur to be given to new people. The Khan's confession that he could not control the robber tribes gave the British, in Napier's view, sufficient right to do this. Sir Charles explains the principles on which he would act in vein half philosophical, half as man of the world, with a dash of historical criticism. It ends, 'If I have clearly explained myself, you will know how to assist me in carrying out that portion which I trust to you into effect, by the means you judge best: for as I like to do the work entrusted to me, myself, so I like to leave those under my command their own

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work.' Nevertheless, while allowing Jacob discretion, Sir Charles made it clear that he wanted the Chandio chief to take over the lands of the

predatory tribes.

The Khan sent word that the Marris were also prepared to occupy the Dombki and Jakhrani lands; to Jacob, Napier wrote, 'I send you a letter to the Khan with full powers . . . having given you my general views you . . . can determine all details, and I am equally pleased to have Murrees or Chandias: perhaps they would unite; in any case it will I think be necessary to make them take the vagabond Khyheerees under their protection.

Jacob had meanwhile failed to persuade the Chandias: the extravagant terms they demanded showed that they dreaded the role proposed for them. He entered accordingly into communication with the Marris; apart from the land question Sir Charles required from them an envoy with full powers and forty good guides. The tribe had however been warned by the Bugtis, their old rivals, that the English would seek to destroy them in their turn, and Jacob had to send many messengers

before they were persuaded to co-operate. 149

Napier's confidence in John Jacob during these critical days is expressed in every letter written to him. The General encourages and compliments him: explains his own dispositions and intentions: discusses his difficulties: and gives his orders in racy style. The Chandio chief is to be sent home 'with all sorts of butter; as there are no parsnips in Scinde, fair words must do for the present.' Letters full of false information about troop movements and of fortifications to be built in the hills are to be written and allowed to fall into the hands of the Bugtis. 'Expatiate largely on my benevolence . . . I really do feel very benevolent in that way since the rascally camel men failed me. I am sadly bothered and shall be glad to make honourable terms, especially with Deria Khan who is a good fellow with a bad calling, like the apothecary in Romeo and Juliet.'

The General's movements were still, in the first week of February, held up for lack of supplies, and his communications were harassed by the enemy. He tells Jacob, 'The rascals got a dawk, and in it the proof sheets of the War in Scinde-how provoking.' This refers to the work The Conquest of Scinde about to be published by William Napier, brother

of Sir Charles; and we shall soon hear more of this book. 150

On 12th February Jacob was able to report the favourable result of his negotiations with the Marris. His last and weightiest envoy had found the tribe collected in the most remote part of their country, and with considerable difficulty persuaded the chief to send the General the representatives and guides he required. He declined the offer of the

Phulaji and Chattar lands, and Jacob in his report to Sir Charles recommended that the Khyheris should be resettled in this their ancestral

country, provided that Bijar Khan was captured.

Diplomacy was by no means Jacob's only task at this time. He had to keep the peace throughout Kachhi and prevent any robbers that might elude the General's net in the hills from making head in the plains. The guarding of the main line of communication, through Shahpur and Khangarh, had been entrusted to two regiments of Bengal Cavalry, but Jacob gave them not a little help, and Napier could at last cease to be anxious on this score, though on 20th February the hillmen made off with 150 camel-loads of baggage close to his own camp. On the 24th he was at Dera Bugti, developing his dispositions for trapping Bijar and the other chiefs. He received word from the Marris that they would pay their respects four days later, and told Jacob that he might begin collecting and establishing the Khyheris at Phulaji.

Jacob warned Sir Charles that the Marris might not keep faith with him, but for once he was mistaken in believing that the minor intrigues he reported reflected the chief's own attitude. In fact they co-operated loyally with Napier in guarding their border, to prevent the Bugtis and the predatory tribes of the plain finding shelter within their

country.151

A letter from Napier dated 5th March informed Jacob of his final dispositions for the dénouement of the campaign. The robber chiefs had thrown themselves into the celebrated natural stronghold of Traki, and the General was blockading the entrances—narrow defiles—to north and south. The chiefs sought to parley, but Napier insisted on his own terms, and prepared to storm Traki, 'a devil of a place, but I think I can manage it too.' Of Jacob's own share in the operations he wrote, 'All you have done at Lahri appears to be right. Whatever you do I sanction.' 152

The plan for the storming of Traki was not executed, for Turk Ali akhrani and other robber chiefs of the plain came out and surrendered, and the troops entered without meeting resistance. Bijar Khan was captured: but Islam Khan, the Bugti chief, had contrived to make his way into the country of the Khetrans, whose chief was connected with him by marriage. The only important sardar of the Bugti tribe to be captured was Mir Hassan Nothani, the man who had betrayed Major Clibborn after the action at Naffusk.

While the final scenes were being played out in the hills, Jacob was not idle. His patrols had on several occasions captured individual marauders and recovered stolen cattle. On 5th March they achieved a much more important success, which may be told in the words of Sir

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Charles's general order. 'Twenty-five brave robbers on foot, well armed with swords, shields and matchlocks, met twenty of the Scinde Horse patrolling in the desert. The robbers gave a volley and charged: the Scinde Horse had one man killed and two wounded; four horses were killed and two wounded: of the enemy, every man fell, sword in hand. Quarter was repeatedly offered to these stern gladiators, but they refused, and every robber bit the dust. Honour be to their courage; more honour to their conquerors. Another laurel leaf has been added to the rich wreath of Jacob's Horse. . . . '

Jacob afterwards ascertained that these men were Marris; his suspicion that this tribe was playing a double game was thus well founded. And the affair was pregnant with mischief for the future, for not being able to avenge these men's deaths on the British, whom they abused furiously as they rushed into battle, the Marris determined to make scapegoats of the Khyheris, the British guides and protégés who were to be left at

Phulaji. 153

At this place Sir Charles on issuing from the hills met Jacob, and learnt that the country people were overjoyed by the capture of Bijar and his associates. It remained to consolidate the success gained.

Napier made Mir Ali Murad responsible for the safe custody of Bijar Khan. The rank and file of the robber Dombkis and the Jakhranis under Darya Khan were settled at Janidera not far from Khangarh. Here lands were granted to them and a resident Commissioner appointed to see that

they devoted their energies to cultivation. 154

Jacob's most important contribution to the success of the hill campaign was perhaps his persuasion of the Marri tribe to co-operate with Napier. But for his influence they would almost certainly have remained aloof. The value to the General of Jacob's firm control of the plains through which his communications ran was also very great. It is pleasant to read Sir Charles' repeated expressions of unlimited confidence in Jacob, his warm praise, both public and private, so honourable to both; and we find the same close relationship in their correspondence on the next problem which required their joint efforts for its solution.

This was the reorganization of the Scinde Irregular Horse. Napier had forwarded to the Governor-General Jacob's eloquent letter pleading for his men's well earned rights; and he now sent Jacob Sir Henry Hardinge's long delayed reply. It was left to the Governor of Sind to choose whether to have a single regiment of a thousand sabres or two regiments; if there were to be two, both would have to be on the establishment of the Bengal Irregular Cavalry, though the special Sind rates of pay would be retained while the corps was serving in the Province. As Indian officers for a second regiment would be provided

by promotions from the old one, many of the existing officers would gain greatly from the arrangement, and there would be no injury to their prospects such as Jacob had feared. The commandant seems to have been satisfied, but must have suggested some modifications, as will be inferred from a characteristic note from Sir Charles dated 15th August: 'You say "I hope I am not again puzzling and annoying you!" you never did either puzzle or annoy me. I was only laughing when I wished you and Sir Harry at the devil: and as to trouble, I would walk 100

miles to serve either the Chief or the Corps.'155

In a little over a week Jacob's plan was in Sir Charles's hands. The Governor supported it with the exception of the proposals for European officers—he told Jacob that he disliked half officering a corps. Jacob replied with characteristic force and frankness, 'What I want is this, that if the increased corps be under my command, it may be organized so as to be one whole. . . . If there be two commandants (call them anything you please) under me, my commanding the whole would only be a source of annoyance to them, and to get on at all either they or myself must be cypher . . . what I want is to be the real commander on whom everything centres, or else to have nothing to do with the matter . . . while under the command of one man, I consider that four European Officers would be quite sufficient for the whole Corps—the Commandant of course always being with that part of the regiment most actively employed. Doubtless you are perfectly correct about half officering a regiment; but our native officers completely fill the place of Captains and Subalterns, and must do so according to the very genius of the service, so different from the regular army.' Two adjutants, according to his ideas, would spoil everything. 'I shall of course do my best under any circumstances; but I really hope, and earnestly entreat that you will allow me to have my way in this business. Let us be a regiment of eight squadrons; you can always detach as many of these squadrons as you please, and for any length of time: but whatever distance may separate the different posts of the corps, let us be one as regards command, with one chain of responsibility and authority throughout.'156

Napier seems to have been convinced: the Governor-General's decision, announced to Napier three months later, was a compromise which met Jacob's main requirements. Such an anomaly as a single regiment of sixteen hundred swords could not be sanctioned: but Hardinge saw 'no objection to name Major [sic] Jacob as Commandant of the 1st and 2nd regiments of Scinde Local Horse, giving him a Second in Command to each regiment. Thus there would be one European officer less than on the ordinary establishment of Bengal, and whenever

Major Jacob ceases to command the two regiments, a commandant would be appointed to each. I pay Major Jacob this compliment on your opinion of his high merits. . . . In the matter of the Indian officers' pay, faith would be kept: those receiving rates higher than those of Bengal would continue to receive them until they vacated their rank; and with a monopoly of promotion within the existing regiment, and from it to the new one, the anomalies would soon disappear.

Napier communicated the decision in an enthusiastic letter—'You are now the real commander of the whole, and everything centres in you; in fact the two regiments form the two wings of one regiment.... I would order your two seconds to fall in sometimes in command of one regiment sometimes of another . . . number your Troops right through from one to sixteen, and fall in thus mixed, so if you choose you can easily keep it as one regiment in reality though two in name, and if you like, to give more unity I will order them to be called Jacob's Scinde Horse, which in fact is correct, for they are not to be united except while under you. I am half inclined to order you to recruit at once.'157

This letter marks the spring tide of Sir Charles Napier's confidence in and benevolence towards John Jacob. It is now unhappily my task to show how that tide ebbed, and why their mutual esteem declined

into mutual depreciation and enmity.

William Napier's book The Conquest of Scinde had arrived in Bombay in February 1845. It was almost entirely a panegyric of Sir Charles, built up with constant misrepresentation of the part played by Outram, vilification of the Mirs, and diatribes against the Civil Service of India and the Indian Press. The Bombay Times took up the challenge on behalf of the Press and the editor found room in almost every issue for some dissection and demolition of The Conquest of Scinde. 158 Jacob as we have seen had shared Outram's adverse views of the General's conduct of affairs before it had culminated in the slaughter of Miani; and Outram's letters during 1844 had made him aware of much of the suppressio veri, suggestio falsi employed thereafter by Sir Charles to maintain his ground.

Outram now broke a long silence. He had refrained from writing much to friends in Sind, lest the fact should come to Sir Charles's ears and lose them his favour. He told Jacob that he had officially submitted a memorial vindicating his own conduct, but on the advice of friends had withdrawn it, as he could not exonerate himself without reflecting on Sir Charles Napier. On the appearance of *The Conquest of Scinde* his first thought was to circulate this memorial among his friends: but on 14th July he wrote to Jacob, 'You must have anticipated that I should not sit down quietly under the repeated kicks of that mad William

Napier. I am sorry he has forced exposure of his brother's folly on me, but I have no other recourse.' He required Jacob's help for confirming or amending information he had already collected from other sources, particularly concerning the time when he was himself absent from Sind. The nature of Jacob's reply may be gauged from Outram's next letter, dated 15th August. 'I am very much obliged to you for answering my queries. Whatever you are doubtful about, or do not confirm, I at once expunge from my book, and whatever you confirm I am satisfied will stand on my previous information, so that you rather benefit than injure Sir Charles, by causing me to discard all doubtful charges against him.'159

Meanwhile in a letter to William Napier Outram had arraigned Sir Charles for responsibility for the fearful losses through sickness sustained by the 78th Highlanders, after he had sent them to Sukkur in the fever season: this being no concern of Outram's was just the sort of retaliation which Jacob had advised him to avoid. The letter appeared in the Press, and the Governor of Sind made an official demand for protection from Outram's 'libels'. But by asserting that he had given no provocation and disclaiming the least share in his brother's production (for which the Court of Directors fairly held him jointly responsible) Sir Charles put himself in the wrong; and in stating that consultation between the author and himself had been impossible and that he had only read the book in the last forty-eight hours, he was believed by the 'Bombay faction' to be guilty of deliberate falsehood in an official letter. Outram twice inquired from Jacob whether it was not a fact that Napier had received and corrected the proof sheets of the book while in the hills, and Jacob did in fact believe this was so. In actual fact, these papers were copies of part only of the manuscript, and the book had been published before they reached Sir Charles. 160

Jacob's position was now peculiarly delicate and painful. On one side in the controversy which began to rage with ever increasing violence was his greatest friend, for whom he cherished an admiration amounting to hero-worship: whose cause he was convinced was just, and persecution undeserved. On the other was his commander whom he had served faithfully, from whom he had experienced constant support and encouragement, and who was now advancing his interests in recommending that he should have the command of a second regiment of Scinde Horse. He did his best to steer a middle course. As fast as sections of Outram's Commentary on The Conquest of Scinde were finished, copies were sent to him for comment and correction. Outram too retained some kindly feeling for Sir Charles. He wrote to Jacob, 'Alas I know not how to soften the business, but I have done so as much as I can. . . .

I perfectly appreciate your objection to afford any information that might be turned against your friend Sir Charles, but . . . I merely seek confirmation or denial from you, in whose judgment I have most confidence, to prevent me by any possibility unjustly accusing Sir Charles. Believe me, I deeply appreciate your friendship and esteem your honourable conduct towards both of us in your very difficult position.'161

The Napier party meanwhile redoubled their attacks on Outram in anonymous articles in a Karachi newspaper edited by Rathborne, the Collector and magistrate of Hyderabad. Outram writes to Jacob, 'If Sir Charles were alone it might be less difficult to refrain, but why should I submit to his rabid brother, to the curs sucking for favour. . .?' He now sent a memorial to the Government of Bombay recapitulating the Napierian 'slanders', again demanding permission to defend himself: if this was refused, he told Jacob, he would publish his Commentary at his own risk. The memorial—a somewhat turgid production in Jacob's opinion-was sent to the home authorities, to whom Sir Charles had also appealed through the Government of India for redress against Outram. The latter decided to wait no longer but publish and chance the consequences. In the letter informing Jacob of this he asked incidentally how it was that grain in Sind continued at famine prices notwithstanding the removal of taxes proclaimed by the Governor. 162

Outram here touched on a subject which for some time had been a source of increasing irritation to his friend. In August Jacob had written to his brother Philip that he would be glad to get out of the country if he could, 'the wretchedness and misery throughout Scinde caused by the horribly offensive Government of Sir Charles Napier is beyond belief.' The explanation is to be found in Jacob's official correspondence, which shows that he was not influenced entirely by Outram in arriving at a much lower opinion of Napier than he had held two years before. It may be recalled that at that period he had been much mystified by the proceedings of Rathborne, the Collector of Hyderabad, in publishing proclamations that transit dues had been abolished, and simultaneously collecting a similar tax under another name. At the beginning of July 1845 new taxes were imposed on purchases in the towns and cantonments, and collected by a tax-farmer. Jacob complained officially, 'By this method of proceeding every private servant of the farmer (or any rascal calling himself such, for in general they are not distinguished in any way) has the power of searching every individual who may purchase something in the bazaar . . . it is enough to drive men frantic. . . . My native officers and men tell me that our horses got no grain yesterday, the baniahs having shut up their shops in consequence of the proceedings of the tax farmer and his servants.' The Scinde Horse were

also obliged to pay 250 rupees for permission to cut grass in one of the shikargahs near Hyderabad; in October we find Jacob reporting a further infliction. The wife of one of his men obtained from Bombay, cloth and other materials for making into regimental uniforms and harness. These were assessed for customs duty in Karachi, but on arrival at the entrenched camp near Hyderabad were seized and only released on payment of 'town duties'. Not till December could Jacob get exemption

for his men's clothing, equipment and accoutrements. 163

These exactions reflect Napier's efforts to reduce the deficit of the new province. It was the same with the land-revenue, levied in kind. The Collectors acted exactly like wholesale corn-dealers. In Hyderabad, at least, the Government grain was reserved till the market price had risen to three times the usual rates and then credited at this inflated value in the Sind balance sheet. The Scinde Horsemen were in great distress and Jacob sent to Bahawalpur for several boatloads of grain. This was seized by the Collector of Hyderabad for payment of import duty, and to Jacob's protests he replied, 'Government have now abolished all internal duties, substituting duties import and export into and out of Scinde as elsewhere in India, with the exception of foreign grain which though free in Bombay pays in Scinde.' The levy was therefore correct. 164

Relief from these annoyances now came in an order for active service. The Sikh armies, which had gained the decisive voice in the Khalsa Government, crossed the Sutlej on 11th December 1845, invading British territory. The Governor-General had been so careful to avoid giving provocation, by movements of troops to secure the frontier, that he risked defeat. Napier exulted in the summons to assemble an army to co-operate with those already engaged. How this affected Jacob may be told in his own words. 'In December 1845 when General Simpson received orders to move a Brigade from Hyderabad to Bahawalpur with all possible despatch, I was in the act of mounting my horse for parade when the Assistant Quarter Master General rode up and asked me from the General when I should be ready to march. I replied that we were always ready; and we actually did march the same day, reaching Roree with the whole regiment in perfect order and fully equipped, before a man of the "Regular" troops could be moved from Hyderabad (fifteen days after our departure) although they were aided by a Baggage Corps, by the Commissariat Department, the Collector, and the Police authorities, while the Scinde Irregular Horse was wholly independent of all external aid.'165 The organization which made such a feat possible will be noticed in a later chapter.

The army of Sind was not in time to take part in the war on the Sutlej. The summons had reached Napier too late. On the day when the

battle of Sobraon was fought, Jacob with the advance guard was on the march from Sabzalkot to Bahawalpur At the latter place the army remained for a month under the command of General Hunter while Sir Charles went up to Lahore to confer with the Governor-General. They counter-marched on 18th March 1846, and on 20th April John Jacob was writing from Hyderabad to his brother Philip: '. . . the wretched state of discipline in the army of Bengal very nearly caused the loss of the first and second battles, in fact the Europeans had to do everything and suffered heavily. This is not generally the case with the Indian Army but since those Bengalees have been allowed to Mutiny so often with impunity, the Sepoys of that Presidency seem to have become formidable only to their own Officers and Government. He alluded to the raising of the second regiment of Scinde Horse-'A splendid command for a poor devil like me without the least interest'and to Outram's Commentary, of which he had himself received an advance copy: 'It is not quite so flowery as General Napier's production, but it has one quality which the vulgar at least may think an advantage,

although Napier and Co. despise it—TRUTH!

The general orders for the augmentation and reorganization of the Scinde Horse had been received during the halt at Bahawalpur. The arrangements were in accordance with the Governor-General's previous communication. As to command of the new second regiment, it was stated that Jacob should have it 'for the present' in order that he should superintend its formation and drill. The regimental officers were to be appointed by Napier in communication with the Bombay Government. 166 Jacob had already made his own choice of the two subalterns required, being young men recommended by Outram in the previous October; of one he had written, 'Young Green is (or was) a perfect enthusiast for wild warfare, and came to India to seek for it on hearing of the Afghan War, against the wish of his parents who . . . could have done much better for him. I think you would make a trump of him.' The Governor of Bombay wrote to Jacob that he was glad to sanction Green's appointment at the request of 'an officer who has commanded an Irregular Corps with so much honour to himself and so much benefit to the public service as you have done.' His second choice, Collier, was similarly approved. Napier authorized the recruitment of the men from volunteers from the Regular Bombay cavalry regiments and the Poona Horse in the Deccan; Outram had already obtained a number of applicants and Jacob sent Malcolm down to complete the work of enrolment.

Napier did not however support Jacob's claim for the command allowance which was mentioned in the general orders, and it was only

on his appeal—'the labourer is worthy of his hire'—that the Governor-General sanctioned the sum of two hundred rupees monthly.¹⁶⁷

In the first week of April 1846 extracts from Outram's book, then passing through the press in England, began to appear in the Bombay Times. Outram promised Jacob the first presentation copy of the revised version—'for to you of all men I feel most grateful, for your noble defence of me in the midst of enemies.' The time of reaction had arrived and he thought that no influence would save Sir Charles from impeachment. The tone of his letters jarred upon Jacob, and he censured his friend's apparent eagerness for the old General's disgrace. A little later, and Sir Charles was writing to William Napier that he had heard that an officer at Hyderabad had obtained an advance copy of Outram's book and was 'lending it to a coterie to read, of course to form a party against me. Jacob is the man, I have strong reason to believe, yet I will not judge till I know that he was the man. If it be so he is a grateful gentleman. I have done more for him than for any man in the Scinde Army.'168

It was some time more however before the storm burst. In October, after the Commentary was in regular circulation, some of Sir Charles's intimates who had read it, and assured him that it was full of gross falsehoods, told him also that Jacob was the greatest enemy he had in Sind, and that he had actually written part of the book. Almost more staggering was the second part of the intelligence: 'Jacob, I hear, says he did more for me than I did for him!' And lo! we are told, contrary to all that had appeared in public dispatches from the same hand, that John Jacob had nearly caused the loss of the battle of Miani—he had nearly brought on a war in the Delta. In 'the desert' Napier had prepared everything, and Jacob merely carried out his orders well. In the hill campaign too he had made 'offensive mistakes'. Then follows the list of what he claimed to have done for Jacob—saved the regiment from disbandment and secured him the command: 'I afterwards got Jacob the rank of Major and C.B.'—not yet in fact granted—and he had obtained for him an increase in pay and tried to recover arrears at this increased rate then the command of a second regiment, and asked for it to be called by his name. 'Jacob is an ingenious man and a good officer, but selfsufficient, and his anger against me is because I keep Captain Jacob in his place; having however made that place too high. Outram was afraid of him, for he is far superior to Outram in ability and could not be by him kept in order—he therefore wisely enough left him alone. . . . '169

Since the charge of ingratitude was pressed against Jacob much more vigorously some years later, an examination of its validity may be deferred until we come to deal with his polemics. By that time Jacob

had additional grounds for feeling that he had done much more for

Napier than Napier had done for him.

The table talk at Government House was after a while relayed to Iacob by his friend Stanley, who continued to keep on easy terms with both parties. He said that Sir Charles's vexation on hearing that Jacob had been false to him and was speaking of him abusively had made him positively ill; and Jacob in a sudden revulsion of feeling wrote to Major McMurdo, the General's Military Secretary. The letter—if identical with that published some seven years later in a Bombay newspaper—was a sorry production. Jacob indeed admits that when he heard Outram spoken of with contempt he had warmly defended him, but makes much of his refusal to furnish him with materials which could be used to Sir Charles' hurt: 'I was true to one friend when all was against him, is it likely that I should prove false to another benefactor, and that one Sir Charles Napier . . .? I feel as if it were a sort of insult both to the General and myself to suppose him capable of listening to such stories. However, if any mischief has occurred, tell the General with my most profound and respectful regards, that my life is at his service, and that right or wrong I shall never speak of his or Outram's public acts again, let what may be said by others. . . . I shall be miserable at the thought of losing his good opinion.'170

The protests and the humility leave a disagreeable impression of disingenuousness. What Jacob might have said is well expressed by Outram a little later in reply to his letter about the affair. 'He [Sir Charles] could not object to your answering a few queries positively put to you by an intimate friend, having reference to public facts, facts of public notoriety in Sind, the object of that friend being to avoid the possibility of being misled by misrepresentation into misrepresenting anything that occurred ... the consequence was so far from injury to him, that you prevented me from publishing a good deal . . . as unnecessary to my own defence, to which you always inculcated I ought strictly to confine myself. . . . There is much left unpublished which you did not confirm, or considered it would be ungenerous in me to make public, from which Sir Charles Napier and his brother have been spared in consequence of your remonstrance. . . . I fear your present sympathy for the old man will soon be overpowered by more just indignation when his reply to me comes out, as he cannot meet my facts by Truth. . . . '

Meanwhile Napier who had at first accepted Jacob's letter at its face value was told by his informants that it was insincere: Jacob was 'not sound after all: the mess of the Scinde Horse is the place to hear me

abused.'

So John Jacob and Charles Napier each hardened his heart; the former

determined not to abate one jot of his zeal in the service of his commander; and the latter resolving that 'Nothing should make me change my conduct towards him as an officer, or make me the General of a faction, instead of the Commander of an Army.' But between them a gulf was now fixed, bridged only by cold official communication.¹⁷¹

We must now return to the frontier of Upper Sind, which Sir Charles supposed he had settled by the hill campaign and the transplantation of the Dombkis and Jakhranis from the north side of the desert to the south. In actual fact, the result had been to expose the frontier to raids from the Bugtis of the hills. They harassed the Jakhranis, whom Napier not only permitted to retaliate, but supported with cavalry on their raid as far as the hills. This of course was promoting a blood feud which could only result in further trouble. He also encouraged the Marri tribe to attack the Bugtis, and furnished them with gunpowder. As for orders to the troops posted for the defence of the frontier, we find them in January 1846 directed to capture or kill the Bugtis, outlaws, and all cattle belonging to them, when they came near the frontier; and in the following August the price of ten rupees was offered for every Bugti seized and delivered to the British cavalry outposts. Up till this month the troops had been told that they must either find guides or pay for them themselves. In September this dangerous parsimony was abandoned, Napier ordering the Commissioner of the Jakhrani settlement to supply some men. The system of command, too, was thoroughly faulty; each post on the frontier was in direct correspondence with headquarters in Karachi, the general commanding in Upper Sind thus having little effective control.172

The 3rd Bombay Cavalry, a Regular regiment, which was placed in charge of the frontier in August, was moreover not well suited to the rough work of checking the raiders of an exposed frontier in a bad climate. Any prospects of success vanished when Napier sternly repressed the initiative—it may have been misdirected initiative—of officers in charge of outposts. Thus Lieutenant Moore was placed under arrest and reprimanded in general orders for sending part of his detachment to Phulaji, with the object of intercepting an attack by the Bugtis on the Khyheris. He was told, 'No officer who knows his duty as a military man ever presumes to move the troops under his command without orders. A ready assumption of responsibility is the surest sign that an officer does not know his business.' Jacob records that Captain Taylor, commanding the post at Shahpur, similarly incurred censure for acting without orders. This crushing of the initiative of officers in command of isolated detachments in the face of a cunning and vigilant enemy could have only one result.¹⁷³ It was not long in coming.

SIND UNDER NAPIER

In the middle of December 1846 the Bugtis made the biggest and most profitable raid into Sind ever known. They were short of food in the hills and came down in arms one thousand strong with five hundred half-armed followers to drive off cattle. They advanced to within fifteen miles of Shikarpur, far within the British outposts, and fifty miles as the crow flies from their hills. The expedition lasted three days, during which they methodically stripped the countryside of over ten thousand head of cattle. Lieutenant Moore fell in with their 'lashkar',* but having only twenty-five troopers with him retired. One of his Jakhrani guides however killed a leader of the Bugtis with a random shot from his matchlock. Another party of the 3rd Cavalry similarly met the Bugtis and fell back, joining the commander of the regiment, Colonel Stack, at Mirpur east of Khangarh. Stack called for reinforcements from Shikarpur, and Colonel Forbes sent him the rest of his cavalry and a strong body of infantry. Stack lost four hours by first advancing with infantry and cavalry together; he then left the infantry and went on with 250 sabres. Early next morning he sighted the enemy on the desert plain, and beyond them the dust raised by the plundered cattle slowly driven towards the hills. 'The robbers draw up,' wrote Napier, 'clash their shields and defy him, and Colonel Stack wheels about and goes off. His horses were knocked up, and the men also, having been without food or water—so he says.' Stack reported that the Bugtis were posted in a nullah, the existence of which Napier doubted; but were it so, why had he not sent his horsemen round to seize the cattle, or made use of his superior firearms?

No attempt was made from the strong post of Shahpur to intercept the Bugtis; the whole of the immense plunder they had secured was safely shepherded into the fastnesses of their hills. They had lost but one

man during the whole operation.¹⁷⁴

There was but one recourse for Sir Charles Napier; one body of troops, one man under his command, on whom he could depend not only to retrieve the disaster, but to solve the whole frontier problem for him. If it also crossed his mind that to send Jacob to Coventry at Khangarh was poetic justice on the loose tongue which had wagged at Hyderabad, it is no matter. On 20th December Jacob's trumpets sounded the advance, and the 1st regiment of Scinde Irregular Horse, with its commander at its head, turned their backs on the hill where Ghulam Shah Kalhoro's tomb looked down upon the lines. It was the third winter running that they had marched out on service. But this time they would return no more to Hyderabad. 175

^{*} A large body of armed Indian tribesmen.

PART TWO

'Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento— Hae tuae erunt artes—pacisque imponere morem; Parcere subjectis et debellare superbos.'

Virgil, Aeneid VI

The Warden of the Marches-Khangarh



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CHAPTER XI

The Strong Hand 176

THE column of Horse was nearing the end of its last march. To the experienced eye of John Jacob, riding at its head, there were clear signs of deterioration in the state of this countryside since he had last seen it in 1845; and it had then been worse than in 1842. There were fewer traces of cultivation; water courses and wells were choked with silt; fewer herdsmen to be seen in the jungles, and those looking scared and sullen. Jacob rode on, considering his problem in silence. At length, as the vegetation grew ever thinner, the northern horizon ahead settled into a bare straight line broken only where, shimmering in the sun, rose the walls of a mud fort with some ruined buildings nestling up to it among a few moribund trees. The first sight of Khangarh shocked into speech the young subaltern, Henry Green, who rode at Jacob's side. Half in jest, half in disillusioned earnest, he exclaimed in good round terms at the utter desolation of the place. Jacob smiled, and said simply, 'This shall be my home: I shall make a garden of this wilderness, live here, and die here.'177 And they trotted on to the gate of the fort.

It was locked; if the approach of his column had been observed by the garrison, there was nothing to show it. Cavalry, charged with protection of an exposed frontier, locked up in a fort at nine o'clock of a cold weather morning! The horse lines outside, which Jacob had built in 1842, were empty, not because the troop was out on patrol—the horses were all there inside the fort, in improvised stabling. The officer commanding this detachment of the 3rd Cavalry could talk of little but the difficulties of maintaining the post. His successor, he thought, would hardly be able to procure water and forage for more than a squadron at Khangarh; and the escorts for convoys of supplies from Shikarpur to this place and to Shahpur had to be very strong or they would be cut up by the border raiders. Jacob knew that he could discount most of the

complaints, and that he would have to assess the position from information gathered by himself. He was glad to be left next morning to go to work in his own fashion.

He had received from Colonel Forbes, his immediate superior in command at Shikarpur, a memorandum of instructions for his guidance. All the outposts were to be under his command and might be reinforced by him at his discretion. He was to do all in his power to destroy any marauders violating the British frontier, but 'on no account' to enter the territories of Mir Ali Murad or the Khan of Kelat, except in actual pursuit of robbers; and in no circumstances to enter the hills. His reports were to be sent weekly to Headquarters at Karachi and to the officer commanding at Shikarpur. Forbes concluded by remarking, 'Further instructions appear to me to be unnecessary, for I feel confident, with the knowledge you possess of the country and its inhabitants, as also with your experience and judgment, our frontier will be but little infested by the hill tribes in future.'

On the night after their arrival at Khangarh, Jacob had dispatched Merewether, his second-in-command, with a troop of the Scinde Horse to take command of the post at Shahpur, giving him similar instructions. These he well knew were in one respect absurdly anomalous; for Shahpur was many miles within Kelat territory; and indeed Khangarh itself belonged to, or was at least claimed by, Ali Murad. But Jacob had no wish to draw attention to such inconsistencies and thereby risk limitation of his own scope for action. He was confident that in practice Sir Charles would allow him wide discretion in his management of the frontier.

Before Jacob took charge, the officer commanding the frontier had been stationed at Shikarpur, Khangarh being merely one of five outposts. Four of these were situated on or close within the British boundary; the westernmost, Rojhan, then Khangarh in the middle, and to the east Mubarakpur and Mirpur; the last named held by infantry and cavalry, the other three by cavalry only. Some twenty-five miles to the north, close under the Bugti hills, lay Shahpur, occupied by a strong detachment of infantry and cavalry with one field piece. For the frontier westward of Rojhan the Camel Corps, stationed in Larkana, was responsible, but it had no fixed outposts. In Mir Ali Murad's territory of Burdika, between Mirpur and Kashmor on the Indus, there were no British troops, but at Kashmor itself, in British territory, there was a strong force of mounted police.

These posts had all reported separately to Shikarpur; but Jacob was now to command directly the five first mentioned, with headquarters at Khangarh. On the very first day of taking charge he recommended that

the Mubarakpur outpost should be moved forward some ten miles to Garhi Dil Murad and that he should be allowed to retain the services of certain Baluch horsemen engaged by FitzGerald for watching the watering places between Mirpur and the hills. He also asked for permission to incur expenditure on repairing the abandoned horse lines at Khangarh. Napier wrote back to General Hunter, commanding the Upper Sind Division, 'Let Jacob put his detachments where he likes. When a man has to deal with such slippery chaps he must play hide and seek his own way, or he cannot do good.' But he could not produce money for building a new outpost and the zemindar Dil Murad was called upon to provide quarters till the men of the Scinde Horse should have sufficient leisure to build their own lines, as they had done in

Hyderabad. The other proposals were sanctioned.

Jacob had also been given the invidious task of making a survey of the ground where Stack's fiasco had occurred. He found it an open plain with only an imperceptible rise—so much for the supposed strong position of the Bugtis when they turned at bay. It had also been alleged that the reason why the detachment at Shahpur had taken no measures to cut off the tribesmen's retreat was that no intelligence of their movements had reached the commander; but Merewether now found a letter conveying the news on the records of that outpost. Stack also had admitted that he abandoned the idea of attacking in deference to representations by his officers. Napier wrote to Hunter, 'The story of his officers riding up to him beats all I have heard yet. However, Jacob will settle the matter; his officers won't ride up to him to run away, and if they did the only turn he would make would be upon them, or I am much mistaken!' To Jacob he explained why he would pass no general orders on the inquiry; the affair was too disgraceful to make public. Meanwhile, Sardar Islam Khan Bugti replied to a menacing letter from the Governor of Sind with cool insolence.

Within the border the effects of the incapacity of the 3rd Cavalry were equally pernicious. On the night before the arrival of the Scinde Horse at Khangarh camels of the Baggage Corps were carried off from near Jagan, according to report by Alim Khan Kalpar; and horsemen said to be from the hills had plundered similarly in the vicinity of Rojhan.

Immediately after assuming charge Jacob organized a system of patrols from all his posts, by day and night, along the frontier into Burdeka and Kachhi up to the skirts of the hills, to protect his charge from disturbance from without. He and his men went to work with many advantages not possessed by their predecessors; the greatest was that they had lived on and beyond this frontier previously for nearly a year, in 1841-42, and did not regard service there as exile. They knew

the country and the tribes from within and the well-disposed people knew that they could trust the Scinde Horse to protect them. The news quickly spread, 'Jekam Sahib has come back!', and old acquaintances-Khosa guides whose employment had ceased, ruined banias from Kandhkot and Garhi Khairo, Sindhi zemindars whose lives had been made a burden by their Baluch neighbours-flocked into Khangarh to pay their respects, to bewail the disorderly state of the country and, these conventional preliminaries past, to impart valuable information.

Jacob's thirty-fifth birthday passed pleasantly enough.

It may be recalled that Sir Charles Napier at the conclusion of his hill campaign transferred en bloc the predatory tribes of eastern Kachhi to Sind. The whole Jakhrani tribe under its chief Darya Khan and most of Bijar Khan's section of the Dombkis were settled at Janidero, some five miles south-west of Khangarh. The chiefs were given an extensive tract of land in jagir, part of which was supposed to be distributed among their followers; their beloved mares were rounded up and sold by auction, Lieutenant Hamilton was placed in charge of the settlement in subordination to the Collector of Shikarpur, and it was assumed that the

tribesmen would devote themselves to agricultural pursuits.

Still the plundering of the border had continued. It was convenient to ascribe it exclusively to the Kalpars and others from the hills. But it does not seem to have been suspected even by the men on the spot that the hill men's raids across the border were made as often as not in direct retaliation for plundering in their limits by freebooters from Sind; still less, that the most active of the Sind freebooters could be the 'reformed' Jakhranis and Dombkis. Yet so it was. The shrewd old Governor at least had suspected that such inveterate caterans would not immediately forsake their former way of life. On 8th May 1846 he had written to General Hunter, 'Now mark, I suspect the Jekranees are raising a talk and mean to plunder some convoy themselves, and lay it on the Boogties. This, you will say, is a deep scheme, but it is just what such chaps are dabs at, and the only thing is to be up to their tricks. I suspect them hugely, however, and warn you to keep a sharp look out on them.' But Hunter found that Major Goldney the Collector, and Younghusband the officer of police at Shikarpur, did not suspect the Jakhranis; and Hamilton would not admit that they could possibly be involved. Unfortunately Hunter, being of the opinion that the 3rd Cavalry were unable effectively to protect the country, had acquiesced in the Khosas, Jakhranis and other tribesmen going about armed although in principle he disapproved of it. At length, in October 1846, Hamilton found that some of his Jakhrani settlers, in company with Khosas, had crossed the desert on a foray against the Bugtis. Hunter

requested the Collector to warn the settlers that if they transgressed again, the arms of all would be taken away and the guilty imprisoned. The

great Bugti raid had followed, and there the matter rested.

Without the aid of the official correspondence on the subject, Jacob was speedily able to form a true picture of the situation from his own inquiries. The Jakhranis' mares had been sold; there was not one in Janidero. How then had they mounted themselves for that October raid across the desert? He was aware of the custom of the tribesmen of Kachhi by which shares in a single animal were owned by several men. The Dombkis and Jakhranis had adapted this system to their new condition with the simplicity of genius. Behind the backs of the officers who had held the auction they had arranged that the mares should be purchased by zemindars and others under their own influence—whether of fear or sympathy—with the prospect of sharing the plunder. Terror prevented bona fide competition—the animals went for a song; and a scrupulous Government actually paid the former owners the difference between their estimated value and the sums for which they were knocked down. Thereafter, as Jacob writes, whenever the Jakhranis wished to proceed on a predatory expedition they quietly picked up the 'boarded' mares, assembled one by one at a convenient rendezvous, and after the raid left their mounts and the plunder with their zemindar friends, returning singly and secretly to the settlement.

But Jacob's patrols made it impossible for Bugti raiders to penetrate the frontier without the fact becoming known to him through his own men, aided as they were by spies and guides; and the Jakhranis' system was speedily uncovered. Jacob heard that a party had left the settlement on an expedition into Ali Murad's territory and ordered a sharp look out to be kept. On 20th January towards evening a Scinde Horse patrol, eighteen men under a non-commissioned officer, fell in with a body of marauders some two hundred strong near Garhi Hassan. The patrol at once advanced to the attack: the Baluchis made no attempt to stand but divided into three bodies and made for the hills. The Scinde Horsemen pursued one of the gangs for several miles, cutting down half a dozen men; but night falling the remainder escaped. In accordance with standing orders the patrol commander had sent back word as soon as he met the enemy, and Jacob on receiving the information proceeded with a strong party direct to the skirts of the hills in the hope of intercepting some of the marauders; but in vain, though in the search he covered eighty miles in twenty-four hours.

This affair yielded valuable evidence in confirmation of Jacob's suspicion of the Jakhranis. The impedimenta recovered from the scene of

discarded saddle bags, were all of Sind origin. And there were no tracks of horsemen leading out of the hills. The marauders belonged to Sind; and Jacob took the opportunity of repeating his recommendation previously made to Hunter that the Jakhranis and other tribesmen in Upper Sind should be prohibited from carrying arms—as it was, 'every man has it in his power to be either a robber or true man at a moment's

notice, just as suits his convenience.'

The report 'perfectly astonished' Napier: 'What have Forbes, Younghusband and Hamilton been about? Against my own opinion I was persuaded like an ass to allow the Jekranees to be armed.' They were now placed under Jacob's orders: 'They are bold fellows and I dare say you will turn them to some account.' Hunter received a rap over the knuckles. He was reminded that the Governor had warned him that the Jakhranis might play such tricks. Dealing with robbers needed only activity and reflection, 'neither seem to have been employed till Captain Jacob arrived.' Jacob was now, in his capacity as magistrate, to enforce the rules applied to the settlement; no man was to quit it without leave, or carry arms without special licence, or possess a horse. Past delinquencies were overlooked, but Jacob was to explain to the tribesmen that the Governor would hang them if they went out plundering. He was also authorized to act at his discretion in the management of the frontier, reporting what he did.

On 28th January Jacob proved his case. One of his patrols captured a band of fifteen predatory horsemen on their return from a plundering expedition beyond the frontier. They had with them stolen cattle, their swords were covered with fresh blood and they boasted that they had killed six men who were with the cattle. All of them were Janidero 'settlers'. They said they had joined an expedition of the Burdis and had looted in the hill country. Jacob sent them prisoners to Shikarpur, and ordered the chastened Hamilton to take measures to discover and confiscate the rest of the 'boarded' mares. But he was not disposed to try to unravel the whole web connecting the zemindars who kept the animals with the freebooters who used them. In a land where disorder had hitherto reigned unchecked the country folk could scarcely be blamed for allying themselves with the men who appeared to wield the most effective power. They would now recognize in the Scinde Horse and its commander a superior power of punishment and protection which extended into every corner of the district.

Jacob was not content to put down disorder with simple rigour. It was necessary at the same time to raise the moral and material status of

such wild people by providing a useful channel for their energy and emulation. As a first step, he enlisted a body of the tribesmen in

Government service—as he had done five years before. Darya Khan, his back-slidings pardoned, was ordered to provide fifteen men under a jemadar, all to be trustworthy and good guides. The chief was to be responsible for their good behaviour, and in the event of misconduct by one of them the pay of all was to be forfeited. These were to be the only Jakhrani tribesmen allowed to leave the limits of Janidero, to carry arms, and to retain their mares. Thus the essentials of the Sandeman system were put into practice on the Sind frontier years before Sandeman himself arrived in India.

Napier approved. He first ordered that the new levies should be paid out of the allowance of twelve hundred rupees monthly which had been granted to the Khyheri tribe when on Jacob's recommendation the latter were restored to their ancestral lands round Phulaji after the hill campaign. The Khyheris were in the anomalous position of being subjects of the Khan of Kelat but under the protection of the British Government; in consideration of this stipend they were to resist raiders from the hills and keep the British frontier authorities informed of their movements. Prior to Jacob's return they had been of little service, and Napier would have cut off their allowance but for his representations that he could make them useful once their confidence was restored. Sir Charles agreed. 'Unless he, Jacob, be free to act he can do no good: but spend as little as possible consistently with success, for really the Military Board torment me to death.'

While Jacob remained nominally in subordination to the officer commanding at Shikarpur, he corresponded direct with the Governor's Secretary on matters connected with Kelat and Mir Ali Murad's territory. He had reported and been ordered to put a stop to the importation of grain by the outlawed Bugti tribe from the eastern part of his charge; but similar intercourse between the Bugti country and Burdeka continued. Mir Ali Murad promised to stop this traffic, but took no effective measures. In April Jacob was directed to seize all 'convoys' proceeding from Burdeka to the Bugti country, and make prisoner the men accompanying them. He found that the marauding chiefs and others had regular current accounts with the Hindu merchants and shopkeepers of this part of Upper Sind; these banias disposed of the plunder—which would often be property looted from their own neighbours-and in return supplied the hillmen with grain, and information of the movements of troops and police on the frontier. Jacob's system of strict watch and constant activity soon put a stop to these proceedings—'but such impudence had been caused by long impunity that a merchant of Shikarpur loudly complained of my having stopped a camel load of matchlocks which he was sending across the border.'178 It should be remembered

that the Bugti tribe were proscribed outlaws; indeed, under a proclamation issued by Sir Charles in 1846 and still unrepealed, a reward of ten rupees was to be paid to any one who brought in a Bugti prisoner.

Meanwhile successful encounters with marauding bands continued. In February the mounted police from Kashmor attacked and routed a large body of Bugtis, and in March and April Merewether's patrols from Shahpur twice annihilated small parties who, refusing in each case to surrender, were either killed or taken prisoner. Even a party of Jacob's Khosa guides cut up a party of Kalpars near Garhi Hassan. By May the Bugtis were fain to try their fortune on the western sector of the frontier. Jacob heard that a band had left the hills and was heading in that direction. The next intelligence was that they had carried off camels from watering places some thirty-five miles west of Jacob's westernmost post at Rojhan. The jemadar in command there set off with a party, and after covering nearly seventy miles came in sight of the band, who in order to effect their own escape into the hills left the camels to be recovered.

Jacob took occasion to recommend that the post of Garhi Khairo, twenty miles westward of Rojhan and occupied by a dismounted detachment of the Camel Corps, which naturally was unable to prevent plundering in the immediate neighbourhood, should be placed under his orders. In anticipation of the Governor's sanction he posted one of his native officers there with thirty men and asked for the services of half the Chandia Baluch horsemen stationed at Dost Ali, to the south of Garhi Khairo. Napier confirmed Jacob's action, gave him the whole of the Chandia sowars, and in the same general orders commended the jemadar's perseverance, and Jacob's promptness in putting him in action.

In June and July Scinde Horse patrols killed and captured two more parties of Bugti marauders, and Lieutenant Younghusband with his mounted police from Kashmor crossed the border to attack the camp of a large body of the tribe, inflicting heavy loss. This exploit was afterwards decried by Jacob, on the ground that as the camp was full of women and children their men could not have been contemplating a raid into British territory, as Younghusband alleged. But we shall have occasion to notice hereafter Jacob's jealousy of any proceedings connected with the frontier for which he himself was not responsible. 179

The intense heat of Upper Sind was now at its height, but there was no slackening of activity on the part of Jacob and his men. The inundation of the Indus brought little relief—a feeble trickle of water through the Begari canal and the Nur Wah, both half choked through long neglect, replenished the wells. For months past it had been necessary to

THE STRONG HAND

transport water to Khangarh on camel back from the wells at Janidero, and the horses suffered severely. 180

As to shelter, officers and men had scarcely time to feel the inadequacy, being in the saddle day and night with a minimum of rest. Through that exacting season they were accustomed to lie down with their boots

on and swords by their sides. 181

By August, Jacob's unremitting vigilance had practically stopped all supplies from reaching the hill country from British territory and Burdeka, and the Bugtis were forced to have recourse to Kachhi. To this Jacob had no objection; he had carried out his duty of securing the British border. Unfortunately the Khyheris had been ordered by the civil authorities, without his knowledge, to oppose the hill men, and they seized a peaceable party of Bugtis who had come into Phulaji to

sell their cattle, and sent them prisoners to Shahpur.

Jacob protested that such persecution could only do harm. The punishment of the Jakhranis, for plundering beyond the British border, was spoken of in the hills as a piece of even-handed justice, and as such would do more to produce peace and respect for law than 'cutting up half the lootoos in the country'. Why should Bugtis be treated as enemies when they went quietly to buy or sell in the Khan's territory? Jacob was confident of the issue, if only Sir Charles would depend on his judgment rather than on that of Police Rissaldar Alif Khan. At first the Governor was obdurate; all Bugtis were to be seized wherever found; they were enemies who had insulted British territory; their peaceable demeanour at Phulaji was probably a cloak for an intrigue with the Khyheris, who had no right to trade with rebels. However, he granted Jacob direct authority over the Khyheris for all purposes of the security of his frontier command.

Jacob knew that distress was severe in the Bugti hills and that the common people were imploring their chiefs to make submission to the British; but their chief, Islam Khan, refused to give way. On 5th September a party of Bugtis, men, women and children, appeared in Khangarh and threw themselves at Jacob's feet to beg for food. When he gave them flour they could not wait to cook it but devoured it raw by the handful. In asking for orders for the disposal of these people Jacob urged that a distinction should be drawn between the chiefs, who deserved no mercy, and the rank and file of the Bugti tribe. Napier was mollified, and ordered that every attention should be given to the women and children especially, and that all Bugtis who surrendered should be treated with the same lenience. He also approved Jacob's suggestion that he should be authorized to correspond direct with the Khan's officials on minor matters relating to the border arrangements.


This was a double victory for Jacob's frontier policy, and its consum-

mation was not long delayed.

The seizure of the Bugtis at Phulaji was so far useful in that it brought affairs to a head. Jacob warned the headmen of the Khyheri villages that they should be on the alert. One of these villages, which was secured by walls and towers, was attacked by the Bugtis a few days later, but unsuccessfully; Merewether narrowly failed to intercept the raiders on their retreat to the hills. Jacob reported that the good conduct of the Khyheris was largely due to Merewether's influence, which had put heart into them. Sir Charles Napier, in the last of his many general orders eulogistic of the Scinde Horse commended Merewether and extended the praise to Jacob himself, 'whose services on the frontier have been what the Lieutenant General expected from an officer of Major Jacob's zeal and abilities.' The Bugtis next attacked Phulaji itself, and were beaten off; this time the formidable Abdullah Khan Khyheri with a party of his tribe pursued the marauders, killed four of them and recovered the scanty plunder they had carried off.

Meanwhile Jacob had been approached by the survivors of the large band of Khosa husbandmen who had been cut up by the 6th Bengal Irregular Cavalry near Mubarakpur three years before. They had turned out to defend their cattle from border raiders, but were themselves mistaken for enemies, and were not only attacked but most of them disgracefully butchered after throwing down their arms and declaring themselves loyal subjects. The men who petitioned Jacob for compensation had all been wounded, and the statements he took from them as a magistrate make painful reading. Napier had ordered an inquiry at the time, which revealed only part of the truth; and nothing had been done to recompense the sufferers. Jacob reported that he had been reluctant to re-open the business, but could not withhold their petitions: moreover, he felt that if nothing were done for them before Sir Charles's impending departure, it would be difficult to get the matter settled. In reply Jacob was requested by the Governor's Secretary to report the

And now, bethinking him of all the scenes in which he had taken part with Sir Charles Napier, and unwilling that the old General should leave Sind thinking him his ungrateful enemy, Jacob wrote to him from Khangarh on 19th September, to express his feelings and so far as might be possible justify himself. It was a difficult letter to write and the impression remaining after it is viewed in the light of other knowledge is not happy. 'You have withdrawn your confidence in me,' says Jacob: but the General's recent public orders proved the contrary; it was only his personal friendship that had been withdrawn. Jacob goes on to speak



The old man in the middle, Bakhsho Khan, is grandson of the famous border raider Sardar Alim Khan Kalpar.

of the 'enormous amount of falsehood mixed up with a small amount of truth' which had been 'cunningly dinned' into the General's ears to his disparagement. 'It is quite true that Outram is my very dear friend; it is quite true that I have often spoken freely about many things regarding him and Scinde, etc., which formed the discussions of the day, concerning which I ought to have been silent.' In speaking of these, he had been wrong, 'but it is not easy for one of my temper or uncivilised habits to avoid doing so.' Having pleaded guilty to so much, he declared all the other accusations of which he was aware to be 'utterly and basely false: what I feel keenly is the having suffered in your good opinion, which I have done nothing to forfeit.' Among all Napier's friends, he asserts, 'there is not one friend or follower who looks on you with greater respect . . . than myself.' Better justified is the claim, 'whatever my opinions may have been, I have always endeavoured with all my heart and soul, and with every energy of which I was once master, to carry out your wishes exactly as if I had been labouring at some pet scheme of my own.' The letter ends, 'if you look back to all the scenes in which I have played my poor part under you, and to all that you have done for me and with me, I am certain that you will do me justice in your heart, whatever may have been falsely told to you regarding me, and whatever my real faults, to believe that I have been and always shall be most gratefully and faithfully yours, John Jacob.'183

The conflict of strong emotions is evident: a sense of grievance struggling with stings of conscience: equivocation still qualifying honest admissions and generous feeling. But whatever fault may be found with passages in the letter, every day was now proving that his best energies were indeed devoted to the task committed to him by Sir Charles Napier, in the completion of his plans to put an end to the menace of

the Bugtis.

The ignominy of their defeat at the hands of the despised Khyheris had exasperated the hungry hill men. The spies sent by Jacob into the hills reported that all their fighting men were being assembled for an attack on Chattar, and the Marri chief confirmed this information. But from Singsila, where the Bugtis were gathering, an invasion of Sind by way of Duz Khushta was equally feasible, and Jacob made his dispositions to provide against both possibilities. He sent Henry Green to Shahpur to reinforce Merewether, warned the posts to the eastward to be on the alert, and himself remained at Khangarh with a reserve striking force of 250 sabres. He was confident of the outcome, 'should time and place serve, as I believe they will.' At the very end of September Alim Khan Kalpar with a band appeared in the plains adjoining the eastern frontier; but Jacob was not to be deceived by a feint, and left

it to the outposts to chase the veteran freebooter back to the hills.

On the morning of 1st October 1847 a man galloped into Khangarh with the news that the whole fighting strength of the Bugti tribe had entered the plains in the direction of Chattar by way of the Zamani river on the preceding night, and that Merewether with his squadron had started in pursuit. Jacob instantly set off for Shahpur with a troop, but only to find that his lieutenant had left nothing for him to do.

In the early hours of that morning Merewether had learnt that the Bugtis, seven hundred fighting men on foot and twenty-five horsemen, had left the hills and attacked without success one of the fortified villages of the Khyheris. With 132 Scinde Horsemen he set out to intercept the raiders on their return to the hills, picked up their tracks, and came upon them after crossing the dry bed of the Zamani river. The Bugtis were ready posted in a deep and long line in some rough broken ground with sand hills and bushes; Merewether in order to cut them off from some nearby jungle galloped along their front. The Bugtis seem to have thought that the British troops did not intend to attack them, and leaving their vantage ground rushed forward with much firing of matchlocks, loud shouts and howls. All Merewether wanted was a fair field, and this the imprudence of the enemy had now offered him.

He gave the order to change front, and the squadron wheeled round as steadily as if on parade. Then drawing swords the Scinde Horse charged; the Baluchis gathered into a solid mass to receive them, but were overthrown at the first onset, with terrible loss. Recovering, though in some disorder, the Bugtis shouldered together and began to move off towards the hills. Merewether continued his attacks and numbers of the enemy fell; on recrossing the Zamani river they made another short stand. A second full charge, pressed home with the same firmness as the first, broke up their mass; some of them made a rush towards the first low hills, but one of Merewether's Indian officers

with some men cut them off from this place of refuge.

In their fearful predicament the Bugtis proved themselves worthy to dispute with the Marris of Kahan the palm of Baluch bravery. They had thrown away their matchlocks, and crouching beneath their shields, cut upwards with their keen blades at the horses' legs as the cavalry came crashing in amongst them, and dodging among the bushes and broken ground as the mêlée opened out slashed at the riders in hand to hand combat. But their disciplined opponents, superior as swordsmen, wrought even more havoc with their carbines. These little weapons, made to Jacob's own specification, were so light and handy that the experienced troopers would fire them like pistols with one hand. The rhinoceros-hide shield that would turn a sword-cut was of no avail

THE STRONG HAND

against the shots fired at close range which picked off the valiant tribesmen when by sheer activity they kept out of the sabres' reach.

Their numbers were now becoming small, and each time Merewether and his officers advanced to the attack they shouted to offer quarter. For a long time the Bugtis refused, obstinately sustaining the combat with ever-increasing losses; at last the remnant left on their feet, about 120 in number and mostly wounded, threw down their arms. The fighting had lasted about two hours and the dead bodies of 560 Baluchis strewed the plain. Only two men escaped to carry the

appalling news to their hills.

The British loss amounted to only one trooper killed, one died of wounds and nine wounded with nine horses killed and ten wounded. Jacob's own charger had carried Merewether that day and came out of the fight with a huge sword cut across the loins and another on the heel. The regimental doctor was left with a detachment to attend to the wounded men, while Merewether returned to meet his commandant at Shahpur.

In reporting the affair Jacob after giving ample praise to Merewether for his skill, coolness and daring, observed, 'The loss of life on this occasion has been terrific, but it is satisfactory to know that the men slain were robbers and murderers, who were the terror of all peaceable persons within their reach . . . all the marauders of any name and power are killed, and I do not think that the name of lootoo will be heard of on our border for many years to come.' He strongly recommended that if the chiefs Islam Khan and Alim Khan Kalpar should now seek to make their peace, they should be admitted only on unconditional surrender.

The Sind Division orders gave lavish praise to all concerned in the victory, Colonel Dundas sending the names of all the men engaged to Sir Willoughby Cotton, the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army: he in turn publicly acknowledged in general orders his debt to Jacob for having brought his corps to 'this state of perfection'. The final tribute was paid by the Bombay Government, to which Sind was now attached, on the vacation of his office by Sir Charles Napier.

At the very hour that the din of combat shattered the morning stillness below the Bugti hills, while the Khyheri herdsmen gazed in terror on the struggle so sternly waged, and in Singsila the famished housewives of the Bugtis counted the hours till their men should return laden with plunder: while Jacob, pressing on with his troop at a steady trot, scanned a horizon tortured by the desert mirage for a first sight of the walls of Shahpur, where young Green paced the lines in a fever of impatience—at this very hour Charles Napier bade farewell to the

country which he had conquered and governed. The second regiment of the Scinde Horse which he had helped Jacob to raise acted as his escort from Government House to the steamer at the 'Napier Mole'. 184 In these moments when many memories thronged upon Sir Charles Napier, he must have thought of the writer of the letter from Khangarh, the man in whom, against his inclination, he still reposed unlimited trust. And this same man, by establishing order and inaugurating prosperity in a region where these had long been unknown, was foremost in giving practical justification to what his soul abhorred—the unjustifiable conquest of Sind.

CHAPTER XII

The First Indian North-West Frontier System

THE hammer-blow at Zamani crushed the power of the Bugti tribe to challenge the new order inaugurated by Jacob in Upper Sind and was appreciated there at its true worth. But in peaceful Karachi and prosperous Bombay, Jacob's laconic despatch and the Sind Division orders produced misgivings. The publication of Merewether's report removed the impression that the troops had slaughtered a fleeing enemy with vindictive ferocity, but there was still much deploring of undue bloodshed, and misunderstanding of antecedent events remained, which went

near to undo all the good that the blow had effected.

The successor of Sir Charles Napier, now placed in charge of Sind as Commissioner in subordination to the Government of Bombay, was Mr. Pringle, a senior civilian of that Presidency who had risen to the post of Chief Secretary by ordinary gradation. Now suddenly uprooted from a life of routine in a 'regulation province' he appeared somewhat as a barn-door fowl in an eagle's nest; in a country and among a people to him equally novel and disagreeable, at the head of a crude administrative system to handle which his own experience was largely inapplicable—with no records worth the name, no 'revenue villages', no Supreme Court; but everything improvised and much at first sight incomprehensible. So, doubtless, the legacy of Napier's 'military despotism' appeared to the staid civilian. Soldiers held every position of authority; apart from himself there was not a single civil officer of Covenanted rank. In order to draw up the detailed report required by his Government on the existing administration of the Province, he called for information from the three Collectors and the heads of all departments.

Major John Jacob's position appeared most anomalous. Here was an officer who, apart from being commandant of two regiments of cavalry,

one of them stationed at over two hundred miles' distance from the other, held command of certain outposts on part of the frontier and beyond it, exercising magisterial powers in an undefined area; and had been the channel of communication between the Government and the tribes beyond the border, one of which had lately been almost annihilated by his lieutenant. Nothing could be found on record investing Jacob with political or magisterial powers—all his official correspondence having been with Napier's military department, was now on the files of the brigadier commanding the Sind Division. The Commissioner, it seems, did not seek access to this to acquaint himself with the events which led up to the fight at Zamani, but assumed that so severe a blow must automatically secure general tranquillity, and that any extraordinary authority which might have been delegated to the commander of the frontier could now be safely withdrawn.

He in fact informed Major Goldney, the Collector of Shikarpur, that he was thereafter to be the agent for dealing with the external tribes, before even calling for a report on the affairs of the border from Jacob, to whom he hinted that there was to be a change. In his reply Jacob for some reason assumed responsibility for the seizure of the peaceable Bugtis at Phulaji which at the time he had condemned as 'indiscriminate persecution'. Perhaps he adopted it as it had in the event precipitated the final solution of the Bugti problem, but he soon had reason to repent this lack of candour. Meanwhile the Commissioner was warned that, though the Bugti tribe would not be able to give trouble again for many years, 'were we to relax in our laborious vigilance I firmly believe (after nine years' experience of these people) that the former state of affairs

would be restored in six months.'

The Jakhranis at Janidero were only keeping quiet by reason of 'a wholesome dread of the gallows' which he had instilled among them. Firmness and justice they understood; but kindness was lost on them

until they proved that they had learnt their lesson.

Before this letter reached Karachi, the orders making over political control to the Collector had issued and Jacob received a set of instructions for working with him which appeared equally absurd and dangerous. He protested vigorously to the Sind Divisional commander: what the frontier required was the single hand and the strong hand—your purely Civil magistrate could do nothing with these people.'185

Jacob now wrote to Outram without reserve and that loyal and discriminating friend immediately threw all his weight into the scale, in a letter to Willoughby, the Secretary to the Bombay Government. He explained how he had himself conferred political powers on Jacob in 1842; he had proved fully equal to the task then and with all his subsequent

experience, more than any other officer in India, to curtail his power for usefulness was 'utter madness'.186 Meanwhile it appeared as if even Jacob had underestimated the man-power and resilience of the Bugti tribe; the Marri chief informed him that their chiefs were attempting to organize another raid on the plains. Jacob wrote to his immediate superior, 'Were I to wait for instructions from the Collector of Shikarpoor, the whole country might be plundered before anything could be done to prevent it, yet by acting at once I am in a measure disobeying orders: I must have political and discretionary authority, or I am powerless. The being placed under the Collector, and the knowledge that other persons are communicating with the frontier tribes, and, without my knowledge, interfering with what has been heretofore my peculiar province, prevents my feeling that confidence in the success of my

arrangements which is necessary to ensure such a result.'

In the event, twelve days spent at Shahpur sufficed for Jacob to set the seal upon his operations against the Bugtis. The prospect of another incursion had terrified the people of the plains; Jacob arrested certain Bugti women sent by Islam Khan to spy, and learned that the outlaws of other tribes who had resorted to the chief had left him when they had ascertained the full extent of the disaster at Zamani, and that he was at length disposed to surrender. Jacob's own spies sent into the hills brought back confirmation, and to prevent any back-sliding he let it be known that he was proceeding to Dera to seize Islam Khan. The Bugti spies, allowed to return to the chief, informed him that they had seen Jacob in full march into the hills. This was decisive; but Darya Khan Jakhrani, to whom some of the Bugti women had gone to make inquiries, sent word to the chiefs advising them on no account to surrender to Jacob, as he would certainly imprison them. Islam Khan and Alim Khan Kalpar therefore proceeded at the end of October to Kashmor and gave themselves up to Alif Khan, the rissaldar of police, by whom they were transmitted to the Collector of Shikarpur. 187

The disasters which befell the Bugti tribe were commemorated by their bards in an heroic lay into which are woven, bitterly, the dread

names of Jacob and Merewether.

On returning to Khangarh Jacob received Mr. Pringle's reply to his letter. The Commissioner's difficulty was that, not yet having obtained access to the military records, he had no official knowledge of Jacob's position; so for the present he could only make use of any information he cared to supply 'in an indirect way, towards the arrangement of our affairs with the hill tribes.' Even Sind Division headquarters required a fresh exposition of the needs of the frontier; Jacob vigorously recapitulated his arguments, from among which we may extract his four word

summary of his system—'common sense, hard labour, perseverence, and watchfulness.'

Meanwhile the leaven of Outram's support was working in Bombay. It was fortunate that the newly appointed Governor, Mr. George Clerk, had had considerable experience of wild tribes and frontier affairs; he it was who had seconded from Peshawar the bold stand taken by Outram at Quetta, in the dark days of 1842. And his private secretary was Captain French, who as Political Agent at Sibi during the same period had co-operated with Jacob in measures for the protection of Eastern Kachhi from the predatory tribes of hill and plain. The Governor wrote to Jacob that it would be 'no less a duty than a gratification to extend rather than circumscribe' his authority on the border, and French asked him for a letter or note explaining all that he required, to be laid before Mr. Clerk.

Before these letters reached Jacob to lessen his vexation this had been increased. The original intention of the Governments of Sind and India had been that he should permanently hold command of the two regiments of Scinde Horse, but in the actual orders for the raising of the second regiment it had been stated that it should be under his command for the superintendance of its formation and drill and that a commandant would be appointed later. There now seemed some prospect of separation of the two corps and Jacob's lieutenant, George Malcolm, who had been left in charge of the second regiment at Hyderabad, sent in an application for its command without any reference to his own commandant. Worse than the breach of discipline and etiquette was the apparent ingratitude; for Jacob had made over to Malcolm, from the time he left Hyderabad, the command allowance of two hundred rupees a month which he received in respect of the second regiment. Jacob at once asked headquarters in Karachi to get the future of the two corps finally decided. Having mentioned how proud he would be to retain command of both, as having been formed 'entirely, according to my own ideas, the men looking to me as their natural head', he recommended, in terms most complimentary to Malcolm, that he should at once be given command of the second regiment, it the two were to be separated.

Outram, with characteristic friendly zeal, had in fact proposed to the Bombay Government that Jacob should be constituted brigadier of the whole corps, the regiments to be commanded by Malcolm and Merewether. After some months the more modest arrangement originally suggested by Jacob, that he should be commandant of both, was approved, and towards the close of the year the second regiment was ordered up to the frontier, leaving a single squadron at Hyderabad.

Mr. Pringle was still reluctant to restore political powers to the commandant of the Scinde Horse; his communications read as if having already reached an adverse conclusion, he only invited Jacob's explanations as a matter of form. As on similar occasions Jacob sent a copy of the correspondence to Outram who replied, 'I can with perfect honesty say I am entirely with you, and think you made out a perfect case: but I must confess to you I am not surprised at Pringle thinking himself called upon to require explanation in consequence of your very candid statement regarding the means you adopted to draw the badger.' 189

Meanwhile Jacob received a letter from Captain French at Bombay; in reply he disburdens himself in forthright terms of the vexation he felt at the Commissioner's prejudice and the 'mere childishness' of his letter—'I mean nothing disrespectful by this, it is true.' He enclosed some of the correspondence which had taken place about the frontier.

'In writing on this matter it is probable that some of what I set forth may appear to be caused by silly personal vanity. I cannot help this but there is nothing of the kind concerned in the matter. My name in this country (not only with my own men but among all the people throughout the land) for making bundobast,* etc., is such that I have not half the trouble in managing matters that any one else would have, though his ability might be by nature much greater than mine; and it must be so unless I be a fool, after nine years' experience and hard labour at the business.' The Bugti tribe were now provided for-though the proposal to locate them anywhere north of Larkana was wrongand unless some grave mistakes were made this tribe would settle down like other Baluch families in Sind. But these wild tribes must in the first instance be governed by fear; not until they were convinced that all return to their former mode of life was hopeless would they become good citizens. The Jakhranis were a good instance. 'Up to the time of our arriving on the frontier though these people had been settled at Janadeyra for two years they had not changed in the smallest degree, no man had built a house, no man ever put his hand to a plough or hoe!they were as much robbers as ever and were proud of being such. How is it now? I have at this moment 120 . . . (Doomkees and Jekranees) digging merrily at a canal, and they have taken to cultivating their fields (awkwardly enough, certainly, but) with as good will as if they had been agriculturists all their lives. How has this been done? By my having made the business of a lootoo disreputable and unlucky as well as dangerous!'

To maintain and extend this system, Jacob wanted both his regiments on the frontier, with no other troops or police, holding the entire line

^{*} Arrangements.

of outposts. He wanted full magisterial powers and political authority for himself, so that he could make all arrangements direct with the Kelat and Khairpur Governments, and in consultation with the Collector settle fugitives from the hills and other tribesmen on the land; two hundred Baluch horsemen, to be selected and controlled by himself, as guides; himself not to be under any military authority below the Divisional commander, and in other matters responsible to the Commissioner, 'but much must be left by him (as it was by Sir Charles) to

my discretion, and all petty nonsense avoided.'

If these arrangements were made he would withdraw the post from Shahpur and afford protection to the Khyheris by moral influence, which he had found more powerful than physical force on the frontier; some would be retained in British pay, and the Kelat authorities and the Marri tribe would be made to co-operate. On the British side of the border the carrying of arms without a permit would continue to be prohibited, and persistence in a steady quiet system of patrols would in a few years break down the habits of private warfare, already greatly shaken. Jacob ends characteristically, 'Every child knows the value of what we have done, and that no one else had hitherto been able to do it, and all are thankful accordingly; this may well be set off against the

persecution of the Commissioner.'190 Jacob was now enabled to make another influential convert to his views and withal a personal friend, in Colonel the Hon. Henry Dundas, afterwards Lord Melville, whose hearty admiration and support of John Jacob and all that he stood for makes pleasant reading in a long series of letters written during the remaining years of his life. As brigadier commanding the Sind Division Dundas devoted three weeks to inspection of the frontier and recommended all Jacob's proposals, giving his approval in advance to the location of two new outposts between Garhi Hassan and Kashmor. Christmas Day 1847 was 'nowhere better spent than at Shahpoor, and in a tent' he wrote on his return to Karachi; and to commemorate it and his 'agreeable tour' he presented to the officers of the Scinde Horse a silver jug and twelve goblets of Cutch ware. His report of the review of the corps at headquarters just before he left does not seem to be on record, but one of his successors declared that he said he had seen many worse parades of Her Majesty's Life Guards. 191

Events now occurred to make the restoration of Jacob's political powers the most emergent part of his scheme. The Khan of Kelat called on the Khyheri tribe to produce their quota of feudal levies in aid against the Marris who were plundering in Kachhi. This, Jacob reported, was contrary to the agreement he had obtained from the Khan, when under

Sir Charles Napier's orders he had settled the Khyheris in their ancestral lands, that they should be considered British subjects so far as the peace of the frontier was concerned. That peace was sure to be disturbed if the tribe were embroiled with the Marris, with whom they had been on friendly terms; wherefore Jacob, with the support of Colonel Dundas who was with him at the time, made an urgent application for political authority to adjust matters with the Khan. This he reiterated in yet more forcible terms on hearing that some Brahuis acting under the orders of the Khan's minister had attacked a party of Marris who had

come peaceably to buy grain at Phulaji.

Here was another puzzle for the cautious and regulatic..-bound Commissioner. On the one hand he had the redoubtable 'Hammer of the Baluchis' and the Divisional General holding up a picture of renewed turmoil and bloodshed if he did not give complete discretion to the man on the spot: on the other was his own sense of the false position in which the British Government would be placed if it interfered between an independent ruler and his subjects within their own country. Moreover, an emissary of the Khan was at Karachi, invoking the treaty of 1841 to obtain from the British military and pecuniary aid for coercing his rebellious subjects. The exiguous records of Napier's régime were searched for a precedent, but the Commissioner could find no pledge of British protection to the Khyheri tribe, nor any limitation of the Khan's sovereignty over them. He decided not to interfere in the affair. There were some further exchanges between him and Jacob, complicated by conflicting interpretations of Persian documents; 192 but now at length dawn broke through the clouds.

The Bombay Government, well primed by Jacob's communications to French, and Outram's constant advocacy through Willoughby, had only waited for the Commander-in-Chief's concurrence with Dundas before overruling the Commissioner. The Governor in Council considered it 'most desirable that Major Jacob should be entirely trusted with the protection of the frontier, and that our relations with the plundering tribes which infest it should be confided to his super-intendence, and is therefore pleased to appoint him Political Super-intendent, as well as Commandant on the Scinde Frontier. . . .' He was to endeavour at once to come to an understanding with the Khan on the Khyheri question: 'such understanding should be founded partly on the alleged agreement entered into by the Khan, that he would hereafter consider the Khyheerees to be, to a certain degree, British Subjects: and partly on the consideration due to the feelings of that Chief, arising from his having formerly regarded the tribe as his subjects.'

The latitude thus granted for the negotiation was exactly what Jacob

wanted; he may, it would seem, have exaggerated the immediate danger in order to secure full powers to deal with it. He was required to forward to the Commissioner all papers in his possession relative to Sir Charles Napier's pledge to the Khyheris, and invited to meet the Governor at Hyderabad or Karachi, Mr. Clerk having decided to make a short tour of inspection in the Province prior to its formal annexation

to the Bombay Presidency. As the documents in Jacob's files were incomplete, he made his proposals in accordance with existing expediency. The Khyheris had only consented to re-occupy their ancestral lands on the assurance of a measure of protection from the British. So long as they fulfilled their undertaking, to give timely information to the frontier officers about the movements of plundering tribes, and to resist them themselves, protection must be given. But since their most inveterate enemies, the Bugtis, had been crushed, Jacob held that support could now be limited to continuing a certain number of the tribe in British pay, living in their own villages, and 'recommending them to the consideration of the Government of Kelat, strongly advising the latter not to adopt such measures as would involve them in interminable quarrels and blood feuds with the tribes around them.' This, the Khyheris should be told, was to be the full performance of Sir Charles Napier's promises, and for everything else they were to look wholly to the Khan of Kelat as their sovereign.

If this course was adopted, Jacob continues, he would withdraw from Kachhi altogether, abandoning the post at Shahpur, and holding the frontier with his two regiments, aided by a hundred Baluch Guides, along the line of posts within the border lately selected by him and

So Pringle found that while the anomaly of the Khyheris' dual allegiance would in some degree remain, the result of entrusting complete authority to Jacob would be to lessen, instead of increasing, interference in Kachhi. He gladly sanctioned the arrangement; and it may here be recorded, as Jacob's own opinion, that the moral influence he derived from the exercise of full political authority was more powerful than any physical force on that frontier. The withdrawal of the post from Shahpur which five months before—when he was deprived of such authority—would have been an 'act of madness' was now rendered perfectly feasible by its restoration.

Under the instructions of the Government, the Khan was to depute an agent to reside at Khangarh, and in view of the consequent correspondence Jacob was unable to undertake the journey to meet the Governor of Bombay; he was allowed instead to proceed to Kashmor

to make a final examination of the country in which the new posts were to be established. Towards the end of the month he submitted his report. For Mir Ali Murad's frontier territory of Burdeka, between Garhi Hassan and Kashmor, he proposed posts at Tangwani, Kandhkot, and Badani,* these being the only places at convenient distances from each other along the line at which a sufficient supply of water was available. The first was an uninhabited spot in a forest, with a few wells: the other two had formerly been populous towns but now contained but a few miserable families, subsisting on a little cultivation near by. The decay of these places was due to the constant incursions of the hill robbers. For the most part the country was covered with dense jungle and pampas grass, extending up to Kashmor. To the northward, a strip of desert separated it from the Bugti hills, and also intervened between Garhi Hassan and the Tangwani forest, while between the latter and the jungles of Kandhkot was a wilderness of sandhills. 194 Jacob proposed to construct a road connecting all the posts, with cuts from each northwards into the desert, for in existing conditions horsemen could hardly get through the jungle in single file. He estimated that the roads could be made at a cost of twelve hundred rupees, and lines for the detachments at each post for a mere fifteen rupees per man and horse. He offered to carry out all these works himself on obtaining the required outlay. Thereafter, with the hundred Baluch horsemen enlisted and the Khyheris remaining in British pay, the Shahpur post could be withdrawn. He heard from Dundas that Mir Ali Murad was objecting to the location of posts in his territory; the Mir, Jacob pointed out, was entirely mistaken, as the security they would afford to his people would ensure an increased revenue.

Dundas was able to lay this report before the Governor before he left Karachi and to obtain his approval. 'All will be entrusted to you' he wrote to Jacob; and he gave a hint to the officer commanding in Upper Sind, to whom Jacob remained officially subordinate, that he should not interefere on matters of detail.¹⁹⁵

The chief of the Marri tribe, which for the time being was behaving well, wrote to Jacob for advice as to his future relations with the Government of Kelat. He was told to prevent his tribesmen from plundering in Kachhi, and to wait on the Khan's naib, Mahomed Hassan, to express his allegiance. The uncle of the chief actually went to Bagh under the Khan's safe conduct, but this was violated by some Brahuis who attacked and killed four of the party while they were in the Dombkis' territory. To this incident may be ascribed in large measure the recalcitrance of the Marri tribe, which continued for many years to thwart

^{*} The post at Badani was afterwards moved forwards to Kumri.

Jacob's efforts to extend into Kachhi the peace and prosperity established in Upper Sind.

This latter was now imperilled by another contretemps. The Bugtis who had surrendered at various times had been settled for the most part at Mahmuddero, a village a few miles west of Larkana, and to this place

were sent Islam Khan the chief and Alim Khan Kalpar.

Jacob had from the first doubted the effectiveness of this arrangement. The settlement was guarded by police commanded, together with Bugti horsemen taken into British pay, by Rissaldar Alif Khan, under the general supervision of the Deputy Collector of Larkana. The land granted to the Bugti settlers had been resumed from local zemindars who received other land in exchange but resented their expropriation. In spite of Jacob's protests no effective steps were taken to prevent the internees from communicating with the remnant of the tribe who still maintained themselves in the hills against the attacks of their neighbours, under the chief's heroic son, Ghulam Murtaza. The latter now made his appearance at Shikarpur just when Islam Khan had obtained leave to go there to purchase plough cattle, accompanied by Alim Khan Kalpar. The three sardars gave the slip to their escorts, met together, and made their best speed back to the hills, just as Major Goldney received another warning from Jacob that the assumed simplicity of these Baluchis was a cloak for much shrewdness and cunning; a number of the tribe had assembled just beyond the Kelat frontier, and mischief was to be apprehended.

The news of the sardars' escape reached Jacob too late for him to intercept them. The affair had obviously been carefully planned and was perfectly executed, owing to neglect of his warnings. The Commissioner informed him that the engagements entered into with the chiefs were now void; he was authorized to expel or seize the Bugtis squatting close to the border, but otherwise all measures were to be defensive only. Jacob had taken the precaution of informing the Marris that Islam Khan and the other sardars were enemies of the British; and when the Bugti chief sent emissaries to treat with them they refused to make terms. Jacob followed this up by letting it be known in the hills that all peaceably disposed Bugtis who did not wish to remain with their outlawed sardars could come and live in British territory. On the 31st March 1848 two hundred of the tribe were camping with their cattle at Khangarh prior to moving further south. Jacob's opinion that the frontier was unlikely to be disturbed by the chief's proceedings was confirmed when other Bugti notables surrendered. Islam Khan had gone to Mir Haji, chief of the Khetrans, with whom he was connected by marriage; the tribe was powerless. Jacob recommended, as 'the most humane policy',

that the Bugtis settled in Sind should never be allowed to return to their former homes, where there was no possibility of their settling down owing to the inveterate blood feuds. And he was in favour of moving the Mahmuddero settlement to Lower Sind, or at least to the left bank of the Indus. 196

In May Jacob was informed that the Government of India, in consequence of the representations he had made to Sir Charles Napier in the previous September, had sanctioned pensions for the surviving Khosas and Jats who had been cut up in mistake for marauders by the Bengal Irregular Cavalry in 1844. Jacob writes to his brother Philip, 'The Court of Directors ordered the pensions to be granted from the date of injury, so that the wretched "Ghurreebs" each received a sum which to them appeared enormous. You can hardly form an idea of the gratitude felt and expressed by these people, and the effect of this proceeding of mine along the border was great and excellent.' 197

At about the same time, evidence of the spreading faith in the permanence of Jacob's new order on the frontier came in, in the shape of a claim preferred by the agent at Khangarh of the Khan of Kelat to certain lands in Upper Sind. These lands had become worth having; the population was rapidly increasing; Khangarh, almost deserted eighteen months before, now numbered three thousand inhabitants. In Jacob's words, 'New canals have been dug, old ones cleared out by the Zumeendars, and a great deal of waste land prepared for cultivation... the operations of the cultivators ... have been extended to the westward into the lands claimed by the Mamool Zumeendar as belonging to him ... but there being no boundary line established, nothing can be settled between the parties.'

Some time had to pass before Jacob was permitted to lay down the boundary line himself; meanwhile his greatest anxiety was to have his proposed military dispositions for securing the frontier put into effect. By 1st April the weather had become excessively hot, and his men and horses were suffering from the exposure; but when he reminded the Commissioner to sanction the necessary works, it was found that his report had been carelessly pigeon-holed and he had again to report all the details. Not till May was he allowed to house men and horses at his discretion, when it may be inferred that the Scinde Horsemen set to work to build their own lines as they had done at Hyderabad.

Equally tiresome was the misunderstanding and delay with regard to the enlistment of the Baluch Horsemen, which was an essential part of his organization. He had been driven to strain the discretion granted to him by Sir Charles Napier, in diverting part of the Khyheri tribe's allowance in order to pay the Khosa, Jakhrani, Dombki and Chandia Guides whom he had employed in his frontier charge, which was now 120 miles in length. He wrote, 'My utmost efforts will be of little avail ... if I be not allowed the use of the guides, whose establishment sometimes enables me to employ to advantage, and to withdraw from evil courses, the most restless spirits and most determined freebooters in the country, and who constitute, in regard to our disorderly neighbours, my feelers, my eyes, and my ears.' This lucid representation seems to have had the desired effect, for on 4th July Jacob writes that the arrangements having been sanctioned, he should be given leave to withdraw the Shahpur post; this being received, the post was abolished on the 20th. 198

On 6th August the road through the dense jungle between Garhi Hassan and Kashmor, some sixty miles, with additional roads into the desert from each post, all fifteen yards wide, were completed at the trifling cost of about twenty rupees per mile, in spite of considerable opposition from Mir Ali Murad's people, and non co-operation on the

part of the British revenue subordinates.

The dispositions for the protection of the frontier of Upper Sind, thus established in 1848, differed considerably from those Jacob had adopted in 1842 for the defence of Kachhi and the Sind-Bolan 'high road'. To a certain degree they were regulated by the scanty facilities for drinking water, and the posts were thus at varying distances from the actual frontier and from one another, the average between posts being fifteen miles. Kashmor on the extreme east, close to the Indus, was occupied by more than ninety rank and file under three native officers. This outpost was of particular importance as it adjoined the Sikh territory of Dera Ghazi Khan as well as the easternmost exits from the Bugti hills. Then followed Kumri, Kandhkot and Tangwani, each held by thirty sabres under a native officer. Next came Garhi Hassan, with sixty men and two officers: and half those numbers at Dil Murad, the post next to Khangarh to the eastward. West of Khangarh was Rojhan, with the same strength as Dil Murad; then separated from Rojhan by twenty-four miles of desert came Garhi Khairo Jamali, for the time being the last post in the chain towards the west; this was occupied by sixty men under two native officers. The outposts thus absorbed about 360 men, or three men per mile, leaving nearly one thousand for the headquarters at Khangarh. Attached to each post, and in practice thrown forward from it as a moving screen, were a few Baluch Guides. 199

This system for guarding the frontier was put into force not a moment too soon; for on 21st April the insurrection had broken out at Multan. Divan Mulraj, the semi-independent governor of that province of the Sikh kingdom, refused to render account of his stewardship; two officers

sent by the British Resident at Lahore, Vans Agnew and Anderson, were killed, their escort of Sikhs joining Mulraj's people: and the whole of the south of the Panjab broke into rebellion. Before the end of the month Jacob heard that emissaries from Multan had been sent to all the hill tribes to induce them to commit hostilities on the British frontier. He proceeded with a squadron to Kashmor, to find that the chief of the Mazari tribe of Baluchis, who occupied the country round this place and immediately to the north of it in Sikh territory, had declined to have anything to do with hostilities against the British Government. Instead, he came in to pay his respects to the Political Superintendent. Returning to Khangarh, Jacob received a letter from the Bombay Government, directing all officers on the frontier, 'and especially Major Jacob', to be on the alert to repel any incursions and to send weekly reports of the state of his charge and of affairs at Multan.

Outram also wrote. He had a painful interest in the affair at Multan as the slaughtered Anderson had been doubly related to him. He urged Jacob to keep him constantly informed of the course of events, meanwhile producing a characteristically sanguine scheme by which the two of them would take the field together, with a regiment of the Scinde Horse, the Camel Corps, and levies of Bahawalpur, to occupy Mulraj for the five hot months during which Regular troops could not act. This plan he pressed upon Sir Frederick Currie at Lahore and the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army; though it occurred to him that Jacob might laugh at such castles in the air. Jacob did in fact, for sufficient reasons, pour cold water on the scheme, and it is significant that Outram replies, 'I of course am at once convinced of my error by your far greater practical experience.' 200

The task which Outram hoped would be entrusted to Jacob and himself was successfully performed by Lieutenant Herbert Edwardes, by means of the Bahawalpur levies under the aged Fateh Mahomed Ghori, Mir Rustam Khan's erstwhile Minister, and some Sikh troops commanded by General Cortlandt.

The Sind authorities had some reason to be anxious for their frontier; Mulraj was trying to bribe the Marri tribe into joining the revolt—it is noteworthy that the Marri chief himself informed Jacob of this—and one Azim Khan who possessed land in Mir Ali Murad's territory of Burdeka was in treasonable correspondence with the Multan rebels. Small parties of outlaws under the indefatigable Alim Khan Kalpar resumed their old occupation of looting and slaying in the tract between their hills and the frontier, while others were active in Kachhi, While the watchfulness and resource of the Scinde Horse were thus being tested to the utmost, a rumour was put about, and found its way into

the Press, that the loyalty of the corps was tainted. Outram with his usual zeal impressed on his Government the impossibility of any such thing, under Jacob's admirable constitution of his corps; their commandant, finding that the editor who had been hoaxed was slow to contradict the story, did so himself in a letter to the Bombay Times.

Early in September George Malcolm departed on leave to Bombay with the intention of resigning his appointment in the Scinde Horse and proceeding to England on sick certificate. Not a trace of the vexation which Jacob must have felt at the time when his lieutenant attempted to filch from him command of one of his regiments was allowed to cool the generous tone of his regimental farewell order. The commandant paid Malcolm the compliment of ascribing mainly to his zeal, intelligence and experience the excellent state of discipline which had given the Scinde Horse its high character. ²⁰¹

Now came the desertion of the Sikh force under Raja Shersingh which had been co-operating with General Whish in the first siege of Multan. They had been mainly cavalry, and Herbert Edwardes in his capacity as Assistant Resident applied to the officer commanding in

Upper Sind for the services of Major Jacob's Irregular Horse.

Colonel Shaw forthwith ordered Jacob to send a detachment of five hundred men to Bahawalpur. They began their march the very next day and ten days later were across the Indus opposite Kashmor with all their stores and baggage. But Shaw had acted on his own initiative and the Divisional commander, Colonel Dundas, ordered the detachment to halt as he had been ordered to organize a field-force of all arms, the rendezvous for which he fixed at Rohri. Dundas wanted the strength of the detachment to be increased and Jacob to proceed in command of it, though he recognized that his presence on the frontier in his political capacity might be indispensable. The place of the Scinde Horsemen detached on service was exiguously filled by mounted police, and Jacob's sense of duty was too strong for him to take advantage of the discretion left him by Dundas, when he had to admit that the peace of the frontier could only be preserved by the most constant care and watchful labour. But while reporting in this sense to the Commissioner he pleaded to be relieved, if any satisfactory arrangement could be made, and so proceed on service at the head of his men. And it soon appeared that such an arrangement was feasible.

Malcolm was at the time in Bombay and the Commander-in-Chief ordered him to return to duty and assume command of the detachment. Jacob represented that Malcolm, as an officer of long experience, might rather take over charge from himself as Political Superintendent—'it appears unfair to me, as it will assuredly appear to the public as a censure

on my conduct that one of my subalterns (whatever his merit) be recalled when about to embark on sick certificate for Europe, and remanded to the Corps with orders to supersede me in the command of one of my own Regiments.' Dundas also recommended the arrangement proposed by Jacob, but the Governor considered the latter's

presence on the frontier to be indispensable.202

It cannot be gainsaid that the affairs of the border in October and November 1848 needed the master hand. Not only were the transfrontier tribes active and watching for opportunities for incursions, but Mir Ali Murad's subjects of Burdeka, who had not had the experience of eighteen months of Jacob's management like their brethren to the westward, were proceeding exactly as the Janidero settlers had done in 1846-47. Azim Khan of Badani, though deprived of his jagir at Jacob's instance, continued his hostile conduct, obstructed the march of the detachment under Merewether, and harassed the labourers on the new road. Jacob arrested him and sent him prisoner to Khairpur. Another nest of robbers was found and suppressed. At the same time the Marris were out again plundering in Kachhi and there were large assemblies of tribesmen in the hills. Jacob tells Dundas that the whole 'Highland Hornets' nest' was up in arms, perhaps as the result of 'Multan persuasion' and the expectation that he himself was about to join Merewether and his detachment; he writes while en route for Kashmor, a likely danger point, yet looking over his shoulder to the west.

Now came final orders that Malcolm was to proceed in command of the Panjab detachment, the distribution of the other officers being left to Jacob's discretion. The Bombay Commander-in-Chief explained why he was unable to accede to Jacob's wishes and took occasion to censure him for the expressions he had used in his appeal, which have been quoted. 'It was for Major Jacob to defer to H.E.'s orders and not to cavil and allow his mind to be swayed by considerations of what "the public" might think of the matter, than which course . . . nothing could be more unmilitary.' Jacob conveyed his regret: he had used these expressions without due consideration and during great trouble of mind. A letter to Outram of the same date shows that his depression had deepened. He had incurred a second reprimand for contradicting in the newspapers the damaging rumours about the loyalty of the Scinde Horse, though he thought that in doing so he was giving effect to Dundas's directions. Everything seemed to go wrong with him, he told his friend, though 'no man in the Indian Army has served the State more honestly and zealously than I have to the best of my ability.' If this were the result, it was useless to remain in the service, and he had practically made up his mind to retire, 'although my regiment be as

dear to me as my life, which I hoped to end in command of it—and I have nothing whatever beyond my Captain's pension.' Outram hastily wrote back to dissuade him; the same idea had in bad times occurred to himself, but poverty kept him from acting on it and he always recognized the folly of it before long—'Keep a good heart under vexations and disappointments, as you ever have done in the teeth of enemies and difficulties.' 203

As was to be expected, new problems and hard work soon dispelled the cloud: but we are told that some years afterwards when again in trouble with authority, Jacob and his staunch lieutenant Henry Green were on the point of throwing up their commissions and emigrating to Australia.²⁰⁴

Early in January 1849 it was reported that an Afghan army was about to invade Upper Sind by way of the Bolan pass—it soon appeared however that this was merely a force intended for collecting revenue from Sibi, a detached dependency of Kandahar. The invasion story had been put about by the Khan of Kelat, in the hope of inducing the British Government to send a force into Kachhi, where the Marris were plundering as usual and his own levies had refused to make war against them in the hills. The Governor-General however remained in some apprehension till Jacob wrote that the Government might rely on receiving timely information from himself regarding any hostile movements towards his frontier. Though he was holding it with five hundred fewer men than the sanctioned strength, Jacob's confidence in his own men is reflected in his unwillingness to have under his command troops which increased his force only 'on paper'. A detachment from the parent stock—the Poona Auxiliary Horse—had been sent up to do duty under him, but he found on inspecting them that their state of discipline, equipment and general tone made them unfit for service on the border, and requested their removal.205

Early in April Jacob learnt of another muster of mountaineers, their objective, as it seemed, being the plunder of the Khyheri villages. But while his attention was directed to that quarter the tribesmen countermarched within the hills and avoiding all the usual routes made a dash upon Kashmor. The system of patrols was active as usual, and on the 6th all the watering places beyond the frontier had been visited without a sign of any enemy being seen. It happened that the Kashmor detachment was relieved that evening, and the horses and baggage camels of the relieved party necessarily made a good deal of noise in the process of being assembled and moved off the ground. They were at some distance when, at about 2 a.m. on the 7th the post was suddenly and violer by attacked.

On being challenged the enemy answered 'Ap log' (friend) and dashed at the guard. A duffadar going his rounds was cut down at once, but gave the alarm as he fell; the rest of the guard were killed or wounded and forty or fifty of the enemy dismounting and holding their mares by long ropes then rushed to the native officers' house, but found it unoccupied as the relieving party had not yet entered the lines. This gave time for a handful of the Scinde Horsemen to oppose the first rush, and when the Baluchis broke in among the horses on all sides the whole party was ready for them. They numbered only forty men and the tribesmen were nearly six hundred, but after a desperate hand to hand fight the latter were driven off with severe loss. The officer commanding the relieved party heard the firing when he was about four miles on his way to Kumri, the next post. Leaving eight men to guard the baggage and carry word to Kumri he galloped back through the night with thirty-two men, and near Kashmor encountered some three hundred of the enemy who were driving off about a thousand camels. He instantly charged and dispersed the Baluchis with heavy loss, recovering the whole of the plundered cattle. Finally the native officers commanding Kumri and Kandhkot, the next outposts to the westward, came by intelligent anticipation on some of the retiring enemy just before they reached the shelter of the hills, killed several of them and captured their mares. The Baluchis lost forty men killed including one of their most daring leaders, and had more than that number wounded; many of their mares were killed or captured, including the well-known animal that had carried Alim Khan, the Kalpar chief, on so many raids. Not a single head of cattle or plunder of any description was obtained by the tribesmen. On the British side four of the Scinde Horsemen were killed and four very severely wounded: two sowars of the Baluch Guides and two jats were killed and also nine horses. It was ascertained that Alim Khan Kalpar, Mir Haji, chief of the Khetran tribe, and Gul Gawar a cousin of the Marri chief, had been the leaders of the enemy, having with them men of all the three hill tribes.

Jacob himself had at once proceeded towards Kashmor, but on his way received information of another large body of hill men assembled for hostile purposes to the westward. He made a forced march back to Garhi Hassan and thence to Shahpur with one troop, ordering a second to join him there from Khangarh. On his arrival the tribesmen retired within their hills, but then marched to the Bolan and encamped at Bibinani. Here they were attacked by the Brahui levies of the Khan and defeated with severe loss.

The Government of Bombay on receiving Jacob's report of the affair at Kashmor misunderstood his reference to the noise caused by the

animals of the relieved party and peevishly inquired how it was that a body of horsemen driving camels had concealed themselves in the immediate vicinity of the outpost—implying that no proper look out was kept. Jacob explained that the enemy had made a night march of some forty miles direct to the attack on Kashmor, and enlarged on other circumstances of the case. 'If want of conduct has been shown in the proceedings, it is chargeable to me only, not to the Native Officers and men, who have done all that men could do. . . . It is impossible always to know with certainty beforehand what will be the proceedings of these wild and lawless marauders, they do not even know themselves; but sometimes change their intentions on the very eve of carrying them into effect. . . . The utmost that we can do is to prevent the success of the robbers; we cannot hope entirely to put a stop to their attempts.' 206

In fact this proved to be the last concerted attempt by the hill-tribes to cut up a post on the frontier of Upper Sind. Small plundering raids continued from time to time, but in every instance cattle driven off were recovered and often casualties inflicted on the marauders. At the end of 1850 Jacob could write to his brother in England, 'The adventurous kind of life which the guarding of this frontier implied some years ago has now settled down into a regular routine and the country is profoundly quiet along the whole border; this is of course very satisfactory as being the result of our labor and perseverence, but I am often tempted to wish for one of the old border raids again to keep us alive.'

The Khyheri arrangement worked well; the regular pay to three jamadars and seventy-seven sowars of the tribe, paid to them at length in full and regularly, gave them confidence; the Marris took care not to molest them, though they plundered the rest of Kachhi. They knew from the occasional appearance at Shahpur of strong detachments of

the Scinde Horse that Jacob's hand was over them.

In the autumn of 1849 a tremendous fall of rain brought the torrents of Kachhi down in spate to join the Indus water in the canals at Rojhan and Garhi Khairo, sweeping away the Scinde Horse lines at the latter place; the usual sequel of fever set in and in October three hundred soldiers were temporarily hors de combat. Jacob felt bound to apply for the Panjab detachment to be sent back as early as possible and meanwhile for a company of infantry to be posted at Kashmor to help him out. The hill country and the greater part of Kachhi were free from fever and the outlaws had renewed their activity in September, Alim Khan Kalpar making two raids just outside British territory; on each occasion as usual he had a narrow escape, and the camels he carried off were recovered from within the hills.

Early in 1850 the Panjab detachment returned, covered with glory.

Their proceedings will be related in the next chapter.

Lord Dalhousie was now devising, with Sir Henry Lawrence, the defence of the western frontier of his new province, and in August 1850 wrote to Jacob through his secretary calling for a report on his frontier system. 'The reports must show the arrangements you have made for the defence and control of the frontier, and which have been so eminently effective and successful, as well as the posts; their distance from each other; amount of force at each place; nature of the force; nature of the post, if fortified, and the instructions issued to the men.' The report was to be accompanied by a map on which police posts were also to be shown.

Jacob's reply begins by giving a description of the state of things as he had found it, and the steps by which he had reduced all to order; the instant change from a defensive to an offensive policy; the disarming of the country; the treatment of British subjects and foreigners as equally guilty when detected in marauding, the plea of retaliation being treated as an aggravating circumstance; and the regular system of patrolling. He went on, 'The duty of guarding this frontier has now become a simple matter of routine; patrols always go daily from post to post in both directions; my Beloochee Scouts, who are kept always moving about the desert and who have constant free communication with the country-folk, give timely information of everything stirring, when a special party is immediately sent to any point indicated.

Having gained the entire confidence of the peasantry of the country . . . every strange footstep on the border is certain to be speedily reported to one or other of the posts, and to be immediately followed.

For the relief of the detachments at the frontier posts the plan I have adopted is this: two parties leave Khangarh the first of every month, one proceeds to Dil Moradki Ghurree and the other to Rojhan. The parties at these two posts being relieved, proceed to relieve the detachments at the next posts, and so on to the end of the chain; the last party on being relieved returning to headquarters at Khanghur.

By this means the men become well acquainted with the country; familiar with the duties of each post, while the work is fairly apportioned. A good body of men is kept at Headquarters, so that drill and discipline do not suffer; and troops are always moving about the frontier in addition to the regular patrols.

On the Cutchee side the Khyherees living at Pholajee, Chutter

etc. keep me fully informed of all proceedings in their neighbourhood and in the hills in that direction.

While having full Political powers, and the Wukkeels of the Khan of Kelat and of Meer Ali Murad residing with me, I find no difficulty in dealing with the subjects of these Princes, who have issued strict orders to all their people to obey me as they would themselves.

With regard to the instructions given to the frontier posts, something is left to the discretion of the Native Officers in command. The standing orders are to send patrols along the border road and to the northward daily; to keep the Beloochee Guides constantly at work; to send a party instantly in the direction in which an enemy may be indicated: to report all occurrences to the posts on each side of them and to cause the information to be rapidly forwarded to headquarters: to stop all armed men, not having passes signed by me, nor being servants of Government, and to disarm them; to be particularly attentive to all complaints of the country folk and to preserve the strictest discipline in their detachments.²⁰⁷

A few words may be added on the legal aspects of Jacob's position. He had been appointed a magistrate as early as March 1843, and since then had exercised magisterial powers over the sowars and followers of the Scinde Horse as well as over the country folk, and his seconds-incommand were similarly empowered. The arrangements with the Kelat Government for the apprehension of robbers taking refuge in its territories were on the lines of modern extradition procedure. The agent of the Khan residing at Khangarh would be requested to order an officer of his Government to forward such persons to the Political Superintendent. For the close pursuit of robbers across the border, the officers commanding detachments regularly carried Jacob's written order calling on all village and other authorities within the Kelat territories to aid in the pursuit and capture. If the offence were committed by a foreign subject in British territory, the man was brought back and Jacob dealt with the delinquent magisterially, 'either committing them to jail for trial, or, if the crime were of less serious nature, sentencing them to such punishment as might be within my power's to inflict, and which appeared adequate to the offences.' If the offences were committed by the subjects of foreign States in foreign territory the captured offenders would be made over to their own princes to be dealt with. 208

All this would appear to show that Jacob's authority was subject to the same limitations as any civil functionary in the country. Certainly we have no such picture of him, as of another frontier officer in the early days, holding his court under a tree from which dangled the corpses of those whom he had just hanged. His official correspondence abounds in instances of a strict compliance with the letter of the law. There is, nevertheless, a persistent legend on the Upper Sind frontier of a certain tree at Mohmal—just outside his boundary in Kelat territory—which was wont to bear such fruit: of marauders captured red-handed who were not forwarded, with warrants and processes and reports, to the prison at Shikarpur but who after a summary trial heard the dread words, in the rough and ready Hindustani which served Jacob so well:

'Chalao! Lejao! Mohmal ki kandi par Lar-kao!' (Go! Take him away,

and hang him on the kandi tree at Mohmal!)

However this may be, no one, as Jacob himself said, could be more convinced than he of the immense superiority of moral power over main force, and this was about to be perfectly demonstrated in what may be considered the 'crowning mercy' in his organization of the frontier.

On 11th March 1851 the Minister of the Khan of Kelat, Mahomed Hassan, waited on him with Baluch Khan, the chief of the Dombkis, and after permission had been granted the Bugti chief, Islam Khan, was admitted to audience. The Dombki chief requested that Wazir Khan, the son of Bijar Khan the famous border raider who had lately died in captivity at Khairpur, should be allowed to return with his followers to their country. He offered himself as security for their good behaviour and was recommended by the Khan and his Minister.

Islam Khan appeared 'very penitent and submissive'. He asked that his wife and the other Bugtis who had remained at Mahmuddero should be allowed to rejoin him. His prayer too was backed by the Khan and his Minister, who were satisfied with the security the Bugti Sardar had

offered for his future conduct.

Jacob recommended to the Commissioner that the exiles should be allowed to return, only stipulating that all concerned should exercise their option in the matter. By November 1851 the Dombkis were back at Lahri and the Political Superintendent was confident that they would not resume their predatory habits but would enable Baluch Khan to

protect his lands from the incursions of the Marris.

Soon afterwards the great majority of the exiled Bugtis had also returned to the hills and in February 1852 we find Merewether, then temporarily in charge of the frontier, reporting to Jacob that Alim Khan Kalpar had rendered material assistance in securing certain thieves traced to an encampment in his country, actually sustaining a wound in the process. In the following April, Jacob recommended a reconstitution of his Baluch Guides; he proposed to engage a number of the Bugtis and

to appoint Alim Khan as their jamadar. Not three years had passed since the Kalpar Sardar had made his last perilous and fruitless raid into Sind, and only five since the Bugti tribe had been so fearfully punished at Zamani. The experiment of 1852 was as successful as that of 1842, when the most dangerous enemy on the border, Bijar Khan Dombki, had been tamed and under the same firm hand had proved true to his salt. And this time that hand was not withdrawn for work elsewhere. Two years after the enrolment of Alim Khan and thirty of his clan in the Baluch Mounted Guides, Jacob wrote that they had proved 'faithful,

diligent, and generally very useful.'209

There was still one more battle to be fought for the consolidation of the border country. The Panjab authorities' management of their frontier with Kelat—that is, with the Marri and Bugti country—did not accord with Jacob's. They took no steps to prevent the Mazaris, a marauding Baluch tribe occupying the extreme south of Dera Ghazi Kahn district, from plundering in the hills, of course provoking retaliation. Early in 1852 Frere had transmitted to the Panjab Board of Administration a letter from Jacob complaining of the Mazaris' raid on the Bugtis, and requesting that the chief of the former tribe should be called to account, and steps taken to prevent a recurrence. The Lawrences' reply had revealed a sorry state of affairs. The Board had decided to lend a small party of horse to a local head-man who offered to guarantee the safety of his neighbourhood; and the extent of patrolling by the Panjab Frontier Force Cavalry was puny in comparison with the routine work of Jacob's posts from which parties were constantly sent up to fifty miles' distance into the Bugti foot hills so that, with the help of his Baluch Guides 'every fresh footstep to a distance of more than fifty miles from our border is observed and reported.'210

Holding the proceedings of the Panjab officers in such low estimation, Jacob was inclined to be curt in his direct correspondence with them, though when paid the deference which he felt due to his superior knowledge and experience, no one could have been more helpful. But the unrestricted bearing of arms in the Dera Jat was constantly upsetting his own arrangements. His request that all armed policemen and government guides should carry certificates of identification was agreed to in October 1853; but John Lawrence refused to make a general rule that no one should be allowed to bear arms near the Sind border without such permits. No authority nearer to Sind than the civil officer at Mithankot, seventy miles away, could, it appeared, be empowered to grant such permits, though there were four military posts in between that place and the Sind border. Moreover Lawrence fully approved of the country people being well armed. The garrisons of his posts were

weak, the posts at great distances from each other. Robbers from the hills could easily pass through the frontier defence line and plunder beyond it; the cattle of the district were habitually taken to graze close under the hills. The Chief Commissioner would therefore 'incite and encourage' the inhabitants to go armed. He agreed however to forbid them entering Sind territory with their arms; this was the extent of his co-operation.²¹¹

In the middle of 1854 another production of the Chief Commissioner of the Panjab appeared, in Jacob's view adding insult to injury. Irritation under repeated hints of the superiority of the Sind border system seems to have caused Lawrence to attempt to defend his own by comparison of the topography and of the means at his disposal. The Dera Jat frontier line, three hundred miles long and on an average only six miles distant from the hills, 'whence the robber hordes come pouring down', was almost entirely held by eight hundred cavalry, paid twenty rupees a month, and aided by four hundred infantry. The Scinde Horse, fourteen hundred strong and paid half as much again, had to guard a frontier only seventy miles long and distant generally thirty miles from the hills. John Jacob, in just indignation, offered remarks to the Commissioner in Sind on these statistics; his frontier, measuring between his twelve posts from the western hills to the Indus, extended in fact to 185 miles*; the posts absorbed 360 men or less than two men per mile, while the Panjab line had four men per mile and was supported by the cavalry of Dera Ismail Khan, Asni, Dera Ghazi Khan and Bannu. Lawrence had reckoned as supports for the Sind line the non-existent 'Cavalry of Shikarpur and Sukkur'—places twenty-five and fifty miles in the rear; the only support in fact being the thousand sabres at Jacob's frontier headquarters.

And Jacob pointed out that during the first and most exacting year on the frontier he had held it with eight hundred men; and thereafter at a critical moment when the border tribes were in a state of great excitement he had detached five hundred men for service in the Panjab,

lasting nearly two years.

Jacob contended that it was an advantage to have posts near to the hills; that the 'robber hordes' mentioned by Lawrence never amounted to three hundred strong; and he claimed the protection of the head of the Province from such injurious remarks 'founded on imperfect information, incorrect as to fact, and unjust as to conclusion.'212 Frere invited him to submit a contrasted statement on the two systems. The heads of Jacob's denunciation of Panjab methods were: strictly defensive methods: troops protected by fortifications: the people

^{*} The two westernmost outposts, Dost Ali and Shahdadpur, were occupied at need, but not regularly. There was a post north-eastward of Kashmor at Mitri.

encouraged to bear arms: their attacks in retaliation on the hill men welcomed: the exertion of moral influence over the tribes 'not even thought of'. To sum up, an exact parallel to the state of affairs on the Sind frontier in 1843-47. though the robbers annoying the Dera Jat were far less formidable than the 'bold and numerous riders of Kuchhee'.

And now for the Sind system, displayed by the hand that created it:

Entirely offensive measures on the part of the troops, the possibility of attack by the marauders never being contemplated. No defensive works whatever allowed anywhere; existing ones destroyed or abandoned; the troops always freely exposed, and obstacles to rapid movement removed as much as possible: the people protected.

No distinction permitted between plundering and killing by private persons, either friend or foe. Robbery and murder treated as equally criminal, whether the victim be a British subject or not.

The plea of family blood feud, or retaliation, in such cases, considered as an aggravating circumstance, as proving the most deliberate malice aforethought. No private person allowed to bear arms, or possess arms, without written permission.

The highest moral ground always taken in all dealings with the predatory tribes, treating them always as of an inferior nature so long as they persist in their misdeeds: as mere vulgar criminal and disreputable persons . . . the feeling instilled into every soldier employed being, that he was altogether of a superior nature to the robber—a good man against a criminal, the plunderers being always considered not as enemies but as malefactors.

As perfect information as possible of all movements, or intended movements, of the plundering tribes residing beyond our border. Such information acted on with the greatest activity. . . .

The strictest justice always acted on, and no success, or want of success, or any other circumstance whatever, being allowed to influence the terms offered to, or the treatment of offenders whether whole tribes or individuals. . . . A few words will sum up the whole business. At first, put down all violence with the strong hand; then your force being known, felt, and respected, endeavour to excite men's better natures, till all men, seeing that your object is good, and of the greatest general benefit to the community, join heart and hand to aid in putting down violence.

[He ended] Every man of the Scinde Irregular Horse is looked on and treated as a friend by all the country folk.

... If the irritation and excitement to evil practices, caused by the incursions of the Muzzarees, and other proceedings permitted and practised in the Punjab, do not interfere with the full development of the causes now at work on our border, it seems to me certain that perfect peace and quiet will be established among all the tribes in hill and plain, whose sole or chief pursuits have hitherto been robbery and murder. 213

These Notes were dated 9th August 1854; the same day that Jacob reported the surrender of a notorious outlaw, Sanjar Rind, as an example of what could be achieved by moral influence over trans-border tribes. The Bugtis had already declined to harbour this man—Jacob having given a hint that he would consider them as his equals in guilt if they did so—and when the Marris also rejected him Sanjar in despair surrendered to the Political Superintendent, who had already answered his previous offers to come in on condition of pardon with the simple message that he would catch and hang him some day. It was a triumph of moral influence and Jacob recommended the Khan not to execute

the outlaw but to keep him prisoner for life.214

The differences with the Panjab authorities came to a head when a few months later three of Jacob's mounted police pursued some Mazari robbers, who had lifted cattle in Sind, and overtook them in Panjab territory. The robbers and their local friends, who of course carried arms, attacked the policemen killing one and wounding another; the third recovered the booty and brought it back to Kashmor. Frere took the opportunity to renew his efforts to bring the Panjab arms policy into line with that of Sind. He showed how the Sind system, by which the people were allowed to keep arms in their houses, enabled them to defend themselves if their villages were attacked; but the prohibition against carrying arms outside, except under written licence, drew a clear distinction between the law-abiding public, the armed servants of Government, and outlaws. The rule helped the people to understand that public wrongs were to be redressed by public agency; and being compelled to submit their feuds and claims for compensation to Government authorities, they were beginning to appreciate the value of rule and good order. Frere also took the opportunity of asking the Chief Commissioner to remind his officers that the Bugti hill country was Kelat territory, and that British relations with the Khan were conducted through him; direct negotiation with inferior chiefs would only weaken the Khan's authority.

John Lawrence had already become a convert: his acknowledgment of Frere's letter was condescendingly cordial. The arms rules for the

southern Panjab frontier districts were henceforth brought into accordance with the Sind system, and Panjab officers were ordered not to communicate with the Marris and Bugtis except through Major Jacob.²¹⁵

CHAPTER XIII

The Indian Ironsides

THE Corps of Scinde Irregular Horse merits detailed examination as the medium through which John Jacob's reforming genius first found

expression.

Of Cromwell and his Ironsides John Buchan has written, 'His Regiment was his family, their prowess was his, his honour was theirs, he had no interest beyond their welfare. With such a spirit in their commander, small wonder that a new type of fighting force was born in England. . . . "My troops increase" he wrote lyrically to St. John, "I have a lovely Company: you would respect them did you know them." '216 So it was with the Scinde Horse: an exposition of its excellencies must begin with some account of the qualities possessed by their commander. This Jacob himself provided, consciously or otherwise, in his Remarks. written at Outram's request, on an article which appeared in the Calcutta Review for March 1846, entitled 'Hints on Irregular Cavalry'. Nothing could be so convincing as Jacob's own voice in this the first of his polemics.

With regard to the qualifications . . . necessary for a commandant of Irregular Cavalry . . . it appears to me that the Bengal Army must be in a miserable plight if such men be not obtainable by hundreds. Some of the qualifications mentioned by Captain Trower are of little moment, such as not being of hasty temper, conciliatory manners, etc.—these things however desirable are little thought of by the men (who are excellent judges of their officers' real characters) if higher and more necessary qualities exist. The supposing it necessary to flatter men's prejudices, etc., which appears to be so much insisted on throughout the Bengal Army is a sad mistake—it is the greatest evil which can exist . . . it creates

and fosters those very prejudices and mutual misunderstandings which it professes to 'conciliate'. Why did the soldiers of the Tenth Legion love Caesar? Because they were proud of him, not because he coaxed them. . . . Show the men that you respect and regard them as soldiers and men, not as Hindoos or what not . . . although without giving offence to caste or prejudices; treat the native officers as gentlemen, and you will soon understand each other perfectly. The differences of religion, etc., between officer and man are forgotten—positively never thought of; you have one common interest, and the European Commander, if worthy by nature of his command, becomes the object of the most profound respect and regard, even though his demeanour be not very 'conciliatory'.

Jacob proceeds to enumerate other qualifications necessary for a good commandant of Irregular cavalry—he should be:

a good and successful partisan soldier, quick in danger, fertile in resources... but after all, everything else is of trifling consideration when compared with a natural talent for command—that quality or combination of qualities, whereby a commander gains not only the respect of his own men, but makes them respect themselves, and raises their character in their own estimation and that of the world. This is the grand secret of being loved, respected, almost adored by the native soldier... there is nothing he will not gladly do to please his commander, there is no inconvenience he will not undergo to maintain or increase the abroo of the regiment. The commandant and his men are naturally proud of and confident in each other; the discipline is perfect, for it is the discipline of the heart.

Government . . . when once appointed, they should have ample powers—they should in fact be absolute in their regiments: they should have all promotions in their hands, and power to discharge any man of any rank. The appointment, also, of the subordinate European officers should rest with them; they should be allowed to go their own way to work in all things, but be held strictly responsible for the efficiency of their regiments in every way; no excuse should be admitted. If the regiment be not what Government wishes, and has a right to expect it to be, the commandant should be removed at once. . . without a properly qualified commander, no rules, orders, nor regulations will avail in the least; they will only make bad worse.

The sepoy should never think of looking to higher authority than the commander of his regiment, who should be the patriarch of his tribe, the chief of his clan . . . to do justice to Silladar cavalry Government cannot give commandants too much power; there should be no rules, no code of laws, nor any trammels whatever. This I consider essentially the one thing needful. Whatever trouble it may be supposed to give Government in the choice of officers, scores of well qualified men do exist in the Indian armies, and Government can find them if they think proper to do so. 217

It will be recollected that the essence of the silladar or Irregular cavalry system was self-dependence; that from their pay the men had to 'find themselves' in everything except ammunition and medical stores. It follows that Irregular corps could only be efficient if men of substance entered the ranks; even a bargir sowar, who did not own his horse, was at a great disadvantage if he depended entirely on his pay. A silladar could not possibly maintain himself without money of his own, at least in the Scinde Horse where he had to keep up baggage animals, while his pay was liable to deductions on various accounts for the beautiful little percussion carbines Jacob obtained for the regiment from England, clothing and accourrements made up at Bombay, and subscriptions to the regimental fund. The besetting weakness of the system as generally applied was perpetual indebtedness of the members of Irregular corps. There was usually a regimental shroff or banker who would soon establish a stranglehold over every man from the senior rissaldar to the latest joined bargir. Curtis, Jacob's predecessor in command of the Scinde Horse, had eliminated the shroff (who had also been a silladar):218 Jacob gradually got rid of all 'be-nokar' silladars -retired officers and men of the corps and others-so that every assami —the place of a horse and that horse's 'pay'—in the corps was actually owned by a fighting man. Jacob allowed a free market in assamis, the sole condition being that all such transactions had to be for cash down. Any man getting into debt to purchase a horse had to forfeit the assami.

The rule for maintenance of the horses in good condition established by Jacob was simple; if he saw an animal in a bad state, sore-backed or otherwise unfit for service, he would order the silladar to get another; and the horse's pay (20 rupees per mensem) lapsed to the regimental fund until he did so.

No court martial was ever held in the Scinde Horse. This was perhaps due to the fact that the corps had been on active service continuously ever since it was raised. The functions of a court martial were discharged by a 'panchayat', the senior Indian officer being president and four

others members. The proceedings were conducted after their own customs, probably inherited from the Poona Horse. The sentences required the confirmation of the commandant before they could be carried into effect, whether fine, forfeiture of one or more assamis,

imprisonment in the regimental guard, or dismissal.

Discipline so administered was as strict as in the British Army and the drill too proceeded as in Regular regiments. Jacob held it unnecessary to teach the sword exercise, as experience in actual fight proved that the men were experts in their own fashion. He remarked, 'It is not the European discipline which Native Gentlemen dislike; it is the stable duties, the European riding school, and all those little harassing frivolities, having no connection with the duty under arms, which exist in the Regular cavalry, and are so disgusting to the purely Indian soldier; and ABOVE ALL, the low rank, below the junior Cornet, to which he can ever hope to attain.' Silladar cavalry ought to be as well disciplined and drilled as the Regulars—indeed in discipline they ought to be superior—the men had more at stake, and discharge from the service was a very severe punishment. 219

Jacob only accepted as bargir sowars men for whom two silladars would stand surety. A bargir was liable to transfer to any horse, though he was generally mounted on one belonging to one of his sureties, and the practice was of course to consult the wishes of the men and keep friends and relations together. No one not in the regiment and no silladar holding three or more horses was allowed to purchase an assami; this kept the price as nearly as possible within the means of the poorer members of the corps. Jacob considered that for a regiment intended for service and at a distance from the men's homes 'your three-horse silladar hath no fellow for efficiency: he keeps a tatoo [pony] or two, or probably a camel, a syce, and a grass cutter, so that he and his two bargheers with their servants form a very comfortable little family. He has generally a little money in hand, instead of being in debt, and can on a pinch get on for two or three months without pay (the Scinde Horse have often had to do this).' Every man joining the corps, however rich or nobly born, had to learn thoroughly his duties as a private sowar before he could hope for promotion: and every rank was esteemed honourable.

Such was the system and the spirit. The equipment of the Scinde Horse was equally superior to the general standard, not only of other Irregulars but of the Regular cavalry of the Indian Army. Jacob would have nothing to do with the Government carbines or Government pistols. The former were far too long, heavy and clumsy for Indian horsemen. As to the pistols supplied by the Ordnance, he simply

dismissed them as 'disgracefully bad'. After many trials and much correspondence he got a manufacturer in England to supply the regiment with a little weapon of 17-gauge bore, 22-inch barrel, weighing less than six pounds, which could be fired from horseback with one hand. And the experienced soldiers would let the muzzle almost touch their enemy before firing; its terrible effectiveness had been proved at Zamani.²²⁰ These weapons cost the men about twenty-eight rupees each. The same was the cost of the pistols also specially made in England. Even the men's swords were of English manufacture, with broad curved blades in the old dragoon style—the weapon which had achieved the British cavalry triumphs under Marlborough and Wellington—and the 'cast' blades were much sought after by Baluch tribesmen who loved a good sword and recognized their superiority to the productions of the smithies of Shikarpur. All that Jacob claimed for these English sabres is borne out by another high authority in cavalry matters, Captain Nolan. When Jacob speaks of the peace of his border being maintained by the 'good swords of the Scinde Horse' the phrase may

not have been wholly figurative.

The dress of the Scinde Horsemen which for sixty years was a familiar sight along the frontier was a scarlet pagri, a dark green alkalug or tunic, with silver lace and embroidery for the officers, red cummerbund, white breeches, black jack-boots. The saddle cloth was green and red and the horse accoutrements covered with cloth of these colours. All these were supplied by the army clothing agent in Bombay; but the pouches and belts, cartouches and sword belts of black patent leather were obtained from England. Says Jacob, 'an officer is not liable to be thought a tailor because he interests himself about the clothing of his men, their arms and equipments in general and procures them for them of far better quality and cheaper than they would get them themselves. They are delighted with and most grateful for all such arrangements -"who else have we to look to-are not you our father?" say they." For any appurtenances of cavalry that were for show and not for use Jacob had a profound contempt. 'The kettle drum is an absurd affair altogether and ought to be abolished; it is fit rather for the establishment of a nautch-woman than for use as a soldier-like instrument. A trumpet to each Troop is quite sufficient, and nothing else ought to be allowed.' Standards, in his opinion, were a nuisance. 'The Scinde Horse have Standards, having won them at Meeanee, but the Corps would be far better without them. They are never fany use, and on real service are only in the way; the better a regiment behaves, sometimes, the more risk there is of losing its Standards.'221

When Dundas inspected the corps in the beginning of 1848 he desired

to be informed by what means its excellence had been achieved, and Jacob took the opportunity to press for an increase in his men's pay—a difficult subject for him to set before the Government on its merits without the appearance of presumption. 'The truth is,' he wrote, 'that the Scinde Irregular Horse is not now an Irregular Corps at all'—all it had in common with the other cavalry termed Irregular in the Armies of Bengal and Bombay and in the Nizam's Army, was that it was organized on the silladar system.

To enable the men to do the work required of them it has been necessary to make the Corps, in regard to drill, discipline, and in fact to all intents and purposes, Regular cavalry; it is armed and accoutred in a very superior manner to any cavalry I have ever seen in India; its horses, although not equal to those of the Regular cavalry, are very much superior to those of any Corps of Irregular cavalry with which I am acquainted. The service in Scinde is not generally liked by the Indian soldier; in fact it is much disliked by the class of men from which the best cavalry soldiers in India are to be obtained, and our expenses are great; from all these causes combined the raw material of the Scinde Irregular Horse must at present be inferior to that of the Irregular Cavalry serving in India. The men generally prefer ease and comfort on seven rupees a month in Bengal, to hard work, strict discipline, and bad or at least disagreeable climate on ten rupees a month in Scinde.

'That we have succeeded so well as we have done is chiefly owing to the high character which we have been so fortunate as to obtain; in fact this has been our greatest strength—by reason of it we get a better class of recruits than would otherwise join our ranks, and the men have willingly submitted to all kinds of inconveniences, losses and hardships for the sake of reputation, which they would not have done for the

pay.'222

In fact the name of the corps was such that there was always a number of 'umedwars'—candidates for enlistment—about Jacob's camp, waiting for a vacancy. Sons and other relatives of the officers and men were a numerous element among them; but there was no preferential treatment in recruiting. Jacob had laid out a tricky test-course with several sharp turns, and whenever a handful of young 'umedwars' were ready to try their luck for a vacancy they were mounted bareback on horses not of the tamest, and sent off round the course. The first home got the vacancy. Even before enlistment the 'umedwars' would regularly attend parades as onlookers to familiarize themselves with the drill, a test in which would be the first step to promotion. 223

A general return of the age, size, caste, country and length of service of the Indian officers and men of the Scinde Horse, dated 21st September

1848, is of considerable interest. It discloses that out of sixteen hundred fighting men, over fifteen hundred came from Hindustan, that is to say the Delhi districts and Oudh. There were fifty-two Deccanis, and three, including two officers, from Baluchistan—one of them the well-known Allahdad Khan who had been with Eldred Pottinger in Herat. About 85 per cent of the men were Muslims; of the Hindus, 34 were Marathas, 140 Brahmins and Rajputs. The age and service columns show as many as ten Indian officers with less than ten years' total service, three of them under thirty years of age—the result of Jacob's practice of promotion wholly by selection. In writing of his system later he mentions instances of sons overtaking their own fathers in rank: one being a jemadar while his father, 'a most respectable and efficient soldier, but, as he well knew himself, unfit for further promotion,' remained a naik. 224

In this same month of September 1848 the corps was inspected by Colonel Shaw, commanding in Upper Sind. He had already been impressed by the excellence of the men's bearing and discipline when they visited Shikarpur off duty—no bad criterion: a complaint against a Scinde Horseman was unknown. As for their performance on parade, the condition of the horses, and all else that he had just witnessed, Jacob was to tell them that it was of a piece with their valour in war, which had 'filled not India only, but the whole world, with their renown.' The sight of them, Shaw said, had cured his previous day's fever.

If the renown of the Scinde Horse had already spread outside India, it was due in the main to the eulogies by General William Napier in The Conquest of Scinde. By some, no doubt, it was assumed that the colour there given to the achievements of Jacob and his men was no more than a facet of the general blaze of Napierian glory, the apotheosis of Sir Charles. Jacob himself was disgusted by the swashbuckling turn given by William Napier to his work in the campaign. There were hundreds of cavalry officers in India, of the Queen's as well as the Company's armies, to whom Jacob's organization would be of the highest professional interest, if only they were afforded a visual revelation. This was now to take place.

Lieutenant Herbert Edwardes of the Bengal Army had heard of 'Major Jacob's Irregular Horse", and on the defection of Sher Singh from General Whish's army before Multan, leaving him almost without cavalry, put in a particular requisition for their services. We have seen how Jacob detailed a detachment of five hundred sabres—two troops from the 1st and three from the 2nd regiment—and, to his deep chagrin, was prohibited himself from proceeding in command of it, being indispensable on the frontier; and how George Malcolm, whose state of health was such that he had had to proceed on sick leave to England,

heard the sound of the trumpet in Bombay and shook off his illness. We have now to follow this detachment on its triumphant career, which may be held to have inaugurated an epoch in Indian military history.

Malcolm joined and assumed command of the detachment on 15th November 1848 near Ahmedpur in Bahawalpur territory. Here were halted also a Bombay native infantry battalion and a battery of artillery; the rest of the Bombay Division commanded by Colonel Dundas being still far to the rear. The advanced force which Malcolm joined received orders to march on 1st December and reached Multan without opposition on the 11th. We must regret that the author of A Year on the Punjab Frontier did not record his impressions of the Scinde Horse. What these would have been, had they been thrown together, may be inferred from his commendation of Bombay troops in general; he recognized their superiority over the Bengal Army in discipline, and in their closer resemblance to the British soldier in other respects. 226

Malcolm and his men were actively employed from the day they arrived before Multan. The role of cavalry at a siege is usually a pleasant one; but in addition to patrolling, intercepting sorties and guarding batteries, the detachment also took part, dismounted, in the attack on

and storm of the suburbs.

Multan had not fallen when the news of the battle of Chillianwalla reached the besieging army. This had been announced by Lord Dalhousie, relying on Lord Gough's first report, as an 'entire defeat' of the Sikh army under Raja Sher Singh and it still appeared as a victory in his general order of 24th January 1849, published after receipt of the Commander-in-Chief's official dispatch. But it was very soon recognized as, at best, a drawn battle. It was not only that the British casualty rolls were more staggering even than those of Ferozeshah, but four British guns had been lost, and Gough had been unable even to remain on the ground he had won at such sacrifices. He had to withdraw for want of water, and the initiative passed to the Sikhs, who during the night recovered all their guns which had been captured, except twelve small pieces. In the words of E. J. Thackwell, 'if either party derived small advantage from this action, it was the Sikhs whose prestige was considerably raised by it. . . . They tested the fact that English regiments are not invincible, and that they even are sometimes seized with panic.' The last remark alludes to the misbehaviour of the 14th Light Dragoons in the battle, in sad ontrast to their gallant but ineffectual efforts at the previous action at Ramnagar. As to the Bengal Regular cavalry, 'It was incontrovertibly proved, writes Thackwell, 'at this and subsequent actions, that the Troopers of the Light Cavalry have no confidence in their swords as effective weapons of defence. It would have been difficult

to point out half-a-dozen men who had made use of their swords. On approaching the enemy they have immediate recourse to their pistols, the loading and firing of which form their sole occupation . . . the instances where Light Cavalry have ever entered squares or masses of infantry are rare-rare indeed. Very few natives have ever become really reconciled to the long seat and powerless bit of the European Dragoons. The usual seat of the native is short, and his bit is so severe that it will almost break the horse's jaw . . . it frequently happened during this campaign that some dragoons in a charge lost all control over their horses, while the Sikh horsemen were turning their spirited horses in all directions.'227

Chillianwalla showed all these defects in the most glaring light. The 14th Light Dragoons turned tail before an inferior force of Sikh horsemen; their sauve qui peut carried away the 9th Lancers and two Bengal Regular cavalry regiments with them, throwing the right of the British line into disorder. Many guns fell into the hands of the pursuing Sikhs and the tide of confusion was only stopped when it had all but involved the Commander-in-Chief and his staff. The detached squadrons of this cavalry brigade redeemed it from entire disgrace; but the few casualties sustained by all four regiments revealed how little they were involved in actual combat. The only charge of the day was made by a squadron of the 3rd Light Dragoons on the left flank; they behaved with their usual determination and suffered severely, but the 5th Bengal Light Cavalry, ordered to charge with them, would not face the foe. The battle was restored by the infantry and artillery.

For a month following the battle of Chillianwalla the British army remained on its new ground, the Sikhs maintaining their strong position at Rasul. Gough threw up entrenchments round his camp, the work being done by several companies of European troops; the Bengal sepoys, true to their traditions, excused themselves from labour with the spade and were allowed to do duty as a covering party.228 The cavalry were in constant request for patrol and escort duties, for the Sikh horsemen were active in plundering and carrying off baggagecamels all round the camp. The Irregular cavalry proved their worth in these harassing duties; yet failed to keep in touch with the Sikh army. On 12th February their tents had vanished from Rasul; on the 13th not a trace of them was to be seen; and no one in Gough's army could say where these thirty thousand men had gone.229 Fortunately, some spics came in and informed the political officers that Sher Singh certainly intended to offer battle at Gujrat, a place associated with early triumphs of the Khalsa. Gough had already diverted some troops advancing from Multan to dispute any attempt of the Sikhs to cross the Chenab at that

point. On the 19th Dundas with the Bombay column joined Gough, after two forced marches totalling close on fifty miles; three more Bombay battalions came in next day, and Gough was now ready to give battle with twenty-four thousand men and ninety-six guns.

The detachment of Scinde Horse did not join the main army in full strength, for on arriving at Ramnagar a squadron under Rissaldar Sheikh Abdul Nabi was detailed to escort the captured Mulraj into Lahore. Malcolm thus brought into line, on the memorable 21st February 1849, only 243 men. The Scinde Horse were placed under the brigade command of Brigadier White, with the 3rd Light Dragoons, the 9th Lancers and the 8th Bengal Light Cavalry, on the left wing of the army. It is noteworthy that for the first time in the campaign Gough brought into his line of battle all the units of Irregular cavalry he had with him. Equally interesting is a general order issued by him on 19th February: 'The Commander-in-Chief directs that Officers commanding Corps of Light Cavalry will permit the men of their regiments who are so inclined to arm themselves with their own Tulwars (which they are understood in general to possess) in lieu of the Government sabres they at present carry.'230 The Irregular style was coming into its own; but the convincing demonstration of its potential excellence was still in the future.

The ground around Gujrat was far more suitable to cavalry movements than the previous battlefields of the Sikh wars. There was practically no jungle, but continuous wheat fields. On the first advance of the cavalry of the left wing Sir Joseph Thackwell, commanding the Cavalry Division, came up, complimented Malcolm on the appearance of the Scinde Horse and said that the duty of the brigade was to take care of the left and rear: that they had guns, and that he had no doubt

The action began at about half past eight a.m. with a tremendous cannonade by the British artillery. At about nine o'clock General Thackwell brought the brigade into line, the Scinde Horse being on the extreme left and next to the 9th Lancers. Shortly afterwards two large bodies of the enemy's cavalry, about 4000 strong, appeared in front and opened fire on the brigade with a gun. Thackwell's horse artillery replied but soon ceased fire, and Sir Joseph threw his left a little back. The enemy advanced farther, extending to his right and threatening to get round the British left flank. Among these troops were 1500 Afghan cavalry, Amir Dost Mahomed having succumbed to the temptation to pay off old scores against the British, allying himself with his former foes the Sikhs in the hope of recovering Peshawar. After some time General Thackwell rode up to Malcolm and ordered him to charge

the Afghan horsemen, saying that he would be supported by a squadron of the 9th Lancers. The charge was witnessed by his nephew, Captain E. J. Thackwell, and we may describe it in his words, being an entirely

impartial observer:

It was indeed a splendid sight to behold the Irregular Horsemen of Scinde, led by their intrepid officers, Malcolm, Merewether and Green, the dauntless Malcolm being conspicuous in the front, rushing upon the enemy with fiery speed, yet close as the blades of a field of corn, driving everything before them, their sabres circling and flashing in the sun.'231 Malcolm himself, writing to his commandant at Khangarh, says, 'We did this with our 240 men, and I assure you that their conduct was the admiration of all. They sent the Afghans to the devil-cutting them down and potting them with their carbines.' The mêlée was a sharp one; a running fight with stiff knots of resistance. One of these was round a standard which was captured by a party led by Jemadar Kalee Khan, after a hard combat; Rissaldar Mirza Ahmed Ali Beg captured another standard single handed, killing its defender. Jamadar Khairati Khan also showed conspicuous bravery at the head of some men who attacked and killed the chief sardar of the Afghans with many of his immediate followers. Meanwhile the 9th Lancers advanced steadily at the trot on the right and rear of the Scinde Horse; and when the latter, having utterly shattered the Afghan cavalry as a body, pulled up in a field of wheat, the Lancers were left with nothing but the 'scrag end of the mutton', as their squadron commander Captain Campbell put it-individual Afghans whom they disposed of without loss to themselves. An opportunity did indeed offer, while the Scinde Horse drew rein, when a body of Sikh cavalry was hovering on their right and Merewether, who was collecting his men and thought the enemy might try to take them at a disadvantage, asked Captain Campbell to drive them off; but the Lancers stood their ground and after a while Campbell came up to Merewether and said that he had not charged the Sikhs as he could see that they were not inclined to molest them, and his orders were to act as a support to the Scinde Horse. 232 In dispersing the Afghans, the British cavalry had covered about two miles to the flank-almost at right angles to the general line of retreat of the Khalsa army, which had now begun.

Sir Joseph Thackwell now hastened forward to the Scinde Horse with his staff and, in the words of one of them, 'rode up to the commanding office and passed high eulogies on the conduct of his men. Their discipline and energy, collectively and individually, he said, had utterly astonished him.' Malcolm communicated the General's thanks to his men. He then received orders to pursue the retreating Sikhs, and

proceeded for about fourteen miles at a trot; being on the extreme left he had to conform to constant changes of direction. The Scinde Horse came upon stragglers and men hidden away in grain fields and holes, but no formed body of the enemy; they captured three guns, returning

to camp and dismounting at 10 p.m.

The casualties of the Scinde Horse were two men and twenty-four horses killed, one Indian officer, eleven men and eleven horses wounded: severer losses than were sustained by any other cavalry regiment engaged at the battle of Gujrat. The return of the 9th Lancers was merely four horses missing. General Thackwell in his report stated that the Lancers had charged with the Scinde Horse, and this apparently had been his intention; but it is sufficiently obvious from the casualty rolls, apart from the letters of the Scinde Horse officers and Captain Campbell on the subject, that the latter's action was confined to support. As to the cavalry of the British right wing, a deep and quaggy watercourse in their front had at first impeded movement and the two brigades on this flank did not come to close quarters with the Sikhs until they were in general retreat.²³⁴

Gujrat was a complete and decisive victory: 53 guns were captured besides the recapture of the two British pieces lost at Chillianwalla: and the battle was won at the comparatively trifling cost of about seven hundred killed and wounded. The Sikh position, though deliberately chosen by themselves, presented none of the difficulties of the former battlefields, but the greatest difference seems to have been in the spirit of the Sikhs themselves. Though superior to the British in numbers, they had come to distrust their sardars and not without reason, for many

of them fled before the crisis of the battle.

It may have been the expectation of much stiffer resistance that caused the generally cautious handling of the British cavalry by Thackwell and Hearsey. But to the infantry, and above all to the newcomers from Bombay and Sind, it was inexplicable. 'Why our cavalry on the right did not charge it is impossible to tell,' wrote an infantry officer of the first brigade. Dundas 'could not understand what Thackwell was about in not driving away the rabble he had in his front.'235 Young Henry Green writes to Jacob, 'I wish we had all been in the fight the other day: with our two lines, one behind the other, we should have astonished these Sikhs a little: as it was, the splendid Cavalry Division was thrown away, for what reason I know not; they must have expected a trap or something. Sir J. Thackwell is a good man; I would swear that he must have mistrusted his men, or something of that sort; the 14th Dragoons are very down in the mouth—never see them out of their lines and the men go about afraid to lift up their heads. Two of the 9th Lancers were

looking at our men after the charge, and I asked them what they thought of them; one said "By God, Sir! they are splendid fellows—I would go to the devil with them." '236

Malcolm, also writing to his commandant, says, 'The fault was in the advance of the whole line not being ordered sooner, and the pursuit not having begun sooner; also in the Cavalry Division not having charged forward on seeing the rout of the Afghan Cavalry. The reason given was that Lord Gough thought Goojerat occupied.' It is not unreasonable to assume that Gough was reluctant to depend too much on his cavalry after Chillianwalla, and that Thackwell, in the light of his own experiences, did not care to commit himself too far. And it was equally natural for Lieutenant Green of the Scinde Horse to write to Jacob that he now saw 'in practice what you used so often to try and instil into my mind at Khanghur. You may well ask, what have the officers of the English Cavalry been doing these last seven or eight years? It is my conviction that more was not done with the Cavalry, on the 21st, because the General had no faith in them, black or white; and that half the Cavalry and Infantry too, excepting Bombay, went into action expecting to be beaten; and nothing astonished me more than, after the action, fellows coming up and congratulating us on our conduct, as if it was anything meritorious doing one's duty: they surely did not expect us to run away!'237


This modest view of their achievement did not extend to admitting the 9th Lancers to an equal share in the credit for it; and when Sir Joseph Thackwell's report appeared, stating that a squadron of that regiment had charged with the Scinde Horse, Malcolm wrote to his Assistant Adjutant General pointing out the discrepancy with his own report, winding up, 'I owe it to myself, the officers and men of the Scinde Horse, to represent to the Major General that the charge which defeated the Afghan cavalry was ours alone.' This called down a rebuke from the General, who repeated that he had ordered 'a part of the Scinde Horse and a squadron of the 9th Lancers to attack supported by the remainder of the Scinde Horse.' [sic] If a mistake had occurred, it was accident only which gave the Scinde Horse the honour of the charge, and he had no doubt that the 9th Lancers would otherwise have done equally well. But there were many in the army, besides Jacob's three young subalterns, who questioned whether any cavalry corps in the army could have disposed of the Afghans as effectively as had the Scinde Horse. Malcolm tried in vain to obtain an admission from Captain Campbell that the enemy had been completely defeated before the 9th Lancers came up with them. It is evident from the correspondence that their ideas of what was a charge and what constituted defeat of the enemy were widely

different. 238 But the last word was spoken by E. J. Thackwell. 'In Lord Gough's despatches much of the credit solely due to the Scinde Horse was awarded to the 9th Lancers. It appears that General Thackwell expressed a wish that the Scinde Horse and two squadrons of the 9th Lancers, the other two squadrons of the latter Corps being in support, should charge the Afghan Cavalry. The Staff Officer to whom this order was delivered commanded the Scinde Horse to charge, supported by the 9th Lancers. The result of this perversion was that the Scinde Horse bore the brunt of the affair, the Lancers merely following them. Thus originated this unfortunate mistake against which Captain Malcolm afterwards loudly remonstrated. . . . But considering the circumstances, the mistake was fortunate; for the moral effect produced on the enemy by the bold attack of this native cavalry was most impressive, and the example set to the remainder of the Hindoostani

cavalry most invaluable. 239

And so as the army moved on, across the Jhelum, across the Indus at Attock, and thence to Peshawar, cavalry officers were constantly strolling round the lines of the Scinde Horse, complimenting, questioning, admiring, and testing all that they saw: the polished metal helmets of the officers, which gave that protection for the 'precious caput' which the other cavalry in Gough's army had been improvising out of rolls of linen cloth round the back of the shako, and other grotesque expedients:240 the steel chains sewn along the outside of the men's coatarms and breeches, and similarly along the snaffle-reins, for turning sword-cuts-all things evolved in the hard school of experience on the Sind frontier, where the Baluch freebooters were at least the equals of the Sikh 'Goorchuras' as horsemen and swordsmen. E. J. Thackwell was struck by the fact that 'these men obey the words of command delivered in the English language and understand many of the cavalry manœuvres.' Sir Charles Napier's marginal comment in his copy of Thackwell's book is the one word 'ALL!' against 'many'. Above all, the carbines made in England to Jacob's specification were admired; before the army was over the Jhelum we find Green writing that the Bengal Irregulars 'are going to send for carbines like ours; they will then, I suppose, think it all right, and that they are just as good as we poor devils.'241

Dundas, writing from Peshawar to congratulate Jacob on 'the increased renown of the Scinde Horse gained by the only charge made by any portion of the cavalry, and which was complete and successful' observes, 'their discipline and equipment are the envy and admiration of all Bengalees, whose irregular cavalry show in sad contrast to your fine fellows.'242 The Scinde Horse officers indeed found a talk with the



Bengalis and a stroll through their lines equally instructive. They had filled up their own losses in horses from the regimental fund, without recourse to imprests or Government grants, within a month of the battle. 'Rum fellows, these Qui Hies,' writes Merewether. 'There was Christie, yesterday, buying horses himself; he got upwards of eighty . . . casting bad ones. He pays the money for the whole, or has it paid, and then strikes an average at which he gives them out to the men. They were saying their reason for doing this was they got the horses for the men cheaper. . . . I could twig fast enough the men cannot buy them themselves, from debt, so the Officers manage for them this way to keep up their horses. They did not own this; however I will get it out of

some of them before long,'243

Malcolm and his men spent the rest of the year 1849 at Peshawar. It was at this time that Sir Henry Lawrence was expanding the little force of Guides raised by Lumsden in 1846 into the Panjab Frontier Force, of five cavalry and five infantry regiments. It is instructive to read the account of the raising of the 1st Panjab Cavalry, by a Bombay officer, Lieutenant Henry Daly, who received his orders at Peshawar on 28th May 1849. 'The regiment is armed, dressed and equipped in a style equal to the best irregular cavalry: all have carbines; the horses . . . are purchased from a subscription fund.' And when relinquishing his command we find Daly writing, 'The Regiment was raised unshackled by a bank, unaided by a Government advance. From the first issue of pay I commenced the stoppages. These I regularly continued until the whole amount was received from the sowars. It was well and often explained for what purposes these stoppages were made, and although it was long before they saw the result, I never heard a murmur at their continuance.' A picture of two Indian officers of the 1st Panjab Cavalry dated 1852, and that of a duffadar painted in 1851, shows them wearing jack-boots and black leather belts-two of the distinctive features of the Scinde Horse equipment. Daly had first seen men of Jacob's corps at Karachi when he was serving under Sir Charles Napier; and he had now been in their company from Multan onwards, in the Bombay Division. Whether in official or private correspondence Daly ever acknowledged his debt to Jacob's organization, I cannot say: but he did at least mention, in a paper read in 1884, that 'The Punjab Cavalry, following the example of Jacob's Scinde Horse were armed with light percussion carbines, bought by themselves and carried on their persons, for which the State found ammunition.'244

Not long after the return of the Scinde Horse detachment from the Panjab, George Malcolm proceeded on his long deferred leave to Europe. He was succeeded as second-in-command of the second

regiment by Henry Green, whose younger brother Malcolm now joined

the corps.

Dundas after furlough in 1850 returned to the Panjab to command the Jullundur Division of the Bengal Army. He had meanwhile succeeded to the family title as Lord Melville. We find him writing to Jacob at the end of 1853, 'The organization and equipment of the Scinde Horse may be said to have introduced a new era in the organization of Irregular Cavalry, for in imitation of your system the grotesque appearance which the Irregular Regiments presented in this Presidency, armed with their spears and matchlocks is gradually yielding to the same armament and system which you were the first to introduce. The officers however still wear the Native dress instead of the European

uniform which your officers wear.'

Jacob was not the man to rest on his oars in the comfortable assurance that his corps had achieved perfection, though this very word was used by inspecting officers in their reports. One such was General Auchmuty, commanding the Sind Division, on reviewing that part of the corps which was at Khangarh on 24th January 1849, though at the same time he warmly recommended a proposal by Jacob to improve its organization by adding to each regiment two 'key' ranks: that of rissaldar major, to supply a single link between the European and Indian officers, and a kot duffadar major, equivalent to a regimental sergeant major. The former rank had existed in the original organization of the Scinde Horse, but on the death of the first holder, after the pay and establishment had been placed on the footing of Bengal Irregular cavalry, no other could be appointed. The rank of kot duffadar major also was unknown in the Bengal Irregulars. Jacob had, in fact, made his senior rissaldar and a senior non-commissioned officer perform the duties of these two ranks, as they could not be left undone; it was proper therefore to recognize and pay them, the cost being only thirty pounds a month for each regiment. Jacob's proposal was supported by the Commander-in-Chief and the Government of Bombay, but the Government of India rejected it summarily and on principle: on renewing his application with further arguments, he was rebuked for having appointed men to do the duty without pay.245

The Panjab detachment of the Scinde Horse returned to Khangarh early in 1850 and the corps was shortly afterwards inspected by Brigadier Derinzy, an old Peninsular officer. He reported it to be 'the perfect beau ideal of a corps of Irregular Cavalry' and could discern no room for improvement, or imagine anything finer or better adapted for the

important services it had to perform.

1850 was an important year in Jacob's life. We have already seen

the Governor-General seeking his advice on the arrangements for securing an exposed frontier; now the Bombay Government, having decided to raise a new Irregular cavalry regiment, the Southern Mahratta Horse, desired the benefit of his experience, which was given in a most detailed exposition of the silladar system as administered in the Scinde Horse. Again in October we find him consulted regarding the disposal and compensation for Irregular cavalry horses found unserviceable.

The Bengal rule was that horses condemned—generally by a committee of cavalry officers—were to be branded and sold on behalf of the Government as soon as compensation was received. This procedure Jacob held to strike at the root of the true strength of silladar corpstheir entire independence of external aid; it involved the State in great expense, and caused the worst conducted troops to be the most costly to Government. As to the committee to 'sit on the body' of useless horses, the men could only consider it as implying that the Government assumed that their commandant was liable to cheat the State. He supported his arguments with figures of the huge compensation claims made by the Bengal Irregular regiments which had served on the Sind frontier in 1844-45; he had himself seen their horses worked when three out of four were suffering from sore backs till they had to be cast as unserviceable, when they were paid for under the committee system. In contrast, he showed the excellent results of his own rule by which the silladar owning and the bargir riding a sore-backed horse were fined until it was fit again. No claims for compensation were ever made in his corps except for horses killed or drowned on service. But it was necessary for the just administration of this system that the pay of the silladars should be amply sufficient for maintaining serviceable horses.246

The next occasion on which a number of horses were lost on the frontier is recorded in one of the most vivid pages of the records of the Scinde Horse. At ten o'clock on the forenoon of 24th December 1850, Jemadar Durgasingh, commanding the post at Kandhkot, was informed that a party of armed robbers had carried off some camels from the neighbourhood. Following the tracks at a gallop the strength of the pursuing party was diminished by half after covering thirty miles, seven of their horses having fallen dead, two of them under Durgasingh. Not content with the recovery of the camels, which the robbers abandoned when sighted, the jemadar swore that he would be ashamed to show his face to the commandant if after coming in sight of the robbers he should retire without killing some of them. He continued the pursuit far into the hills and when the marauders, reinforced by about fifty men, turned at bay, he had only two troopers and one of the Baluch Guides with

him. Nothing daunted, the jemadar and his men went headlong at the foe, who outnumbered them by twenty to one, and killed or disabled fifteen of them before being literally cut to pieces, with the single exception of the Baluch Guide who escaped severely wounded. In his regimental orders, Jacob expressed his admiration for Durgasingh's invincible courage but took occasion also to point out the errors he had committed and to contrast the excellent management of the rissaldar commanding the next but one post of Garhi Hassan, who arrived on the spot with his party in perfect order in time to save the guide and the dismounted troopers left behind en route, and recover the plundered camels, though he had only received an indistinct message that Durgahsingh had taken the field.²⁴⁷

In addition to tributes to the gallantry of the fallen from the Sind Division and Bombay, the Bugti tribesmen acknowledged after their fashion the jemadar's prowess, giving the name Durgakhushta to the place where he had fallen after thus letting them feel the weight of Jacob's arm. At Kandhkot, the post where he had been in command, Jacob caused a cenotaph to be raised to his memory which still stands,


almost hidden by jungle, on the bank of the Sind Dhoro.

Jacob had in the previous month made another attempt to obtain sanction to the kot duffadar major's appointment which was so badly needed; he showed that if at the same time some superfluous non-combatant ranks on his (Bengal) establishment were abolished, this could be done with an actual saving to the State. The Supreme Government agreed to abolish the non-effective posts, but sanctioned less than half the allowances Jacob recommended for the performance of their duties by fighting men; the proposal for a kot duffadar major was once more rejected. In disgust, Jacob wrote to request that at least his establishment might not be made less efficient than before.²⁴⁸

A week passed and he found himself unable to digest the rebuff. He resolved to make another effort and called up every argument by which

he might enforce his claim.

If this establishment did not exist in the Irregular cavalry of Bengal it followed inevitably that there was a corresponding defect in their discipline; and the state of the frontier when in charge of Bengal Irregulars compared with its condition in 1842 and since 1847 under the Scinde Horse was proof enough. The change effected, almost incredible to those who had not seen it, had been produced by nothing but the discipline of the Scinde Horse. Jacob explains the principles on which he had acted; striving to develop the powers of the native Indian soldier and do justice to them, attaching the men to the service by creating pride in their profession, until no coercion was required to maintain a



JEMADAR DURGASINGH'S CENOTAPH AT KANDHKOT Erected by John Jacob. The man is grandson of the well-known Baluch Guide Wali Mahomed Khoso who was the only survivor of the action.

discipline which had become second nature. He continues, 'Sir Charles Napier and Sir Willoughby Cotton have both recorded in General Orders that I have "brought the Scinde Irregular Horse to perfection". It is certain that the words of the historian Macaulay are as truly applicable hitherto to the men of the Scinde Irregular Horse as they are to the Ironsides of Cromwell—the earliest Silladar Corps on record.' And Jacob proceeds to quote Macaulay verbatim, merely substituting the name of his corps and its theatre of operation for those in the text.

In the mountains and plains of Cutchee, in Scinde, in the desert, or in the Punjab, the men of the Scinde Irregular Horse, often surrounded with difficulties, sometimes contending against ten-fold odds, not only have never failed to conquer, but have never failed to destroy and break in pieces whatever force was opposed to them. They came at length to regard the day of battle as a day of certain triumph, and marched against the most renowned soldiers of Asia with disdainful confidence.

'This spirit which they have hitherto invariably shown whether under personal command of their European, or of their Native Officers without a single European present, together with their orderly and regular conduct in quarters had been produced by their discipline alone.'

It was not dependent on one man; it had little or no reference to individuals. Jacob claimed that his ten years of invariable success in command should entitle him to be heard, and acquit him of presumption in again urging his request. 'Government may rest assured that the State will be richly repaid for whatever extra expense may be caused by the grant of the establishment applied for, even if it be granted to all the Irregular Cavalry Regiments in India. The Supreme Government does not probably know what the Scinde Irregular Horse is, or how impossible it would be, as has been proved on trial, for a really Irregular force to keep the order now preserved on this frontier. . . . 'But the commander of the Sind Division and the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army, to whom all this was known, would, he felt sure, support him.

Brigadier-General Manson's 'cordial support and assistance' were forthcoming in a well-reasoned letter to the Bombay Commander-in-Chief. Aware that Jacob's request had already been refused he took the matter up again from a conviction that the proposal was made solely for the good of the service, and his own experience (he was an officer of the Bombay Army) entirely agreed with Jacob's that the ranks asked

for, which existed in every Regular regiment, cavalry or infantry, and every artillery battalion of the Bombay Army, were essential. He ended, 'His Excellency can well decide if it would be advisable for the sake of 245 rupees per mensem to weaken the discipline of Major Jacob's fine

regiments....'249

Jacob was by this time fighting another administrative battle. In June 1850 Lord Dalhousie had republished a Governor-General's Order of 1837, by which every officer seconded from his regiment on staff, civil or other employment, who had not previously passed an examination in the Hindustani language should do so within six months, or be remanded to his corps. Merewether, Collier, Henry and Malcolm Green duly presented themselves before the station examination board at Shikarpur in February 1851. But their names did not appear in general orders as having passed, and by May it seems to have struck Jacob with horror that if the order were strictly enforced he might at any moment be deprived at one fell swoop of all his trusted lieutenants. Thus aroused, his representation on the subject was nothing if not forcible.

Whatever opinion the examination committee might have formed from their papers, his subalterns' knowledge of the Hindustani language was, for practical purposes, far superior to that of most passed interpreters; they had been in the habit of interpreting and translating all my orders and written communications which, in a Corps disposed in so many detachments as is the Scinde Irregular Horse, are very numerous, for many years past in the best possible style, and it appears contrary to reason and commonsense now to question the qualifications of my officers.' Jacob proceeded to enter at length into the merits of his subalterns individually, acknowledging how much he owed to their co-operation on all occasions. As they had been appointed to the corps, he claimed, without any such conditions expressed or implied, and had in the performance of their duties won even a European reputation, it was unreasonable, unjust, impolitic and injurious to the public service to displace them, because it was supposed that they had not 'a critical knowledge of the Hindoostanee language.' He begged that they might be specially exempted from the operation of the order 'regarding any further passing in the Hindoostanee language, of which I solemnly affirm that they have at present a competent knowledge.'

The Commander-in-Chief at Bombay forwarded this epistolary explosive to the Government of India requesting—possibly in some trepidation—the issue of instructions. The detonation was perhaps less violent than might have been expected from the dynamic Dalhousie. He observed, 'The merits of the officers of the Scinde Horse are well known. Their services are so really meritorious in themselves that the

Governor-General regrets to see them in danger of being damaged by the inflated tone in which their Commanding Officer has thought fit to proclaim them. But praiseworthy as they are, and praised as they have been, there are scores of officers throughout India every whit as able. as energetic, as gallant, and as useful as these gentlemen have been.' (Jacob would never for a moment have admitted that this was possible.) But no exception has been admitted in favour of any of those who have not passed the examination required, and His Lordship can permit none in favour of the officers of the Scinde Horse, they having failed equally to meet the test applied.' It was for the Government of Bombay to decide whether they had passed, agreeably to their regulations. If not, they were to be remanded to their original corps. Then follow severe strictures on the tone of Jacob's letter. He had observed 'that these officers have been of more value to the State than would be the philological attainments of a college of linguists. . . . Every officer has a full right to represent such things as he desires in a fitting manner and becoming terms. But His Lordship will permit no one in those Services to comment on, and to controvert, the orders of his superiors, as Major Jacob has done, in language which closely approaches to actual contempt, and which, at all events, is utterly incompatible with that respect and deference to superior authority which Major Jacob professes. The Governor-General requests that the Government of Bombay will convey to Major Jacob these expressions of His Lordship's marked dissatisfaction and censure.'250

The Governor of Bombay expressed his extreme regret that 'the conduct of an officer so distinguished should have called forth so grave a censure'—a pronouncement of masterly ambiguity. Jacob had hardly swallowed Dalhousie's snub, which reached him only on 22nd September, having been delayed several weeks both in Bombay and Karachi as if in reluctance to administer the unpleasant dose, when the Governor-General's sentiments on his renewed application for the additional establishment for his regiments were communicated to him.

The cordial support accorded to his representations by the Government of Bombay may well have increased Dalhousie's irritation, though probably he was mainly provoked by Jacob's scornful disgust at the terms on which his request for the appointment of pay-duffadars was actually sanctioned, which he begged to be excused from bringing into force; and again, his calm adaptation of the passage in Macaulay. The Governor-General reiterated his previous decision that the appointments of rissaldar major and kot duffadar major were unnecessary; and this was to be regarded as final. Dalhousie again took occasion to notice, with increased displeasure, the tone of Major Jacob's official letters, and

his renewed attempts to strengthen his application by 'loud praises' of the Scinde Horse. The commandant was told that the services and efficiency of his corps were correctly appreciated by the Government of India, and that it was painful to see them 'damaged by bombastic eulogy'.

In his reply addressed to the Sind Division Jacob expressed his gratitude to the Commander-in-Chief and Governor of Bombay for their support. He had tried, on public grounds, to obtain what appeared to him justice for his officers and men; on public grounds alone he expressed regret that his efforts on their behalf should have called forth

the serious displeasure of the Governor-General.

He heard that he had had a very narrow escape from being turned out of his command in consequence of these brushes with authority; alluding to this in a letter to Philip Jacob he writes, 'The old gentlemen of Leadenhall much mistake my nature if they suppose that for their wrath or for anything that men could do I would go back one inch from anything done or spoken which I know to be right. . . . It does not disturb me in the least. It is just old Galileo and the College of Cardinals over again.'251

At any rate Jacob did not lose his lieutenants, except temporarily when they took their furlough; and we find every one of them with 'H', denoting passed in Hindustani, after his name in the Army List for

1853.

Several events in this year afforded renewed proofs of the efficiency of the Scinde Horse. It opened with an inspection by Brigadier-General Robertson, commanding the Sind Division. He was particularly im-

pressed with the transport arrangements.

'The whole of the baggage was packed and laden, on the reverse flank of the column, ready for a march, and everything was in that state of preparation, with only a day's warning, that the whole body on parade numbering 796 sabres could have moved on the sounding of the trumpet in any direction where their services might be required for any period.' The men were in their cold weather marching order, wearing over their Alkaliks 'a dressed sheepskin coat reaching to the knees but only covering the arms half way between the shoulder and the elbow: the woolly side is worn next the body, and it proves a most admirable substitute for a great coat.' Here Jacob was adopting the sensible custom of the country where the cold is bitter when a wind blows from the north in January; but these 'poshteens' also gave some protection from swordcuts, and he may not have been unmindful of the buff coats of Cromwell's men.

Robertson was impressed by the excellent English in which the words

THE INDIAN IRONSIDES

of command were given by Jacob's senior Indian officers whom he saw take personal command of the two regiments on parade; he invested one of them, Rissaldar Mohbat Khan, with the Star of the Order of British India, awarded for his services at the battle of Gujrat. Seldom was there an annual inspection of the Scinde Horse without a special

parade for such presentations.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army, Lord Frederick FitzClarence, was struck by Robertson's remarks about the baggage, and desired a detailed explanation of the system. Jacob showed that the only good check on excess of baggage was by compelling officers and soldiers at all times and in all places to be provided with carriage: 'Their means being limited they cannot carry too much. No carriage is ever allowed to be hired, under any circumstances. All men are made to keep their own baggage animals . . . being private property, the men never injure them by overloading or ill-treatment.' These rules were liable to be enforced by heavy fines, but the last occasion when a fine was imposed, for being unprovided with proper carriage, was five years before. The men took bedding and cooking apparatus, sometimes tents, and if necessary three days' food for man and horse. Jacob had 'never found more than twelve hours' warning necessary to enable the whole Corps of Scinde Irregular Horse to commence a march of any length. . . . The syces, grass cutters, etc., generally travel mounted on the baggage animals . . . and I have always found all able to keep up with the Regiment even on long marches, such as forty miles a day.' A return of the baggage animals then belonging to the silladars of the corps showed that 1440 men maintained 407 camels, 581 pack-ponies, 14 mules, and 107 bullocks for carrying water-skins.

These arrangements were all part of Jacob's purely regimental system, and he ascribed their success to the fact that he had been left to manage matters as he found best, his men not having to look to higher authority than himself, as commandant; his possession of full powers

'almost prevents the necessity of ever using those powers.'252

It so happened that an opportunity of demonstrating this readiness of the Scinde Horse in actual practice occurred between the writing of Robertson's report and that of Jacob. A rebellion broke out in Bahawalpur State and the Nawab sent an urgent request for assistance from Sind. A field force was ordered to be assembled in readiness, including four squadrons of the Scinde Horse, the whole to be commanded by Jacob. The orders, dated from Shikarpur on 6th March, required a report to be made as soon as each unit was ready to move. Jacob reported his readiness on 7th March.

The services of British troops were not after all required on that

occasion. But a few weeks later Jacob was faced with the greatest menace to his frontier since the same reason in 1849. The Marri tribe assembled in great force near the Bugti border, and he advanced with 400 men of the Scinde Horse to attack them should they menace the frontier. The day-20th March-proved an exceptionally hot one, and in crossing the desert no less than 116 horses died of sunstroke. Jacob too was disabled, being shot through the thigh by the accidental discharge of a pistol. He was however able to direct operations, and after a few days the Marris abandoned the idea of attempting a predatory expedition within his reach, moved through the hills to raid the Dombkis successfully, and dispersed. Jacob had hardly returned to headquarters when information arrived that the marauders had reassembled and gone eastwards through the hills on another expedition; after plundering in Panjab territory a large band of them made a dash towards Kashmor and carried off a number of cattle between that place and the hills. The officer commanding the post, Rissaldar Sheikh Karim, followed the tracks some thirty miles into the hill country, overtaking the marauders at nightfall. He had then thirty men with him; the Marris outnumbering him by more than two to one, turned on their pursuers; the rissaldar charged and a hand to hand combat ensued. After a confused and desperate struggle in the gathering darkness the Baluchis fled, and Sheikh Karim returned to Kashmor taking several of their mares, all the cattle they had carried off, and the bodies of an officer, six other ranks and a Baluch Guide killed in the fight. Nine horses were also killed and two troopers wounded. These were the heaviest losses ever sustained by the Scinde Horse in a frontier affair and were due largely to the darkness, in which chance to some extent neutralized skill at arms.

Jacob succeeded in obtaining the distinction of the Order of Merit for five of the Scinde Horsemen engaged in the fight, and Yaru Khosa, the veteran Baluch Guide who had fought manfully along with the rest, having his mare killed under him, was granted a pension while

still in service.253

Jacob was called on for a special report on the mortality among the horses of the detachment which he had led himself; he observed that 20th March, the day on which he had crossed the desert, was hotter by sixteen degrees than the 19th. But this was not necessarily the cause: long experience of this desert convinces me that these sudden strokes are neither to be foretold nor accounted for in the present state of our scientific knowledge. I have been out frequently on horseback in this desert from sunrise to sunset, in the very hottest part of the hottest seasons without losing a horse or a man, while at other times a sudden puff of air, apparently, has instantly struck both man and beast dead,

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even in the middle of the night.... There is no remedy for these things and it would be better to sustain a far heavier loss than to allow the plunderers to suppose that we cannot take the field at any time or season against them. Our dead horses have all been replaced, without

costing the State one farthing.'

This last fact aroused the curiosity of the Commander-in-Chief at Bombay. How was it done? Jacob explained how the silladars of the Scinde Horse mounted and remounted themselves at their own expense in the first instance, but received for each new horse, when approved by the commandant, one hundred rupees in aid of the purchase, the sum being raised by equal contributions from each assami in the corps. As there were sixteen hundred horses in the Scinde Horse, each casualty among them cost each assami one anna. In practice this meant that the silladars had to bear half the cost, or a little more, which prevented any carelessness. Horse dealers were attracted to and settled permanently at headquarters; none but ready money transactions were allowed; and the extent of Jacob's interference was only to 'vet' the horses before they were enrolled. Their general standard had by this time become about equal to that of any cavalry in India. A few years previously Jacob had admitted that the powers of the horses of the Regular cavalry, provided by the State, being more equal, their movements on parade would be more steady and precise than those of a silladar corps. But he had adopted a characteristic mode of evening out inequalities among his men's horses -by supplying each animal with a type of bit appropriate to its temperament. This, we learn from one of Frere's letters to the Bombay Government, was the solitary fault ever alleged against the equipment of the Scinde Horse by an inspecting officer—'a very distinguished Major General who said he would have preferred the horses' bits all of exactly uniform pattern instead of being adapted as they are to the several varieties of horses' mouths-a criticism at once characteristic of the critic and his subject.'254

It was in November of this year 1853 that Lord Melville wrote to Jacob that the organization and equipment of the Scinde Horse had inaugurated a new era in the organization of Irregular cavalry. This letter was in acknowledgment of a copy of the Record Book of the Scinde Irregular Horse, compiled by Jacob, from which could clearly be understood the process by which he had built up this excellence, till it was

revealed as by a lightning flash in the Panjab.

The effects and to some extent the causes of the superior merit of the Irregular as compared with the Regular cavalry system, apparent in the Second Sikh War, had been the subject of much correspondence and numerous articles in the Press of India, but it was not till the

beginning of 1851 that Captain E. J. Thackwell, of the British Service, published his Narrative of the war. His wholehearted admiration for the performance and organization of the Scinde Horse was expressed, as we have seen, in several passages and his final judgment remains to be quoted: 'Having witnessed the charge of the Scinde Horse at the battle of Goojerat against the Afghan force of Akram, I am convinced that no cavalry could have achieved the overthrow of the enemy in a more spirited and effectual manner.' As to the Regular cavalry of Bengal, 'If the Court of Directors were to consult their real interest, they would convert all the Light Cavalry Corps into Irregulars.' And again, 'The only use derived from the Light Cavalry of India by the East India Company is the splendid source of patronage it presents.' Sir Charles Napier scribbled in the margin of his copy of the book, opposite this last remark, 'How this young gentleman runs ahead!'255 Yet Thackwell summed up the opinion of competent and unprejudiced judges, and in the year 1853 his views were endorsed in a work of far greater scope and power, which ranks as a military classic, namely Cavalry; its History and Tactics by Captain L. E. Nolan of the 15th Hussars.

Nolan, though also a 'young gentleman', possessed an inquiring, critical and open mind; he had made a profound study of his subject, and was familiar with the cavalry of most of the armies of Europe. It does not appear that he was acquainted with the writings of John Jacob on military matters, but they were kindred spirits, as witness the following passage: 'The most hopeless condition to which an arm or a science, or an art can attain, is that where its professors sit down with perfect self-satisfaction under the conviction that it has reached perfection, and is susceptible of no further improvement. True also is it, that nothing in this world can remain in a statu quo, and that whatever does not

advance must retrocede. It is a law of nature.'256

Nolan was in India at the time of the second Sikh war and in 1850 as aide-de-camp to the Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army. His personal experience of Irregular cavalry corps was confined to those of the Nizam's Army (which Jacob himself allowed to be of good quality—far less developed, bien entendu, than the Scinde Horse) and finding his impressions fully borne out by the much more extensive experience of Thackwell, quoted copiously from his brother dragoon's Narrative. Nolan observes, 'Nothing during that campaign was more gallant and determined than the behaviour of the Scinde Horse, whereas the distinction the Regulars attained was such that it is best passed over in silence. Yet the only difference between the men composing the two Arms lay in their organization.' He quotes with approval from a letter published in the Delhi Gazette, 'A cavalry soldier should find himself

strong and firm in his seat, easy in his dress, so as to have perfect freedom of action, and with a weapon in his hand capable of cutting down an adversary at a blow. There is scarcely a more pitiable spectacle in the world than a native trooper mounted on an English saddle, tightened by his dress to the stiffness of a mummy, half suffocated with a leather collar, and a regulation sword in his hand, which must always be blunted by the steel scabbard in which it is encased.

'This poor fellow, who has the utmost difficulty in sticking to his saddle and preserving his stirrups, whose body and arms are rendered useless by a tight dragoon dress and whose sword would scarcely cut a turnip in two, is ordered to charge the enemy: and if he fails to do what few men in the world would do in his place, courts of inquiry are held, regiments disbanded, and their cowardice is commented on in terms of astonishment and bitterest reproach. This is truly ridiculous: the system and not the man is to be blamed.'257

From this point Nolan proceeds to the logical conclusion from which most cavalry officers in the British service would have shrunk in horror.

'Now if this system, which has had a fair trial, has been found so bad in the East, why should it be supposed to be excellent when applied to our own dragoons?

'If a native horseman should not be put in a helpless seat with long stirrups, and should not be tightened by his dress or suffocated by a leather stock; if it is necessary for him to have a sword that will cut down an enemy at a blow—are these things less necessary to the English dragoon? or if not quite so necessary, would they not add greatly to his efficiency in the field?

'It doubtless requires great liberality and freedom from prejudice or preconceived opinion to admit that a system on which the talent and experience of practical men has been exhausted for ages, can be a bad one. Yet experience for many, many years has shown how deficient cavalry is, how it has fallen off instead of improving, and how much is required to be done to render it as useful to the State and as formidable to an enemy as it should be.'258

As regards the arming and equipment of cavalry, Nolan advocated the sword as against the lance, and the curved cutting sabre as against the straight thrusting sword; protection for the vulnerable legs and arms by a narrow steel plate running down the outside of the former and steel gauntlets for the latter; the hunting style of seat and type of saddle—almost every improvement suggested by him agreed with Jacob's practice.

Nolan's revolutionary proposals aroused the usual virtuous indignation which awaits all attempts to shake blind faith in tradition. As a

reviewer wrote two years later, 'The pertinacity of class bigotry in

military matters seems almost to vie with religious polemics.'

But after forty years of peace during which the study of England's most influential cavalry officers seemed to have been devoted to the evolution of the most unsuitable style of horsemanship, clothing and equipment, 259 the country was once more at war in Europe. For a start, we learn that Lord Cardigan's reconnoitring patrol in the Dobrudsha had 140 sore backs among 200 horses. With the dragoon saddle forcing the rider up from the horse's back so that he had to ride wholly by balance, the man who got on best was the type 'so short in the body and so long in the leg as to look like the afternoon shadow of somebody else.' These 'Light Dragoons' therefore rode at eighteen stone; yet a surprising proportion of the weight was made up of shabracques, sheepskins and other useless frippery for man and horse, together with materials to keep these things clean.

The truth of the doctrines of Jacob and Nolan was forced upon the army partly by bitter experience and partly by the power of the Press. A few clever leaders in *The Times* abolished that 'remnant of barbarism'—the stock—'ruthlessly sacrificed at Varna to the commonsense of the English public.' Then we hear of shakos thrown away, straps and braces nowhere, overalls stuffed into the boots and jackets ripped open at the seams. There was hope at last that the devisors of cavalry uniforms would understand that even a horse-soldier's work was rough and dirty.

Let us take one more view of the Scinde Horse as they appeared on 25th October 1854-the day of Balaclava, where the British light dragoons, hussars and lancers showed, in spite of the disabilities of their equipment, that for sheer courage and discipline they were unsurpassed. Brigadier Smee, who inspected Jacob's regiments on this occasion, had commanded the force which stormed the fort of Khangarh in the early days of 1839, and thereafter spent the terrible summer of that year at such places as Janidero and Rojhan. The transformation of Khangarh and the country round it is matter for a later chapter: perhaps the difference was little greater than that between Amiel's Baluch Levy and the Scinde Horse of 1854. Smee writes, 'The arms consisted of a double barrelled carbine weighing five pounds' (introduced by Jacob about the year 1852 in place of the single barrelled weapon) '... the sabre about two feet ten inches long, broad at the end, slightly curved, and of the old dragoon kind; the scabbard . . . wooden . . . particularly light and strong; the belt'—the pouch belt containing twenty rounds—'of the best English leather. The horses' furniture is in excellent order and most complete: each man carried his horse's head- and heel-ropes, pegs, etc., two or three days' provision for man and horse, and also a most valuable

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acquisition in the shape of a small water mussock, which contains about two gallons of water, and is carried under the horse's belly, and which in no way incommodes. On average they ride fifteen stone.' (This in their

poshteens and heavy marching order.)

On the condition of the horses, the transport arrangements, the intelligent bearing of the Indian officers, the precision of each manœuvre in a review, Smee bestowed the same enthusiastic praise as previous inspecting officers. Another feature of Jacob's organization struck him; 'His system of carrying on his durbar or Orderly room is one of the best I ever witnessed, as the whole of the interior economy and all duty connected with the Regiment is conducted by him in the presence of the European and Native Officers, and all who may have occasion to come before him, in such a way that no one can plead ignorance of any orders that may be issued.'

One of Jacob's regimental orders issued in this year 1854 became deservedly famous, as a practical and conclusive proof of the truth of his doctrine that under a proper system of discipline the Indian soldier would cheerfully lay aside the prejudices of caste or religion when his commanding officer—'the patriarch of his tribe, the chief of his clan'—declared that this was necessary, 'to maintain or increase the Abroo of

the Regiment'.260

The occasion was the Muslim festival of Mohurram, and the order reads as follows:

The camp at Jacobabad has been, for the last week, the scene of wild disorder, such as is in the highest degree disgraceful to good soldiers.

A shameful uproar has been going on day and night, and this under the pretence of religious ceremonies.

The Commanding Officer has nothing to do with religious ceremonies.

All men may worship God as they please, and may act and believe as they choose, in matters of religion: but no men have a right to annoy their neighbours, or to neglect their duty, on pretence of serving God.

The Officers and men of the Scinde Irregular Horse have the name of, and are supposed to be, excellent soldiers, and not mad

fakeers.

They are placed at the most advanced and most honourable post in all the Bombay Presidency. The Commanding Officer believes that they are in every way worthy of their honour and would be sorry if, under his command, they ever became unworthy of their high position.

The Commanding Officer feels it to be the greatest honour to command such soldiers, but that it would be a disgrace to be at

the head of disorderly fakeers and drummers.

He now therefore informs the Scinde Irregular Horse, that in future no noisy processions, nor any disorderly display whatever, under pretence of religion, or of anything else, shall ever be allowed in or in the neighbourhood of any camp of the Scinde Irregular Horse.²⁶¹

A commentator writes that no murmur or dissentient voice was heard among the Muslim soldiers, though there were ten thousand of their co-religionists in the neighbouring town. And we shall see in a later chapter that the order continued to be obeyed in Jacob's absence,

in peculiarly critical and difficult circumstances.

In April 1854 Jacob had written to his brother, 'I hear that there is some intention of sending me with the S.I.H. to Turkey; we are quite willing, and able to go out at once.' His hopes of taking part in the war in the Near East were encouraged by an order to send a troop of his corps to Poona for the Commander-in-Chief of Bombay to see; he took care that the detachment should go with a proper number of 'Lascars, Bhistees, Bazar establishment and Artificers, as essentially necessary to its efficiency in the field.'262 The same rumours persisted as the war in the Crimea dragged on; and in the Bombay Quarterly Review for July 1855 an article on 'Light Cavalry in India' summed up the experience gained there, against a background of the most distinguished writings on cavalry subjects which had appeared during the previous decade. The doctrines of General de Brack, a Napoleonic veteran; Colonel Arentschild of the King's German Legion; Nolan (who had been killed at the very moment that the charge of the Light Brigade began); Trower, and finally Trower's commentator, John Jacob, were critically examined; and the reviewer's verdict, on almost every point in which these authorities differed, was for Jacob's practice.

The writer was not a Bombay officer, but Captain Mayne, of the Bengal Army, who had served for many years with the Nizam's Irregular cavalry. And it was a Queen's officer who had written that the Scinde Horse had introduced a new era in the organization of Irregular cavalry in India: and a second Queen's officer who had anticipated the Bombay reviewer in his opinion, that the dress, equipment and particularly the organization of the best Indian Irregular cavalry should be a model, not only to the Indian Regular, but to the cavalry of

every nation in Europe. 263

The Versatile Genius—Jacobabad

CHAPTER XIV

The Iconoclast

Jacob's first essay as a writer on military matters—his remarks on a review of Captain Trower's Hints on Irregular Cavalry which have been quoted at the beginning of the last chapter—incidentally inaugurates open war with the 'practice of Bengal', against which he had previously fulminated in private and official correspondence. The year 1847, in which Jacob's article was published, marks also his breach with Sir Charles Napier; two streams of controversy now began to flow, mingling in a stormy sea in which he was to battle for many years.

The pamphlet produced a number of rejoinders and comments; the writer's evident sincerity of purpose kept criticism within bounds and Outram welcomed the public discussion as certain to further Jacob's views. He had sent a copy to the Chairman of the Court of Directors who, he told Jacob, was his staunch friend; and copies of a second pamphlet on the same subject, which Jacob had printed privately in the beginning of 1848, were similarly sent to influential persons in England and India.²⁶⁴

Jacob attained the rank of regimental captain, which he had held by brevet for four years, in January 1847; and he was appointed brevet major five months later. He could now expect his gazette as Companion of the Bath, for Joshua Tait, the other officer included in the Duke of Wellington's promise, had received the honour more than a year before. Major Jacob was strengthening his claims to the decoration every day he remained on the frontier, which he had all but restored to order before Sir Charles Napier left Sind.

It will be recalled that about that time Jacob, under the influence of generous feeling not unmixed with remorse, had written to Sir Charles regretting all that had occurred to injure him in his estimation and mentioning that 'though Outram was my loved and honoured friend

I could not forget what I owed to Sir Charles himself.' The General wrote a few hasty lines in reply just as he was embarking at Karachi; Jacob's letter had afforded him much pleasure and he would write more

fully from Suez.

But Jacob tells us that some time before, his father had inquired from Mr. Astell, the Chairman of the Court of Directors, about the delay in the fulfilment of the Duke's promise; and that Mr. Astell had replied, not long before his own death, 'the only reason your son is not now a Major and Companion of the Bath is that his friends Lord Ellenborough and Sir Charles Napier did not wish it.' The original of this note the vicar of Woolavington sent to his son, who forwarded it to Sir Charles Napier through Major McMurdo. 265

At Christmas 1847 Colonel Dundas, at Jacob's instance, desired the Commander-in-Chief at Bombay to remind the Court of Directors of the promised C.B. Outram, active as ever on behalf of his friend, told him that the oversight was not with the Court, though he was indignant that they should have acquiesced in the delay-'Why the devil don't they stand up for the rights of their officers without consideration for the feelings of the Duke and his satellites?'266 But in August 1848 the Court was still temporizing; Jacob's claim 'would be brought to notice

in the proper quarter.'

In the same month Jacob received through Major McMurdo a copy of a letter which Napier had written to him from Malta in November 1847. The original had apparently gone astray. In Jacob's words, 'It contained a summary of my alleged offences in seven distinct charges, and finished by saying that as I had acknowledged myself wrong nothing more would be said, and that all should be forgotten. That with regard to the letter of Mr. Astell he, Sir Charles, knew no more of the matter than the man in the moon'; but he was ready to sift the matter to the bottom.

Jacob says, 'The seven charges against me were some of them entirely false, while others were not only false but puerile and silly in the extreme. However, I answered each one distinctly and separately, and stated, what was evidently the case, that my only offence had been warmly defending Colonel Outram when falsely accused and ungenerously attacked: that in such discussions I had of course frequently alluded to Sir Charles' public acts, as I might have done those of any other public or historical character; that while serving under his orders I was, to a certain extent, wrong in so doing, as I had once freely acknowledged to him.' But he reminded Sir Charles that he had himself allowed and taken part in such discussions at his own table in Karachi, where on one occasion, sitting next to the Governor, he (Jacob) had defended Sir

Henry Pottinger when attacked 'to the astonishment and horror of all parties present.' This letter finally closed all communication between Sir Charles Napier and himself.²⁶⁷

A reminder regarding Jacob's promised Companionship of the Bath now became a regular appendix to the reports of the general officers inspecting the Scinde Horse; and as regularly, after some months, the stock reply from the Court of Directors came back to him. It appears that Major William Jacob believed that the withholding of the honour was due to the betrayal of one of his cousin's private letters, in which he had expressed himself very strongly on the manner in which the decoration had been distributed.²⁶⁸

Meanwhile the Panjab War had broken out and on the news of Chillianwalla reaching England Sir Charles Napier was sent to supersede Lord Gough as Commander-in-Chief. He arrived to find the war won, but threw himself with all his old vigour into the administrative work of the command.

Nearly a year later, in April 1850, John Jacob was employed in a matter deriving from the transactions which took place in Upper Sind just before Sir Charles's arrival there in 1842. Mir Ali Murad, considering that he was being kept out of part of his rightful inheritance by his elder brother and nephew, had then asserted his claims by force of arms, and having the better of a skirmish extorted a treaty from them, under which certain villages were made over to him. This treaty was deposited with the Assistant Political Agent, Licutenant Brown. Ali Murad, after throwing in his lot with the British general, and securing the Turban of Upper Sind, was momentarily baffled in his ambition to appropriate the lands of his hostile relatives; for these, Napier had told him, would be forfeited to the British Government if the owners resisted. The Mir however bribed Brown's munshi to let the treaty be stolen; and obligingly furnished a copy to take its place. In this, districts were shown instead of villages; and Ali Murad accordingly was able after the conquest to possess himself of considerable territory to which he had no right. Unfortunately for himself he quarrelled with his own minister, Sheikh Ali Hussein, whom he had paid well, and with Pir Ali Gohar whom he had employed to forge the treaty. Napier came to know from these sources, shortly before he relinquished the governorship, that there had been foul play and suggested that the matter should be investigated by his successor. The leisurely preliminary inquiries were now at last complete and Lord Dalhousie ordered a commission to be convened to record evidence in the Mir's presence and report its findings. Mr. Pringle was appointed chairman and John Jacob one of the members of the commission. 269

Outram hailed with joy the news that his friend was to be employed in this investigation, feeling sure that the commission would find positive proof of much that he had asserted in his Commentary on the events leading up to the conquest. He urged Jacob to make full use of all opportunities that might offer for vindicating Mir Rustam, with a view to obtaining belated justice for the surviving Talpur princes. But Jacob's reply showed that he had too just a notion of his duty and responsibility to let his friend's pleading influence his conduct. Outram found his attitude 'bitterly disappointing'; but as Jacob pointed out to him, the subjects on which he was pressing for evidence were outside the commission's terms of reference and would have been ruled out of order had they been brought forward.²⁷⁰

About this time Jacob received from Sir Henry Dundas further news regarding his long-awaited decoration. In Bombay Dundas had been told that the Directors had 'refused to entertain the application', but when on arrival in London he made representations at the Horse Guards Lord Fitzroy Somerset told him, 'that nothing could be done without the Court's recommendation'. This news exhausted Jacob's patience and on 14th June 1850 he took the most unorthodox step of writing direct to the Duke of Wellington to claim fulfilment of his promise.

After apologizing for his presumption and irregularity in thus addressing the Duke in an appeal for justice, Jacob recapitulates briefly the services for which the honour had been promised, pointing out that the pledge had long since been fulfilled in respect of Major Tait. He proceeds to mention his subsequent services and the private and public praise he had received for them. Sir Charles Napier and Sir Willoughby Cotton had both recorded in general orders that he had brought his corps 'to perfection'. The behaviour of a detachment of it at the battle of Gujrat had confirmed their opinion. Jacob concludes, 'my conduct ... has therefore, I humbly submit, been such as to prove me not unworthy of the promised honour for which, I trust, Your Grace will now recommend me.'

Wellington replied by return mail through his secretary Lord Fitzroy Somerset, who acquainted Major Jacob that it was 'not usual for His Grace to correspond with officers of the Service of the East India Company with regard to their claims to promotion or honors: and therefore he can do no more than forward your representation to the President of the Board of Control, to be dealt with as he may see fit.' This was dated 6th August; and on 18th September the Court of Directors had 'the gratification of apprising' the Governor of Bombay that the Queen had been graciously pleased to appoint Major John Jacob to the 3rd class or Companionship of the Order of the Bath. The

award was published in Bombay general orders on 6th November. In a letter of 29th December Outram wrote, 'of course I did not write to congratulate you on the C.B. which to you is no honour, and its tardy bestowal more an insult than otherwise.' Philip Jacob had however duly felicitated his brother and John's reply shows that Outram had not misjudged his feelings. 'Thank you kindly for your congratulations regarding the honor of the Bath. I cannot say that I appreciate this "honor" very highly however, for I should have received it seven years ago, and have now been Lieut. Colonel had it not been for the exertions of my friends Lord Ellenborough and Sir Charles Napier. Had it not been that there was some pleasure in defeating these "great" men I should have treated the thing with the contempt it deserves and which I really feel for it.'271

This was misleading: under the terms of the 'promise', at least, Jacob could not have received the decoration before 1847, and his depreciation of it was peevish affectation; it is soon evident that he valued the prestige

deriving from the letters after his name.

Early in 1850 a sensation was produced in the Indian world by the first of Jacob's pamphlets criticizing the organization of the Bengal Army. This powerful dialectical study was evoked by the appearance in England in the previous year of a pamphlet on The deficiency of European Officers in the Army of India: by one of themselves. But there was far more in the Remarks of a Bombay Officer—Jacob's rejoinder was published without his name—than the clever strokes of a disputant seizing advantage. He had long revolved the subject in his mind; in 1844 he had written in an official letter to Sir Charles Napier, 'Assimilation with the practice of Bengal will be the ruin of the Bombay Army'. He had criticized Bengal practice in his Silladar Horse pamphlets, and his opinions, based on constant observation from a still earlier period, had recently been reinforced by the experience of his lieutenants at Multan and Peshawar. What they told him may well have convinced him that the truth about the Bengal system must be made known, as it was progressively imperilling he safety of the Indian Empire.

He was provoked by the very title of the 'European Officer's'

pamphlet.

The author is evidently merely a Bengal Officer . . . he has not even a shadow of suspicion that there are other native soldiers in the Indian Army, besides those of Bengal, and who though formed of exactly the same material are essentially different from them in training and in discipline, in habit and feeling. The normal state of the Bengal army is such as must appear, to an officer of the Royal

or of the Bombay Army, as a state of mutiny! I have known the men leave the ranks by hundreds at a time without leave to cook, to plunder, or what not. Yet such is the force of habit, that the excessive want, or rather total absence of discipline, and all the gross evils which pervade the native army of Bengal, are looked on by the European Officers of that army as necessary consequences of employing a native army at all . . . like the author of this pamphlet they attribute all to the deficiency in the numbers of the European Officers. The fact being that they are already more numerous than is necessary to real efficiency, and that unless means be adopted to improve their quality, addition to the number would be hurtful.

rained to sink the European and adopt the Asiatic. In the Bombay Army the 'feeble Hindoo' becomes half European, and adopts the feelings and ideas of Europeans, as far as they refer to his position as a soldier, till they become his own. In Bengal, the European becomes half Hindoo, and thus the commanding influence of superior energy and superior moral character (I deny any superiority of intellect) is in a great measure lost. . . . In the Bengal Army there is a constant studying of men's castes, which the European appears to think as much of, and to esteem as highly, as do the natives themselves; and the sepoys, instead of looking on the European Officers as superior beings, are compelled to consider them as bad Hindoos . . and think that their power and value are best shown by refusing to obey any orders which they please to say do not accord with their religious prejudices.

[The Bengal sepoy knew well that by] crying out about his caste, he keeps power in his hands, saves himself from many of the hardships of service, and makes his officers afraid of him. This is proved by what takes place in the other armies of India. In the army of Bombay, even a Purwaree* may, and often does, rise to the rank of Subadar by his own merit; in Bengal such a man would not even be admitted into the ranks, for fear of contaminating those fine gentlemen, the Brahmins; yet in the Bombay Army the Brahmin (father, brother or son, may be, of him of Bengal) stands shoulder to shoulder in the ranks, nay! sleeps in the same tent with his Purwaree fellow soldier, and dreams not of any objection to the arrangement. If this subject be mentioned to a Bombay Brahmin sepoy, as it is sometimes by Bengal officers, who are always asking the men about their caste, the ready answer is, 'What do I care? Is he not the soldier of the State?' The reply

* Untouchable

speaks volumes, and shows a state of affairs which the officers of the Bengal Army cannot conceive.

Jacob also expatiated on the evils of the system of promotion exclusively by seniority rigidly followed in the Bengal Army, 'exactly in keeping with the principle of the immutability of caste. . . . The men, not feeling that their prospects of advancement in the Service depend on the favourable opinions of their European officers, want the most powerful stimulus to good conduct. They are never disciplined (as I understand the word) are often mutinous, and never acquire the knowledge of their profession which may qualify them to hold Commissions

with advantage to the Service.'

The Bengal Native Officers were totally inefficient—inevitably so under a system whereby they were chosen with no regard for their fitness to hold commissions, and were usually worn out with age before they received them: 'poor old wretches, feeble in body and imbecile in mind, who would in Bombay have been pensioned off ages ago. . . . Does this arrangement cause any saving to the State? Does it really enable a greater military power to be maintained at less cost. . . ?' Jacob pours scorn on the absurdity of the Bengal officer's remedy, 'to make the Native Officers young again by appointing more Europeans.' In other words, apply an increased volume of the latter's superior but 'fearfully costly' energy, in the attempt to enforce obedience. This would only increase the distance in feeling, already dangerously great, between the native and the European in the Bengal Army. In contrast, Jacob brought forward the example of 'one of the best reputed Native Corps in the Indian Army' in which there were only five European officers to 1600 men, and its Native officers as subalterns were equal to the best Europeans. Though called Irregular Horse, it was as regular as Her Majesty's Life Guards '... in short, this Corps is justly considered as the most efficient Corps in the service. While, if the Bengal principles be true it should be the very worst! There is more danger to our Indian Empire from the state of the Bengal Army, from the feeling which there exists between the native and the European, and thence spreads throughout the length and breadth of the land, than from all other causes combined. Let Government look to this; it is a serious and most important truth.'

Jacob went on to state in brief what was requisite for the efficient organization of an Indian Army; largely changes implicit in his exposure of Bengal defects and features of his own system as proved in the Scinde Irregular Horse. From the allusions to the latter the identity of the author was of course universally recognized. Jacob himself said he did not care who knew that he had written the pamphlet though some

years passed before he acknowledged his authorship. Needless to say,

it produced some bitter though ineffective rejoinders.273

În May 1850 Sir Charles Napier resigned his command, as the result of a reprimand from Lord Dalhousie for suspending on his own responsibility the operation of a regulation regarding allowances to troops in the Panjab. The resignation was accepted on the Duke of Wellington's recommendation in August; but it was some time before his successor could arrive. Sir Charles came down the Indus on his way to England and on 21st December Jacob wrote to his brother Philip: '... great preparations are being made at Sukkur for a grand dinner, etc., to His Excellency. I do not intend being present or having anything to do with the business myself, but there will doubtless be a due allowance of the usual Napierian scurrility and grandiloquence from which a good deal of fun may be extracted.

'In my opinion India will be well rid of the late Commander in Chief, than whose proceedings nothing can be imagined more mischievous to the Indian Army or more dangerous to the safety of our Indian Empire'-witness his late orders to the Bengal Army, which he had undertaken to reform. In one of these 'he writes a great deal about Moosulmans sacrificing cows and compels a Mahometan Native officer to apologize to an idolatrous gentleman for so doing! Such absurdities would not be tolerated for a moment in any other Indian functionary, but in a Napier these things show profound wisdom on his part and

expose the stupid ignorance of everyone else.'

This was all very well in a private letter, but it is a matter for enduring regret that Jacob should have opened his second battery against the Bengal Army with a violent attack on Sir Charles Napier's character. 273 Criticism of certain public acts of the late Commander-in-Chief was necessary for the development of Jacob's argument, but by attributing to Napier such motives as disappointed spleen in issuing his farewell order, he exposed himself to the very charge of 'virulent enmity' which formed part of his indictment of Sir Charles. Believing as he did that his old commander had used his influence to have his own well-earned honour withheld, Jacob seems to have let this personal grievance persuade him that Sir Charles Napier was incapable of acting honestly in his public capacity.

Sir Charles in his valedictory order had admonished the officers of the Indian armies for their general want of discipline, their luxurious habits, their mistaken notions of society, all of which faults had been forced upon his notice through courts martial. His sense of duty was, probably, never shown to better advantage. Jacob's malignant comment is unpardonable: 'Those best acquainted with the subject and with the

man, cannot persuade themselves that the publication of the Order above mentioned was really intended to benefit the army of Bengal or the Indian Army generally.' Allowing that Jacob was honestly convinced that the authority of Napier to prescribe remedies for the evils in the armies of India must in the public interest be demolished, this imputation of malice instead of ignorance or faulty judgment was not likely to further his purpose. And not only do the Records of the Indian Command of Sir Charles Napier show in the reports of courts martial on European officers how amply justified was the Commander-in-Chief's order, but Jacob himself bases the first of the eight charges against the Bengal Army which he makes in this pamphlet—against the officers—on exactly the same grounds as had been elaborately set forth by Sir Charles. His diagnosis of and remedies for the fault may have been more accurate than Napier's; but they were at one as to its gravity.²⁷⁴

Jacob is on surer ground in attacking the late Commander-in-Chief's order of 18th October, directing that promotions in the Bengal Army from the ranks and upwards should be made strictly by seniority;²⁷⁵ but here too the manner of his advocacy of a good cause was liable to

injure it.

The evident and unavoidable consequence of fully carrying into effect such an order, is the entire ruin of the Bengal Army. This will be shown hereafter. Sir Charles Napier asserts that the proceedings common among the officers of the Bengal Army prove them to be no gentlemen. Be this as it may, assuredly he has himself by his last order, done his utmost to make them no officers; talent, skill, energy, high principle, and soldier-like pride fall alike crushed and powerless under such a system of promotion as Sir Charles Napier has ordered to be strictly enforced with regard to the Native Army of Bengal. Of what use is it for the zealous European officers to endeavour to instruct the Native and to make him really, and not in name only, a soldier? Of what use is it for the latter to endeavour to learn; when neither instruction, nor acquirement, nor merit of any kind avails to advance the sepoy a single step?

Nothing but the most deplorable ignorance and folly on the one hand, or the deepest hatred and malice on the other, could have

given rise to such a fatal measure.

It was utterly unnecessary for Jacob's primary and worthy purpose as a reformer thus to suggest that Napier must be a knave, if he was not

a fool, nor to show that the former was the more probable, as he does in the next sentence: 'Notwithstanding his Baggage Corps and other incredible absurdities in India, no one has ever accused Sir Charles Napier of imbecility.

It must have been these passages which caused such an enthusiastic friend of Jacob as Frere to confess to Keith Young, Napier's friend, that he was ashamed to show him the pamphlet; though he heartily approved of its general propositions. Certainly, it is a relief to follow

John Jacob on to surer ground.

He seems to have taken note of the retaliatory gibes, appearing in rejoinders to his pamphlet of the year before, that the 'Bombay Officer' was merely giving vent to petty provincial jealousies. For he now adopted a much less aggressive tone, claiming that he would try to write as if he himself belonged to the Bengal Army; only its officers must apply themselves honestly to the task of reform, not flattering themselves if they had only concealed or denied the existence of a fault; 'nor should the patient think the surgeon an enemy because he gives

The most serious faults he observed in the Bengal Army were eight in number; and half of these were due to the want of power vested in the regimental commanding officer. His sepoys were allowed and encouraged to forward their complaints direct to army headquarters; the pecuniary transactions of the regiment were carried on in great measure without his knowledge; cliques could arise and flourish among his European officers; and mutinies could come to a head before they were

aware of any such tendency.

As to the slavish recognition of caste and the promotion by seniority, the former subjected the Army to the control of Brahmins and fakirs. A commanding officer felt bound to dismiss a good soldier if his comrades complained that he was of inferior caste. With this strength for evil, caste brought weakness in regimental duty of all kinds. The cavalry man could not unsaddle or groom his horse, because it was work for the groom; the sentry refused to strike the gong at the quarterguard, so special gong-strikers had to be maintained and paid by the Government. Yet the Bombay sepoy, taking the English soldier as his model, would cheerfully turn his hand to any fatigue work.

The effect of the Bengal promotion by seniority was that 'The clever and the foolish, the brave and the timid, the energetic and the imbecile, are nearly on a par.' Jacob declared it wonderful that under such a system the outward semblance of an army had been maintainedthough there was no discipline. It said much for the excellence of the

raw material from which the Bengal Army was drawn.

As in the former pamphlet, Jacob followed up his destructive criticism under each head with an equally lucid and powerful statement of the remedies. But this could not salve the wounded self-esteem of the Bengal officers when a mirror was held up before them and they were invited to compare what they saw in it with a picture of a Bombay officer drawn by an anonymous but notorious member of that fraternity.

The young officer setting foot in Bengal was encouraged to sink English habits and ideas and take to a semi-Oriental life, being carried in a palanquin and living in artificially cooled houses, 'with a dozen Hindoos at work with fans and flappers to beat the flies off him.' It was these effeminate gentlefolk who suffered from the climate. On the other hand the Bombay 'griffin' had at most two servants; he went about on the back of his pony not fearing the sun. Jacob says, 'let it be the fashion to be English.' Study the character, habits, feelings, thoughts, of the natives of India as deeply as possible; but let the Englishman strive always to remain the thorough English gentleman. 'All our power in India rests on this . . . the millions of natives which a handful of Englishmen govern in this vast Continent will not consent to be governed by a handful of their equals. Our power consists in our being essentially different from them, and in their belief in our moral superiority only. ... Let us then be English in all things to the utmost of our power, internally and externally, in religion and in morals, in habits and in feelings, allowing absolute freedom of opinion and fair play to all men, and all will be well.'

One thing required to improve the tone of British Indian society, by keeping the English feelings of individuals fresh and healthy, was to liberalize the furlough regulations, and Jacob closes his pamphlet with a plan for their reform. The existing rules dated from the times when the double passage to and from England round the Cape absorbed a whole year; they tended also to favour the least valuable servants of Government—the sickly, the hypochondriac, the scrimshanker. The hardworking active man, who had no time to be sick, was seldom seen in England.

Jacob's plan was to allow every officer for himself, to use as he pleased, every seventh year on his full allowances and to retain a lien on his staff appointment if he had one, though the salary attached to it should go to the locum tenens. (Jacob was not prepared to risk losing his command of the Scinde Horse by going home!) This arrangement would infuse vigour into the Indian services and the benefit would extend to the Government and the people. 'The continual return to England, and reflux into India, would be to the body moral and politic exactly what

the circulation of the blood is to the animal body'. The outcry for more Europeans would end as those already in the service would work better; there would be a more equal distribution of staff appointments and more men acquainted with their duties. Jacob appealed to men of common sense and experience—his doctrine, he claimed, was founded on the laws of nature.

We have seen in the last chapter how John Jacob waged war against the regulation by which his subalterns were liable to be remanded to their original regiments in default of passing an examination in the Hindustani language. Perhaps he had just received the rebuke from the Secretary to the Government of India, of 8th August 1851, at the time he was writing his pamphlet, for he appended another sarcastic diatribe. The effect of the order of the Court of Directors was ludicrous—the only post for which a knowledge of the native language was not a necessary qualification was command of their regular native soldiers! On the other hand if they required an engineer or an astronomer they were bound not to appoint men with the proper scientific training, unless they had also passed in Hindustani. It would be as reasonable, said Jacob, to make lack of the gift of music a bar to staff employ as lack of the gift of tongues-'but does either deficiency imply that the man is fit to command the Native Infantry soldiers of the Indian Army and fit for nothing else?' He dwelt on his own case (he had been tacitly exempted) and that of his subalterns who were now threatened with the loss of their appointments in spite of their excellent service on the frontier and in the Panjab.

It was notorious, says Jacob, that officers who had 'passed' had, as a body, less knowledge for practical purposes than the unpassed. He allowed brilliant exceptions to this rule; he was careful to explain what knowledge of the language he meant—the interpretation of his paradox was that while one had been studying books the other had been studying men. Knowledge of the people of India, of their thoughts, habits, feelings, beliefs and wants was learnt from intercourse with the people themselves—and was more important to the service and India than the most intimate acquaintance 'with all the Hindoostanee books ever written.'

But while we have been examining the non-controversial parts of the Bombay Officer's pamphlet—after all, 'passed' men were a very small minority at least in the army, and the proposal for a sabbatical year of furlough made a universal appeal—the fury of the admirers of Sir Charles Napier and the outraged feelings of Bengal officers of the numerous 'our Army right or wrong' persuasion, were finding vent in tremendous denunciations in the Indian Press. Bombay welcomed the

pamphlet with a grim satisfaction and, it is to be inferred, a certain degree of mischievous delight that the truth had at last been told. In one way or another European society throughout the country was stirred to the core. Bengal-bred Captain Keith Young recognized Jacob's hand at once and wrote in his journal, 'He ought to be brought to a Court Martial for his scandalous imputations.' The general trend of Bengali comment was that the author was actuated by 'small Presidential envyings and heartburnings'; Bartle Frere, who at the time had not long made Jacob's personal acquaintance but was deeply impressed with his extraordinary capacity and sincerity, writes to him on 30th September, 'You must not think me an advocate for milk and water if I say I think some of the propositions so sound and so likely to meet with general acceptance that I should have been glad to keep them out of the debatable ground of controversy.' The pamphlet was reviewed in various Indian newspapers. The Friend of India was favourable, and drew attention to the contemporaneous general order from Napier's successor as Commander-in-Chief announcing that several men of low caste who had surreptitiously obtained admission to a certain regiment should be paid up and discharged. These men, said the editor, would be welcomed in the Bombay Army which was not 'humbugged by Brahmins.'

The Bombay Times cordially supported the views expressed in the pamphlet, adducing incidents at Multan and after Chillianwalla in proof of the characteristic caste intolerance and insubordination in the Bengal Army. Letters from 'One of the Deccan Fraternity' and others gave further instances in support of the pamphleteer, pointing out that while there was a general hue and cry against him there was no attempt to refute any of his arguments; he was in fact the best friend of those who

were so fiercely opposed to him.²⁷⁶

Meanwhile on 25th September an attack had developed in another form. The Bombay Telegraph and Courier printed what purported to be a copy of the exculpatory letter which Jacob had written to McMurdo in November 1846; and the editor, assuming that Jacob was identical with the 'Bombay Officer' who had so severely castigated Sir Charles Napier in his pamphlet, opined in so many words that he was neither

an honest man nor a gentleman.

An article contributed to the Bombay Times of 22nd October pointed out the fallacy in its contemporary's reasoning. The lapse of five years was liable to produce changes in men's opinions; Sir Charles Napier's opinion of Outram had undergone a complete change in less than a year. 'Does Major Jacob's private letter of 1846 make it untrue that the orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army issued in 1850 were calculated to injure that Army?'

In the next issue, of 25th October, Jacob himself enters the field with a long letter to the editor explaining his 'position with Sir Charles Napier'. Part of this letter has already been quoted in this chapter; and the reader is sufficiently acquainted with the earlier relations between the two men, which are fairly stated by Jacob, without any attempt to minimize Sir Charles's kindness and consideration to him or his own grateful feelings at the time. Rather he lays stress on the continuance of his own gratitude, and unwillingness to believe that Napier approved of the anonymous libels on Outram and the Mirs in the Karachi Advertiser. But when he reaches the point where Sir Charles (to use the words of the letter) 'became my enemy', we must begin to take exception. As to the General having 'avoided meeting' him on his way through Sind: Napier no doubt knew that Jacob was encamped at Kashmor on the Indus-he had come to pay his respects with a squadron of his corps—but may not have wished to interrupt his voyage at that point. And though it appears to be a fact that Sir Charles pointedly omitted any reference to the Scinde Horse in his speeches in Karachi, while mentioning 'even the Grenadiers', Jacob's observation, 'After this, even, I still could not believe the unfairness imputed by Mr. Astell to Sir Charles Napier,' is certainly disingenuous. For before Napier set foot in Sind on his way home Jacob had been gazetted C.B., and the manner of its award fully convinced him of the truth of Mr. Astell's allegations; as is proved by the letter to his brother dated 21st December 1850 already quoted, where both matters are referred to.

After describing the circumstances of the ultimate award of his honour, as if it occurred after Sir Charles's final departure, Jacob says, 'What is to be inferred from this?' It is sufficiently clear what he himself inferred. The Napier faction could be in no doubt of the reason, whether

it was valid or not, for his 'pertinacious hostility' thereafter.

Jacob ended his letter by declaring that only the impertinent and dishonourable communication of his private letter, 'a little altered however', to the Press, had induced him to come forward with his own statement; and in a postscript let it be known that he now also had sent copies of private letters to the editor of the Bombay Times—not for

publication, but in support of his assertions.

Doctor Buist of course seized the opportunity with both hands, with a leader about domestic espionage in Sind under Napier's government, even suggesting that officers might have received advancement as a bribe for future silence and adulation. This was too much for William Napier, Sir Charles's nephew, then commanding H.M.'s 25th Regiment at Bangalore. He wrote a letter to the editor of the Bombay Times, who duly published it with an accompaniment of his own contraverting

comments. Doctor Buist ended by claiming that Colonel William Napier's letter fully supported his case, that Sir Charles listened to tale-bearers and victimized those they said were hostile to his policy.

'Young' William Napier had, as he himself stated, only written his letter to maintain a skirmishing action until the heavy artillery of his uncle in England could be brought to bear. It was not till 7th February 1852 that a counter-blast from Sir Charles, in three columns, appeared in the Bombay Gazette. It was, he confided to his journal, made up to suite the taste of the nobility, gentry and others. On the last day of 1851 he had noted, 'McMurdo says the Adjutant-General tells him Jacob will be punished if his pamphlet can be brought home to him: in my opinion there is more of Outram's than of Jacob's style in it: perhaps a joint production . . . I am ready to meet the avowed author.' At about the same time, it appears, Major McMurdo went to Sukkur with the object of giving Jacob the opportunity of fighting a duel with him. The note sent by McMurdo—it is not styled a challenge—was in Sir Charles's opinion 'pretty plain', and he says, 'how Jacob came not to fight is hard to say'. A little later, 'Jacob's answer is amusing, Bobadil himself could not say more or do less.' The reference is to Jacob's reply to a letter of Sir William Napier in the Bombay Gazette; he would speak his mind at need in spite of all the broom-sticks and all the pens of all the Napiers alive'. As to McMurdo, perhaps Jacob reminded him that Sir Charles as Commander-in-Chief in India had cashiered several officers for duelling and for sending challenges. 277

Meanwhile, as the storm aroused by the Bombay Officer's pamphlet died away, its merits began to be more justly appreciated. We find Jacob writing to his brother Philip in April 1852, 'The pamphleteer has remained completely master of the field, and this trifling thing has already done much good. Nearly all the men of good sense in the Bengal Army have come round to the same mode of thinking as is there set forth. . . . I was a little surprised by the support which I received from the London press. . . . The state of the Bengalees is a matter of the very gravest importance. This result was foretold by Sir J. Malcolm long ago; he was not listened to. . . . Government has deliberately and systematically brought about the present state of affairs, and if not

remedied it will lose us India.'

This is not the last that we shall hear of the famous pamphlet; but meanwhile Mir Ali Murad's affairs came to a head once more. Dalhousie had passed orders on the findings of the commission on which Jacob had sat eighteen months before; the Mir was declared to have been proved guilty of instigating forgery to possess himself of lands to which he had no right, and they were appropriated by the British Government.

The delay was due in the main to the time required by the Hon. J. P. Willoughby, Member of Council in the Bombay Government, to compose his remarkable minute on the case. Willoughby in fact did for Outram, in the last stage of the transaction, what Jacob had declined to do in the first instance; and his production, characterized by Sir William Napier as 'one long, laboured, flagitious lie against Sir Charles Napier', was by Dalhousie on the other hand complimented for 'that research and mastery of the subject which distinguishes every important state paper coming from Mr Willoughby's hands'. 278

A new literary work laudatory of Sir Charles Napier from the pen of his brother Sir William reached India in the beginning of 1852; and was thus referred to by Jacob in a letter to his brother Philip on 3rd February: 'The impudent falsehoods contained in Sir William Napier's account of Sir Charles Napier's administration [of Sind] have astounded me, even although during the last two years my eyes have been completely opened to the consummate knavery of the "Conqueror" and the

reckless absurdity of the historian.

'That hill campaign is a gem! It has startled even Sir Charles Napier's most idolatrous worshippers, and makes me deeply ashamed of myself in ever having received praise from such a quarter and in having ever believed and admired the "Conqueror of Scinde". The account of the hill

campaign is ludicrously false in every particular.'

Jacob gives a few instances; Sir Charles Napier's force was nearer 7000 men than 5000 as given in the book, while their enemy, said by William Napier to number 26,000, were at most 3000 strong (the fighting men of the Bugti tribe amounting to 1500 and the Dombkis and Jakhranis of the plains to about as many). The desert 'eighty miles wide' which Sir Charles crossed, was at the most twenty-eight miles in breadth. The historian, evidently relying on Sir Charles's word as usual, asserts that no troops had entered these hills, save to meet disgrace and defeat, when Sir Charles, before beginning his campaign, had full details from Jacob of the successful expedition of Major Billamore at the head of seven hundred men of all arms against the same enemies.

Jacob at once wrote a short Memoir of this first hill campaign and sent it to England to be printed, though not under his name. Mentioning this to his brother he adds, 'Sir Charles Napier in spite of his bravery and energy in face of an enemy, etc., is a perfect charlatan in all else, and the state of the Scinde border was infinitely more lamentable during his administration from 1843 to 1846 inclusive than it had ever been

under the Ameers of Scinde.

Jacob's own copy of William Napier's book is scrawled all over the margins and interleaved with notes corrective of the innumerable

misstatements in the text. The most provocative part of the book to him was the end, remarkable for the author's barefaced omission of any reference to affairs on the frontier of Upper Sind for the nine months of 1847, January to September inclusive, till the reader is suddenly informed of the crushing defeat of the Bugtis by a 'young officer called Merewether'. Why this officer was at Shahpur at the time, who sent him there, and how he was enabled to do what others failed to do, are all matters deliberately left in obscurity, with the obvious motive of denying to John Jacob the credit of restoring order in Upper Sind and thus saving Sir Charles's reputation. The materials for giving a full account of these transactions were as much available to Sir William as they were to Jacob and the latter therefore appended to his Notes on the text of Sir William's book, copies of the correspondence relating to the frontier during those months, completing the exposure of the Napier brothers' malice.

The Notes were printed for circulation among a few selected friends in the first instance and reached England at the end of 1852. Outram writes from London in January of the following year that he had read them with great interest; but though they could be embodied in a crushing refutation of William Napier's lies, in their present shape they were too highly seasoned. 'I mean you have put rather more pepper into your curry than most people could swallow.' William Napier had, moreover, lost all reputation as a veracious historian, so 'his Scinde writings may safely be left to die a natural death—they will never be taken as data for future history'. 279

The Notes on The Administration of Scinde remained unpublished for the time being, on the advice of Jacob's friends. But his Memoir of the First Campaign in the Hills North of Cutchee appeared in pamphlet form. Outram regretted that it did not bear Jacob's name, which he said was 'as well known as that of any public character in India, and few names are more respected'. Colbourne's United Service Magazine for August 1852 pronounced the Memoir interesting, but noticed adversely the apparent attempt to detract from the merit of Napier's expedition. Jacob had moreover indulged in a sly glance at Sir William Napier's foibles in the observation, 'In the account above given are omitted numerous adventures, many slight encounters, personal fights, and single combats with the enemy, and such like, which if duly set forth in glowing terms might, without any exaggeration, have given an air of romance to the story. As it is the simple truth has been told in the plainest language.'

Jacob's authorship was detected by Sir William Napier and Outram wrote that he and all Jacob's friends in England were anxious that he

should not notice the scurrilous remarks on the Memoir which appeared in the Naval and Military Gazette over the signature 'Elian'. However, Jacob did publish a rejoinder-Major Billamore's surviving Subaltern versus Sir William Napier, dated 1st April 1853. As the editor of the Gazette, a staunch Napierian, refused to publish it, Jacob had it printed as a pamphlet. He presumed the identity of 'Elian' from his style-the recklessness of assertion, the matchless effrontery with which the most palpable misstatements are put forth . . . proclaim the author to be one with the Historian of Scinde.' Leaving aside matters connected with Billamore's campaign, 'Elian's' most unwarrantable assertion was that both regiments of the Scinde Horse were ordered on service to the Panjab ('the remainder, possibly' says his commentator, 'being left to guard the Scinde Frontier'), and that Major John Jacob from cowardice declined to go in command of them. Jacob appended copies of letters addressed to himself by Sir Charles Napier, Dundas and others at the time when the various events took place, which letters contained, in his own words, 'the most clear and positive refutation of these falsehoods.'280

In August 1853 Sir Charles Napier died and shortly afterwards a work on which he had been engaged for some time, entitled Defects Civil and Military of the Indian Government, was given to the world by Sir William and appeared in India in November. Jacob had just sent a letter entitled 'The Native Troops of the Indian Army' to The Times when he received a copy of Sir Charles's posthumous work, and found it 'filled with enormous falsehoods. Those regarding myself I am answering in some papers.' In the passages in question Napier had attacked several of the doctrines advanced by the 'Bombay Officer', and also their author himself—'He writes to excite ill-will between the two armies, and has shown that if he really belongs to it, the Bombay force possesses in him an unsurpassed specimen of baseness.' Jacob, in the rejoinders sent as a supplement to his new signed article, convicted Sir Charles of misquotation and completely demolished his attempts to justify his 'seniority promotion' order. The approval of it by senior officers of the Bengal Army was of no weight-they preferred the only arrangement with which they were well acquainted. The change to promotion by selection involved no breach of faith; the sepoy was enlisted to serve the State and acquired his ideas of seniority only after entering the Service. 281

In his letter to *The Times* Jacob declared that one cause of the defects in the Regular Indian Armies lay in the 'attempt to govern and treat the Sepoy like an Englishman'. The latter, conscious and jealous of the possession of a freeman's rights, had to surrender some of them legally by subjecting himself to a Mutiny Act and special laws on becoming a

soldier. 'Not so the Oriental. He insists on being governed, and considers being compelled to govern himself as the greatest oppression and tyranny. He expects to be ruled, and to be ruled well: if not, he will perhaps rebel, and destroy his bad rulers. But in no case will he endeavour to establish freedom, which he neither wants nor understands (at least not as an Englishman wants and understands it). The Oriental merely sets up another tyrant who, he hopes, will rule better than the last . . . force the Oriental to take his share in the Government, and you will at once have no Government at all.' Neglect of these principles, which were of as much force in the Indian Army as in respect to the Indian people generally, had been attended by ruinous results.

Courts Martial, articles of war, rules and regulations, bewilder the Native soldier and fill his mind with the idea that his officers are wishing to keep him out of his rights, he knows not what but certainly important ones, or such a fuss would not be made about them. The only principle which a Native Indian soldier thoroughly understands is obedience to his Commanding Officer. He cannot, without great injury to efficiency, be taught to look beyond him.

On the Regimental Commander he should (and must, to be in a healthy state) wholly depend. Enlistment, discharge, promotions to all ranks, and everything else, should rest with the Regimental

Commander alone.

With the absolute authority which he required for commanding officers, Jacob insisted on their complete responsibility for results. Officers must therefore be selected for command; and for the comparatively few Irregular corps this could be done without much difficulty. But what of the Regulars? Sir Charles Napier in his posthumous work declared that this was impossible. And at this obstacle even those who were most in sympathy with the doctrines propounded by Jacob in his former pamphlets were baffled. They could not conceive how his organization, good though it was, could be applied to the army as a whole, because they had not sufficient power of original thought to recognize and cast aside that which only tradition but not reason declared to be indispensable. The difficulty had been fairly stated by Jacob in his new paper before Sir Charles's reference to it was seen by him.

The evil of the want of powers entrusted to commanding officers was a practically necessary consequence of another error; the seniority rise among the officers of a Native regiment, appointed originally at hazard.

There was nothing to ensure that officers succeeding to the command would be fit to wield the great powers which they required for producing the maximum efficiency. This, Jacob held, was the stumbling block of all honest reformers and had to be removed before other remedies could be applied.

The haphazard system of posting and the presence of such a number of unselected European officers as were thus borne on the strength of Regular native corps, were both attended with ruinous consequences. Yet it was notorious—was a constant complaint of Napier himself—that not more than half the officers borne on the roll were actually present with their corps at any given time; the other and abler half were always absent in staff appointments. This feature of the Indian Service had become characteristic before 1828 and justified the warning uttered by Sir John Malcolm in that year. Regimental service was no longer sought after; the best men contrived to escape to some form of staff employ and only the 'refuse' remained; all proper feeling between the native soldier and his European superior was thus destroyed.

Jacob, however, contested one opinion of Sir John Malcolm, that with few British officers native regiments would not be fit for general, but only for local, purposes. It had been proved by the Scinde Horse that with a sound organization three Europeans were sufficient for any service. His Indian officers were equal to the average of Europeans; as for the maintenance of discipline, in the past five years defaulters had been at the extraordinarily low rate of one in a hundred per year. With such distinguished Indian officers, it was doubly necessary that only the most carefully selected European officers should be appointed. One such man could infuse such a spirit into his soldiers that they felt the greatest pride in acting in his absence as they knew he would wish them to do if present. But with thirty European officers in a regiment the Indian officer found himself of no importance; by making the Englishman common, giving him trifling duties which any Indian officer or N.C.O. could do equally well, the prestige of the superior race was destroyed. Having nothing of importance to occupy him, the British officer lost somewhat of his self-respect; and instead of taking a pride in his men, he would generally be longing to escape to staff employ.

As to the men themselves, 'A Sepoy of the line, dressed in a tight coat, trowsers in which he can scarcely walk, and cannot stoop at all, bound to an immense and totally useless knapsack so that he can hardly breathe, strapped, belted and pipe-clayed within a hairsbreadth of his life, with a rigid basket shako on his head, which requires the skill of a juggler to balance there, and which cuts deep into his brow if worn for an hour, and with a leather stock round his neck to complete his absurd costume,

when compared with the same sepoy clothed, armed, and accoutred solely with regard to his comfort and efficiency, forms the most perfect example of what is madly called the 'Regular' system, with many European officers, contrasted with the system of common sense now recommended for adoption.

'Let the common-sense system be adopted, and nearly one half the cost of the Native Army of India might be saved to the State, by reduction in the number of European officers, while the real strength and military power of the Army would be more than doubled'.

Sir John Malcolm's proposal to enable postings of officers to be by selection on the limited scale he had in view, was to keep the regiments of officers as they stood in the Army List, but not to have regiments of men attached to them. Jacob's plan was to have all the officers of the Indian Army borne on the strength of the European portion of it. An excess of British officers with British troops did no harm, and the number of artillery and engineer officers had little relation to the numbers of men in their corps. Jacob works out his plan in some detail for the Bombay Army, allowing four British officers to each Indian corps. These appointments he designed to be considered the highest prizes of all in their various grades: 'The allowances should be such, as to cause the Commands of the Native troops to be sought after by Lieutenant-Colonels, and to have Commandants of that rank in the Army would be an advantage: but rank alone should never be considered in such appointments.'

Jacob proceeds to scout the idea that in order to cope with the warlike tribes of the Indian frontier it was necessary to employ men of those tribes in the army; he pinned his faith to the excellency of the Hindustani Mussulmans: 'they are in fact more like Gentlemen than any other class of Indian'. Other recommendations were the universal adoption of the Silladar system for regimental transport—involving the raising of the pay of all ranks; and the fixing of a permanent headquarters for each regiment. So organized, he claimed, the Indian Army could go anywhere and do anything.

There will be many to whom Jacob's closing observations in this revolutionary pamphlet will be found the most interesting of all. He combated the opinion, expressed by persons held to be high authorities in such matters, that 'If we were to make too much of our Native Officers, they would take the command from us'. Says Jacob, 'We hold India by being in reality, as in reputation, a superior race to the Asiatic. If this natural superiority did not exist, we should not, and could not, retain the country for one week . . . the more the Natives of India are able to understand us the more they will know and feel this, and the

firmer will be our power. . . . To attempt to keep the nations of India or the Native soldier of the Indian Army in darkness and ignorance, in the hope of increasing our power over them, will be as contemptible and base, as it would be unwise and useless. The better example we set them the more we make them feel the value of truth and honesty, the more we can raise their moral character, the firmer we must stand.'

Jacob's letter appeared signed with his name in *The Times* of 26th December 1853, and was discussed in a long leader in that issue. This begins with the words, 'A glance at the signature . . . will at once insure an attentive consideration for its contents. The simple names of "John Jacob, Scinde Horse" will carry with them, to the minds of all military and many general readers, the authority . . . of a man who has seen and conducted as much active service as any officer in the army of India.' The leader-writer's comments were in the main favourable; only he doubted whether, without a hundred and fifty Jacobs, the principles on which his two cavalry regiments were organized

could be extended to the Army of India as a whole.

The letter was reproduced in the Bombay Times on 30th January and 1st February 1854. Jacob's medicine was too powerful and drastic to be swallowed by his patients in England and India without much heaving of the stomach, and at the outset with instant rejection. The first denunciation came from the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army. Lord Frederick Fitzclarence published in general orders his marked disapprobation that Major John Jacob should have given publicity to opinions which ought to have been communicated, if at all, to himself. His 'most unmilitary' conduct in reflecting on and censuring every regulation framed by his superiors was liable to undermine discipline. Again, his application of the word 'refuse' to the regimental officers was unjust as well as insulting; for His Lordship could testify to their zeal, soldier-like sentiments, and assiduity, from his personal acquaintance with them. The Commander-in-Chief deeply lamented being forced to observe that the conduct now so strongly condemned, 'emanated from one who has received (most justly) honours from his Sovereign, and the approbation of the Government he has the honour and good fortune to serve.'282

Jacob's comment on this piece of well-meaning pomposity in a letter to his brother Philip dated 2nd March 1854 runs, 'I am sorry to see a man in a position to do much good perverting his powers to evil, but am no other way affected by his Lordship's remarks; for knowing that I am right I shall continue as I have begun, though all men be against me.' He showed also that he had at least one supporter in F. F. Courtenay, Lord Dalhousie's Private Secretary, to whom at Outram's instance he

had sent copies of some of his writings. Courtenay rejoiced to see Jacob's 'admirable paper' in print; he had been about to ask him to have it printed for private circulation after showing the manuscript to several authorities who, 'notwithstanding Bengalee prejudices', expressed their admiration and general concurrence in the views advocated. Jacob's scheme in Courtenay's opinion was 'so rational, so wise and so practical' that he had little or no hope of seeing it put into execution. But he added that he would exert whatever influence he possessed, or might thereafter possess, in England, for the circulation of Jacob's sound doctrines.

Jacob did not submit in silence to the public rebuke of the Commander-in-Chief at Bombay. He desired it to be brought to Lord Frederick's notice that he had written his paper from the best and highest motives, not in his official capacity or with a view to publication in Indian newspapers, but as an English gentleman striving to apply his special knowledge to the good of his country and Government. The invidious word 'refuse' was a quotation from Sir John Malcolm's evidence before Parliament; and Jacob therefore asked to be relieved from the heavy public censure conveyed in the general order. Lord Frederick however declined to recall his censure of the 'serious breach of discipline', though he did not question Jacob's motives.²⁸³

Meanwhile the original letter in *The Times*, with the sympathetic comments of the leader, had attracted considerable attention in England. It was favourably noticed by the *Naval and Military Gazette*—presumably at some moment when Sir William Napier, whose influence on the journal seems to have been paramount, was not at the editor's elbow—in its issue of 21st January 1854.

'The opinions of Major Jacob command attention from the professional test of which [sic] is the acknowledged excellence as a military body of that force which he commands and which is, we believe, mainly indebted to him for the efficiency of which it has given frequent proofs.' The writer, however, considered some of the suggestions Utopian.

But at the same time an official thunderbolt was in preparation. Outram warned his friend, having heard from Lord Dalhousie that it was to be expected. The Honourable the Court of Directors' dispatch on the subject reached Jacob on 8th April; it was couched in much the same terms as the censure of Lord Frederick Fitzclarence, but was written quite independently. Jacob was to be called on to state whether he had written the letter, and if he acknowledged it he was to be informed of the Court's marked disapprobation of his conduct, and warned that a repetition of it would subject him to removal from the service.

Jacob of course admitted his authorship; his comment to Philip Jacob was simply, 'I have done my duty and that is enough for me. I care little

for man's approbation. Every word I have written is absolute truth and

that is the reason why it TELLS.'284 Only a month after the menacing reprimand of the Court of Directors reached him, Jacob received another from a most unexpected quarter -from the Governor-General himself. In a report to Frere, Jacob had written of the excellent effect produced on the border tribes by putting down private and tribal war, whether either contestant was friendly or hostile to the British. He took occasion to advert to the contrary practice, as it appeared to him, in the adjoining district of the Panjab, quoting a letter from an officer who congratulated him on a successful attack by the Bugtis on the Marris. In his dispatch, Dalhousie recalled that he had only recently ordered the severe censure of the Court of Directors to be conveyed to Jacob; regarding this officer's new offence, he desired that he should be called upon to offer proofs of his assertions. In a private letter dated 28th May, Dalhousie writes, 'I have been obliged by the Court's orders to pitch into Major Jacob also, and to issue a General Order forbidding all communications with the Press, by name or anonymously. Major Jacob deserved what he got; but the order is a stupid order, for it cannot be enforced. I have been pitching in to him too on my own hook. He thought proper, in an official letter, while lauding his own merits in suppressing fights between tribes on the border, to complain of the mischievous policy pursued in the Punjab of encouraging such warfare. I have come down on him for this, and will make him eat his words and much dirt, before I am done with him. It is a pity, for he is a fine fellow.'

Jacob's explanation, which seems to have been that he deduced the policy from a few examples of the practice and from the general permission to carry arms in the Southern Derajat, was held up in Frere's office through oversight and it was fortunate that he sent a copy direct to Courtenay, which satisfied Dalhousie who, as is well known, was sensitive to any reflections cast on his model province. In writing soon afterwards to congratulate and thank Jacob on concluding the treaty with the Khan of Kelat, which will be described in the next chapter, the Governor-General added, 'It has given me much pain to be obliged on two occasions of late to refer to your name in a different strain. The general order was issued under instructions from the Court of Directors and was the sequel of their former dispatch. Your allegation that the policy of the Government in the Punjab encouraged quarrel and fighting among the tribes was a direct imputation upon myself, which it was necessary for my public reputation publicly to meet.'285

Jacob had thus weathered the official storm raised by his daring publication on the Indian Army. It is amusing incidentally to see that at the same time as he was being threatened with expulsion from the service, the brigadier commanding in Upper Sind is writing, after inspecting the Scinde Horse, that the excellence of the corps could only have been brought about by 'a happy combination of the highest qualities in the Commander'. Nay, Lord Frederick Fitzclarence himself, four days after hurling his thunderbolt, is deferentially asking Jacob's opinion on the cavalry sword exercise, and desiring a detachment of his corps to be sent to Poona for his inspection; the very Court of Directors, in a resolution of 26th April, expresses its satisfaction with Jacob's complete reform of the once dreaded Dombkis and Jakhranis. ²⁸⁶

Meanwhile attacks on John Jacob were developing in another shape; and the most partial critic could not deny the provocation he had given in publishing his caustic Notes on Sir Charles Napier's Posthumous Work. Outram had written to him on 26th November 1853, before Jacob had actually seen the book, drawing his attention to particular misstatements

which required to be refuted.

Jacob was nothing loath. He was fully determined to demolish the reputation of Sir Charles Napier as an authority and guide in Indian military matters; not purely out of personal spite, as his opponents believed, but because he was convinced that belief in Napier's infallibility and general acceptance of his doctrines would hasten the ruin of the Indian Army which he himself was striving to avert. Again, to make known the truth of some of Sir Charles's proceedings in Sind had become in his eyes an imperative duty when it was being smothered under fresh falsehoods and mystifications tending to mislead the British public, which might result in the growth of ideas favourable to another gigantic deed of spoliation'. It is to be deplored that Jacob seized upon and held up to scorn the worst, as if it were the only, construction that could be put upon Napier's motives, asserting thrice in the Notes, directly or by implication, that he made war in Sind for prize money. This was evidently due to the fact that Sir Charles or his editor Sir William devoted a whole chapter of the book to describing the difficulty the General experienced in obtaining his due share of the spoils. Jacob did not hesitate to express his approval of any act or opinion of Napier with which he agreed; but he was readier still with a harsh or contemptuous comment on anything with which he did not agree. This display of bitter enmity, repellent in itself, could only impair his own due influence. 287

The Notes seem to have been published in February 1854, together with a publication in pamphlet form of his letter on the native troops of the Indian Army. The two were reviewed in the Naval and Military Gazette for 11th March 1854, and the comments may be thus

summarized; whatever was true in Jacob's pamphlets was stolen either from Sir Charles himself or from others; Jacob was not destitute of ability, but contemptible for his black ingratitude, rancorous malice and oracular arrogance.

A week later Sir William Napier asserted, in a letter to the editor of the Gazette, 'Twice has it been proved by experiment that Major Jacob of the Scinde Horse, and his bosom friend, Colonel Outram, although prone to offer insult a distance, are totally destitute of the spirit necessary to support their insolence.'

The reprimand to Jacob by Lord Frederick Fitzclarence was reproduced in this periodical under 'East Indian Intelligence' on 1st April and must have afforded some satisfaction to his opponents. But the irrepressible Jacob provided a new cause for offence to them a few months later.

Sir Charles Napier in his posthumous work had attempted to disparage the Lawrences' administration of the Panjab and had brought forward for comparison instances of the excellence of his own system in Sind. Sir Henry Lawrence had obtained from Jacob information on these features of the Sind system, and in a rejoinder quoted his authority for his own most damaging criticisms of Sir Charles's administration.

When this reached England the Napier party went into action again with a letter signed 'One faithful to his salt', which depreciated Lawrence's article in general and unconvincing terms, but reserved its sting for Jacob whose pamphlet had been his authority for 'the most abusive portion of it'. The letter proceeds, 'That pamphlet has already received sufficient castigation at your hands: but it may not be amiss to show further the exact amount of credit due to this witness.' The writer forwarded alleged copies of the two letters written by Jacob in 1846 and 1847 to McMurdo and Sir Charles respectively in vindication of himself from the charge of base ingratitude brought against him. Major Jacob's subsequent conduct had shown how well founded these charges were, and would be held by all a sufficient justification for now giving his disingenuous letters to the public.

The editor, in a short introduction, associated himself with the views of his contributor. 288 Jacob countered by publishing, at last, his Notes upon Sir William Napier's Administration of Scinde, together with copies of official correspondence on affairs of the Sind frontier in 1847; prefacing them with the note that they had been printed in the previous year, but would not have been published but for the outrage committed on his private letters.

Without extensive quotation it is impossible to convey the pulverizing force of the Notes. Something of the original picturesqueness of

phrase was sacrificed, whether by Jacob's cooler judgment or on the representations of his friends: but the exposure of Governor and historian was too circumstantial to be simply ignored or cloaked by attacking the motives of the writer.

Montagu McMurdo was at least able to contravert conclusively the *Note* most damaging to Sir Charles's character, in which Jacob, relying on the authority of Colonel Edward Green, had accused Napier of telling a deliberate falsehood in a letter to the Governor-General regard-

ing 'The Conquest of Scinde'.289

I have not been able to find that Jacob made any amends for this manifest error; but before he could have become aware of it he was involved with a new assailant in India. On 6th September, the Lahore Chronicle printed what Jacob styles 'a foul, violent and most uncalled for attack on me personally by Captain Younghusband of the Punjab Police'. Younghusband's main attack on Jacob was on account of his description of the prize auctions at Hyderabad, appearing in his Notes on Sir Charles Napier's Posthumous Work. In an official letter to Frere, Jacob declared that he was ready to depose on oath to the truth of what his opponent called false and malicious calumnies. He forwarded a copy of a letter from Mr. Richardson, Deputy Collector, who had been at Hyderabad at the time, which fully confirmed his statement. Jacob being now prohibited on pain of removal from the Service from writing to the Press claimed either to be protected by authority from such attacks, or to be permitted to repel them himself, as he could easily do. It does not appear however that he was able to obtain any satisfaction. 290

About the same time Jacob came once more into conflict with the 'Hindustani Regulation'. He had to find a locum tenens for Malcolm Green, proceeding to Europe on sick certificate. The newly liberalized furlough rules, though not providing the 'Sabbatical year', allowed fifteen months sick leave without vacating a staff appointment. Jacob had his eye on a subaltern who unfortunately had not yet passed in Hindustani. He essayed once more to storm the castle of prejudice, setting forth most cogently the reasons on which he based his claims, that the rule should not be applied in respect of Scinde Horse officers; the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army agreed, remarking that their case was stronger than that of adjutants of line regiments, who had long since been so exempted. But the Governor in Council was not prepared to beard Dalhousie again in face of his recent denunciation, and that of the Court of Directors, of Jacob's previous proposals. Jacob resigned himself to suggesting a 'passed' man, observing that his officers were required to work rather than to talk—'Time will, I am well aware, show the truth and justice of my views'—and he

gratefully acknowledged the support which once more he had received from the Bombay Commander-in-Chief. 291

It was in this mood of intolerance of artificial and misapplied regulations, and confidence in the sovereign virtues of common sense, that he penned yet another remarkable open letter on military matters, addressed like its predecessor to the editor of The Times.* But on this occasion, having pondered over the reports of special correspondents with the British Army in the Crimea, and the letters of his subaltern and friend Henry Green (who being on leave in England when war with Russia broke out had volunteered and was serving in the trenches before Sevastopol), Jacob felt convinced that the general principles on which the Scinde Horse was organized could, and indeed must, be applied for the regeneration of the British Army. So stated, the proposition may seem extravagant: but what has been the verdict of history on the organization of the army at the time of the Crimean War? And how have, in fact, the real improvements of these last hundred years been produced?

Jacob's argument was that the defects of the British Army were due to the systematic crushing, by rule and regulation, of individual thoughts and original ideas; under such training it was no wonder that the army lagged far behind the position which the general progress of the nation in intellectual and moral power entitled it to hold in the world. It was useless to attempt piecemeal improvements under the

existing system; new principles had to be adopted.

On the power of public opinion, if it were allowed scope to act, Jacob relied for the elimination of unhealthy developments and for the stimulation of healthy growth, for establishing the rule of reason and natural law, instead of the special Military Code and the Mutiny Act. The Military Code enabled the wrong man to be kept uppermost, until the time for actual warlike exertion arrived. 'Then real workmen are absolutely necessary, and the amateurs † at once fail. . . . This has been well shown in our war with Russia. There has been plenty of power. Our glorious soldiers are still unmatched in fight, and show a martyr's endurance of misery; but these noble warriors have been systematically trained to helplessness. . . . 'Their military education had done for their minds what the stock, pipeclay, tight coats and knapsacks had done for their bodies. 'They must only think, as Frederic's soldiers prayed, according to regulation.

† Jacob thus designates the 'Horse Guards Generals' and Staff Officers with no previous

experience in the field.

^{*} On the Causes of the Defects Existing in our Army, and in our Military Arrangementsthough cast in the form of a letter to the Editor, it did not, so far as I have been able to ascertain, appear in The Times, but was printed as a pamphlet.

THE ICONOCLAST

'The men can do nothing for themselves, while their amateur leaders and heads of departments can neither feed, clothe, shelter nor move the Army. At the commencement of operations our Generals endeavoured to enforce regulations regarding stocks and jackets, etc. and with such matters many of them seem alone competent to deal.

'Under our present system there can be no long reach of understanding of military affairs, and no particular readiness in handling and supplying the wants of soldiers in the field: it seems abundantly certain that thousands of our English merchants are better able to command

an English army than our General Officers.'

All must applaud the words, 'Our soldiers of all ranks should be less separated from other citizens; they should be taught and enabled to do more for themselves-to be more handy, and ready at all manner of expedients, and in a word, the reasoning faculties, individual development and action should be more cultivated, and less time thrown away on foolish trifles.' But in proposing the adoption of the silladari baggage transport system, and the regimental 'bazar' of the Indian commissariat for the British Army, Jacob cannot have taken into consideration the vast variety of conditions in which the British Army has to wage war, and the equally vast variety in the wars themselves. His recommendations for better pay, liberal pensions, promotion from the ranks, permanent headquarters for regiments, all came to pass in time; the enormous and wasteful follies of half-pay, sale and purchase of commissions, unwieldy and inefficient weapons, unfit clothing and accoutrements', did gradually disappear under the operation of public opinion; but progress has not yet reached that millennium when 'the best man for every post, and the best means of effecting every object, must soon be known, and when once known, must be employed. 292

The tone of calm authority throughout the paper, and a depreciatory reference to the commissariat arrangements of Sir Charles Napier (whose sons-in-law, Colonels William Napier and Montagu McMurdo had organized the Land Transport Train in the Crimea) prompted a final violent attack on Jacob by an admirer of his old commander. It took the form of an editorial in the Naval and Military Gazette of 7th July 1855, and deserves notice as exhibiting the characteristic malice and falsehood

of Jacob's opponents.

Granted that he was a very good regimental officer, any one else allowed such powers as he possessed, to fix the pay of every grade of his corps and deal with it as an absolute monarch, could have made the Scinde Horse equally efficient—all was really attributable to Sir Charles Napier's fostering support, instruction and advice. Jacob's own conduct at Miani and Hyderabad had been undistinguished; when ordered to

open up communications with Cutch he had advanced only to retire because he thought the enemy too strong for him. Sir Charles Napier's praise of his action at Shahdadpur was due to a misapprehension, 'for Major Jacob is an adept at blowing his own trumpet', and Jacob had done nothing noteworthy in the great hill campaign or subsequently. Yet this man was perpetually thrusting himself before the public with pamphlets full of abuse, incurring reprimands from one high authority after another, and when called to account by Colonel McMurdo 'only escaped a duel or its alternative' by repudiating the authorship of his 'Bombay Officer' pamphlet.

To this editorial was appended a letter from Sir William Napier repeating the assertion that Jacob had twice been proved 'destitute of the spirit necessary to support his insults', and directly contradicting the charge relative to the proof sheets of *The Conquest of Scinde*. No attempt was made to contravert any other of Jacob's damaging assertions; says Sir William, 'such a chastised person—chastised as far as his want of spirit would permit—cannot move me to further notice of

his libels.'

It is pertinent at this stage to say something on this oft repeated imputation of base ingratitude on Jacob's part. It is an unpleasant subject but is not to be avoided. What degree of gratitude was Sir Charles entitled to expect, on account of what he had done for John Jacob? And how far should the sentiment of gratitude influence the individual who feels, or might be expected to feel, it? The Napier party, following the example of Sir Charles himself, invested with a halo of generosity actions of his which in fact were dictated by common sense, common justice, and even self-interest. He intervenes to prevent the disbandment of the Scinde Horse after the withdrawal from Afghanistan. What cavalry had he with him in Sukkur that he could afford to dispense with those who had proved their worth in hard service? He recommends that Jacob be confirmed in the command: what would any other general have done in the circumstances? He gets the Scinde Horse commandant's allowances restored to their original figure and helps to recover some arrears: how would the General's conduct have appeared, had he acquiesced in Jacob's command allowances being reduced, or if he had failed to perform the common duty of a chief to his subordinate, of 'fighting' a routine case for him? When Jacob is omitted from the Gazette of Honours for the Sind Campaign, Napier brings his services to particular notice, and obtains a promise of the Bath and brevet promotion for him-and for another officer. But how did the actual services rendered by Jacob over the six months January to June 1843 compare with those of any other of Napier's regimental commanders?

He persuades the Governor-General to order another regiment of Irregular Horse to be raised for service in Sind, and to put Jacob in command for superintending their recruitment and training: if he wished, as any other general in his place would have wished, that the second corps might be as efficient as the first, what was the best way of achieving this?

At the end of 1846, it seems, Jacob thought that he had done more for Napier than Napier had done for him. What can he have thought at the end of 1847, when he had reduced to order the previous chaos of the frontier and already had reason to believe that Sir Charles was exerting his influence to withhold the honours that he had earned? The Bombay Times-hostile to Napier it is true, but not in any wanton spirit -seems to have fathomed accurately, in its editorial of 25th October 1851, the depth of gratitude, beyond all reason, to which the Napier party considered Sir Charles entitled from all who had served under him. It could not have seemed to them possible that any of his officers could have regarded Sir Charles Napier simply as a general like other generals, and a man like other men, when in their eyes he was entitled to the same unquestioning loyalty as the king who can do no wrong, or such submissive adoration as is paid to the Almighty. The attribution of these semi-royal, or rather semi-divine, honours to a man partaking so much of the frailty of human nature as Charles Napier, must have been an irresistible provocation to Jacob's incisive and downright intellect. He had thus summed up his own attitude in February 1852. 'I have acted solely in self-defence, but being attacked shall take care that my blows fall with crushing force. I have proof for everything and am in no danger of losing my temper, by reason of the utter contempt in which I hold my adversaries, in spite of their European fame.'293

Like Outram and Napier before him, Jacob was now under a direct and personal ban not to publish further controversial matter. The challenge was taken up on his behalf by one of his subalterns, probably Henry Green, who was in England on leave from the Crimea at the time when the article in the Naval and Military Gazette appeared. The rejoinder dated 1st September and signed 'A Scinde Horseman' was rejected by the editor of the periodical and therefore printed for private

circulation as a pamphlet.294

The 'Scinde Horseman' opens with a frontal attack on the bona fides of the editor, for deliberately ignoring Jacob's refutation of old calumnies which, with the necessary proofs, had been sent to him by Jacob himself. As to these latest misrepresentations—if Major Jacob had been able to produce fine regiments because he had the full support of Government, how did he obtain that support? Why did not other

commanding officers inspire the same confidence? Though Jacob's reputation did not rest solely on the reports of Sir Charles Napier, was not the latter's often repeated public and private praise about the best evidence of an officer's worth and ability? 'The Seidlitz of the Scinde Army' 'One of the best officers I ever met in my life'-what had occurred (if Jacob had seen no further active service since Sir Charles left Sind) to enable the Napiers or the editor to discover that the 'able leader' as he was described during the war, was in reality a coward and a charlatan? The 'Scinde Horseman' proceeds to set forth the true part taken by Jacob in engagements under Sir Charles Napier's command, which is sufficiently well known to the reader. And Sir William is taken to task for 'fallacy upon fallacy, raving about trials, as he calls them, and denials which never occurred, and about the want of personal combativeness of a man who, while utterly despising such exploits and never seeking them, had yet been in the course of his duty successfully engaged in as many personal conflicts and single combats, probably, as any man in India.' The letter concluded, 'Since January 1847 Major Jacob has commanded on the frontier of Scinde, and has there, during eight or nine years, endured from the sun of the Desert a hotter fire than ever came from mortal arms: while the Desert itself has, under his rule, become a populous and cultivated country, and some forty thousand human beings have been reclaimed from a life of the wildest rapine and murder, to peaceful and industrious pursuits.

'This was a task to which Sir Charles Napier proved wholly unequal, and he attempted it in vain. But to have successfully accomplished which seems more honourable and calculated to afford a higher satisfaction, to any right thinking man, than a whole life spent in mere

violence. . . .

CHAPTER XV

The Builder

RIDING across the plains of Upper Sind in 1847 there were days when John Jacob would inquire not for news of robbers or stolen cattle but of the former extent of cultivation; and follow to their source not the tracks of horsemen but the remains of old watercourses, long choked with drift sand or tamarisk or pampas grass. Here was another war to be waged, with spade and axe, with river water pressed into the service, with theodolite and measuring chain; and in this the genius that forged and launched the thunderbolt of Zamani and Gujrat, and plied the 'Bombay Officer's' revolutionary pen, found its truest satisfaction—in the victories of a peace that grew and spread amongst the din of other conflicts.

The campaign opened in April 1847, when he employed 500 of the Dombki and Jakhrani ex-freebooters from the settlement at Janidero on the nominally 'annual' silt-clearance of the Nur Wah, a branch of the Begari canal. This was not forced labour, the common expedient for canal clearance in Upper Sind: Jacob saw to it that the men were paid the market piece-rates for their work. They had never touched a spade in their lives, and never thought to do so; but the man who told them 'Dig!' meant to be obeyed. Their first clumsiness past, the Baluchis showed that they could excel the Sindhi labourer, and learned the satisfaction of a well-earned wage. The first battle of the new war was won. 295


The scanty water that was thus enabled to reach Khangarh that season was not enough to make sweet for more than a few months the wells on which the place depended. Drinking water had to be fetched on camel back from Janidero, four miles away. In the cold weather of 1847-8 Jacob started on a new plan: to excavate close to the old fort a large 'tank' to be filled with Indus water at the next inundation, which

by percolation would remove the saltness of the well water. And from the earth removed he would have bricks made, for the building of lines for his men, stables for the horses, and a house for himself and his subalterns. The tank cost two thousand rupees, which came from Jacob's private purse. The work had to be done and paid for without delay, while to convince Government of its necessity would probably have

required six months' intermittent correspondence.

As to the house, officers who were posted to up-country stations and outposts in those days were expected to fend for themselves. Sometimes they could buy a bungalow from their predecessors; but Jacob's predecessors had been content with a lean-to shed within the old mud fort: in his words, 'their sole, and most anxious, and most natural wish, was to get away as speedily as possible from such an unpleasant abode.' Jacob having taken charge felt that the well-disposed people in the country would be best encouraged, and the turbulent elements dismayed, if he let them see that the British officers intended to make the country habitable and settle down there. 'I therefore proceeded to build a large house as a residence for myself and my Lieutenants, to plant a garden in the desert, and make all other arrangements for myself, officers and men, as if they were to remain on this frontier for the remainder of their lives.' 296

Exactly when the great pile which for years to come dominated the landscape, till the trees planted by Jacob grew level with its battlements and his new town cut off the view from the west-exactly when Jacob's second castle was finished is not recorded. It was probably begun in the spring of 1848 and perhaps the plan altered and extended when his second regiment was sent up to the frontier that year. His prize money for the Sind Campaign-and regimental commanding officers were entitled to a handsome sum-came in just when he was most in need of it, and the greater part was sunk in the house. Jacob had no architect's fees to meet—the design was his own; but he had to import builders from Shikarpur and direct them himself. Nothing could have been more impressive in the eyes of the country people, whose previous idea of a ruler's abode had been the old fort of the Khan, which Jacob had pulled down, than this lofty palace. Another of the sights of the place for those who could gain admittance must have come into being before the great house-Jacob's workshop and forge, close beside it. Here he worked with his 'mistries' and joiners, and though years passed before he had it as completely equipped as could well be, we find a testimony to his craftsmanship as early as the end of August 1848, in a letter from Colonel Dundas—though the nature of the 'very well-worked present' he acknowledged is not disclosed. And round the house sprang up a



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garden—plenty of stable manure and sweet water soon woke the sulky, baked soil to life; and beyond it straight roads, at first simply nicked out of the plain, then bordered with little water channels, with trees planted along them, each protected from the omnivorous goat by its little thorn zareba, and a stern warning that they were to Jekam Sahib Bahadur as children. It is recorded that he planted over a million trees in and around Khangarh in the following ten years. 297

That which could be achieved at or near his headquarters under the immediate eye of the Political Superintendent, and paid for mainly from his private resources, could only be extended farther afield very gradually. In the first place the Government would require to be convinced by something more than argument that any public works other than military were required on a frontier constantly exposed to attack, and Jacob, as we have seen, found it sufficiently difficult to obtain money for

providing shelter and water for his corps.

Equally baffling was the scarcity of permanent population along the border. Zemindars, cultivators, labourers, artificers, shop keepers, were all but unknown, except close to such places as Mirpur and Mubarakpur near the Begari, and Thul in Mir Ali Murad's territory, which had been tolerably well guarded even in the worst times. In seeking to encourage rehabitation of the country, Jacob made no distinction between British territory and that of Mir Ali Murad. The Mir in fact gave Jacob full powers and his cordial co-operation, and, as recommended by him, ordered all zemindars, and others having claims on frontier lands who had migrated elsewhere to return and reoccupy them within one year, in default of which their rights would be extinguished. This was in 1848: by the next year only a few of the old zemindars had returned. Many others categorically declined to reoccupy the lands from which they or their fathers had been driven by the chronic incursions of the border raiders. 298 Jacob's efforts to convince the people of Upper Sind that the British Government and himself in person were determined to stay there and to eradicate the forces of disorder needed more time for full success. Much land therefore lay at the disposal of Government and of the Mir-but who would come and till it? There was one class which would not dread the marauding Baluch tribes; and that was the Baluch marauders themselves. Jacob had broken them in to use of the spade and they were ready to try their hand with the plough. In 1850 Jamal Khan Dombki, one of the most notorious leaders of the predatory tribes settled at Janidero, obtained a grant of waste-land near Kumri in British territory to the west of Kashmor. At Jacob's instance the grant was made free of land revenue for the first three years. The land was covered by dense jungle, penetrated only by Jacob's roads for

communication along the chain of frontier posts; but Jamal Khan assembling all the idle hands of his immediate following set them to work clearing out an old canal and building a substantial dam to prevent its water flowing into a hollow. These men a few years previously would have starved rather than touch a spade or hoe: but now when Jacob visited them they showed as much pride in their work as they would formerly have felt after a successful foray. By 1852 they had cleared about four square miles of jungle and turned it into one immense wheat field 'of great beauty and promise'.299 But in the early days the hardest thing was to get any start made. One of the small irrigation improvements Jacob was able to effect in 1849 was by making use of the Sind Dhoro, an ancient channel or branch of the Indus which had been closed with dams and silted up. He persuaded Mir Ali Murad's people to dig a new cut to it from the Indus, which restored it to usefulness as a long reservoir from which water could be lifted with Persian wheels.

During these first four years on the frontier, Jacob carried out such works not only on his own initiative but (so far as the public records show) without any co-operation or assistance from superior authority. The control for revenue purposes of the British territories under his political superintendence vested in the Collector of Shikarpur, who since the ill-advised abolition of Napier's Canal Department in 1849 had also to administer the canals. The administration in practice did not extend beyond their annual clearance by means of 'statute' labour paid only with grain rations. The Collector was doubtless ready enough to let Jacob do his work in the howling wilderness north of Shikarpur. As to the head of the Province, Jacob wrote some years later, 'Mr. Pringle never did anything, he was always for standing still. He was an excellent man no doubt, but a complete personification of visinertiae: and a mighty power this is, for evil!'300

But in the beginning of 1851 a new era dawned in Sind, with the

installation as Commissioner of Bartle Frere.

Not yet thirty-six years of age, Frere was promoted over the heads of about fifty Bombay civilians, his seniors. Never was the principle of selection more triumphantly vindicated. He was the exact opposite of his predecessor; active physically and mentally, with a boundless capacity for work, an insatiable thirst for fresh knowledge, and a most practical enthusiasm for improvements. In John Jacob, Frere found at once his ablest coadjutor in the regeneration of Sind; and in Frere, Jacob found a chief who delighted in extending his power for usefulness, and on whom he could rely for ungrudging support. Jacob's masterful, independent, and often intolerant spirit reverenced the nobility and capacity of Bartle Frere, as of no other living soul: 'non omnia possumus

omnes—few have your concentrativeness and firmness of brain,' he once wrote to him. Though we find in his private journal and correspondence strong criticisms of weaknesses in the character of his greatest

friend Outram, there is not a word depreciating Frere.

The personal acquaintance of these two men began early in 1851; within three months of his taking over, Frere was at Khangarh. Pringle had not achieved the journey in his three years! Frontier policy, the Bugtis, the sabbatical year of furlough were discussed, as we know from Frere's first surviving letter to Jacob, written from his steamer below Sukkur on 19th March. The Commissioner had ridden up from Shikarpur and had heard much of the pre-1847 state of affairs in Upper Sind. He writes to the Bombay Government, 'It was impossible not to be struck with the present altered state of things. Single unarmed travellers seemed now as safe as elsewhere in Scinde, the general sense of perfect security was shown by the improving state of the villages, and the fact that the people now trust themselves, their cattle and grain yards, day and night, out in the open fields instead of keeping, as was so lately their invariable custom, under shelter of their village walls. All were loud in proclaiming their gratitude for the present peace and security assured to them by Major Jacob's arrangements. Nothing further is now wanting to restore the country to its ancient state of prosperity than to give it its ancient supply of water.' And Jacob had drawn his attention to 'The immense benefit which would result to all the country north of Shikarpoor, if the Begaree canal were deepened and widened so as to enable it to convey a greater body of water.'301 Frere asked him for a rough estimate of the results: 'It ought to have been the Collector's part to frame such an estimate, but I knew you would not mind my troubling you . . . whereas the other course would have led to endless references, measurements and calculation, and possibly ended in a debate whether broader or deeper canals do not transmit less water than when left narrow and shallow, or something equally to the point.' Even so, after sending off his official letter he writes to Jacob again, 'My only fear is that the Bombay Councillors will doubt whether any proposition so slightly swathed in foolscap can be safely sanctioned.' Jacob's estimate for the amount of work required to be done and its cost was indeed a model of clarity and conciseness. He showed the total length of the canal: the mean breadth and mean depth of the proposed new excavation: produced the area in square feet of a section of it, and the cubic contents for the whole length: calculating labour at the existing rate of 216 cubic feet per rupee, the total cost came to 130,000 rupees. This was only some ten thousand rupees more than Jacob's forecast of the probable permanent increase in annual revenue resulting from the work.

Frere recommended that its execution should proceed under Jacob's superintendence, the Collector being directed to co-operate with him. 'Besides possessing a more minute and accurate acquaintance with the country than any European living, and having brought all his observations to the test of regular scientific survey, Major Jacob is, as a practical engineer, second to none in the Government Service, and I have not thought it necessary to submit his plan for the criticism of any other officer. . . . '302

Many months naturally would elapse before the Bombay Government's decision on the Begari plans could be expected, and meanwhile Jacob obtained Frere's support for other projects of public utility. Up to the year 1850 there was no made road in the whole of Sind, except three miles from Napier's old entrenched camp on the Indus to the fort of Hyderabad-Jacob's communication paths, cleared through the jungles of Burdeka in 1848, were evidently not accorded the status of roads in the return. There was no indigenous wheeled transport in Sind except round Larkana, Sukkur and Shikarpur where a primitive type of cart seems to have been in use since prehistoric times. It was generally accepted that the Indus boat which could also find its way down the larger canals was the natural vehicle for transport through the Province, and that for the country beyond the command of water-borne traffic, the baggage camel could function well enough without roads. Yet the letters and journals of the time are full of instances of officers losing their way between well-known halting places; of camels breaking their legs on the banks of canals made slippery by the passage of others through the water; of the crazy improvisations miscalled bridges which the country people occasionally threw over the smaller watercourses giving way and precipitating baggage animals and their loads into the mud. Such annoyances were too easily accepted as inevitable in service in Sind. But Jacob was not the man to be influenced by any opinion which had not solid reason behind it. He had projected roads from Khangarh to Shikarpur and Larkana, and Frere, who fully shared his practical outlook, obtained sanction for them. Shortly afterwards Frere referred for his opinion some suggestions for stimulating British trade with Central Asia, and particularly a proposal to establish a regular commercial fair in Sind.

Jacob did not think much advantage would be derived from such fairs. The commerce in question would be best aided simply by removing the obstacles to the free action and reaction of demand and supply. Among these obstacles were the import and export duties levied on the frontier from Napier's time (and not abolished by him, as Frere's Committee supposed). These should be totally rescinded. Duties were also

levied in the Kelat territories: then there were the predatory tribes infesting the Bolan Pass. The Khan should therefore be given assistance and support in putting down the Marri plunderers, and be persuaded to reduce his own tariff, abolish the dues exacted by petty chiefs on the trade routes, and give protection to the merchants. Next, good roads should be made from Garhi Khairo, the frontier post, down through western Sind, with bridges over all canals, and so on to Karachi, where the port should be improved as much as possible. Once all this was done, if there be a word of truth in the principles of Political Economy, nature will best do all else, and further interference would in all likelihood prove injurious.

Frere was deeply impressed. He did not abandon the idea of a commercial fair, and the first of an annual series was successfully held at Karachi in December 1852. But meanwhile he warmly recommended Jacob's proposals 'as embodying the opinion of an officer of unequalled experience and local knowledge of the countries in question, and an acute observer of all which relates to matters of commerce . . . who reasons upon what he sees and hears with a severe sobriety of judgment

... on every subject to which he turns his mind.'303

The Government of Bombay—in which, it is well to remember, there was no one with experience of Sind—could not understand the desirability of having a road parallel with the Indus—'the good, safe and free road'. Let it be supplemented by feeder roads from Shikarpur to Sukkur, and from Tatta to Karachi, and direct all other efforts to improving the condition of the river, and what need for duplication? Jacob had to explain that in contrast to the easy voyage down the Indus, the passage up stream of laden boats was slow and laborious. 'Three months is by no means an unusual duration for a voyage from Kurrachee to Sukkur, while camels can accomplish the journey by land in eighteen days, and, with the road proposed, would do it in ten days.' But without bridges over the numerous canals, which contained water or mud for about eight months in the year, it was difficult for these animals to get on at all.

The Court of Directors peremptorily rejected Jacob's proposal to afford assistance to the Khan of Kelat to chastise the rebellious Marris, but were ready to give effect to his other projects, supported by Frere and the Government of Bombay, and with some difficulty the Commissioner was able to obtain financial sanction for four more roads in Upper Sind. It would be tiresome for the reader to be conducted over all the obstacles that had to be overcome by Frere—whom Lord Falkland styled 'the importunate widow' on account of his perpetual requests for funds to carry out schemes of improvement in the Province.

A report of his, dated 28th April 1853, describes Jacob's methods of executing his plans when money for them was forthcoming.

The roads sanctioned in 1851 and the following year extending to 330 miles had been completed. They were all forty-five feet wide, cleared and levelled but not metalled-'no ordinary road metal will bind in so very dry a climate' says Jacob—with trenches at the side, and running straight from village to village. Many of these roads had to be cut through dense and tall jungle, and in order to get the right line the contractor, on a calm day, would have a large fire lighted at the spot to be reached, and keeping his eye fixed on the column of smoke would push through the jungle marking trees as he went. The roads made on the resulting line were almost as straight as could have been laid out by the best surveyor. 159 bridges designed by Jacob had been built of good burnt brick with semi-circular arches. The contractors, many of them illiterate and previously acquainted only with pointed arches, were at first sceptical of the stability of the round type, especially when the span was as much as twenty-four feet; but the workmen, furnished with drawings in a style intelligible to them, and instructed by Jacob himself in the art of laying bricks true to line, delighted in realizing his designs.

Frere wrote a long report on these works, which exemplified what could be achieved by a practical officer in disadvantageous conditions by making full use of 'the appliances he finds at hand, when he would be unable to do anything if obliged to send in voluminous returns and furnish all the usual paper checks on such expenditure.' Even Jacob's military road along the frontier was much resorted to by the cattle-breeders of Bhag Nari in Kachhi, who drove their bullocks to Multan this way instead of by the old circuitous route via Shikarpur and Sukkur. Frere also found this frontier road frequented by caravans proceeding from Afghanistan to the Panjab. As to that between Khangarh and Shikarpur, statistics showed that cart traffic had doubled since Jacob had furnished it with bridges. With some difficulty, Jacob persuaded the Government of Bombay to sanction contracts for repair of these roads for periods of three or five years, so that it became the contractor's interest to execute repairs as durably as possible.

Meanwhile the Superintending Engineer in Sind, Major Blois Turner, a most skilful and competent officer, but lacking in practical experience of the country, took occasion to criticize Jacob's methods, and in particular the construction of his bridges, evoking the following defence by their builder: 'I have worked in these matters not altogether in ignorance of the art of road and bridge making, nor of constructive art generally, but I have endeavoured to make, not the best possible bridges, etc., but to produce the greatest effect in improving the

communications of the country with the least possible expenditure of time, money and labour.' In September 1853 Lord Dalhousie intervened to accelerate the Bombay Government's parsimonious programme; and Jacob's practice, supported by the vigorous advocacy of Frere, was now adopted as a model for the whole Province, over which a network of roads was thereafter steadily extended, with great and increasing benefit to trade and cultivation. 304

At the time of Frere's first stay at Khangarh, Jacob received news of the death of his father: his correspondence with his brother Philip, now the head of the family, throws some light on his own character. He was pained by the complaints of his elder sister Mary, who appeared to consider herself unjustly treated under their father's will, and to entertain extravagant ideas of the style of living to which they were entitled. John had for many years paid her £,50 annually and, he said, would continue to do so; but 'though my income is pretty good I have no money in hand having, after paying for my house here and settling a few other expenses necessarily incurred in my position in this country, found myself in possession of just £300 which I sent to Henry [his youngest brother] to enable him to come to India, as I was told.' He was, however, quite willing to make over to his sisters all rights or interest he might have in the sum left by his father. 'More than this I do not think it fair for Mary to expect from me, as I have as yet made no provision for myself, and my retiring pension, even as Major, will be but £280 a year.' He alludes to his own strange and busy life: 'On the whole I think I prefer it to any other, it is pleasant to find you are some use in the world instead of being a mere drop in an ocean.' There had recently been most unusual rainfall on the frontier: instead of the customary annual half-inch, it had rained every day for over a month, and he had at one time thought his house in danger of being melted into its pristine mud. Now again—half-way through August—the thermometer showed 115 degrees in the house, and his officers and men were beginning to suffer from fever before the regular malaria season. He refers also to the talk that Irregular cavalry might be sent from India to Cape Colony, where a Kaffir war was in progress. 'I wish much that we were allowed to go, we should I think astonish the Caffres'-but who would take the place of the Scinde Horse on the frontier?

A postscript mentions that Outram was about to leave for England and intended to call on Philip Jacob. John says, 'he is my best and most respected friend. What else he is is known to the public.' Outram, as Political Agent Baroda, had been for some months engaged in a lone struggle to eradicate a hydra-headed system of corruption which, having branches in his office and the Bombay secretariat, was bringing disgrace

on the name of the British Government. Outram's 'Khutput Report' gave considerable offence to Lord Falkland, who recalled him. In a letter to Jacob, Outram declared that he was confident of standing higher than ever in his friends' estimation when his proceedings, which had thus drawn down the wrath of the Bombay Government, became known. The only drawback to his happiness in getting away from the sink of iniquity-Baroda-was the condition of his pecuniary affairs. Jacob instantly offered him assistance, though his own finances were by no means flourishing at the time. Outram replied that his generosity had moved him to tears; not so much the offer of his purse, which he declined, 'it was the undoubting faith in my honour, and the rights of my cause, which I felt most deeply.' A little later he was writing to implore Jacob to take a holiday from the frontier; he had heard that he was far from well. 'Go east to China-Australia-anywhere for a change. How I wish you would come home, but that I know you will not think of.'305

As it happened, a slight change of scene and of labour had fallen to Jacob's lot at the time his friend was writing. Orders had been received from the Court of Directors on the recommendation of the Sukkur Commission which had investigated the forgery and cheating charges against Mir Ali Murad, with the minutes thereon of the Governor of Bombay and of the Governor-General. The Mir's punishment was severe: he was to be deprived of all territory other than his patrimony and would thus lose nearly two-thirds of that which had been in his possession since the 'conquest', and was also to be degraded from the honorary position of Rais of the Talpur family. This was clipping him in power and territory much closer than the commission had recommended, and was perhaps the effect of Willoughby's famous minute which dissected in detail the affair of the Turban. The Government of Bombay assumed that the Mir might resist by force of arms, and without consulting Frere or the commander of the Sind Division ordered a field force of all Arms, including one of Jacob's regiments, to assemble at Rohri, the whole to be under Jacob's command. Two other brigades were kept in readiness at Multan and Hyderabad. Frere could rely on Jacob taking care that his preparations should have as little as possible the appearance of 'holding a fist in a man's face', but he was anxious to learn how the Mir was said to take it. In fact, the Mir had no thought of resistance: all the Syeds in Khairpur were persuaded to pray for him with Korans on their heads. He vainly tried to enlist the good will of his nephews, whom he had so cruelly wronged. The wheel had come full circle; intrigue would avail him no more, Captain Stanley, Jacob's old comrade-in-arms of Billamore's campaign, was engaged on

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intelligence duties in the affair, which at the eleventh hour brought to light more of the Mir's shortcomings. He found Mir Rustam's widow and daughter and the female dependants of one of the old Mir's sons living in pitiful penury—not to mention five other nephews of Ali Murad who had lost their lands by the 'conquest'. The British Government, assuming that they were maintained by Ali Murad, had never granted them any allowances.

Jacob introduced among his Notes on Sir Charles Napier's Post-humous Work, at the point where Rathborne is quoted as refuting 'fictions' regarding the Governor's treatment of the dethroned Talpur families, a memorandum of the condition of these unfortunates which he had written after verifying Stanley's account. Their cause had meanwhile been taken up by Lord Jocelyn in an eloquent appeal to the House of Commons, which obtained some pecuniary relief for them. 306

The territories now to be resumed from Mir Ali Murad were to be embodied in British Sind, involving much work for the Commissioner and the local revenue officers, and John Jacob's cousin, George Le Grand Jacob, was sent up from Bombay to assist Frere in settling the political side of the business. With regard to Burdeka and the lands along the Nur Wah near Khangarh, hitherto possessed wrongfully by the Mir, Frere writes to John Jacob, 'My own impression is that the frontier posts and Khanghur should be under your control as regards all Civil as well as Military matters. . . . Let me know what you think and, if you agree, what should be the limits of your District round "Jacobabad".' And here for the first time we see written the name which the country people had begun to give to Jacob's camp and the new town, which had almost effaced the memory of the mud fort and the few wretched shops huddled up against it which had constituted Khangarh.

At Frere's request Jacob stayed on in Sukkur with his regiment for a week after the field force was broken up on 24th February. The Commissioner writes, 'I would not ask you to stay at all if you could leave your uniform stuffed with straw in your tent and make folk think you were still here.' 307 Jacob was in fact most anxious to return to his post on the border, for while he had unlimited confidence in Merewether so far as concerned the command of the frontier which had devolved upon him, an incident had just occurred which came within the purview of the Political Superintendent. A large band of the Mazari tribe, whose country lies in the Dera Ghazi Khan district of the Panjab, immediately north of Kashmor, had made a raid into the hills and carried off some plunder from the Bugtis. The Bugti chief, instead of resorting to reprisals in the traditional Baluch tribal fashion, complained to

Merewether asking for protection from such incursions, as he had lately been received into favour. Merewether made representations to the Panjab authorities and Jacob followed up the matter in his characteristic downright manner, also invoking Frere's support. The incident had no immediate evil consequences, but as has been shown the contrast between Sind and Panjab frontier methods inevitably came into prominence some years later.

On the side of Kelat, affairs seemed to augur well for the future. The Khan reported that he had summoned the chiefs of the Marri, Bugti, Dombki, Khyheri and other tribes of Kachhi, and had settled all their blood feuds: a principal sardar of the Marris was to remain with him at Kelat and he sent the chief, Gaman Khan, to wait upon Jacob and give

him assurances of the future good behaviour of his tribe.

Jacob had been accompanied on his return to Khangarh by Frere, his cousin, and the other officers concerned in the arrangement of the territory resumed from Mir Ali Murad, and Philip Jacob was informed, 'We have lately been enjoying a most delightful party here on the border. We had four ladies living in my house for more than three weeks, and altogether about twenty people. The weather was most unusually favourable and nothing could have been more pleasant, every body was as happy as possible and the breaking up was quite melancholy.' Soon after the hot weather had set in Frere, who had tried in vain to persuade Jacob to avoid the worst of the climate in the previous year, was able to renew his invitation in such a form as overcame his friend's obstinate scruples. The Court of Directors had sanctioned his plans for the Begari canal: these, and 'all that Turner contemplates for the next cold weather' had to be talked over: the visit would be 'on duty' and not 'leave' with its various complications. 308

So Jacob made the journey to Karachi and became Frere's guest for three months. As frequently happens to those who exchange a very severe climate for a mild one, he suffered instead of gaining in health, being afflicted with those persistent boils of which most of those who have served a few years in Upper Sind must have painful memories. While laid up he was busy as usual—advocating the abolition of import duties on the frontier, in a most masterly exposition of the case, and fighting for sanction to execute the work of enlargment of the Begari in the way he found best. If, Jacob says, the work was placed in his hands, he would enter into a single contract for the whole, begin the work at once, and extend the enlargement to the Nur Wah which had now come wholly into British possession. Delay in the execution would involve great loss of revenue, so he requested immediate sanction to the

necessary outlay.

An extract from a letter of Frere's to Lord Falkland, probably referring to this particular matter, shows the estimation in which he held Jacob as an engineer. He worked in an entirely different way from the cautious, regular Turner, who was careful to observe all the rules and regulations of his department, '... which to Jacob appear only as so many fetters.
... Jacob will not willingly defer acting after he has satisfied himself what is right to be done ... of course if I asked Turner's advice I must take it. If I take it and call for more elaborate details, plans, estimates, etc., Jacob is of course disgusted. With ordinary men this would of course not matter. But Jacob is not an ordinary man; he is a very first-rate engineer, and never fails to succeed in all he undertakes. ... Jacob is quite competent to get on alone, and he is one of those men who do not get on at all well unless you let them alone.'

Jacob got his way over the Begari. On 6th August Frere told him he had sent orders to the Collector of Shikarpur to advance money as he had requested. 'You have been so much more expeditious than I expected that I haven't sent you a copy of Turner's letter. I had no idea you would be able to do anything till you got back. You have anticipated his most important suggestions as regards slope and berm. I have asked Government for money for the Nur Wah. These will be great works, and please God if they succeed as we hope, will create a new

province and a new era in these wilds.'

It was the same with the police arrangements for the territories resumed from Mir Ali Murad. 'I am convinced you are right about Bordica. The delay has been caused by my not getting from others their views regarding other parts of the country with the same clearness and precision.' He let Jacob enlist the men at once; his simple statement would secure Government's sanction.³⁰⁹

Jacob stayed for the greater part of his visit at Clifton, where Frere had a small bungalow, some two miles from Government House. From these low sandstone hills the view embraces the Arabian Sea, the Fort of Manora with the diversely shaped Oyster Rocks in front of it: the entrance to the harbour running up in between: then the village of Keamari at the end of a long sandspit at that time divided from the foot of the Clifton hills by the Nawa Nar, a channel running through the mangrove swamps of the harbour to the old town of Karachi: looking farther to the north, the white buildings of the Cantonment, and beyond all the line of low hills behind which lies Baluchistan. In such surroundings, and with a house 'impervious to morning callers', a man might think and write imperially. Frere on receiving a copy of Jacob's Memoir on Billamore's campaign, wrote to urge the author to produce a treatise, 'How to defend a frontier against barbarous and semi-barbarous tribes.'

It should distinguish what was invariable principle from variable detail. Frere adds, 'I think it a national loss that such a book should not be

written. It would be a Military Classic. . . .'

Tut Jacob was too engrossed in the business of regeneration within the frontier he had secured to spare time for such a treatise. A letter to Philip tells of his new responsibilities as revenue officer; with the assistance of the Deputy Collector allowed to him he was confident of dealing with it. 'The business is, however, new to me somewhat, and there is a good deal to be learnt before I have the whole detail at my fingers' ends.' He could not be prevailed upon to stay out the hot season; it rained at the end of August and early next month he set out on his march northwards through the hills. 310 On reaching home he went down with fever.

He writes to Philip, after his own recovery, of the terrible extent of the sickness in Upper Sind, due to a high inundation of the Indus; it had left only three hundred men from his two regiments fit for duty. He was sending Philip a picture of his house painted by a Hungarian artist who visited the frontier during his own absence in Karachi. 'You should remember that five or six years ago this place was an absolute desert, totally bare and barren, and half the year without water, where now all is garden and cornfield. When we arrived here in January 1847 the inhabitants not being camp followers amounted altogether to twenty-two. There are now more than ten thousand.' Less than a month later, a postal notice was issued in Bombay: 'Khanghur', on the frontier of Upper Sind, 24 miles north from Shikarpur, was thence-forward to be styled 'Jacobabad'. 311

So far as I am aware, this announcement was the first instance in history officially recognizing the naming by Indians of an Indian town after an Englishman. And few, before Jacob's time or since, have so well

deserved the honour.

The cold weather of 1852-53 was perhaps the happiest time in Jacob's life. In his manifold activities he was still in the absorbing and stimulating stage of creation and experiment; however confident of ultimate success in all that he undertook, he had still to plan and strive, adjust and amend. And in much of his work besides the command of his regiments the subalterns he had trained were bearing their part. The loss of Collier, who had joined in Hyderabad days and stayed with Jacob on the frontier while the others proceeded to the Panjab, till forced to take sick leave to England in the beginning of 1852, had been supplied by W. L. Briggs; and Merewether, Henry Green and his brother Malcolm were in Jacobabad with their commandant—all together for the last time.

hog-hunting, tiger shooting, and racing. For Jacob, the personification of devotion to duty and efficiency, could still unbend, and he would occasionally play a practical joke even outside his 'family circle'. We read, 'On one occasion he sent a horse to meet a friend who was coming to stay with him at Jacobabad, to bring him the last ten miles. The horse sent was one named "the Collector" and was seventeen hands high, a veritable giant among the small horses of the country. The friend, a light weight, as he mounted, asked the syce if the horse had any peculiarities. "He will only run away," was the reply. And no sooner was he in the saddle than "the Collector" did run away, at full speed, over rough and smooth, to within a mile of his destination, where meeting Jacob, who had ridden out to see what would happen, he stopped'—when the host blandly thanked his panting guest for the extraordinary empressement he displayed to partake of his hospitality. 312

The day on which the fresh Indus water reached Jacobabad at the beginning of the inundation season was a regular festival. A feu-de-joie saluted the life-giving flood and for an hour or two discipline was relaxed. The Scinde Horsemen, the zemindars and the boys of the town (who worshipped Jacob) all turned out. The Nur Wah head was the rendezvous and thence they came back with the water to the town. Jacob would make signs to mischievous boys to pelt his rissaldars with the rubbish that came floating down, and it is still affectionately remembered how, when one of them pursued by the officer he was tormenting fell into the stream, 'Jekam Saheb' plunged in 'accoutred as he was' and

rescued him.

Jacob had not long been back at his frontier home when he heard from Frere that the frontier customs had been unreservedly abolished by the Court of Directors. Frere's reply to an invitation to pay a long visit during the cold weather is worth quoting: 'There is nothing I would like better than to pay a three months' trip to your frontier, but the fact is it is one of the few places in Sind where I find that there is very little for me to do—elsewhere people want stirring up and teaching how...' So Jacob went off on tour himself, and returning on Christmas Eve reported the progress of the great work of the Begari enlargement.

Jacob had incidentally prohibited the previous practice of the zemindars, of building just below the 'heads' of their private distributaries dams projecting sometimes more than half way across the main feeder, with the idea of improving the supply to their lands. Many were convinced that without these scoops they would get no water, and made no preparation for the next cultivation season, thereby becoming a laughing stock to those who reposed implicit faith in the wisdom of John Jacob: they received a better supply in 1853 than ever before.

But this is anticipating.

The removal of the dams and the enlargement of the channel would make it available for inland navigation, and Jacob provided for the passage of large boats along the Begari and of smaller size along the Nur Wah, building his bridges across these canals with arches of such

dimensions as to allow the largest to pass.

The great scale of the works on the Begari, promising abundance of water in the future, together with the complete confidence in Jacob's power to protect Burdeka and the entire country within the frontier from tribal raids from outside, produced a great number of applicants for waste land for cultivation. It was given out on terms which Jacob found would strike a proper balance between the interests of the zemindars and the Government; for the first year, free of all charges: in the second year, one fourth of the produce to be paid to the State: in all future years, one third. The claims of old zemindars who had failed to reoccupy their ancient holdings when called on to do so within a year, in 1848–9, having been extinguished by orders of Mir Ali Murad, on Jacob's advice, were not allowed by the British Government which recognized those only who were in effective possession when the district was ceded. 313

From about this time we find Frere encouraging his district officers to visit Jacobabad, sometimes procuring invitations for them, so that they might see for themselves the fruits of Jacob's administrative methods and apply the knowledge gained in their own charges. The Freres themselves arrived at Jacobabad about half-way through February 1853 and stayed nearly three weeks on the border. Henry Green returned with them to Karachi, en route for Bombay; his health had broken down and he was obtaining sick leave to England. Green was not the only loss from the happy family at Jacobabad this year. Merewether was attracted by a young lady who had been staying in Upper Sind for the

festive season, and they shortly afterwards became engaged.

The effect on John Jacob of this very normal transaction was such as may raise a smile on the lips of the cynical. The reader may first be reminded that his regard and love for Merewether was that of a father for his son. Jacob was deeply hurt that he should not have confided in him before taking such a step and mentioned to Frere his vexation at not being informed till others less intimate knew of it. Frere replied, 'But his preference for the lady was very marked when we were in Upper Sind, only not wishing to marry then perhaps held him back from being more demonstrative. We were not told of his engagement till after you were. . . .' But Jacob's objections were not altogether ignoble or selfish. His views on marriage were idealistic and he perhaps disapproved

of his lieutenant's choice as not likely to promote that sublime state of felicity which alone in his view sanctioned the union of two persons. Even the genial and wise Frere wrote to his friend, 'If I could have arranged everything for your Lieutenant according to my own views of sublunary happiness I should have taken 5 or 6 years off Miss' age with a view to matters 20 years hence. In all other matters I think he has got an excellent wife. . . . 'Jacob saw other drawbacks to the marriage. Enough has been said of the climate of Upper Sind to make it evident that Jacobabad was no place for family life for seven months of the year; on the other hand Merewether could not dream of throwing up his appointment to look for an easy berth in a comfortable station. The new ties he was forming could not lessen his devotion to his Guru and his attachment to the Scinde Horse. So the married couple would live at Jacobabad; there would be the disturbing influence in the place of one woman, cut off from other female society, left alone for weeks at a time when her husband was out on duty; perhaps retiring to Shikarpur cantonment to relieve strained feelings at home; and above all in Jacob's apprehensions loomed the coming of children, only to be cut down in their infancy by the deadly climate; of illness beyond the skill of his regimental surgeons; or, if the future of their children came before all else, heart-breaking separations of wife from man over months and years.

What passed between him and Merewether himself on the subject is not told. But in September the young couple were married and to Frere Jacob poured out his soul. He did not disguise the grief, almost agony caused him by the knowledge that he must be content with second place in his 'son's' heart and mind. His friend replied, 'I had many palliatives which might in some degree have lessened your pain, but while I was concocting them I got your second letter which told me how the Giver of all Good had come to your aid with a remedy such as mortal physician could not dream of, and that you had found entire relief.'314 One at least of Jacob's forebodings was to be fulfilled. The cemetery in the cantonment of Shikarpur each year received the toll exacted by the climate; three young wives were among those cut off in 1853. Within a year Mary Cecilia Merewether was born, on 12th June 1854, and laid in her grave three days later. The next tombstone records that William, born in the following July, survived for one year, two months and sixteen days.

But all was life and hope, that first cold weather of Merewether's married life; the zemindars along the Begari were rejoicing after the best inundation season yet known. In spite of lack of hands for the plough, four thousand acres were cultivated from the Begari above the

previous year's total, and the number of Persian wheels for lifting water on to the land decreased by three hundred and thirty, for water now flowed in the subsidiary channels two feet higher than previously. This was not only due to a 'good river'; the supply had increased from the clearing and opening up of the main canal and particularly the removal of the dams from the private 'karia' heads. And Jacob had not yet fully completed the enlargement of the Begari, nor even begun that of its branches, so further improvement was to be expected.

True to his policy of extending prosperity as far as he could, Jacob permitted certain zemindars on the other side of the frontier, subjects of the Khan of Kelat, to dig canals from the Begari to their lands. One half of the revenue from lands so cultivated came to the British Government; but far more valuable was the good will and the introduction of

peaceful, settled habits of life.

That hot weather Jacob had made an effort to get a small civil hospital or dispensary established at his headquarters for the benefit of the country people. His regimental doctors were treating on the average a dozen of them daily but could not meet the ever-growing demand for medicine and attention. The Medical Board were hard to convince. Jacob wrote characteristically, 'The question is one at first sight of pure benevolence: but there are no isolated facts in nature and that which is

really good in one sense is good in all.

'There is land and water about this neighbourhood sufficient to occupy the labor of ten times the number of the present inhabitants. About one fourth of the value of labour of such men employed on agriculture finds its way into the Government treasury. Restoration to, or preservation of, health among the people, is a direct addition to the fund of labour, and thereby to the revenue. Directly, then, as well as indirectly all such measures as that now proposed must be beneficial to the State generally, to the Government as to the people.' But such reasoning could not move the Medical Board and we find Frere expressing annoyance, in a private letter to Jacob in November 1855, that 'redtape' was still delaying sanction to the dispensary.

The year 1853 saw the beginnings of another enterprise of Jacob's—the Survey of the frontier. The Grand Trigonometrical Survey of India was expected to be extended to Sind; and at the same time Frere had succeeded in obtaining sanction to the laying down of the boundary between Sind and Kelat on the one side and Rajputana on the other. Jacob offered to undertake the demarcation of the Kelat frontier from the western hills to Kashmor, and completed it in the cold weather of 1853–54, though he had had to obtain the instruments he required by private purchase. He had already produced a 'city survey' map of

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Jacobabad, of which Frere wrote on 30th June 1853, 'I only wish I could get anything of the kind from any one of the three Collectors. Here at Kurachee it is a matter of daily increasing importance for the town is spreading on every side.' And so, in scant hours of spare time, training raw hands as surveyors, and for the time being doing every part of the operation himself, Jacob began to extend his Survey over the frontier district. 316

It is here proper to mention a circumstance which may occasion the reader some surprise. Since January 1847, Jacob had performed the police, magisterial and political duties of his frontier in addition to its military command, without receiving any allowance other than that to which he was entitled as commandant of the first and second regiments of the Scinde Irregular Horse. When he had commanded the frontier in 1842 and had been appointed Assistant Political Agent by Outram he had received an addition of 250 rupees to his salary for the performance of comparatively trifling duties; and in the minute under which Jacob was formally invested with political authority over the frontier in February 1848 Sir George Clerk had stated that he should receive 'a moderate additional salary in that capacity'. For many months Jacob supposed the delay was only due to official routine and meanwhile did not hesitate to use his private means as far as they would go, in the belief that all would be repaid. At length, in July 1851, he pointed out that even if the Government thought it just that he should perform his political duties without extra pay, it could not be intended that he should pay for the political office establishment from his regimental allowances; 'or that the better those duties should be performed, the more I should have to pay for performing them.' Ten months later he put in an application in a more serious strain. Other political officers lived in palatial residencies, built to impress on the people the grandeur and prestige of the British Government; but the cost of those houses was invariably borne by the State. He however with the same object in view had expended 'nearly every farthing of pay and prize-money' which he had received. But apart from this he found that the single item of stationery used in political and civil correspondence had cost him eighteen hundred rupees, in addition to heavy sums for the carriage of office records and other expenses on public objects. Not having any salary beyond that of a regimental commander, he was unable to obtain leave of absence without forfeiting three quarters of his allowances. He therefore applied for a proper establishment and stationery allowance, a reasonable salary as Political Superintendent, and the privilege of obtaining leave occasionally, retaining a fair proportion of his staff pay while absent. This application was of course recommended to the Government by the

Commissioner; but it was rejected. In February 1853 he repeated it; Frere drew attention to the anomaly—Jacob, for all his varied work in the worst climate in the Bombay Presidency, received no greater emoluments than he would have drawn had he been commanding his corps in the most healthy cantonment in India; this representation also failed. More forcible memorials began to come in from Jacob; like the Sibyl he fixed a higher price with each refusal; that is to say, he recollected additional items of expenditure incurred by him in the public service. For instance, the excavation of the tank at Jacobabad, which was of inestimable advantage to the troops and inhabitants, had cost him two thousand rupees for which he had never been reimbursed, though the Government did pay for its annual clearance.

'In short, for six years past I have performed, to the satisfaction of my superiors, to the great advantage of the people of the country, and of Government . . . the duties of Political Agent, Magistrate, Superintendent of Police, Surveyor and Engineer, throughout a large district, under peculiarly difficult circumstances, not only gratuitously, but with heavy expenditure of my private means. . . . 'He mentioned that Government had recently expressed its 'deep obligations' to himself for his

labours on the frontier.

'The effects of these labours, as resulting in increased revenue, are only now commencing to be apparent, but the prospect is most encouraging: and to be enabled to continue these labours without pecuniary ruin to myself is all that I now pray for.' He applied for a suitable allowance as Political Superintendent, and a proper establishment, with arrears from the date of his appointment: but the Government of India authorized only 'the grant of office rent and arrears, and the reimbursement of all sums bona fide expended by him for the public service, from the date of his employment on political duties'. The Court of Directors however stated that they would consider favourably whatever change in his allowances the Government of India might propose.

So Jacob, faute de mieux, submitted his claim for 20,244 rupees certified on honour to have been spent by him between 1847 and 1853, and it was repaid about the middle of 1855. Nothing was said about his salary

as Political Superintendent.317

His political duties were becoming steadily more onerous. Men calling themselves vakils or accredited agents of de facto or de jure rulers of Kandahar or Herat would present themselves, with retainers armed to the teeth, having passed through Kelat territory often without the Khan's permission or knowledge; coming sometimes with the object of establishing friendly relations with the British Government

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to secure support against a rival; sometimes as spies pure and

simple.

It must be borne in mind that the British Government had had no diplomatic contacts with Afghanistan or Central Asia since 1842. Regular political relations extended only to the Khanate of Kelat, an agent of which resided at Jacobabad. Here on the only route from Central Asia on which commerce could be carried on, merchants, refugees, and adventurers passed under the scrutiny of the Political Superintendent. He had to decide on his own whether to detain, to forward under escort, to let pass, or to send back.

Jacob derived regular information about Central Asia from the merchants and bankers of Shikarpur and did not depend on mere chance contacts for his intelligence. But though it was necessary and interesting to keep his finger on the pulses of Kabul and Kandahar, and to sift the rumours that passed in the covered bazaars of Bokhara, he had nearer home a problem which made far heavier demands on his time and his

judgment.

The internal state of the Khanate of Kelat, for years disorganized and feeble, was towards the end of 1852 approaching a crisis. The Wazir Mulla Mahomed Hassan—in Jacob's words, 'a very clever, plausible and determined character'—had in 1839 brought about the downfall of Mehrab Khan by calculated misrepresentation to the British authorities of that unfortunate chief's attitude towards them, while at the same time persuading his master that they were determined to ruin him and that his only course was bold resistance. Alike during the 'usurpation' of Shah Nawaz, the restoration of young Mir Nasir Khan, the evacuation of Afghanistan and the troublous years when Napier ruled Sind, Mahomed Hassan steadily built up his influence. In March 1851 he first met Jacob who was not at the time fully acquainted with the part he had played twelve years before, and was disposed to take his protestations of loyalty to the Khan at their face value, and confide in him his own views on the needs of Kelat. But a year later Mahomed Hassan, evidently thinking that he had convinced Jacob that he alone was capable of keeping the country in order, showed his hand with an impudent proposal that the British Government should recognize his authority to the exclusion of that of Nasir Khan. Jacob told him that he was a traitor, ordered him to quit British territory immediately, and warned the Khan against him. But Mahomed Hassan's influence over his master was great and he strove to close his ears to the advice of the Political Superintendent. The Khan was persuaded to refuse extradition of malefactors who had murdered British subjects in British territory, while Mahomed Hassan released hostages whom the Marri chief, largely

through dread of Jacob, had left with the Khan as sureties for the good behaviour of the tribe.

Predatory raids of the Marris on Kachhi followed, culminating in a treacherous attack by the whole fighting strength of the tribe on Phulaji -the Khyheris having been thrown off their guard by certain Brahui chiefs in Mahomed Hassan's interest. The losses of the Khyheris were heavy and Jacob addressed a severe letter to the Khan telling him he would recommend no countenance or aid from the British Government till he was satisfied that he really intended to adopt measures for the better government of the country. And he again demanded surrender of the men who had murdered British subjects. The Khan at length complied, at the same time inquiring naively who were the traitors who were assisting the Marri robbers. The chief of them, he was plainly told, was his Wazir, Mahomed Hassan. 318 Throughout the hot weather of 1853 the Marris plundered in Kachhi. After their unsuccessful raid near Kashmor in April, Jacob renewed a proposal he had made previously; to reduce the tribe to order by a punitive expedition. Frere had replied on the former occasion that permission would hardly be granted while Government were 'trying to shut their eyes to all beyond your outposts and then to persuade themselves that nothing exists there'. In view of the outrage on British territory he now supported Jacob's suggestion; but it was peremptorily rejected by the Governor-General. As usual Jacob thought this could only be the result of ignorance, which might be removed by explanation and more powerful advocacy.

He pointed out that the British Government might gain in reputation from the contrast of peace and prosperity within its border with the chronic disorder beyond it; while the constant exertion and vigilance required to prevent the reflux of the old tide of turbulence made the frontier an excellent school for Indian officers. But the untamed existence of the last of the organized robber tribes, welcoming every outlaw in the country to their bands, must excite the envy of the many Baluchis but recently reclaimed from a similar way of life, thus postponing their complete reform. Nor could commerce with Central Asia flourish while the Marris could infest the trade route through Kachhi and the Bolan. Jacob made it clear that he did not advocate the use of force against them habitually, but 'once for all'. He required comparatively few troops and only asked to be allowed to make the whole of the necessary arrangements himself. But if this were not approved, the Khan should be given sufficient pecuniary assistance to enable him to assemble his own forces to chastise the Marris.

In August Frere wrote, 'I think the Murree inroads in the Punjab are likely to do more than all our arguments to induce Government to

authorise severe measures against them.' Next month it appeared (in the Lahore Chronicle) that the Panjab Board of Administration were about to take punitive measures, and Frere recommended to John Lawrence that the Marris should be left to Jacob to deal with.³¹⁹

Meanwhile the confusion and anarchy in Kachhi continued unabated; and from an intercepted letter Jacob came to know that the Marris had plundered two of the Khan's villages on instructions from Wazir Mahomed Hassan. This, communicated to the Khan, at last procured the Wazir's dismissal. Mulla Ahmed, the Kelat agent at Jacobabad, reported that his master had also given orders for the abolition of transit dues levied by chiefs on the trade routes through his territory; bodies of horse were being organized to watch the outlets from the hills into Kachhi; and the majority of the feudal chiefs had agreed to support the Khan in all his measures. The Political Superintendent's steady moral influence had at length produced its due effect.

Jacob recommended that the success should be followed up by an interview between the Khan and the Commissioner: 'I have a strong opinion that merely assembling these chiefs in formal Durbar and there, in presence of their prince, explaining to them the wishes of the British Government, would be attended with the happiest effects, although no promises whatever should be made, nor we be pledged to adopt any

further measures whatever.'

But in fact Dalhousie had now decided to recommend to the Court of Directors that pecuniary aid should be given to the Khan. This was largely due to the advocacy of Outram, who was in Calcutta during the cold weather of 1853-54, pending his restoration to the Baroda Residency; for he had won a complete victory in the Khut-put affair. The Government of Bombay which had removed him had also consistently poured cold water on Frere's trans-border policy, and habitually delayed transmission of his dispatches to the Central Government. Fortunately, Dalhousie consulted Outram, who took the opportunity to recommend that should operations against the Marris be undertaken, they should be left to Major Jacob's sole responsibility; he could be relied on to accomplish the end in view with the smallest means requisite for success. The Governor-General himself remained opposed to such an expedition; and before he was in a position to issue orders on the second line of policy, to subsidize the Khan, Jacob took it upon himself to invite His Highness to meet Frere in the course of the latter's annual visit to the frontier, in February 1854. This personal interview produced an excellent effect; whatever remained of the influence and power of the traitor Mahomed Hassan was overthrown. 320

The Marris at this time were directing their raids mainly against the

Bugtis, not wholly without provocation. When the Bugtis wrote to Jacob boasting of a success over their turbulent neighbours he replied that had they been living in British territory, he would have had them hanged for their robbery and murder. It was on this occasion that a Panjab Frontier Force officer had written to Jacob congratulating him on the success of his Bugtis, and provoked Jacob's denunciation of the Panjab frontier methods which had so irritated Dalhousie.

Just before he was made aware of the Political Superintendent's strictures, towards the end of April 1854, Dalhousie had ordered him to proceed to negotiate a treaty between the British Government and the

State of Kelat.

The previous treaty concluded by Outram with Mir Nasir Khan in October 1841 had become largely inoperative in little over a year, owing to the death of Shah Shuja and the expulsion of his dynasty (to whom the Khan of Kelat had acknowledged vassalage); not to mention the withdrawal of the British from Afghanistan. Sir Charles Napier, who thereafter took charge of political relations with Kelat, regarded the treaty as waste paper; and we have seen how in the years that followed, both Kelat and Sind suffered from the want of definition in their mutual relations.

The subsidy of fifty thousand rupees annually to the Khan, long recommended by Jacob and Frere, was adopted as the basis of the new treaty. In consideration of this, the Khan undertook to oppose the enemies of the British Government, act in subordinate co-operation with it and enter into no negotiations (friendly correspondence being excepted) with other States without its consent. The British authorities were to be at liberty to station troops anywhere in the state that they thought fit. The Khan bound himself and his successors to prevent plundering in or near British territory and to protect the passage of merchants between that territory and Afghanistan; and also to permit no exactions from them to be made beyond an equitable and agreed duty. The payment of the subsidy was contingent on the faithful performance of these conditions in the year before it fell due.

Jacob reached Mastung, the summer residence of the Khan between Kelat and Quetta, on 12th May after a grilling passage through Kachhi. The next day was spent in formalities and the delivery of a personal communication, the plain speaking of which escapes becoming a patronizing homily only by virtue of the proved sincerity and good will of the man who spoke, which completely won Nasir Khan. The treaty was signed and sealed next day; and Jacob, after this short breath of the delicious climate of Sarawan, returned to the furnace of the frontier.

impossible for me to express too strongly the sense I entertain of the spirit, the tact and complete success, with which you have fulfilled the wishes of the Supreme Government. You have far outrun all our expectations, and left nothing to wish for in the matter, except the assurance which we hope soon to receive, that you and your men have not suffered by your public spirited and valuable exertions.'321

Jacob was now able to recommend that the old anomaly of the subsidy to the Khyheris of Phulaji should be discontinued from the following year; there was a little discontent over and attempts to abuse the new customs arrangements; but with Mulla Ahmed, a man popular with all classes of the Khan's subjects as well as being Jacob's disciple in the art of administration, installed as Wazir, improvement in the general condition of the country and the people was rapid. Nasir Khan took pride in attending personally to State affairs. The rest of the year 1854 passed without any violence, robbery or loss occurring to Kafilas or merchants; the Marris plundered a little round Lahri, but the Khan was planning measures to control them. To such an extent was the predatory tribe impressed by the probable outcome of the treaty and anxious not to give offence that, as mentioned in an earlier chapter, they declined to give shelter to the last of the notorious border robbers, Sanjar Rind, whom a few months before they would have welcomed.

Before turning our eyes once more within the Sind frontier mention must be made of Jacob's historical sketch of the states and tribes connected with it. This work was an official report, written under the orders of the Government of India; and in forwarding it, several months later than it was due, Jacob felt bound to apologize for its imperfections. He had had to write it 'among the distractions and interruptions of all manner of other necessary duties', and desired that it should be considered as an outline to be filled up by others. It was nevertheless thought worthy of a place among the published selections of Bombay Government records, issued a year or two later; and if the author's own share in the transactions narrated seems brought too prominently forward, Jacob's justification would be simply, Quorum pars magna fui. 322

The reader is already aware of the heavy burden, much of it self-imposed, which Jacob now carried, day in and day out. Every year spent on the frontier added to the scope of his labours; whatever he created required the creation of other things for its due fulfilment; nothing that could be improved could be allowed to stand still; the goal in all things was perfection, whether they were great or small. The very multiplicity of his duties and interests gave him relaxation in turning from one to another; sleeping little, he could find in the long laborious days hours of leisure to be devoted to reading and experiment. Many

were spent in his workshop, a microcosm of his endeavour; for while his main preoccupation here was to evolve the perfect rifle and shell, he found time to produce, for the delectation of friends and the beautifying of his house, other triumphs of mechanic art. The best known of these is the clock which is still to be seen in the Deputy Commissioner's house at Jacobabad. This shows accurately not only the time but the date, the day of the week, the month and the phase of the moon. Every cog of the complicated mechanism, of highly finished brass and steel work for the most part, was cut by Jacob's own hands, and the face bears his coat of arms, name and designation, beautifully engraved, amidst other decorations.

Yet more remarkable was an exposition of his religious beliefs, the fruit of wide reading and deep thought, for which probably he had found more time after Merewether's marriage. He found in the works of Godfrey Higgins, author of Horae Sabbaticae and Anacalypsis, a congenial mind-here was a man of affairs, a radical reformer who had laboriously acquired wide learning to equip himself for the pursuit of Truth wherever she might lead, and had given his conclusions to the world, careless of obloquy, in the belief that they would help to 'liberate mankind from the shackles of prejudice in which they were bound.'323


Jacob's metaphysics are outlined in a series of letters addressed to 'a very excellent and highly gifted lady'-we may perhaps assume a Platonic friendship springing from his mysterious unhappiness of 1840 - -who had sought his aid in resolving her intellectual problems; in particular the conflict between scientific knowledge, so rapidly extend-

ing at the time, and orthodox Christian doctrine.

The letters are four in number. Jacob adverts to the initial difficulty arising from the insufficient teaching of natural science, which could not be easily assimilated after prejudices had taken root in the mind. The removal of these required the greatest mental effort. He therefore leads his pupil by easy stages down the path of the then most advanced theory of the evolution of the Universe, and builds upon it a materialistic

philosophy.

'All mathematical science is based on self-evident axioms—is indeed only the expansion of such axioms. So likewise in the Universe around us, the highest mental phenomena are produced, and the highest state of being proceeds, from the very same causes and principles which regulate the formation and growth of a crystal or a leaf. . . . I speak not of the infinite first cause of all Being. Beginning or end there can be none; but of these we know nothing more. Before the Eternal we can but bow in silence.' But with regard to anything finite—the discoveries of the microscope on the one hand and of the telescope on the other-





'Reason fails not, shrinks not in the least, but rejoices and revels at the glorious prospect of growing knowledge, and in the progress of Being towards the first great cause of all, the centre of power, goodness and beauty; the path towards which is the way of Truth alone'—how different from the 'contemptible theological impertinences of Priests and Churches.'

Basing his reasoning mainly on the ascertained effects of polarity and laws deriving from it, in elaborating all matter from the simple organic cell, Jacob passes steadily through on the evolution of vegetable and animal life, 'through countless ages', until the appearance of Man—'Different species or varieties of man evolved independently in different parts of the earth.' At this point he deduces from the field passed over that which lies beyond: 'Apply now these laws which we have been discussing, or glancing over, to the universe; the worlds around us are particles of matter following the same course as we have been contemplating on a smaller scale. To a mental capacity enlarged in proportion, the whole mass of suns and worlds which we see around us would be a microscopic object like one of our "primary cells". Every where there is life, steadily proceeding from simple to compound, lower

to higher—but the identical individual is never reproduced.'

Jacob's next step is to argue that mental being is a continuation of the same processes. 'We are accustomed to regard as most real and substantial the matter of which our own frame is composed. This is an error. Magnetism and electricity are as real as a lump of lead. The real substance of a living body is chiefly constructed of these imponderables . . . CAUSALITY, CONSCIENTIOUSNESS, BENEVOLENCE, VENERATION, IDEALITY, &c are as much part of man's person as are bones and muscles. Let us then habitually identify ourselves with, and especially exercise and cultivate, that portion of our being which we find to lead us eternally towards reason, justice, charity, holiness and beauty, and wheresoever these are, there shall we live. DEATH is but PROGRESS, RESURRECTION is only growth. The less we dwell on our individuality—on our cellular existence, as it were, and the more we identify ourselves with Life generally, the MORE, IN FACT, WE LIVE. . . . This precept to endeavour to be, is what the best and wisest of men implied in the words "Be ye therefore perfect, even as our Father in Heaven is perfect", which with such amazing effrontery are so completely set aside by the absurd doctrine of the atonement now taught by his pretended followers. . . . The chief, perhaps the only serious obstacle to the perception of truth everywhere, and in all things, among men, is excessive attachment to the individual, cellular, rather than to general life; we appear inclined to rank as blood corpuscles rather than as men.'

He had already warned his pupil that she might be alarmed by his conclusion that 'resurrection of the body in the vulgar sense, or even the reappearance of individual beings in any way after death is contrary to the manifest working of Nature's Laws.' But, 'why identify ourselves with man as he now is, when we feel that we can take our place with

universal being, and rise with it for ever?'

In the last letter of the series Jacob attacks revealed religion, more particularly Christianity as taught by the Churches-the 'detestable blasphemy' of calling the records of such proceedings as those of David, Solomon, and 'the murderess Jael' as Divine revelation. As to the New Testament, he declared, after much research (and here Anacalypsis had been his chief guide) that the doctrine of the churches was only slightly altered paganism; 'the Man-God crucified, the Virgin Mother, the Sign of the Cross, were many ages older than the reign of Augustus.' Moreover the Churches' approach was by way of an appeal to the basest instincts; 'at every turn, hopes of reward are held out, and fears of punishment excited.' As to the admonition to fear God, 'Verily I fear not, but glory, revel and rejoice beyond expression in the light of his truth blazing and burning in my mind. In this, the noblest, best and truest state of being (now or ever after), every thought is religious; there are no set times, no forms, no ceremonies, nor aught else of such impertinent puerilities; to live is Divine Service; the Temple is the Universe. The presence of God is always felt, always rejoiced in. We are always before the judgment seat.'

On the other hand 'the most enormous evil which ever existed in the world is the Church of England united to the State.' There would yet be a violent moral revolution, 'unless the priests (among whom are many of the best men of any Age) see in time the folly of the Church. When Science and Religion are felt to be, and esteemed openly to be

ONE, we shall be in the safe and sound path of God's laws.

His pupil should not grieve, he said, if she were assailed and called 'infidel' by priests and others; if she wished to reply she might send them his letters. 'Let them assail me and assail me publicly. I should rejoice in the contest. . . . Yet in all honesty I count myself as nothing, save as the sense of belonging to a divine whole exists in my mind, relying solely on Nature's Law and God's Truth. . . . Those who attack us shall haply be found to fight against God.'

These originally bona fide private letters 'being thought interesting', Jacob took leave to get them privately printed in 1855 for the use of his

It should be remembered that though Darwin's ideas on evolution were at this time to some extent known among scientific men in England, his Origin of Species only appeared in 1859. A critic might in 1857 dismiss Jacob's metaphysics as 'a collection of crudities, an ollapodrida of La Place's old theory of the materiality of thought, and the more recently exploded "Vestiges of Creation". At least the 'Letters' bear the stamp of an earnest seeker after truth, and in judging them we may bear in mind the words of T. H. Huxley: 'In all matters of the intellect, follow your reason as far as it will take, without regard to any other consideration . . . do not pretend that conclusions are certain which are not demonstrated or demonstrable. That I take to be the agnostic faith, which, if a man keep whole and undefiled, he shall not be ashamed to look the universe in the face.'324

Jacob in fact consciously applied his philosophy of Being to the every day business of life, ascribing the success of all that he undertook to the

efficacy of Natural Law.

We find Frere writing to him in September 1854, 'I only wish you could cut yourself in two or three, and give me a bit for each Collectorate.' As there was only one Jacob, Frere encouraged his officers to visit Jacobabad and learn all they could. The oasis in the desert was now seven years old; the trees, carefully fostered, had achieved a seemingly miraculous growth. Everything was neat and orderly: the roads and streets straight and wide; the bazaar itself as unlike an Indian city as possible. Here were congregated banias of Bhag Nari, who had sought refuge in the early days when Kachhi was in a turmoil, and had prospered so that they had no desire to return to their ancestral villages, though Jacob's peace had extended there also. Trade in Jacobabac was thriving. After the enlargement of the Nur Wah, Jacob cut a navigable branch from it, ending in a dock close to his great house and the bazaar, where boats unloaded piece-goods, iron and the like, and took in cargoes of grain; the works on the Begari had produced a vast increase in cultivation and a corresponding growth in local needs.

Jacob persuaded the zemindars to pay their land revenue in cash, under a settlement worked out with the aid of his Deputy Collector, instead of the traditional system by which the State took a fixed share of each year's produce. This at once gave rise to a new problem: the calculation of the annual cropped area of each landholder. Jacob was not content merely to abolish the injustices inherent in the Talpurs' method of calculating areas: a system dependent on annual measurement, and admitting proportional remission of revenue for partial failure of crops, was in his view fundamentally objectionable, as demand-

ing costly inspection and supervision.

Finding that the practice in his district was usually to allow lands to remain fallow for two years out of three, Jacob hit on the expedient of

granting lands on the principle that one third of the area would be liable to assessment annually. Within the limits of land thus granted, the zemindar might cultivate all or none; but would have to pay assessment annually on one-third. Such an arrangement could not have been applied to a country already extensively occupied and developed, but in Sind north of the Begari cultivation had always been sparse.

Jacob's practice was to grant waste lands beyond the existing irrigation boundary to the man who first, by digging a new private canal, brought water to it. Such water courses had to be dug along the

boundaries of older holdings.

The assessment rates of October 1854 were readily accepted by the zemindars: yet six months later we find Jacob proposing that they should be lowered farther, in order to stimulate development, and to enable the Government to dispense with all remissions and other temporary adjustments which were such fertile sources of fraud and improvidence. After correspondence with Frere, he agreed that the interests of all parties would be best served by continuing the existing rates provided that the Government guaranteed that there would be no increase for twenty years. In a tract which had been so long disturbed, anything conferring real security on the people was of great advantage to the Government. Jacob opposed the principle of varying the assessment with the nature of the produce cultivated: the operation of a free market would result in the different grains being cultivated 'in exact proportion to the wants of the people.

Similarly he held it inadvisable to vary the rate of assessment in accordance with differences in the soil. Frere would not allow that a flat rate could be introduced into the older settled districts, with their longrecognized diversities of soil. But as to the frontier he acquiesced, as there was a vast amount of good waste land waiting to be cultivated.

Once again Jacob's claim to know best the requirements of his own domain was admitted, and in June 1857 the Court of Directors approved the extension of his zemindars' leases to twenty years at the current

rates.325

The regular Survey of the frontier district inaugurated by Jacob in 1853 had made sufficient progress to anticipate, or at least speedily overtake, the vast expansion of cultivation in 1854 and 1855. As all efforts to obtain good instruments through the 'regular channels' had failed, Jacob had on his own responsibility ordered the best patterns available direct from the makers in England, trusting that the Government would pay for them. Frere was able to obtain the necessary sanction.

The physical difficulties of executing the Survey were great. Field work could only be carried on between November and April, and even then the dusty atmosphere and frequent mirages made trigonometrical operations difficult and most tedious. From May to October the minimum daily temperature—at 4 a.m.—averaged 94°: and only by artificial means could the daily maximum indoors be kept down to 96°. A European draughtsman could not, from profuse perspiration, work at plan-drawing at such a temperature—nevertheless Jacob was confident that he would be able to accomplish a correct Survey showing every canal and zemindar's boundary, without additional assistance, 'within a reasonable period'. Moreover he intended to extend the Survey southwards as soon as he had finished his own district: 'the Grand Survey of India may afterwards verify my work, which is more than sufficient for all practical purposes of a local map.' Frere informed the Government of Bombay that his work was fit to be incorporated in the most scientific and accurate Survey; the India Survey should start work elsewhere in the Province. Jacob was officially commended for his zeal in undertaking the work; his small establishment was continued and he gradually entrusted most of the duties to one of his subalterns, Lieutenant Macauley, whom he had trained.

It is noteworthy that soon afterwards Merewether was appointed Deputy Collector in addition to his own duties; Frere was of opinion that so long as Jacob remained Political Superintendent, all work in the Frontier District should be in charge of officers of the Scinde Horse. 326

In February 1855 Malcolm Green proceeded on sick leave to Europe, taking advantage of the new furlough regulations which, following in part the scheme put forward by Jacob in his pamphlet, had been liberalized and permitted thirteen months' absence on sick certificate without surrender of a staff appointment. A few years earlier Jacob himself might have been tempted to apply for leave on such terms; but he was now far too absorbed in the manifold development of his District to leave it, unless the call should come for service in the Crimea with his corps. Up till August Frere was in great hopes that the Scinde Horse might be sent there; it was Outram who let Jacob know, by means of a letter from Courtenay, that the Governor-General was strongly opposed to such a measure: 'he added something very pretty about your being much too valuable where you are for him to be very ready to part with you.'

But Malcolm Green, though compelled to leave the frontier through ill health, was soon well enough to join his brother in the trenches before Sevastopol, and served in the Crimea till the end of the war.

Lord Dalhousie's determination to resist any demand for the services of the Scinde Horse or the Punjab Irregular Cavalry in the Near East

was not without good reason. Two British regiments had been withdrawn from India for the Crimea in the teeth of his protests. In a minute of 13th September 1854 he observed, 'We are perfectly secure so long as we are strong, and are believed to be so': but it was dangerous thus to countenance the belief that Russia was too strong for Britain in the Crimea, when the British force in India was in his opinion only adequate for garrisoning the country. The attitude of Persia was beginning to cause him anxiety; and he asked, 'what if we have to send an army to the Persian Gulf?'

In April 1855 we find Frere asking for Jacob's view on the military arrangements required for Sind. Jacob proposed that the force under his command should be increased to a brigade of all arms by the addition of two troops of silladar horse artillery and two battalions of silladar infantry, who should be armed with the rifle which he had invented, the history of which will be told in the next chapter. A reserve force should be retained in Karachi consisting of one European and two Native regiments, and two field batteries. No other troops would be required for garrisoning Sind and the military stations of Hyderabad and Shikarpur would be abolished. In their place eight hundred foot police would have to be raised to take over the duties of the guarding of jails and civil treasuries which were performed by the troops at Hyderabad and Shikarpur. The net saving would be one European regiment and two Native infantry battalions, or in terms of money, over 60,000 rupees monthly independent of commissariat and such like heavy charges, 'while the Military force would positively be really greater in reality than at present; activity would make up for weight.'327

The sequel to this revolutionary proposal will be dealt with hereafter together with Jacob's plans for securing the North-West Frontier of

India as a whole, which now began to take shape in his mind.

Meanwhile he was fighting to obtain sanction to the greatest of his irrigation projects. The financial effects of his enlargement of the Begari and Nurwah served to overcome the diffidence he had felt in bringing forward a scheme from which far more startling results, in

proportion to the means required, were to be expected.

The total annual increase of land revenue attributable to the Begari improvements already exceeded half the capital outlay incurred, inclusive of the provision of bridges. Nearly 100,000 acres of waste land had been brought under irrigation. He had moreover proposed further extension and enlargment of the 'tail' of the Begari below the Nurwah head, estimating an ultimate return of thirty per cent on the capital expenditure.

His scheme for the 'Great Desert Canal' far overshadowed the Begari

improvements. It was to run from the Indus in the neighbourhood of Kashmor right along the Kelat frontier to beyond Garhi Khairo Jamali, a distance of about 150 miles. The levels were favourable, the soil potentially most productive, and Jacob calculated on bringing fifteen hundred square miles of this virgin desert land under command of his canal. The annual return would eventually reach the sum of six lakhs and thirty-seven thousand rupees.

Jacob's estimate of the cost of excavation, calculated in the same simple manner as he had adopted for the Begari enlargement, came to about six lakhs, inclusive of the cost of bridges. The annual silt-clearance would require an expenditure of about seventy thousand rupees. His inquiries showed that labour would be forthcoming both for the construction and for subsequent cultivation: the inhabitants of Kachhi and the neighbouring hills would flock to the work for a very moderate wage.

Frere forwarded this remarkable project to the Superintending Engineer. Cautious Colonel Turner thought Jacob over-sanguine as to the return to be expected: and also objected to his method of calculating the hydraulic gradient, and other features. The scheme required much more detailed examination.

Jacob took the criticisms in good part. As to levels, he pointed out that water from canals which took off from the Indus miles below the proposed head of the Desert Canal flowed close to the surface of the ground near Ghari Khairo, to which it was to take a direct course: and he adduced evidence in support of his other calculations. Even if the advantages derived were considerably less than his forecast, the work would still be 'enormously remunerative'. This supposition was warranted by the success of the Begari enlargement 'although our proceedings were somewhat irregular': had he waited for instruments to be sent up for executing a regular survey and levels along the line, the work completed a year ago would not yet have been begun.

In recommending the scheme to the Bombay Government Frere practically argued that it should be treated as an exception to the rules requiring detailed estimates in regular form. He forwarded Turner's remarks, but reinforced Jacob's arguments on all the points contested.

The Bombay Government 'approved highly' of the project, but declared themselves precluded from sending it for sanction to the Supreme Government in view of the stringent instructions that detailed plans and estimates should accompany all proposed public works. Frere communicated this result to Jacob, who in a characteristic reply claimed that his plan was detailed: the data he had used were the most perfect that existed and 'the estimate which Government supposes to be

conjectural is no more so than is any calculation regarding any future circumstance whatever.'

As to the insistence on the appearance of precision on financial grounds, 'It may be well to bear in mind that the cost to Government of delay in the execution of this work is assuredly not less than five lacs of rupees per annum; and it may be worth while to consider whether any conceivable formality of estimate would be an equivalent

advantage.'

Frere replied in a private letter, 'We will, please God, have the great Desert Canal yet, though this kind of work puts me in mind of Robert Bruce and his spider.' Outram wrote, 'Nothing appears to incite the wretched Government under whom you serve from their little Piddlington and muddling ways—had you been in the Punjab under Lord Dalhousie your canal scheme would have been hailed as it deserves, and full credit would have been given for the conception, as well as full powers to carry it out . . . 'twill yet be done I trust, and the desert annihilated; tempting the hill tribes to become solely cultivators of the plain. . . . God bless and prosper your philanthropic exertions.'328

The time was now approaching when John Jacob was to leave the scene of these exertions. The occasion was not a breakdown in health, though we must echo Outram's words, 'You are indeed a wonderful being to stand such a climate so long'—it was Frere who fell ill through overstrain, and Jacob who was to take up the Commissioner's burden in his absence. Promotion in the official hierarchy held no attraction for him (though he had written to claim as his right, and obtained, advancement to the rank of lieutenant colonel); his heart and soul were in his frontier home and his work there; but he could not refuse the call of duty when Frere insisted that no one else could take his own place. The wrench would be less severe in that Jacob's adopted son and pupil Merewether, who in Outram's words had stood by him 'like a trump, God bless him!' would gain well-deserved promotion by the change.

Nine years had passed since they had ridden up together to the wretched mud fort of Khangarh, standing on the shore of the brown sea of desert; how transformed was the scene on which Jacob now turned his back, with many a look behind!³²⁹ The lines of the Scinde Horse, barracks and stables squarely built and brightly plastered, stood along that shore-line which men had thought unchangeable; but beyond them to the north the only piece of desert land visible was that occupied by Jacob's mighty rifle range; all else was cornfield stretching as far as the eye could see.

The lower buildings were overshaded by line upon line of trees; only the battlements of the Great House still topped the dense verdure around it. Where the old fort had stood and a few scared men had kept armed watch, wondering each day whether the half-starved beasts driven out to graze would return by evening to the shelter of its crazy walls and the grass mat hovels huddled against them, hundreds of Baluch herdsmen with splendid Bhagnari cattle, fat-tailed sheep from the hills, goats and horses for sale, chaffered and jested with Hindu traders in the market near Jacob's tank.

From the new town of twelve thousand people, radiated straight roads thronged with camel-caravans and loud with the creak of bullock-carts; and the eye might look in vain among the men who passed by, whether on foot or horseback, for one carrying arms, unless a Baluch Guide or a zemindar who had earned the rare privilege of exemption under the hand and seal of the Political Superintendent, chanced to

come that way.

They were there on the day that John Jacob bade farewell to 'his Castle and his kingdom', a cloud of sardars and zemindars pressing up through the dust behind him as he rode with his officers along the road to Larkana. On either hand stretched stubble fields of millet and cotton, dotted with stacks of karbi, and peaceful homesteads with cattle grazing or turning the Persian wheels of wells round which a patch of spring crops brought a touch of vivid green to the landscape. Here in preparation for the next Kharif season men were burning the tall pampas grass that had shot up along their water courses during the last inundation; others giving their fields preliminary ploughing before the soil was baked too hard. And as Jacob drew rein on the bridge over the Begari his surveyors and contractors for the enlarging and extending of the tail of the canal came to touch his stirrup. He now stood on the boundary of his district; but for many miles onward he would ride on a road he had made, through lands to which he had brought water. New and troublous duties lay before him and heavy responsibility which he undertook with confidence; with confidence too he left his own work in Merewether's hands. But as his eye travelled back along the road he had come, with all the evidence of prosperity around, and his inward eye recalled the country as he had found it, he must have known in his heart that in no field of action could he surpass what he had here achieved for humanity.

CHAPTER XVI

The Weapon of the Future

Among the legends which have grown up in North-West India round John Jacob's many-sided achievement is one which finds expression in the statement, loosely made and often unthinkingly accepted, that he 'invented the rifle'. With the change of one word, the legend becomes truth; Jacob invented a rifle, and it was the most efficient rifle of its time. But of course the expedient of cutting spiral grooves in the barrels of fire-arms, to impart a rotatory motion to the ball and so keep it straight on its flight and increase its range, was discovered long before Jacob was born.

Crudely rifled muskets were used in the French Revolutionary Wars: Wellington's army in the Peninsula had its rifle regiments: and in the hands of Kentucky backwoodsmen rifles were effective in the American Campaign of 1812–15. But these weapons were slow to load and their use practically restricted to skirmishing and sniping. Battles were won by infantry armed with the smooth bore musket who could load and

fire rapidly and would close with the enemy.

For many years after 1815 the rifle was chiefly esteemed for sporting purposes and there seemed no object in achieving ranges longer than three hundred yards. In France however Delvigne and Thouvenin, and in England Captain Norton, worked during the second decade of the

nineteenth century to devise an effective rifle for war.

Norton produced the cylindro-conical type of ball as early as 1823, but his most remarkable invention was the percussion shell for use with rifle muskets. This was becoming known in 1826 and aroused the interest of John Jacob while he was at Addiscombe. From 1829 onwards, at Matunga and elsewhere, Jacob experimented with rifle shells of his own contrivance, using any rifles, sporting types as well as the old British army two-groove, that he could obtain. It was in 1845 at

Hyderabad that he began to attempt distant ranges, concentrating on the problem of evolving a better type of rifle and bullet to achieve easier loading without sacrifice of accuracy. It was solved by using a rifle with four grooves which would spin the spherical ball by two bands fitted on it at right angles. This gave excellent results, which in 1846 Jacob placed freely at the disposal of the Indian Government. His four-grooved rifle was, however, rejected on the ground that the two-grooved type, thought good enough for the Royal Army, must be good enough for the soldiers of India. Neglect of an invention which eliminated the most important defect of the rifles of the time was the less excusable in that it could have been adopted with trifling expense, as Jacob had shown how the extra grooves could be cut, by a simple method of his own devising, in the standard two-grooved rifle.³³⁰

On his transfer to Khangarh he set forth to obtain increased ranges, and after several years' trial with different shapes of projectiles, made of course in his own workshop, he evolved a conical type which gave excellent practice up to 800 yards. He also experimented with the Minié rifle ball, recently invented, and highly acclaimed in Europe; but it did not satisfy him, and the next advance was made when he adopted the conoidical instead of the conical point for his bullet, which now approached closely Newton's 'solid of least resistance'. The hinder part had projections on it to fit the grooves of the rifle, and he found that the twist of the rifling could be greatly increased. He adopted one full turn in twenty-four inches length; and in the opening years of the 'fifties ranges far beyond the utmost achieved elsewhere had become common at Jacobabad.

In England the authorities at Woolwich and Hythe had come to believe that the rifle, the Minié in particular, would be useful for military purposes. The Minié was issued to some of the troops employed in South Africa in the Kaffir War of 1852, and Sir John Fortescue gives some account of the practice obtained up to nine hundred yards; though he does not say how often it was interrupted by the ball being blown into a tube of lead and left sticking in the barrel—the great defect of the early Minié.³³¹

Jacob sent a memorandum of his experiments to the Secretary of the Military Board, Bombay, early in 1854. He had obtained excellent results at 1400 yards and even further with his percussion shells, which he claimed to be 'the most formidable missile ever invented by man'.

'Judging from our practice at Jacobabad it seems certain that two good riflemen so armed could, in ten minutes, annihilate the best Field Battery of Artillery now existing. . . . It seems evident that, if the arms above described be supplied to our soldiers, their power would be increased

at least four-fold. The army which should first adopt these weapons would thereby obtain an advantage equal to that of the exclusive possession of fire-arms a century ago. One effect of this would be that the whole of our field artillery must be totally useless. The guns must be rifled also! In which case shrapnell shells of the shape . . . would be fully

effective at distances of 5000 yards or more.'

Unfortunately Jacob was unable to go in person to Bombay when the first tests were made; his instructions were misunderstood; the experiment was not made with the appropriate type of rifle, but one of the early four-grooved patterns fit only for the spherical ball. The results were therefore inconclusive; 332 but Jacob did not allow the disappointing outcome of the Bombay tests to interrupt the course of his experiments, and the last three months of 1854 witnessed another

wonderful advance at Jacobabad.

The first small range which Jacob had laid down 'from the front of the Castle Dangerous which he has erected in the Desert'-the words are Frere's—had long been superseded by a remarkable practice ground. It was characteristic of the man not to copy unquestioningly the type of range adopted elsewhere, with a single butt in front of which targets of various sizes could be set up and separate firing points one behind the other at each distance were required. The desert beyond the lines of the Scinde Horse afforded unlimited space; and the saving of time and of unnecessary exposure to the sun was important. So Jacob had his butts and targets-walls of sun-dried brick-erected in echelon at every hundred yards up to six hundred and thereafter at every two hundred yards up to two thousand: the firing point being the same for all ranges. It was covered in, and the marksman had only to walk along it for a few yards to be in a position to fire at any range.

Here Jacob and Malcolm Green continued their practice at the longer distances. Jacob had much trouble to prevent the distortion of the lead bullets under increased charges, but at length evolved a composite ball, the conoidical portion being of zinc and only the cylindrical base of lead. The two thousand yard mark which he had almost despaired

of attaining was at last achieved. 333

Meanwhile it was the officially patronised Enfield-Minié rifle which a few British battalions took into action in their first European campaign since Waterloo. In the opinion of most British officers Brown Bess, with which the majority of the troops were armed, was not dethroned from her position as the queen of small arms. Yet the Russian Commander-in-Chief attributed his failure at Inkerman-a confused soldiers' battle in which there was full scope for the musket—to the destructive effects produced by the Minié rifles with which a few of his opponents

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were armed: and the range at which this damage was done was a mere two or three hundred yards.

Less than a month after Inkerman was fought we find from Jacob's report of rifle practice at Jacobabad that out of twenty-one shots fired at a range of 1200 yards, seven struck within five feet of the centre of the target, five more within ten feet, and the rest within fifteen feet.

It is perhaps a little known fact that Jacob's rifle and percussion shells were actually used in the Crimean campaign, and with startling effect. Lieutenant Malcolm Green, en route for England on leave early in 1855, joined the army before Sevastopol where his brother was already serving. He had brought with him one of Jacob's rifles and ammunition, including percussion shells. In the words of his brother Henry, 'On one occasion he went to the trenches occupied by the French which faced the Green Hill, a position held by the Russians, and at a distance of about 800 yards he opened fire with his rifle on a gun in a battery which had been giving much trouble to the French. In a very short time his fire caused the gun to be withdrawn from the embrasure, and the French were much interested and astonished at his proceedings.'334

A volunteer subaltern from the Indian Army could, however, hardly hope to obtain a committee, other than an informal gathering of brother officers, to witness such a demonstration in the front line, and his performance seems never to have come to the notice of the military authorities.

At about the same time Dalhousie's secretary Courtenay told Outram that the Government of India had done all that it could to stir up the Court of Directors on behalf of Jacob's rifle, but there was 'some specially noxious influence over the India House' which would not yield. Frere, an enthusiast for Jacob's inventions, had urged him to make them known through an article in a Bombay periodical; but his friend preferred to address a wider public by means of a pamphlet. This, entitled Rifle Practice appeared in July 1855 and caused a considerable sensation. Jacob's thesis is that the power of a nation to follow peaceful pursuits might depend on its superiority in war; yet England, the 'workshop of the world', lagged far behind other countries in the armament of its defence forces.

After describing his experiments and the types of rifle he recommended for introduction in the army, he continues, 'Their use implies skilful workmen in our ranks, instead of pipe-clayed automatons. It implies further an entire change in our tactics, so as to give full scope not only to the bodily, but to the high moral and intellectual powers of our men. . . . With open files and ranks, each man a skilful single

combatant, but still all acting in concert, they would sweep their enemies from the earth, themselves almost unseen, while a single discharge from a Company at 1000 yards' distance would annihilate the best field battery now existing.*

'With such infantry, so armed, our artillery must be abolished or

improved: and cavalry would be of little value against them.'336

The argument, powerfully supported by statistical records of practice at Jacobabad, challenged a new trial; but it was not till April 1856 that this was held. Meanwhile Frere in England wrote that the pamphlet had done much good-the edition had been quickly sold out-but no one credits me when I offer to swear the truth. I was disbelieved by the late Commander of the Horse Artillery in the Crimea.' No test appears to have been made in England with the pattern rifle and shells sent to the Court of Directors; but the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army, Sir Henry Somerset, who had long served with the Cape Mounted Rifles, desired a test to be arranged at Bombay; and this time it left nothing to be desired. The ranges tried were from 300 to 1200 yards; 'practice was made by the many officers who attended, at distances which could not have been attained by any other known missile. The result was convincing—that before a small body of marksmen armed with such weapons, no battery of artillery could long hold its ground . . . the accuracy of flight attained by projectiles of the peculiar form on which Lt. Colonel Jacob's shells and balls are cast, has now carried the use of fire-arms far beyond anything which has come under the notice of officers in this country.' Sir Henry Somerset caused a copy of this report to be sent to the Court of Directors. 337

During the summer of 1856 in England the claim of Minié rislemen to have silenced a Russian battery in the Crimea, vigorously disputed by artillerymen, aroused so much interest that tests representing the circumstances of the action were held at the Hythe school of musketry. The distance was 600 yards, and the rislemen were held to have proved their case. The writer of an article in the *United Service Magazine* observed what might have been achieved had Captain Norton's risle shells received due patronage, 'but it seems fated that while in Civil Engineering England leads the way, she is destined to import every military improvement from abroad.' This was exactly the thesis with which

^{*}Compare the following passage in the German Official History of the War in South Africa (English edition, 1906, Vol. II, pp. 336, 344): 'In South Africa the contest was not merely one between the bullet and the bayonet; it was also between the soldier drilled to machine-like movements and the man with a rifle working on his own initiative.... Fortunate is that army whose ranks, released from the burden of dead forms, are controlled by natural untrammelled, quickening commonsense.' (Quoted by Major-General J. F. C. Fuller in *The Decisive Battles of the Western World*, Eyre and Spottiswoode, London, 1956, Vol. III, p. 146.)

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Jacob opened his Rifle Practice; but that pamphlet seems to have escaped the notice of the contributor.

Jacob was a prophet not without honour in his own adopted country. The author of the Sind Cossid, who witnessed his experiments at Karachi, was eloquent on his behalf, combating the views of sceptics. Frere contributed an excellent article to the Bombay Quarterly Review; and another enthusiastic advocate of Jacob's rifle was Sir Henry Lawrence. It is doubtful whether Lawrence had seen the rifle in action; but he 'went far with the inventor' even in his opinion 'which may appear to many an idle speculation' that a range of ten miles or more could be achieved with rifled cannon.

The experiments in Karachi during 1856 were indeed remarkable. Jacob had built a range and butt, at a cost to himself of 5000 rupees, to allow practice at a distance of a mile or more. A large box, some ten feet square, filled with gunpowder, was blown up by Jacob firing his rifle shells from 1800 yards range; on another occasion he exhibited the penetrative power of his plain iron pointed ball by firing one through twenty-five deal boards packed together, making a total thickness of twenty inches of wood. 338

An account of these experiments appeared in the Illustrated London News of 22nd November, but the 'noxious influence' at the India House

was evidently still vigorous.

Nevertheless, as many as 'four of Jacob's rifles complete with a supply of iron pointed balls and shells' formed part of the equipment of the expeditionary force sent to Persia; and one service in the war was performed with the rifle shell which proved its value, though not applying the full extent of its power. This was the exploding of 40,000 pounds of gunpowder and other combustibles found in the Persian entrenched camp at Borasjun. Such services at this period were usually performed by the hazardous means of a 'powder hose'—such as Major Waddington had used to blow up Imamgarh. On this occasion Malcolm Green exploded the powder with a rifle shell in comfort and security from some hundred yards distance.

In a new edition of Rifle Practice Jacob added a new memorandum on rifled cannon, the projectiles for which were to be composite iron and lead. It was with these that he contemplated attaining a range of ten miles. He had communicated the details to the Royal Artillery officers through Henry Green, when that officer went to England in 1853. 339

It is a healthy sign when improvements in branches of the military art are discussed in technical and Service journals; and we find Jacob's inventions canvassed at length in an article appearing in Colbourne's United Service Magazine for January 1857.

The writer commended him for his individual enterprise and genius which had at last broken through the characteristic indifference of the East India Company; but though official countenance might no longer be denied, it was doubtful whether his rifle would supersede the Enfield, already in possession of the field. 'A perfect breech-loading rifle is perhaps the only one which would have any chance of success. If Colonel Jacob will turn his attention solely to the bullet and shell, and adapt these to the three-grooved rifle adopted into the service, his improvements might have a better chance of being tested at home. Unfortunately for him, there is no want of range in the small arms of the present day." (The Enfield was sighted up to nine hundred yards.) Jacob showed in a subsequent article that his own bullet and shells could not be used in the long-barrelled Enfield, with its comparatively slight twist in the rifling. This incompatibility in fact made the official adoption of his inventions even less likely than the reviewer had supposed, unless a demand should arise for increased ranges, which the Enfield-Minié combination was incapable of attaining. On this latter subject the remarks in the article were characteristic of the time; the reviewer deprecated the cult of extreme ranges as impracticable in warfare, though he admitted that tactics must change and the old theory of not firing over one's own troops must be abandoned.

As to Jacob's anticipation of accurate practice by rifled artillery at ten miles' range or more, the writer duly astonished says, 'Perhaps it would be better if he would limit himself to the utmost distance at which one might be supposed capable of seeing the largest object usually fired at, with the naked eye. If we go on at this rate, there is no knowing where we may stop . . . with guns of the largest calibre we may get to thirty or forty miles, and in case of a war with our neighbours, we may have the consternation of seeing their fleet with an army advancing to invade us, under cover from the beginning to the end of their voyage, of these long range rifled guns on the shore. A walk on Dover Cliffs will be about as pleasantly exciting as a visit to the advanced trenches, or a run in the open at the siege of Sebastopol. Ships will commence firing at each other just as their masts appear above the horizon, and if they make good practice, may never see each other's hulls at all. There will be a complete revolution in warfare. Invisible armies will combat with each other for days and weeks, and shot and shells of an elongated shape and diabolical character will be thrown in amongst them without the report of their discharge being heard, or a very clear idea existing of where they came from. Seriously, is there anything practical or desirable in a ten-mile range?'340

In thus unconsciously describing the warfare of the next century,

'J.W.F.'—so the Royal Artillery officer signed his article—bore equally unconscious testimony to the fact that John Jacob was fifty years ahead of his time.

A rejoinder, typical of the attitude of the ultra-conservative and sceptical, appeared in the April number of the magazine. The writer was either ignorant of or ignored the lessons of the experiments at Hythe, which tended entirely to confirm Jacob's views, and had been favourably commented on in the number for August 1856. 'J.W.F.', he said, seemed to reason as if deer-stalking and a general action were the same thing. In the references to Jacob's pamphlets this wiseacre could perceive no facts on which his claims were founded—only a string of strong assertions. However, if this inventor was correct, 'there is an end to war!'—he had done better than the peace societies. But to take the matter seriously, soldiers armed with these weapons in the field would not have the feeling of superiority which comes of success in close combat. 'Sebastopol was an opportunity for rifles to prove themselves—but they had never checked the fire from a single embrasure.' (Alas, that Malcolm Green's achievement passed unnoticed!)

This critic's conclusion was a solemn warning. He detected 'danger to efficiency in our Army' in allowing the civil and scientific element to dominate. There was a 'great deal too much gim-crackery creeping into the Service.'341

Whatever the effects of 'J.W.F.'s article on readers of the *United Service Magazine* in general, it served to introduce Jacob to the last of the woes of an inventor—the accusation of having stolen ideas from someone else.

His rival was Mr. James Lawrence, who had made and patented a rifled cannon, which performed successfully under trial but was ignored by authority. He was indignant at the suggestion that Jacob's invention, apparently later in date than his own, was likely to receive official patronage; and in a letter to the editor of the same magazine hinted that Jacob, in trying to supplant him, was not in ignorance of his work.

Jacob saw this letter while he was in command at Bushire in April 1857, and at once sent a characteristic reply to the magazine. After explaining how he had advanced steadily along his own path, unaware of Mr. Lawrence's parallel progress, he offers that gentleman all the encouragement and remuneration which he himself had received—they consisted 'in my having been permitted to incur an expenditure of some £5000 from my own private means . . . I never expected either encouragement or remuneration. I am not therefore in the least disappointed, but on the contrary am well pleased at having, in carrying on these expensive experiments, learnt much and greatly extended my

knowledge of physical science generally'. The delight he felt in seeing the effect of his shells fired at two thousand yards' distance, would have been ample reward, 'even if I had been reduced to work on the roads for the rest of my life'. And he recommended Mr. Lawrence to read his

Rifle Practice.

Lawrence in a rejoinder made amends for his inadvertance in supposing that Jacob would have been better treated by the Government than himself. The question of priority in their inventions was not worth pursuing as there seemed no likelihood of either being taken up by the Government. Jacob's ironical gift he reciprocated with a copy of a letter he had received from the Secretary of State for War, Lord Panmure, informing him that the Select Committee on Projectiles did not recommend further experiments—this in spite of the recent and complete success of a trial of his rifled cannon.³⁴²

Jacob was in the habit of presenting various types of his rifle to friends and others interested in them; Captain Marston, head of the Sind Police, and the chief of the Bugti tribe were among those so favoured. His journal for the year 1857 is full of memoranda of correspondence with the various well-known gunsmiths and manufacturers in England who worked for him. One of these, after receiving various specimens of Jacob's mechanical skill in models for copying, told Frere who called to inquire about them, that he would be glad to pay a salary of two

thousand pounds a year to so expert a craftsman.

It seemed, as the year 1857 drew to a close, that this particular battle fought by John Jacob against odds, was lost irretrievably; that only an ideal imaginary army-such as he had adumbrated in his writingswould ever be equipped with his 'army rifle'. But the very occurrence of the Mutiny had so enhanced Jacob's reputation and influence as to bring victory in what would otherwise have been a hopeless cause. We find a significant entry in his journal for 1st November 1857, 'To Swinburne, to ask about the price of 2400 Army Rifles.' For the Government were at last giving serious consideration to his proposals of April 1855, to constitute a brigade of all arms on the frontier; and included in this were two battalions of silladar infantry, to be armed with his rifles. Nothing but implicit confidence in Jacob's system of discipline could have overcome the Government's reluctance to place in the hands of any Indian troops a weapon which was well known, if not officially acknowledged, to be superior to the best arms with which their European soldiers were equipped. Nevertheless, with the support of Lord Elphinstone the Governor of Bombay, Jacob got his way at last; his two Baluch infantry regiments were to be armed with his own rifle.343

THE WEAPON OF THE FUTURE

weapon, favoured with possession of the field, conquered Jacob's rifle. Backed by all the weight of Government influence, with paid experts to experiment and develop and improve it, under ideal conditions and with unlimited means, the Enfield slowly brought up its leeway. Had Jacob lived to perfect a breech-loading type before the end of the 'fifties the result might have been different. As it was, the efficiency of his rifle was only equalled when the fundamental principles of its construction were borrowed, and in particular the dimensions of his projectiles adopted. When the breech-loading Enfield rifle was evolved and issued to the Indian Army, it displaced the distinctive armament of Jacob's rifles. The Geneva Convention of 1863 banned the use of small-arm rifle shells in war, relegating his most formidable invention for a while to the sphere of big-game hunting, until eighty years later 'total war' reproduced it in essentials.³⁴⁴

The Final Authority

CHAPTER XVII

In the Seat of the 'Conqueror'

'WE observe that Lieut. Col. John Jacob, C.B., of Jacobabad, Commandant of the Scinde Irregular Horse, etc., has been appointed Acting Commissioner-in-Sind during the absence of Mr. H. B. E. Frere on sick certificate. What will the Napier faction say to this! Major John Jacob sitting in the seat of Sir Charles! We trust that the Acting Commissioner, now that he has the opportunity, will prove himself worthy of the good opinion which the veteran Governor had of him, and which of course a mere personal quarrel could not really change. Lieut. Colonel Jacob has played his part well hitherto, and we will hope equal success for him on a larger scale and a busier scene.'

Thus the Bombay Gazette of 18th January 1856. Not four years had passed since the same newspaper had published Sir Charles Napier's complete exposure' of the character of Major John Jacob, from which it would seem that officer was totally unworthy of trust. The Napier faction, still smarting under the blows dealt by the 'Scinde Horseman' in the last exchanges of the controversy, perhaps deemed the appointment a crowning instance of spite against the memory of their hero, on the part of the Governor-General who had unfairly worsted him. Let us read the letter which Lord Dalhousie actually addressed to Jacob

two months later:

I am unwilling to pass beyond the Indian bounds without offering you my best wishes and bidding you farewell. It is a matter of regret to me that we have never chanced to meet during all these years in India. But altho' I cannot be said to have your personal acquaintance, I have watched your service with none the less interest, and appreciate its value not the less heartily. You are one of those whose able and eminent public character I most regard,

and to whose invaluable cooperation I have been most deeply indebted. I beg you to accept my cordial thanks, and to be assured of my best wishes for your future happiness and increasing honours.

Jacob's comment in a private letter reads, 'He must indeed be a great and good man, for few potentates ever possessed sufficient magnanimity to enable them to write thus to one who had stoutly opposed them on occasion, persisted in opposition, and finally declared, as I did to His Lordship the Governor General, that time would show the justice of my views.' And Jacob agreed that his 'being on the throne of the Conqueror of Sind' was 'a strange freak of fortune'. 345

The new Governor-General Lord Canning followed the example of his predecessors in office in appointing Jacob as honorary aide-de-camp to himself. On this occasion, James Abbott of the Bengal Artillery, George Lawrence of the 2nd Bengal Cavalry and Neville Chamberlain of the 16th Bengal N.I., made up with him as distinguished a quartet as have ever, perhaps, been associated in this honorific capacity.

Jacob had assumed charge of the Province of Sind on 22nd January when Frere sailed for Bombay; but the greater part of his first six weeks as Commissioner was spent at Jacobabad, to deal with affairs beyond the frontier. He had persuaded the Khan of Kelat to devote part of the subsidy received under the treaty of 1854 to the 'final' coercion of the turbulent Marris, and Nasir Khan was engaged in assembling his feudal levies. But the Marris did not wait for the gathering storm to burst. When part of the Kelat force reached Lahri in the middle of February, and Nasir Khan in person advanced with the rest of his levies from Gandava to Bagh, the chief Gaman Khan and other sardars came into his camp and surrendered unconditionally. Jacob was informed by the Khan that they had 'made their perfect submission to his authority, and had promised to give up the whole of the battery of artillery which Major Clibborn had been forced to abandon before Naffusk.' After their release from detention in the Khan's camp, the chiefs resiled from this promise; but they had had a fright: not for a generation had their feudal overlord displayed such power. Jacob was satisfied that the Khan, guided by his Jacobabad vakil, Mulla Ahmed, who had been virtually the British agent in the negotiations, would now steadily extend his authority over the whole of his country; and Frere, to whom in England he wrote of the transaction, describing how blackmail had been stopped and commerce revived, congratulated him on the prospects of civilizing Kelat.346

So having made Merewether's path smooth the Acting Commissioner

could proceed on his interrupted tour southwards through the Province.

Eight and a half years had passed since the Conqueror of Sind had left its shores; but such material development of the province as had taken place was due almost entirely to Frere's energetic administration during the last five. Within such a period it was not to be expected that the whole face of a country as large as England without Wales could have undergone a transformation; that miracle had only been achieved on the frontier, by the genius of one who, in Frere's own words, did more good than ten ordinary men. This was illustrated in the disproportionate share in the progress of public works in Sind during these years belonging to the Upper Sind frontier, a District comprising less than one-twentieth of the area of the Province. Thus out of nearly nine hundred miles of

regularly bridged roads constructed since 1850, six hundred were in the Frontier District; it was pre-eminent also for its buildings and miscellaneous public works, and in mileage of enlarged and improved canals.³⁴⁷

The provincial figure for entirely new canals—nine of them averaging little more than three miles in length—must seem absurdly small. The explanation lies in the fact that the Government of Bombay had persuaded itself that the existing canals, inherited from the Talpur and Kalhora rulers, could afford adequate irrigation for the Province if kept in good order, with such scientific modifications and improvements as could be cheaply executed. Colonel Scott, head of the Department under Napier, Pringle and Frere, pronounced the system one of expedients and makeshifts to obtain immediate savings regardless of consequent revenue losses—losses estimated by the brilliant irrigation engineer Lieutenant Fife at thirty lakhs of rupees annually. In 1854 a plan by Scott's successor Colonel Turner for reorganization of the canal management, which provided a highly qualified establishment for undertaking permanent improvements, was sanctioned by the Govern-

Jacob's own independent project for the great Desert Canal was probably first in date among proposals for entirely new canals of considerable length. But just about the time when Jacob took charge of the province from Frere, Fife produced a scheme which completely overshadowed all ideas of piecemeal development. He proposed to give a perennial supply to all existing canals on both banks from four great feeders, the heads of which were to be at two points in Upper and Lower Sind where the Indus kept a constant channel—Sukkur and Jherrak. This would eliminate the chronic local failures of canals due to the choking or abandoning of their heads by movements of the capricious river.

ment.

It took three-quarters of a century for the first part of Fife's plan to

be given reality, with the inauguration of the Sukkur barrage and canals: and just before the hundred years were out the barrage for Lower Sind was also brought into effect. A less ambitious scheme of this farsighted engineer, complementary to the opening of the Nara supply channel, was put forward in 1856, sanctioned, and execution begun

two years later, in the construction of the Mithrao canal.

I have been unable to find any reference by Jacob to these projects. He thought highly of Lieutenant Chapman's proposal for a navigable canal from the Indus to Karachi, and this scheme, recommended by Turner and himself, was referred for the favourable consideration of the Court of Directors. The grandeur and science of Fife's ideas must have made a strong appeal to him. But he had had bitter experience of the penny-wise pound-foolish attitude of the Government of Bombay and knew that cheap local improvements, yielding an immediate if small return, were far more likely to find acceptance. One such was the extension of the tail of the Begari canal through the desert to Garhi Khairo Jamali, planned by himself and carried out this year by Merewether. In reporting its completion and prospective effect, Jacob wrote of it as 'the first and most important irrigational work executed by the British Government in Sind'. The canal had been extended thirty miles through the desert, with a section large enough to allow a passage for the largest river boats. The tribesmen who wished to take up lands watered by the canal undertook to perform part of the excavation proportionate to the area they desired, receiving a similar portion of the sum allowed by the Government for the whole work. Sturdy Baluchis flocked in from Kachhi and the work was thus executed very quickly and cheaply. But Jacob pointed out that such methods could not be adopted elsewhere in the Province.348

There were in Sind at the time a number of intelligent and resourceful young officers, discovered and encouraged by Frere, who undertook schemes of useful local improvements. St. Clair Ford, Tyrwhitt and Jameson, among others, combined the progressive with the patriarchal in their methods and their names endure in the areas where they served.

But the improvements in a few canals were more than offset by deterioration in the great majority, due very largely to inefficiency in their management. The irrigation system in Sind inherited from the Talpurs, though defective by modern standards, was capable of serving the needs of the scanty agricultural population and of producing a fair revenue, provided that the annual clearance of silt deposited by each inundation was properly executed. And neglect of this important work had been progressive during the years before Jacob assumed the Commissionership.

The reports of the Superintending Engineer, Colonel Turner, for the years 1852-54 had disclosed some of the causes for the general deterioration. It appeared that less money was being allowed for silt clearance than in the Mirs' time, and that the sums actually allocated were spent injudiciously. The canal Deputy Collectors in the Shikarpur district evidently did not understand that deepening a canal at the head would not benefit the tail unless a proper slope were given throughout; nor that widening the mouth beyond the capacity of the canal lower down would only arrest the speed of the flow and so increase the deposit of silt. In the Hala district of Hyderabad Collectorate the canals appeared to have remained almost untouched for two or three years; and Turner had found instances of gross ignorance, inefficiency and roguery in the south of Karachi District.

Frere, who had personally observed the effects of this maladministration and in contrast the efficient working of Jacob's method of executing all public works by open contract, was also sensible of the inequity of the system of forced labour for canal clearance; but he was not disposed to attempt a radical change without ascertaining what the financial effect would be.³⁴⁹

The proposal to abolish 'statute' i.e. forced, labour had been made incidentally by Jacob, in reply to an inquiry by Frere in February 1855 whether 'nerricks', or price-rates fixed by authority, were allowed in Government transactions in the Frontier District. Jacob explained how he had always practised and inculcated free trade, with perfect success, for the supply of his regiments and all other Government business in his charge, and proceeded to expound the advantage of applying the same principles to the question of statute labour: an 'enormous evil' reducing the peasantry to a species of slavery and causing all labour to be looked on as an intolerable hardship, while it gave ill-disposed zemindars the power to delay or prevent the execution of public works. If, by old established custom, a certain amount of labour was due from villages or lands for the canals that served them, let the due number of workmen be engaged and regularly paid by British officers at the full market rate of hire, the payment being made to each man personally and the amount recovered subsequently from the zemindar from whom the labour was due. It would then be in the interest of the zemindars to try to keep the market rates as low as possible by offering inducements to the people to come forward, and keep the supply fully equal to the demand; labour would become popular, the productiveness of the people increased, and the moral effect alone would be beneficial to all parties.

Frere sent copies of this letter to Colonel Turner and the three

Collectors for their comments and estimates of the financial effect of adopting Jacob's method. Turner's report showed that virtually throughout the Province recourse was had to compulsory labour in some form, for canal clearance—in some instances remunerated at less than the market rates, elsewhere with just sufficient grain for subsistence; while in the Upper Sind districts resumed from Ali Murad

the men were wholly unpaid.

The replies of the revenue Collectors and their deputies had revealed wide differences of outlook. Fife was carrying out the excavation of the Nara Supply Channel with 'free' labour: the local Deputy Collector remarked that while delay of even a year in the completion of the new work would not affect the well-being of the population, they would starve if the existing canals were not cleared out at the due season. (When Jacob as Commissioner came to read this letter he scrawled in the margin, 'There could not be a better example; that is, people will rather starve than be well paid!') This Deputy Collector was nevertheless of opinion that the Political Superintendent's plan should be tried experimentally on one canal in each district, paying the labourers at market rates wherever they were compulsorily engaged. Other officers were apologists for 'statute' labour.

The Collector of Hyderabad and his deputies on the other hand had enthusiastically welcomed Jacob's proposal. They had found that when Fife, in order to obtain more labourers for the Nara Supply Channel, increased his wage rates by half an anna per diem, the effect was to attract men from a distance of eighty miles; while close to their very homes in the Hyderabad District Mr. Deputy Collector Richardson had found the greatest difficulty in getting his canals cleared under the old conscripting system. The Collector most pertinently pointed out that a large scale undertaking such as the construction of a railway, offering good wages, would render it altogether impossible to execute works by

statute labour.

Frere had decided in favour of the limited experiment for the season 1855-56. Though averse from sudden change he was firm that men employed on all works under Government control must be adequately paid, even though in the public interest it were necessary to requisition their labour. 350

Frere as we have seen left charge of the Province in January 1856 and Jacob, after making some progress on his tour southward from Jacobabad through Larkana and across the river into Naushahro, decided to cut the Gordian knot. In his report to Lord Elphinstone, the Governor of Bombay, he outlined the chaotic state of affairs disclosed in the papers left for him by Frere 'in a rather incomplete state', and then proceeds,

'I would respectfully observe that the question of the advantages or disadvantages of pressed labour appears to me to depend on those laws of Political Economy which are as well established as the truths of geometry. No disputed doctrines are involved. . . . To say with regard to such matters, that what may be right with respect to one part of the country might be wrong with regard to another, appears to be like asserting that though a triangle had three sides at Hyderabad, yet at Shikarpur it must have four.

Jacob's contention was that under a system of free and fully paid labour the capital and therefore the revenue of the country was increased by bringing more, and more efficient, workers into the field. The effect of forced labour, on the other hand, was to decrease the said capital assets and revenue of the province: 'Twist or turn the subject as we will, the facts are as I have endeavoured to set forth, and in this, as in all else, the eternal law of Nature and of God holds true—that to be unjust

is to be unwise.'

The plan of the Acting Commissioner was to have the main feeder canals, which had hitherto been cleared by the Government whether by forced labour or otherwise, cleared by hired or contract labour engaged at free market rates, superintended and measured by Government officers, and paid for by piece-work. A fair rate of remuneration would be assumed at the outset and raised or lowered in accordance with experience so as to maintain a due supply of labour. On those canals for the clearance of which statute labour was formerly due, he proposed to levy a water-rate from the lands irrigated in proportion to the number of labourers which the zemindars owning them had been compelled to supply. Other canals, which zemindars might wish to clear without Government aid or interference, would be left to them to deal with and would not be charged with a water-rate.

Jacob adverted to the ruinous effects of the forced labour system: the consequent demoralization of Government officers and people alike. Under his proposed plan, with work 'truly and fairly performed, accounted for, and paid for' an increase in expenditure on canal clearance was inevitable; but it was equally certain that the real cost to the State would be much less, the work being better done and the people not

impoverished.

He delayed dispatch of this letter till the end of his tour through the Province, when he could claim to have witnessed and ascertained personally the ruinous effects of the old system; whereupon, being deeply impressed with the urgent need for its abolition, he 'thought it necessary to follow up Mr. Frere's intentions, and at once to prohibit, in anticipation of orders, the use of forced labour throughout Scinde.'

His proclamation is dated from his camp at Gharo on 18th April 1856. Statute or forced labour was abolished, and thenceforth any Government servant compelling any person to labour would be liable to dismissal. All works should be performed under free contract, whether for piece-work or daily wages. 351

In a letter to his brother Philip a few days later John Jacob writes of his emancipation of the peasantry from 'crushing slavery'. 'The step . . . I look on as irrevocable, and in taking it I feel that if I never did

anything else, I have not lived in vain.'

Sir Charles Napier had perhaps felt likewise when issuing a Sind general order to much the same effect nearly ten years before. Jacob does not allude to previous orders of the Governor of Sind and it is possible that he did not know of them, as they certainly had remained a dead letter.

Lord Elphinstone expressed entire concurrence in Jacob's views, and was only surprised to learn that what was miscalled statute labour, 'since it is contrary to the Regulations of this Presidency and to the orders of Government', had been suffered to remain in existence for so long; the mismanagement of the Sind canals might well be traced to this system. Government were 'much indebted' to the Acting Commissioner for having brought forward the subject, and approved of his

anticipation of orders in the matter.

The proclamation was very well received in the Press, both in Sind and Bombay. One Karachi commentator indeed pointed out that the average Sindhi would not, in fact, work hard in order to make more money, and the Bombay Times mentioned the propensity of people in the Madras Presidency to spend the wages of a week's labour on a month of idleness. This had been used as an argument for compelling them to work on the roads. Yet under the free system there had been no difficulty in obtaining labour for Indian railways, or for the Vehar

Lake project near Bombay.

Jacob devoted much time to instructing and encouraging some of the able and willing but puzzled young officers who had to work the new system; and before leaving the Province nearly a year later he wrote a minute to assist Frere in answering objections to the scheme of free labour advanced by Colonel Turner, who was alarmed by the estimates of the cost of clearance under the new system, and had written direct to the Government of Bombay requesting approval to the importation of coolies from India. Jacob by no means desired that workmen from outside the Province should be deliberately brought in to supply the labour for the seasonal public works. Part of the pay received by the inhabitants for their labour would ultimately return to the soil,

while foreigners would take their earnings away from the country. 'There is no escape from this axiom, that the freest market is the cheapest market all over the world, and with regard to everything which has an

exchangeable value among mankind.'352

In the same letter in which he informed Philip of the abolition of forced labour John Jacob wrote, 'Here I am hard at work reforming the revenue system of the Province which is in a ruinous state. It is a difficult task and the attempt to execute which nearly killed our good Mr. Frere. However, I am confident of perfect success unless Government turn

me out for assuming too much responsibility.'

Why, it may well be asked, was the revenue system of Sind in such a condition after thirteen years of British rule? Sir Charles Napier on assuming the Governorship had wisely directed his Collectors not to interfere with the existing system but to content themselves with abolishing oppressive imposts. Unfortunately neither Napier nor any of his men had any revenue experience, and did not make sufficient inquiries into the reasons for certain features in the Talpurs' administration which had tended to obliterate a revenue system derived from the Moghuls. The Talpur grants of land in jagir with which they paid for every service were constantly being changed, divided, or resumed; but each for the time became a recognized territorial unit. When a new canal was dug, the land it watered was made a new fiscal division. The British Collectors adopted these confused arrangements, sometimes making arbitrary alterations; the village headmen who knew the ancient boundaries had been discouraged and their emoluments discontinued on the assumption that they oppressed the common people. Frere was astonished by the general lack of local knowledge on the part of European officers.

There was no complete survey or plan of any District in Sind; the boundaries of not one of the three Collectorates were accurately laid down, and the greater part of them appeared in the maps as a blank. Few of the canal or Parganna boundaries were perfect: there was no 'village area', approximating to the English parish, of which there was a plan on a scale useful for fiscal purposes; and only in the Thar, or desert, was a list of fields maintained, in the manner of the older provinces.

Yet the limits of the old villages or parishes—in Sind called dehs—were known to the country people, and capable of being accurately demarcated; and when the Trigonometrical Survey of India started its operations in Sind, Frere determined to produce its complement by a rough revenue survey through the agency of selected officers serving in the Province, with a view to the introduction of a logical revenue settlement without further loss of time.

Napier had encouraged the gradual introduction of payment of the land revenue in cash instead of in kind-the traditional 'battai' system by which the State took a specific share of the produce. In such a thinly populated country battai was popular because the Government had to share equitably losses arising from failure of crops. The system of cash leases introduced by the Collector of Shikarpur for seven years from the 1847-48 season was based on temporary high prices, and almost ruined the zemindars: in Hyderabad Rathborne's 'settlement' made persons with discordant and opposite interests mutually responsible for meeting the District revenue demand, causing endless disputes and losses. Frere found that the abolition of the petty emoluments enjoyed by zemindars, the extensive suppression of their agency in managing the cultivators, the leasing out of the whole country without any accurate knowledge of what was being leased or to whom, at excessive rates and with no provision for keeping accounts, had been 'some of our prominent errors'.

He had obtained sanction for his own proposals to introduce a rough survey and settlement for revenue purposes, on 8th May 1855. The ablest Deputy Collectors were placed on special duty with comprehensive instructions, which show how close was the Commissioner's own grasp of the problem. But the work was marred by casualties among the staff and little progress had been made when Jacob assumed charge of the Province. In the Frontier District at least his own minute and accurate topographical Survey was nearing completion, and Frere had obtained the assistance of a branch of the Panjab Revenue Survey to extend the work elsewhere. He also commended to his Settlement officers Jacob's plan for lands requiring fallows-to assign three acres for each acre charged for.353 It was on a recommendation left by Frere that Jacob arranged for the training of salaried village accountants, to maintain agricultural statistics and record the rights of cultivators. Jacob selected Captain Lewis Pelly as his principal Revenue Assistant. His reports had been distinguished by considerable research and intellectual grasp, and his turn of mind was congenial to a champion of natural law. Pelly looked to the development of artificial wants among a barbaric people to bring in a few generations a period 'like that of the nineteenth century in England'. 'In this general progression agriculture will progress. It is a ray-an arc, so to write-of the circle of civilisation, whose centre is man.

Largely on Pelly's reports, Jacob reorganized the survey settlement operations; the village accountants and measurers were trained in large numbers, and rules issued for the guidance of Settlement officers in dealing with boundary disputes. They were to make certain that no rent

claims on the cultivators by intermediary superior holders should be met, save by shares in the surplus produce of the land.

The subject may be closed by quoting Jacob's exposition of the

essential duties of revenue officers:

When boundaries have been clearly defined and permanently marked, and when agricultural rights have been fairly ascertained and registered, the Collector and Magistrate should exercis his revenue powers as seldom as possible, and should endeavour never to appear unless in his judicial capacity. To prevent neighbour interfering with neighbour: to positively resist all undue interference on the part of Government Agency, whether high or low: to leave the people alone and let them grow: in this lies the essence of a really good Collector. He should never for an instant allow the appearance of his next revenue report to weigh against any measure which he knows to be right and for the permanent good of his district. For myself, I have long perceived that despite the best intentions on the part of our Home and Indian Governors, we have sadly overtaxed the people. . . . Above all, avoid overgoverning and unnecessarily interfering. Depend on it, the people understand their own interests better than you do. See that all men know, and feel secure in, their rights; remove all obstructions to free intercommunication; and then stand by to keep the peace.

If these ideas appear crude to those versed in the complicated revenue arrangements of the later over-governing and interfering era in British India, at least Captain W. J. Eastwick the East India Director, writing to Jacob after he had relinquished charge as Commissioner, observed, 'the best Revenue Officer at the India House told me a few days ago he was impressed at your knowledge and grasp of revenue matters.'354

Jacob arrived in Karachi, on the conclusion of his tour, on 21st April. He had passed down the left bank of the Indus, through the districts in which canal and revenue mismanagement had been at their worst. He paid a flying visit to Ketibandar, the decaying port at the mouth of the river, near which he had first set foot in Sind nearly eighteen years before. Just before reaching Karachi he had issued the forced labour proclamation; three weeks later appeared another fruit of his tour of inspection, in the shape of a notification prohibiting the practice of police officers receiving confessions. 'It is the function of a magistrate alone to receive confessions of criminals, and this cannot be too often or too carefully impressed on the minds of Eastern policemen. . . . Violence of any kind on the part of a police officer in such a case is a

deeply criminal offence, for which several years imprisonment with hard labour would be a just reward.' The need for this absolute ban may hardly be appreciated by those acquainted only with magisterial and police procedure in England; in India the evil is perennial, and too often acquiesced in or connived at by superior police officers and even by magistrates. Karachi's bi-weekly newspaper the Sind Cossid remarked, 'Colonel John Jacob promises to be a reformer such as Sind has not seen. The present notification is as judicious as it is humane, such as has long been required.' 355

Other questions of the hour in Sind's capital were the development of the port and the inauguration of a railway. A number of indignant correspondents from Karachi called the attention of the Press to the manner in which the Bombay Government had 'isolated Sind' by refusing to sanction direct steam communication between Karachi, Aden and Suez. It was justly pointed out that Karachi was to the Panjab what Calcutta was to Bengal, and more; three thousand families of Europeans in the Panjab had to go to Calcutta to obtain passages on steamers sailing

for England 'when they could have them at their door'.

Jacob's own summary of the needs of the port included removal of the sand-bar, the maintenance of a steam dredge, the appointment of pilots, reclamation of the Chinnee creek for improving the salubrity of the neighbourhood and for the convenient extension of building ground; and, first in importance in his view, construction of a navigable canal to connect Karachi with the Indus. This would afford the ample supply of fresh water required by a great sea port; cultivation along its banks would supply Karachi with necessities then imported from a distance; it would give safe and direct communication by water between the Indus and the sea port at all seasons; and it would be a necessary preliminary to the introduction of a railway.

At the end of 1855 the East India Company had entered into a contract with the Scinde Railway Company, promoted by Warren, for construction of a line through the Province, and the first annual general meeting of the directors was held in London on 18th February 1856. The project was to connect Karachi with the Indus 'at or near Hyderabad', on the general alignment of Chapman's proposed navigable canal. It is noteworthy that Chapman himself had estimated that a railway would prove cheaper than a canal, taking into account returns as well as the initial cost. The main credit for bringing the railway scheme to fruition was to be ascribed to Frere, who was continuing in England while on leave that indefatigable advocacy of schemes of improvement in Sind which had caused him to be dubbed 'the importunate widow' by Lord Falkland. Developments henceforth began to take tangible

shape at Karachi. Tenders for the unloading of heavy stores were called for by the Company in June, and next month the Mersey, with a cargo of fifteen thousand pieces of railway iron, was piloted over the bar. 356

But the question of the landward terminus of the railway and therefor its whole alignment was reopened by Jacob, who held 'clear and decided opinions' in the matter. It was an error to place the inland terminus at Kotri—ever in danger of erosion by the Indus—to serve Hyderabad, which was not on any great line of communication. The alignment of the railway should be decided with an eye to the great trade route through the Bolan pass: the country between this and Sehwan—'apparently the most permanent position along the whole course of the Indus in Scinde'—was most favourable for the construction of a railway. He proposed therefore that the way through the hills between Sehwan and Karachi, which he knew so well, should be surveyed with a view to building the railway on this, the shortest route for bringing the produce of Upper Sind and the Panjab to the sea.

Connected with the long term plans for development of communications in North-West India was a project for bridging the Indus between Sukkur and Rohri, at which point the island of Bukkur shortens the distance to be spanned to a few hundred yards. Jacob himself, when stationed at Sukkur in 1839, had sketched out a rough project for his own satisfaction. Perhaps as a result of discussions with him Frere brought the matter to the notice of the Government of India in 1854, and during the next two years detailed plans and estimates were framed.

Jacob now forwarded these with his commendation; but at the same time remarked that he was convinced that the commercial traffic in Sind would settle in the route down the right bank of the Indus as soon as the obstacle of the Lakhi range near Sehwan was overcome and the road thence through the hills to Karachi properly constructed; then, he considered, the Sukkur bridge would be useful 'for mere local purposes only'. The Government of India fortunately awaited Frere's return before deciding the matter, and on resuming charge of the Province he pointed out the fallacy of Jacob's argument. The larger the traffic down the right bank the greater the necessity of connecting that road with the left bank via Sukkur; and by this means the traffic from Afghanistan with North West India would be facilitated. The Government ruled in July 1857 that the project must await 'a more favourable state in the finances of India'; but Frere nevertheless took occasion to point out to the agent of the Sind railway that it might be combined with the extension of the line from Kotri to Jacobabad, as 'the Rohri to Hyderabad line must come in time'. And Warren replied that he believed the bridge would pay the railway three and three-quarters per cent.

Frere had combated in several letters from England his friend's insistence on the superiority of the alignment of the railway from Karachi to Sehwan which, he pointed out, being 100 miles of desolate country hemmed in by mountains, would not be economic. He observed very pertinently that from a commercial point of view the Panjab was much better worth tapping than Afghanistan. As to Chapman's navigable canal, so warmly recommended by Jacob, 'canals are perhaps best for Sind, but British capitalists won't look at them'. This was in October 1856, but Jacob was unconvinced, and his advocacy of the Sehwan route was sufficient to induce the Government of Bombay to direct that operations on the Kotri line should be suspended, and to propose that that to Sehwan should be surveyed. This produced some confusion and delay and the matter was undecided when John Jacob relinquished his charge of the Province.

It must be admitted that his views on this subject had not shown his usual perspicacity and grasp. Evidently his eyes had been fixed too long beyond his own frontier. Frere shortly after returning to Karachi wrote to his obstinate friend, 'I am quite confident I shall convert you the very first time we get half an hour together over a map. My line to Sukkur is many miles shorter than via Sehwan. I am quite sure of your conversion, for hard-mouthed as you are on matters which rest on the authority of others, you cannot hold out against a good reason!'357

A similar curious wrong-headedness is to be observed in Jacob's resistance to Frere's determination to introduce Sindhi as the official language for Government business instead of the corrupt Persian hitherto employed. Frere replies from England to a letter of Jacob's on this subject, 'I do not agree with you about Sindee. The first duty of a Government is to keep its records, fiscal and judicial, in the tongue of the people. Would not your arguments have condemned Petrarch and Chaucer for using Italian and English instead of Latin?'

Frere congratulates his locum tenens on his abolition of statute labour and police confessions; but the great difficulty was to alter evil habits: ceaseless vigilance was required. And so the correspondence continued; policy towards Central Asia, the proposal for uniting the Panjab and Sind, the insidious encroachments of centralization, are discussed without reserve. Frere was up in arms when his friend reproached him with not having enough faith in principles. It was necessary to adjust action according to other men's prejudices in order to get things done; amongst free men concession and compromise were inevitable. 'Peel managed to get more real freedom for England than Robespierre or Louis Blanc for France.' Moreover there was always the English aversion to abstract principles.

Amongst other battles, Frere was fighting hard for a revision—an increase—of the pay of civil officers in Sind. Jacob in his officiating capacity received in accordance with the practice of the time a reduced salary; and his representation that his travelling allowance should be raised, as touring left him out of pocket, was rejected on the familiar ground that it had been 'assimilated' with others elsewhere. Jacob's views on the general question deserve quotation: 'Every reduction of salary below that which is necessary to command the highest available moral power and intellectual vigour on the part of the revenue officers, and civil officers generally, must assuredly result in the exclusion from the public treasury of many thousands of times the amount supposed to be so saved in salaries. . . . The energy and moral excellence which we introduce into India by means of English Officers form the only article of import—the only possible means—by which we can restore and repay to India the amount of capital which, as foreign rulers, we are and continually must be draining from the country. . . . No one was better qualified than he to speak of the benefits that a single officer of outstanding capacity could confer on the people: on the other hand, employment of inferior men dried up the very sources of natural wealth.358

John Jacob did not suffer fools gladly-men who fumbled through their business without serious thought of the true scope of duty. There were too many of this stamp in civil appointments in the Province. Such men might feel vaguely that their charges afforded a field for development in one or more respects, but only first-rate abilities, energy, and personality could achieve any far reaching improvement in the face of the characteristic inertia of the people, and the obstacles imposed by Bombay's tight grasp of the purse-strings. Their environment did not tend to develop such qualities. The country people appreciated the impartiality and love of justice for its own sake which distinguished them from the Mirs' officials, and expected them to decide and solve all their disputes, including matters domestic; but it was a rare thing for Sindhis to come with a demand that the 'Sarcar' should build a new road or bridge, or dig a new canal. They would complain fast enough if a powerful zemindar were appropriating all the water supply, knowing that in the eyes of the Collector and his deputies the rights of great and small were equally to be maintained; but if a canal constantly silted up by reason of its defective construction or alignment, the consequent failure of the crops would be regarded as an Act of God. Fatalistic and lazy themselves, they were too ready to tolerate these defects in their rulers, provided that they were easily accessible and 'bonhomous'; and they liked nothing better than to see them treat time as of no account, while enjoying hospitality and field sports and the other simple pleasures of the countryside. With such a people to govern, and themselves living lives cut off in great measure from the society of their kind, the tendency among district officers in Sind, perhaps more than elsewhere in India, was to settle down as local patriarchs rather than to strive as social reformers or harbingers of material progress. Frere's influence had done much to produce a different attitude, but the field was vast and the real labourers few. On the conclusion of his tour, Jacob had written to him lamenting the general incapacity to grasp and apply large ideas and principles of government, and the distrust or ignorance of the natural laws which he himself habitually acted upon. Frere agreed that there was 'certainly a great lack of provision for a sufficient supply of superior men'—the great bulk were not superior to what they had been twenty years before; and he could have added to Jacob's list of 'hard bargains'.

Jacob managed to get rid of two of them, one being Mr. Richardson who was quite worn out after some seventeen years' service in Sind. The Acting Commissioner wrote very favourably of his old acquaintance, and succeeded in obtaining 'as a special case' a better pension than


he was entitled to under the regular rules.

A little later Jacob expressed his general view of the subject: 'He who fearing to offend the few with whom he is in immediate contact, consents to perpetuate evil influence on the many subject to his control, is

unfit to rule.'

It was unfortunate that with so many mediocre officers serving in the civil departments Jacob should have fallen foul of one of the ablest. Captain Goldsmid had been employed in the investigation and record of jagir and other alienations of revenue in the province. In August 1856 Jacob considered that he had completed his allotted task, and offered him a magisterial appointment. Goldsmid took this as a censure on his conduct, though Jacob had praised him in his reports; and this misunderstanding then followed a familiar pattern—resignation of Goldsmid: displeasure of the Commissioner: the correspondence sent to Bombay: Bombay supports Goldsmid: indignation of the Commissioner: soothing assurances from Bombay. The only result was that the jagir work suffered till Goldsmid returned to it after Jacob's departure. 359

By way of contrast we may try to picture Jacob as he appeared as host to the whole station, at a ball and supper given at Government House on 23rd May, the eve of the Queen's birthday. This, Frere heard from all quarters, was 'quite unequalled'; he was replying to a letter in which his friend had said that he would feel in the London which Frere described to him 'like old Cromwell at a ball'. Government House Karachi



Scanned by CamScanner

—the long low bungalow where Napier lived, which is affectionately remembered by many generations of Sind officers—at this time lacked the upper storey over the central block. It was added by Jacob who found, as Frere had done, that 'there was not a private room in the house—visitors arriving drive along the whole length of the building and every room is open to their gaze.' Karachi was a cheerful social station, with theatricals by the amateurs of the British regiment, cricket, and regattas; the Karachi gymkhana was inaugurated in September that year, and the local 'Derby' run in October. In Trinity Church, the head of the Province gazed thoughtfully at the Napier memorial window, which had been added to 'its other chaste embellishments'. It included the emblems in stained glass of the 22nd Regiment, the words 'Meanee' and 'Hyderabad', and the crest and arms of the Napier family, with their

mottos 'Sans Tache' and 'Ready, aye ready'. 360

Jacob was at this very time in correspondence with the Government of Bombay on a proposal to abolish one legacy of Napier's rule in Sind: the two Baluch Battalions. These were local corps, that is to say embodied for service in and paid out of the revenues of the Province. They had been raised in 1844 and 1847 with the object of 'taking up the loose soldiery of the Province, and attaching them with their families to our interest.' Their actual duties were to furnish the treasury and jail guards at Shikarpur and Hyderabad, and occasional escorts. This, Frere had pointed out as early as March 1854, could be safely entrusted to the police, if six companies were added to the force at a comparatively very trifling charge. Jacob agreed that the money spent on the battalions produced no more advantage to the province than if it were thrown into the sea, and Frere, shortly before proceeding on leave, had again recommended their abolition. A reference from Bombay gave Jacob the opportunity of recording his views, which went a good deal further than those of Frere. He regarded the battalions as a positive danger, because a large proportion of the men belonged to Brahui, Afghan and other trans-border tribes; and as the terms of enlistment allowed them to take their discharge after five years, we were in fact 'forming the men of Beloochistan and Afghanistan into trained soldiers at the rate of some thirteen hundred men per annum'-in any operations in those countries we should expect traitors in our camp and trained soldiers against us.

These blunt observations fluttered susceptibilities in Bombay, and the Commander-in-Chief vigorously defended the character of the Battalions. But neither his arguments, nor statistics, nor copies of eulogistic inspection reports convinced Jacob. He maintained that the Baluchis in the corps were not for the most part inhabitants of Sind; he could recognize by their appearance many Brahuis; and he had formed

a bad opinion of their general character from correspondence with the Kelat authorities about their private affairs, and apprehension of deserters while he was Political Superintendent. These men might not take their discharge in time of peace, but would do so if there were war between their native country and their employers. And Jacob repeated his recommendation that the two Battalions should be disbanded and 1200 men added to the rural police of Sind to take over their duties.³⁶¹

While this correspondence was proceeding, affairs in Central Asia were developing in a manner which gave weight to Jacob's warning against 'maintaining a military school for these countries'. Even before the close of the Russian war they had assumed a threatening aspect for the rulers of India. The storm centre, as in 1838, was Herat. Mahomed Yusif, grandson of a former ruler of this city, had seized power and invoked the support of Persia against Amir Dost Mahomed, who had just annexed Kandahar on the death of his brother Kohandil Khan and was threatening Herat. In March 1855 a treaty of non-interference with each other's territories was concluded between the British Government and Dost Mahomed; the latter undertaking, moreover, to be 'friend of the friends and enemy of the enemies of the Honourable East India Company.' Persia maintained a provocative attitude; her policy was closely connected with the course of events in Eastern Europe and Asia Minor. The town of Kars in Turkish Armenia south of the Caucusus had been taken by the Russians and the Turks had failed to recapture it; this produced a far greater impression on the Shah than the Allies' capture of remote Sevastopol. In the spring of 1856 the Persian prince Murad Mirza advanced on Herat, and it became more than ever necessary that the British and Indian Governments should receive the most speedy and accurate intelligence from Central Asia. This passed for the most part through Sind, from correspondents engaged by Jacob in Kandahar and elsewhere in his frontier days, and was transmitted by him, generally with brief comments on the value of the information.

The new Governor-General, Lord Canning, received in May a dispatch from the Secret Committee informing him that Palmerston's policy was that the State of Herat should be independent, and in the event of its occupation by the Persians the Queen's Government would direct what measures should be taken to maintain its independence 'as an important element in the defence of British India'. Jacob had just replied to an inquiry by Mahomed Yusif, the ruler of Herat, that the British Government had no intention 'at present' of intervening; and his endorsement on a report of the approach of a Persian army and the appearance in Herat of a person claiming to be a British agent—a sort

of resurrection of Eldred Pottinger—was simply that 'no importance should be attached to it'.

Canning was irritated by the Commissioner's off-hand manner, as it seemed, of dealing with vital affairs, and administered a rebuke in a personal letter. Jacob warmly defended himself, but the Governor-General only explained at length, in a sarcastic schoolmaster's vein, where he had erred.

He refused to qualify his disapproval of the answer returned by Jacob to Mahomed Yusif; but his expressions of vexation were offset by appreciative references to Jacob's character and services, and due recognition of the responsibilities and difficulties of the post he held. These, Canning felt bound to admit, were more onerous when those who had to carry them were left in ignorance of the general views and intentions of the Government which they served; and he undertook to keep the Acting Commissioner fully informed thenceforward of all that might concern him. As an earnest of this, he explained and commented upon British policy towards Persia; Her Majesty's Government already had a quarrel with the Shah on their hands, and any new misunderstanding arising out of Herat would require to be dealt with, in the first instance, by the Home Government and not that of India, in order to avoid cross purposes. This being so, 'it was, and is especially incumbent on the Government of India to say and do nothing which shall prejudge the future course of England, either on the side of interference or noninterference.'

The letter proceeds to discuss, in most friendly style, Jacob's remarks on the significance of the fall of Kars. In conclusion the Governor-General observes, 'My attention has been caught by your observation that Persia will be more easily assailable in other quarters than on her eastern frontier. I shall be glad if you will let me know your views on this point. The more I examine it, the more I am brought to the conclusion that there never was a country, an attack on which would entail so much risk and cost with so little certainty of an impression.' The occupation of Karrack was no longer the talisman it had been. The chief ports on the Gulf were farmed out by the Government, so they would not be sensitive to a blockade; nor would they care for any injuries which might be inflicted on the Arab tribes who occupied much of the coastal region. Canning added a few remarks on the alternative lines of advance on the interior of Persia, and desired Jacob's opinion on them.³⁶²

This gave John Jacob the opportunity for which he had long been waiting. In his reply, dated 30th June 1856, he sketched with a few masterly strokes a plan of campaign based on Bushire. 'But I am

convinced,' he continued, 'that all this will not be requisite to ensure the complete submission of Persia, and to place our Indian Frontier generally in the most permanently secure state for the future... we could command success by another far more easy and more certain mode of

proceeding.

'I would establish a large cantonment permanently at Quetta in the territory of the Khan of Kelat. This Prince, together with all his people, would be delighted above all things to see us established there on their northern frontier; the whole resources of Beloochistan would be entirely at our disposal, and, which is even of more importance, the feelings of the people would be most cordially friendly to us.' He pointed out the ease with which the road through the Bolan pass could be improved, and linked with the frontier of Sind, the portion between Dadar, at the foot of the Bolan, and the Indus being eventually made a railway. A good force established at Quetta, with such communications, would 'give us complete command of all Afghanistan, without at the same time our giving the least offence to anyone around us.' Jacob held that Amir Dost Mahomed 'or whoever might be the ruling Afghan Chief' would then be delighted to enter into a closer alliance with us if we wished it, and that Britain would have the support of Baluchistan and Afghanistan in any subsequent move on Herat that might be found necessary. The establishment of a strong force at Quetta would not, moreover, entail any considerable increase to the existing military strength; all that was required was to give effect to his proposals made in the previous year-disband the Baluch Battalions or employ them on regular service elsewhere, abolish the Hyderabad and Shikarpur brigades, and move the troops forward to Quetta. The climate of the latter place was quite suitable for European troops; and an incidental result of occupying it would be the development of a large commercial town 'whence British manufactures and British influence would be spread throughout Asia.'

Jacob sent copies of this correspondence to Frere, who replied, 'I have long known, felt, and acted on the maxim that in any matter between the Caucasus and the sea, the English Government would never go far wrong if they left matters entirely to the judgment of one John Jacob, who for some five generations of Governor Generals has dealt with our neighbours in the North West and never once blundered nor been

Meanwhile Merewether transmitted from Jacobabad intelligence of Persian aggression in another quarter. A force had arrived on the Khan's western border and was levying supplies from two of his villages. In

of British protection given to his master on a previous occasion and asked what action he should now take. Meanwhile Mir Azad Khan the Chief of Kharan, an important and habitually disloyal feudatory of Kelat, had gone over to the enemy's camp. The Persians began to negotiate with other border chiefs of Kelat and a subordinate official of the Khan wrote a very frank report of his inability to organize resistance to a further advance of the 'infidel Persians'. 'The state of the army is known to you: they have no pay. Your name is great, in your forts however there are no stores. . . . I have received no pay for three months, but from dread I am unable to say anything.'

These deficiencies were, however, in a way to be remedied. The Government of India, in reply to Jacob's letter, agreed in the exceptional circumstances to assist the Khan with a supply of arms and money, the manner and time of the aid being left to Jacob's discretion; but no hope

of co-operation by a British force could be held out.

Jacob replied on 13th August that Nasir Khan was assembling two 'armies' to oppose the Persians, and recommended that two thousand percussion muskets with two hundred rounds each should be sent as soon as possible, together with a lakh of rupees; and in addition, four 3-pounder mountain guns complete with two hundred rounds of ammunition. This armament could be provided from the arsenal in Sind.

He added that the Khan's vakil had also introduced the subject of military aid and observed, 'The presence of a British Force, however small, acting in co-operation with the troops of His Highness the Khan would be invaluable.' The Baluch soldiery would then be deemed irresistible; the vakil fully understood that he could only ask for this as a favour and not by right; but he had pointed out that in the recent treaty a clause existed permitting the establishment by the British Government of cantonments anywhere they wished in Kelat territory; and if it was not thought right to send troops actually to co-operate with those of Kelat, still it might not be thought objectionable to form a British camp at some convenient place above the Bolan, such as Quetta.

The vakil declared that this would be of the greatest assistance to his master in repelling the present assailants, and that Nasir Khan was well assured that it would prevent the recurrence of such attacks and invasions of his country by the Persians or any other power in future. He earnestly

begged that this should be taken into consideration. 364

Jacob had already pursued the subject of the occupation of Quetta in direct correspondence with the Governor-General. Canning in his reply to Jacob's letter of 30th June had only referred to it in general terms, incidentally making up for his previous severity. He acknowledged the

value he attached to the aid and co-operation of such men as Jacob and the pride he felt in being associated with and supported by them; he was anxious that his relations with Jacob should be those not only of unreserved and uninterrupted confidence, 'but (if the term is not misapplied to an acquaintance hitherto only by correspondence) of personal friendship'. The tribute was a worthy complement to that from Dalhousie.

Canning ended by asking Jacob for his opinion on the ancillary question of the practicability and advantage of subsidizing the Afghans with money and arms. Lord Elphinstone, to whom Jacob had sent a copy of Canning's letter of 11th June and of his own reply, wrote at length on Persian policy and treaty obligations. He deprecated a move which would afford Russia a pretext for advancing her frontier: 'If we set the example, she need never want an excuse for following it.' Yet at the same time Elphinstone admitted that as the Khan of Khiva had lately been assassinated the Russians might treat this as a ground for an advance. These criticisms assisted Jacob in producing a fully comprehensive exposition of his scheme in all its bearings, in his reply to the

Governor-General dated 28th July 1856.

The existing position of the British in India was that of 'a mighty army without outposts of any kind'. The best possible opportunity of supplying this defect was now available; 'a combination of circumstances favourable to our purpose such as must very rarely occur'—the supplications of the Khan of Kelat and his people, the generally friendly attitude of the Amir Dost Mahomed and the Afghans, the 'fairest possible reason for precautionary measures' in the Persian advance to Herat and through Seistan, and the tranquillity of India, more particularly in Sind and the Panjab. Jacob proceeds to explain the essential differences between the two great routes by which India could be invaded from the north-west: the Bolan, through an entirely friendly country, perfectly practicable for an army, the shortest road to Herat, and 'the natural outlet to the ocean of the commerce of a very large portion of Central Asia': the Khyber, longer in distance, among unfriendly and barbarous tribes, with greater physical difficulties, but secured by the strong garrison of Peshawar. The strength of this latter fortress moreover would be enormously increased by the occupation of Quetta, from which 'we could operate on the flank and rear of an army attempting to proceed towards the Khyber pass. . . . We could reach Herat itself before an invading army could even arrive at Cabool. Such a position would form the bastion of the front attacked, and nothing could, with hope of success, be attempted against us until this salient were disposed of.' Jacob did not think the Governor-General's proposal to subsidize the

Afghans advisable until Quetta was occupied; they would be likely to use against us the very means supplied to them. The preliminary should be to take into British pay a body of the Khan's troops and attach them to the Frontier Field Force already proposed. These 'wild Irregulars' would perform all the work which the Cossacks did for the Russian army, 'which is that which in general our regular soldiers perform the worst, and is that by which they are most exhausted and demoralized.' The employment of these auxiliaries in numbers which could always be increased 'would make us in great measure independent of the Afghans, while the enjoyment of regular pay by the Kelat people would have great influence on the Afghans generally. All would be anxious to obtain the same advantages, while our evident strength, independent of Afghan aid, in their immediate neighbourhood, would be the best security for their good faith.' Then would be the time for subsidizing Afghanistan if thought necessary.

But it was certain that the state of feeling towards us among the Afghans would depend on our real intentions towards them; the habitual exercise of straightforward honesty would in a short time undo the evil left by our proceedings in the former invasion of their country. 'The English mind, to whose leading all these wild spirits will bow, must actually be present among them, and a sufficient British force be on the spot to support moral power and dignity, and to give

tone to the whole. . . . '

'We should in the present case occupy a position in the undisputed territory of an ally, with his most cordial assent and approval, and to his great advantage.' Jacob declared that he would welcome a similar advance by Russia, if the result were to civilize Central Asia; but he believed rather that her manner of proceeding would exasperate the

peoples against her.

He attached to his letter a memorandum of the arrangements required for giving full effect to his scheme. The place of the Scinde Irregular Horse and the officers employed on the Upper Sind Frontier, whom he proposed to move forward to Quetta, would be supplied without troops—for he recommended not only the abolition of the military stations of Hyderabad and Shikarpur, but that no troops should be quartered in Upper Sind at all. He would replace them by mounted police, commanded by a lieutenant of police as in the other Sind Collectorates, but distinct from the general force of the Province and under the orders of the Superintendent of the Frontier District, who was to remain as before subordinate to the Commissioner in Sind, but with orders to communicate on the political business of the frontier with the 'Political Commissioner on the Frontier of India' at Quetta

This latter officer was to be supported by a full staff of departmental secretaries and to have under his orders the Frontier Field Force already proposed, together with Baluch auxiliary infantry and cavalry, the whole constituting a division of all arms, each unit being organized

under the 'irregular' system. 365

It must be impossible for anyone who has followed John Jacob's achievement on the frontier of Upper Sind not to admire the breadth of vision in the light of which he could recommend virtually the complete supersession of his own splendid creation: the replacement of that which was good for its own time and local circumstances by that which was best for a long future and every chance and change. But at the

time other minds could not be so discerning.

A letter from Lord Canning, asking for further information about Kelat, the exact nature of the Persian aggression, and the best means of assisting the Khan, crossed Jacob's letter of 26th July. In his reply dated 11th August, after disposing of these queries, he proceeds, 'It is evidently not merely Persia with whom we have now to deal, but Persia guided, moved, and aided by Russia; and, from this circumstance, the proceedings near our frontier now appear to be of much more serious nature than any mere Persian occupation or threatenings of Herat, which have been so often made and attempted during the last twenty years. Wherefore, our demonstrations by sea, if no simultaneous proceedings be undertaken by land on our North-West Frontier will, it seems to me, have no effect but to make Russia push Persia on the more vigorously in this direction, while we are still unprepared. . . .

'Success is now in our own hands, and may be commanded with ease. Our position may be permanently secured with perfect safety, and with comparatively trifling labour and cost. But if we remain idly looking on from the valley of the Indus at the movements going on above the Bolan, we shall, it seems to me, be throwing away the fairest possible opportunity for settling for ever the question of the invasion of India

by Russia. . . . '

Lord Elphinstone, to whom Jacob had as usual sent copies of his letters to the Governor-General, still thought Jacob underestimated some of the objections to his plan; though he had to concede that Russia would probably occupy Khiva whether Britain took Quetta or not. He added that the French traveller Ferrier had found that our reputation in Afghanistan was not so bad as might have been expected. 366

On 3rd September Jacob received via Bombay the assent of the Government of India to his proposals for supplying the Khan with money and arms. On the same day he recommended to Merewether that the recently completed extension of the Begari canal should be

used to transport the arms and ammunition by water to Ghari Khairo Jamali; the rough draft of orders to the commissary of ordnance and to the superintendent of the Indus Flotilla, rapidly penned in Jacob's own hand, the brief letters sprawling over several pages of foolscap, are still filed in the records of the Commissioner of Sind. By the 8th, Merewether had paid over a lakh of rupees to the Khan's officer at Jacobabad; on the same date a steamer left Hyderabad loaded with two thousand muskets, four hundred thousand rounds of ammunition and four field pieces with ammunition. Arriving at Sukkur on the 16th the stores were transferred to large river boats, which carried them in two days to the mouth of the Begari canal farther up stream. Here a second trans-shipment was necessary into sixteen smaller boats which dropped down the canal for eighty miles through the Frontier District, reaching Garhi Khairo on the night of the 20th. Merewether had ordered Gordon with a squadron of the Scinde Horse to proceed there, load the stores on camels and escort them to Gandava, the Khan's winter headquarters, only fifty miles across the desert (which a month earlier had been impassable, flooded out by excessive rain). So in a little over three weeks from the receipt in Karachi of Government orders, war material including artillery had been transported nearly four hundred miles and delivered at the mouth of the Mulla Pass, the most convenient route for the Khan's 'western front'.367

The Khan had already ordered his forces to advance towards Kedj and Panjgur, and a contingent from the Jam of Las Bela was to march in the same direction; operations were to begin immediately after Id, when an additional force under the Shahgasi himself was to be sent. Merewether directed Mulla Ahmed to tell the Khan to act with energy, when all would go well; he should not concern himself with the British attitude to Herat.

Affairs at this latter place were now developing rapidly. In July the Persians having (as they supposed) secured submission by a demonstration of their strength, entrusted the governorship on behalf of the Shah to Isa Khan, the late minister of Mahomed Yusif, and retired. Isa Khan however wrote to Amir Dost Mahomed offering to hand Herat over to him, and prepared to maintain the place against the Persians, who soon returned and again invested it. Dost Mahomed distrusted Isa Khan and wasted time in negotiations; meanwhile the Persians masked the fortress and took possession of Farrah, half-way on the road to Kandahar. Two of Dost Mahomed's nephews came into the Persian camp hoping for support in a bid to regain their inheritance which he had usurped. The Amir in his perplexity sought assistance from the British Government; but by the end of August he had lost heart, and

Jacob reported to Sir John Lawrence that he was preparing to return to Kabul. Lawrence in return undertook to send Jacob any information he

might receive.

Lord Canning had meanwhile decided to aid Dost Mahomed with a supply of money and arms; the latter to be sent up from Bombay. Jacob's extraordinary promptitude in dispatching the similar supply to the Khan had removed the objection to sending through his territory, via the Bolan pass, the quota allotted to Dost Mahomed; but it was not certain whether the latter was now at Kandahar or Kabul. Jacob pointed out the embarrassing uncertainty he must feel until he were placed in direct communication with the Afghan Government, particularly at such a critical time, and recommended that the Amir should be requested to enter into correspondence with him; 'and if it be not now thought advisable that the conduct of our relations with the Afghan Chiefs be wholly entrusted to me, still at least timely information should always be sent to me regarding all negotiations with the Ameer of Afghanistan which may be conducted by other authorities.' Sir John Lawrence, on coming to know of this suggestion, wrote indignantly to a friend, 'Fancy Colonel Jacob writing coolly to Government to place all Afghan relations under him. So far as I personally am concerned, it would cause me no regret.' Canning replied to Jacob on 19th October, 'I am not unwilling to place the relations of the Government of India with Dost Mahomed in your hands if on grounds of public convenience it becomes desirable'—though always previously they had been via the Panjab. 'There have not, nor will there be, if I can avoid it, anything to be called Political relations to be conducted with Dost Mahomed.' No conditions were attached to the supply of arms and money, which were intended to assist the Amir in resisting the Persians.

Canning agreed to let Jacob communicate directly with the Amir in emergencies—the Chief Commissioner of the Panjab being accorded

the same latitude for addressing Sind officers. 368

Jacob was more successful with a proposal for entering into closer relations with the Khan, which Canning sanctioned in this letter. The Acting Commissioner had already asked Lord Elphinstone to place Henry Green at his disposal for employment as Assistant Political Agent at Kelat, where his presence at this critical time 'would be worth ten thousand men in the field'. Green was staying at Government House Bombay on his return from Asia Minor where he had been serving with the Turkish Irregular Cavalry; and in reply to a letter, Jacob wrote to him criticizing the Eastern policy of the British Government. It was an error to have allowed Kars to be taken, but far worse not to have made Russia withdraw from Turkish Armenia before we evacuated the

Crimea. This had encouraged Persia to invade Afghanistan and Baluchistan; Russia would endeavour steadily to put her in secure possession of Herat and perhaps Kandahar. Thus on the next occasion of war breaking out with England, Russia would be in a position herself to occupy Western Afghanistan and thence invade North-West India. Jacob says characteristically, 'the time for action is now, and the wise proceeding is that which I have proposed. Nothing short of this will answer or be safe.'

He now wrote to Nasir Khan apprising him of the appointment of Major Henry Green 'whose words and advice I request that you will

consider as coming directly from myself.'369

Some time was to pass before Green could join his new appointment and meanwhile the arrangements to supply Dost Mahomed with money and arms matured. From Bombay Jacob received a letter addressed to the Amir by Lord Canning desiring him to communicate with 'my Agent in Sind, Colonel Jacob', together with instructions to the latter to provide the necessary escort for conducting the supplies via the Bolan pass, as Dost Mahomed had not after all left Kandahar. There was a further delay of a month owing to the dilatoriness of the Amir in opening communication with Jacob. The convoy of 550 camels loaded with three lakhs of rupees, as well as muskets and ammunition, marched from Jacobabad on 20th October, under the escort of four hundred sabres of the Scinde Horse commanded by Briggs. Though no forage was obtainable and the track through the pass more difficult than usual, no mishap occurred, and Briggs handed over his charge in perfect order at Quetta, when the temperature on the Dasht-be-daulat was twenty degrees below freezing point; and he counter-marched next day. For this service, in Jacob's words 'managed without the least unusual stir or excitement being apparent anywhere', and highly commended in his report, Merewether and Briggs received the thanks of the Government of India, while the Governor-General acknowledged his obligations to the Khan. Frere, on hearing of the affair in England, wrote to his friend, 'All who have seen are struck with your letters on Punjab mismanagement. After wishing to absorb you and me and all Sind, they are forced to take your route and use your men and influence to get money and arms to Dost Mahomed.'370

As predicted by the Khan's news-writer at Kandahar, the supplies were sent much too late to enable Dost Mahomed to save Herat. The Amir's perplexities had increased; for he intercepted letters written from the Persian camp by his nephews, Mahomed Alim Khan and Mahomed Umar Khan—the former an able, enterprising man—calling upon the people of Kandahar to espouse their cause. An attack by the Persians on

a gate of the fortress of Herat on 12th September had been heavily repulsed, but Isa Khan was now in extremities. He sent his nephew to Dost Mahomed to implore his assistance, but a Persian envoy also waited upon the Amir. To neither would he commit himself, but left Kandahar in the direction of Kabul, taking with him all the sardars and half of their families, and leaving his son Ghulam Hyder in charge of the city.


The first round of the game in the north-west was lost.

Jacob also had reason to be dissatisfied with the conduct of Mir Nasir Khan. On 3rd July, Merewether had reported a raid by the Marri tribe on the Nothani Bugtis, and Jacob had directed him to call on the Khan to take measures to prevent in future such insults to the British frontier by tribes owing allegiance to the Kelat throne. But the incorrigible Marris resumed their depredations, and Jacob had to write again to Merewether on 28th October to 'call the serious attention of the Khan to the fact that the lawless proceedings now brought to notice are caused solely by His Highness having declined to attend to my advice given to him last year, when he had assembled a force with the intention of coercing the Murrees. Had he then acted with the firmness and energetic severity which is proper and just on the part of a sovereign when dealing with rebellious subjects who have outraged all law and despised his authority, the whole of these predatory hill tribes would by now have been reduced to perfect obedience. . . . Now, tell him to attend to the advice I have so often formerly given him, namely at once establish a good post under an efficient officer at Dera, and thereafter, as soon as it is possible, at Kahun.'

It was more than ever obvious that little could be expected of Nasir Khan until a British officer was continuously at his side. On 27th October Jacob received the formal sanction of the Government of Bombay to Green's appointment as Assistant Political Agent at Kelat, and furnished him with the necessary instructions, adding, 'I am myself proceeding to the Frontier on 1st November through the hills, so you can accompany me.'371 Almost simultaneously two letters from the Governor-General reached Jacob, one desiring to be informed of the instructions given to Green, and the other, dated 18th October, on the

Quetta scheme.

Canning now expressed a predisposition in its favour; but he saw three important objections. These were, the isolation of a British force two hundred miles beyond the British frontier, with a difficult pass, and wild tribes around it in the rear: secondly, the Afghans would be sure to look on the occupation of Quetta as a prelude to aggression: and thirdly, how could the country round Quetta provide supplies for the thousands of additional men and animals belonging to the field force?



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Or would it have to be supplied, at prohibitive cost, from the plains? Jacob's further observations, thus invited, dealt in some detail with the changes that had taken place in Kelat territory and Upper Sind during the last ten years, in particular in the attitude of the tribes which had previously disturbed the country. (In specifying them, Jacob made no reference to the Marris and their recent 'lawless proceedings'!) As to the isolation of Quetta, 'the Bolan Pass presents no difficulties for the party which holds it, and we should hold it securely at Quetta.

'The road through this Pass I would improve so as to make it the easiest mountain road possible for us, but I would make such arrangements that the force at Quetta could, by occupying the Pass itself if necessary, hold it against all the world. I would connect the foot of the Pass at once by a good road with Sind, and ultimately by a railroad, and by means of the subsidized troops of Kelat acting as Police, I would

maintain the most perfect security along the whole line.

'The British camp at Quetta would not then be in any way isolated; it would indeed be as little isolated in reality as are the camp and town of Kurrachee at present which, owing to the want of connection by canal with the Indus, are still chiefly supplied, even with such things

as grass, grain and firewood, by sea.'

As to the local supplies in Quetta's vicinity, 'the valleys of Mustoong, Pesheen and Shawl produce large quantities of excellent wheat and lucerne, sheep are procurable by millions, and all that the neighbouring country could supply would assuredly flow into our camp; while grain and cattle from Cutchee (where prices are generally very much lower than in Sind itself) would be brought up the Bolaun by private traders

in any quantities required to meet the demand.

'Provision must undoubtedly be made for consumption during the winter season, as is habitually done by all inhabitants of that country. But no Government Commissariat arrangements would be requisite; while, in the case of unforeseen accident or emergent necessity arising, the Cavalry, who require the greatest provision, could during the winter, when the ground is covered by snow, and military operations are necessarily suspended, be moved in a march of six days to Dadar, where supplies are at all times abundant. However, I consider it to be certain that the establishment of the Field Force at Quetta would result in the growth of a large commercial town at that place; the resources of which would, as in the instance of Jacobabad, suffice for the wants of an army.'

Jacob undertook to make all the necessary arrangements, if given a free hand, 'at the risk of loss of life and reputation in case of failure'. He pointed out the very low cost of his plan in proportion to the value of the stake which it would secure; moreover the expense of such measures

as the proposed expedition against Persia by sea was to be weighed on the other side. Jacob was convinced that the stake was the Empire of India. To enable the red line of England, which Canning did not wish to advance, to remain on its place on the map, this outpost must be occupied in advance of it. The British power in India must be shaken if we had to wage war with an invader in our own territory; but battles fought beyond the frontier, if thus held, would hardly disturb it.

Again, with regard to the Afghans, Jacob felt sure of his ground. They would take note of the Khan's cordial consent and of the advantages which would accrue to him. They would understand our real motives, when displayed in fair, honest and just action—a frank attitude such as had reconciled the wild tribes round the Upper Sind frontier. And once more Jacob undertook to carry out the whole scheme down to the last detail, if entrusted with its management, without any assistance and

without calling on Regular troops.

The Governor-General's reply to this letter does not appear to be extant; but Lord Elphinstone, to whom Jacob sent a copy, remarked that the real objection lay not in the physical difficulties or the tribes. 'If they were, the fact that you were to tackle them would be enough. . . . I cannot help feeling that you underestimate the extent of the hostility and distrust of the Afghans; and though the Russians will creep on whether we stay still or not, we should avoid hastening their advance. If absolutely necessary for our defence, Quetta appears the most eligible place to occupy in advance of the frontier. But I do not think it is necessary. I would rather wait until the first move on the chess board is made by our adversary. If the report of the increase of the Russian fleet on the Caspian, and their occupation of Asterabad is true, adoption of your plan may follow.'

But on the very day that Jacob had written his letter to Lord Canning, the latter, under instructions previously received from Her Majesty's Government, had declared war on Persia. Herat had fallen; and to secure its rendition operations were to be undertaken, not in accordance

with Jacob's far-seeing plan, but by invasion from the sea. 372

CHAPTER XVIII

Persian War-Indian Mutiny

Though Jacob disapproved of the manner in which it was proposed to bring the Shah to reason, he was credited in some quarters with having applied to proceed on service with the expeditionary force, at the head of one of his regiments. Some days before war was actually declared, the Phoenix newspaper of Calcutta remarked on the report that he had asked for an appointment in the expedition, and ascribed it to the 'promptings of that restless and ambitious energy that have been so characteristic of his career. . . . Colonel Jacob has but little right to expect more than scant praise from this side of India. His offences against the fair fame of the Bengal Army, though innoxious, and though they drew down on their perpetrator reproof from high quarters, are not yet forgotten.' The editor, however, was prepared to forget Jacob's 'ill-tempered' pamphlets, in view of the reforms which he had introduced in Sind, and other good service; and expressed the hope that the Bombay Government would 'gratify his manly resolve' and give him a command in the force equal to his reputation and merits. From such a source the comment was not ungenerous; but the Sind Cossid would not let it pass without observing that Jacob deserved well of Bengal-unless indeed exposure of abuses was a crime and reform an offence. 873

The expeditionary force was drawn entirely from the Bombay Army, with the addition of one and later two more Queen's regiments, and was first commanded by Major General Stalker. In the first week of December the island of Karak, off Bushire, was occupied and formed into a base: the force then landed at Halila Bay and stormed the Persian position at Reshire on 9th December. On the following day Bushire surrendered to a bombardment from the sea. Meanwhile Her Majesty's Government had decided to extend the range of operations, and the command, with full political powers, was offered to Outram, then on

sick-leave in England. His health had begun to improve; and under the stimulus of the prospect of this service, he assured his correspondents

that his recovery was complete.

In the very first of his official letters, dated 18th November, Outram applied for the services of John Jacob. Colonel Hennell, late Resident in the Persian Gulf, had written in a memorandum in October 1856, 'If cavalry be sent, European Dragoons and Jacob's Scinde Horse will be found the most effective.' The future operations were intended to threaten Shiraz and Ispahan, after taking possession of Shustar and Mohammerah, and for this a powerful cavalry arm was required. Outram wrote, 'The utmost exertions should be used to enrol as numerous a body as possible of mounted Arabs, and to bring them into the best state of discipline practicable, during the season of inactivity-namely, from the beginning of the hot weather to the end of the monsoon. Colonel John Jacob, of the Bombay Army, I would earnestly recommend, should be entrusted with this duty, as well as with the command of the entire cavalry forces, with the local rank of Major General, to enable him effectively to assert his authority, and to place him in the position of second in command of the army. By this arrangement a most efficient leader would be secured, should death or sickness remove me from the command with which I have been honoured.

'To officer these Arab levies, some active subalterns from India should

be placed at Colonel Jacob's disposal. . . .

Outram shortly afterwards sailed for India, and we find him writing from Alexandria to Colonel Sykes: 'I hope you have overcome the obstacles interposed to the local rank of Major General for Jacob. . . . Her Majesty's Army has many a Major General of ten years junior service to Jacob who, after twenty eight years incessant active service may, I should think, be considered qualified by experience at least, to hold that rank in your army, even if he were not confessedly one of the

best officers in your service. . . . '374

Outram landed at Bombay on 22nd December, and on the following day Jacob, then camping at Jacobabad, was warned of the requisition for his services and those of one regiment of the Scinde Horse. In reply to a letter from Outram dated the same day Jacob wrote that he would be pleased to serve under him in any capacity required, but 'I much wish that you had seen my correspondence with the Governor General regarding our Indian Frontier, for I feel sure that we are about to commit enormous errors.' His own proposed arrangements would secure the frontier of the Indian Empire permanently—'without any rushing about or appearance of much unusual exertion at all.' On the other hand, such plans as sending an army up the Bolan when found necessary and then

withdrawing, would no more attain it than the enormously costly

expedition despatched to assail Persia from the sea.

To the Governor-General Jacob forwarded a copy of this letter, at the same time requesting sanction to Merewether remaining in command and civil charge of the Frontier, and to Henry Green accompanying him to Persia, together with Captain Lewis Pelly, his gifted Assistant Commissioner. Green had just come in to Jacobabad from Gandava to consult about Kelat affairs; these, Jacob wrote to his brother Malcolm, who had come out with Outram as his Military Secretary, he was managing 'famously', and were proceeding satisfactorily. He went on, 'it will be very pleasant, our all meeting again with the old Scinde Irregular Horse on service; but I would far rather be commencing life again in my old age as a cadet, than take my place as a General in this enormous folly, if any exercise of will were allowed me . . . our present proceedings are exactly like that of a man who, wanting a great forest, should stick a lot of large branches of trees in the earth, and then think the business done. His labour would make a grand display perhaps for a while, but in one season or so all would have rotted and disappeared.

'I would sow acorns—feeble looking things at first, but containing mighty principles of life and growth, and I should thus assuredly at last raise giant oaks, whose strength might resist the utmost force of the

storm for a thousand years.'375

Next day Jacob and Henry Green left Jacobabad en route for Karachi. Macauley went to take Green's place at Kalat, and Briggs was to march with the 1st Regiment of the Scinde Horse. Jacob was very reluctant, in the face of some unrest in Kelat, to weaken the frontier garrison, and wrote a vigorous official protest against the decision. Meanwhile he moved rapidly down the country, making a final march into Karachi of 36 miles on 19th January in order to meet Outram, whose steamer was to touch there en route for Bushire. He arrived just after the Semiramis was signalled and sent Henry Green to the port to bring Outram up to Government House. Here the two friends met after almost fourteen years' separation, and talked over affairs for some hours. In the evening Outram went on board and proceeded on his voyage to Persia. Jacob ended the day's entry in his journal with the words, 'Heu! Quanto [sic] Mutatus ab illo.'

From Outram Jacob learned that he had been granted the rank of brigadier-general, under general orders dated 12th January, with the command of the whole of the cavalry of the expedition. In writing his acknowledgements to Lord Canning he says, 'the appointment with which Your Lordship has now been pleased to honour me is of all others the most in accordance with my personal inclinations.' As to his own

opinion that the invasion of Persia was a great error, 'I trust that having strong convictions of my own, conscientiously arrived at and expressed, I shall not be found deficient in the force and energy necessary to the just execution of those of others.' From his personal consultation with Sir James Outram he found that the services of a regiment of the Scinde Irregular Horse was considered indispensable for the plan of campaign; he therefore recommended that Merewether should be directed to raise a third regiment and also two hundred additional Baluch Horse.³⁷⁶

Outram wrote from at sea next day to Lord Elphinstone invoking his aid in preventing any countermand of the orders for Jacob and his Horse. Outram always wrote in enthusiastic terms of his friends, but the tone of this letter suggests that his health and nerves were still much impaired. He 'implores' that they be allowed to come on under any circumstances; the success of his operations depended mainly, if not entirely, on their aid: no other Irregular cavalry could impart the tone which they would inspire in the Arab levies: he would feel utterly crippled without them: if the Governor-General would not agree to let Jacob join him, at least the regiment should be sent, under Green. 'But I shall consider myself deprived of my right arm if Colonel Jacob is withdrawn.' Meanwhile the Sind Cossid expressed regret at the loss which the Province would suffer by the transfer of the Acting Commissioner, but added appropriate sentiments on his high qualifications for command of the Cavalry Division. He had also been gazetted Aide-de-Camp to the Queen.

Briggs with the First Regiment of Scinde Horse marched into Karachi on 28th January, three weeks after leaving Jacobabad. Jacob had given orders that the men should provide themselves with ponies and mules instead of the camels generally used for their transport-cattle, and the route being made known, dealers from all over the Province flocked to the camps; so that the regiment was equipped with six hundred ponies and mules before reaching Karachi, the camels having been sold off as replaced. During the following month twelve officers were attached to the regiment for doing duty with the Arab levies when raised, and Jacob was busy making arrangements for shipping. There was also of course much Provincial business to be disposed of; but Barrow Ellis of the Civil Service arrived on 12th February to officiate as Commissioner till Frere's return, and we learn that Jacob auctioned his tents two days later.

Embarkation of the baggage began on the 22nd and next day Jacob held a final review of the regiment. On the 25th news of the victory of Khushab reached Karachi and Jacob wrote enthusiastically of the achievement of Major Forbes with 240 sabres of the 3rd Bombay Cavalry, who had ridden over a fully formed and steady square of 500 Persian infantry, only twenty men escaping. The enemy were Regular

troops, well armed and disciplined, and confidently stood their ground. Jacob thought this 'the best cavalry performance of modern times', refuting conclusively the view that cavalry charges against unbroken infantry standing firm and steady in a square were certain to fail. It was also an instance of the fine qualities of the Hindustani soldier. But Forbes's triumph tended equally to refute one of Jacob's doctrines: the destruction had been inflicted by the straight sword, drawn from the steel scabbard—the very weapon said to be useless in the hands of a native dragoon.

Jacob found time in his last few days in Karachi to send to Smith Elder, for reprinting, his tracts on the Indian Army, and Rifle Practice: and a packet of letters on the Persian war and frontier policy, to be

opened and printed in case of his death.377

Lord Elphinstone referred to him a report by Major Hill on the country along the Karun river, in which it was proposed to raise the Irregular Arab Cavalry, and also the plan of campaign drawn up by Outram before he left Bombay. Outram proposed to advance on two parallel lines, from Bushire to Khisht and from Mohammerah to Shustar, in order to secure healthy situations for the European troops. From these advanced bases he would threaten Shiraz, undertaking further operations in October. Meanwhile Jacob would be occupied at Shustar with the organization of the Turkish-Arabian levies on the nucleus of the Scinde Horse. The communications between the two lines of advance would be by steamer; while, in Outram's view, corresponding defence concentrations for the enemy by land would be difficult.

Jacob wrote, 'My own opinion with regard to the plan of proceeding is not at all in favour of making a rush through the hills into the interior

of Persia, in the hope of frightening the Shah into submission.

'Russia would not fail at once to see and inform the Persian Government of our faulty position, with the sea for our base, barren countries all around the isolated valley in which we were operating, immense ranges of mountains across our communications with the sea, and across the line of our further advance.

... I would not advise any such course, but would occupy the whole maritime provinces between the mountains and the sea, from the

Euphrates to the Bunderabass.'

He would inform the Shah that not having afforded the satisfaction rightfully required, the country occupied would be annexed for ever to the British Empire.

Kurdistan he thought would be a valuable acquisition. Developed in accordance with its natural capabilities, this line of country, especially

the valley of the Karun, could be organized as an excellent base of operations in case of a renewed war with Russia. With command of the Black Sea and the co-operation of Turkish forces from Trebizond, England could drive Russia beyond the Caucasus. Russia would foresee the consequences of permanent occupation of Kurdistan by Britain, and to prevent it would more probably persuade Persia to cease her provocative eastward advance, than throw in her own weight in support.

A commentary in a confidential staff manual written many years later reads: 'The above remarks by General Jacob are still pregnant with advice for us, and should not be lost sight of; for a study of the topography of the Zagros hills to the north of the maritime provinces from Bushire to the Euphrates, point to their great value to us as a base against the

Caspian region and the Caucasus.'378*

As things fell out neither Outram's nor Jacob's plan was put to the test of experience. Outram was already exercised over political restrictions placed on his general operations, which tended to render nugatory the chief object of his proposed advance to Shustar. No attempt was to be made to subvert the reigning Shah; his people were not to be instigated to rebellion; and no Persian subjects were to be enrolled in the ranks of the British Army. Outram had to reconcile himself to abandoning the plan of occupying Shustar. He would have to limit his operations in that quarter to the capture of Mohammerah and then turn to driving away the Persian forces in front of Bushire, which were stronger than he expected after their defeat at Kushab. Meanwhile the delay in attacking Mohammerah had allowed the Persians to strengthen their position there.879

The concentration of troops on ship board for this enterprise was nearly complete before Jacob arrived at Bushire on the 13th. The events of the next four days may be told in the words of Jacob's journal:

14th March: General Stalker shot himself during the night in dread of the responsibility of being left to command at Bushire during the absence of Sir James Outram.

15th: General Stalker buried with full Military honours—a most

injudicious proceeding in my opinion.

I find Col. Lugard one of the most excellent men and best soldiers I have ever met with-able, energetic, cool and methodical

* It may be noted how important the line of the Karun river , wed in the Second World War, as a base to reinforce 'the Caspian region and the Caucasus', in alliance with Russia. Vide Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. III, pp. 427-432 (Cassell & Co., Ltd., London, 1950).

-it is evident to me that his presence alone has saved this army from some great disaster. But I can well imagine what he must have suffered from the miserable proceedings of the General prior to my arrival here.

We had a 'scene' with Sir James Outram this night; he was about to write some wretched nonsense in reply to a communication from a moonshee of the Persian Commander-in-Chief. I spoke out freely and firmly and with much trouble at last induced Sir James

to write a reply which I drafted.

16th March: . . . I can imagine no greater political crime than that which has been committed by those who have entrusted an English Army and the most important interests of our country to a General in such a state of health. Nothing appears to remain in Sir James Outram's mind but a morbid sense of the opinions of others, his brain appears to have degenerated into one immense organ of love of approbation and I find no response to any great or good idea when I endeavour to rouse him to better thoughts; while orders and counter orders are every hour issued by the General, all departments are confused and everyone is disgusted.

17th March: . . . to-day I went to the Residency in the town of Bushire, accompanied by Pelly to see Sir James Outram before his departure for Mohammerah. While with Sir James and before he had risen from his bed information was brought that Commodore Ethersey had shot himself during the night. . . . Leaving Pelly with the General, Col. Lugard and I went to look at the dead body which

had not been disturbed.

Some entries were found and shown to us by Captain Jones in Ethersey's journal to the effect that he was completely worn out and becoming daily more sensible of his incapacity for command—on the day of General Stalker's suicide there was an entry in the journal to the effect that his (Ethersey's) case was exactly similar to Stalker's.

Sir James Outram cross-questioned Jones in our presence with a view to prove that he (Sir James) had not driven Ethersey to commit suicide by vexatious interference, etc. This was a painful exhibition and tended to produce exactly the contrary effect to that which was intended by it.

'I am left in command of all the troops at Bushire.'

These comprised twelve companies of infantry, detached from four regiments, the entire cavalry of the 1st Division, and details of artillery, under three brigadiers; they occupied an entrenched position in front

It is sad to find Jacob writing of his old friend in such terms, but the uncompromising frankness wears the unmistakable stamp of truth, which a man would confide to his private journal but otherwise leave unsaid. Granted that the comments reflect that self-sufficiency and contempt of any kind of feebleness so characteristic of John Jacob, there is independent evidence that Outram was very far from being at his best at this time. The transfer of Sir Henry Lawrence to the Oudh Residency and his own appointment to the less onerous Rajputana Agency recently gazetted might, he feared, be regarded by the public as an evidence that he had been found wanting. 'My present occupation will, however, I trust, preserve me from injurious imputations.' This in a letter to Lord Canning dated 11th March. Outram's biographer speaks of it as disclosing 'the workings of a highly sensitive mind'. Jacob, five days after it was written, saw cause to censure his friend's 'morbid sense of the opinion of others' and 'love of approbation'—it is a fair supposition that Outram had spoken to him in the same peevish terms. Again, in reporting General Stalker's suicide to Lord Elphinstone Outram is at pains to show that he had in no way contributed to the unfortunate man's vexations.

As for the 'orders and counter orders', the Scinde Horse were the chief sufferers. Outram had sent a detachment to Mohammerah: recalled them to Bushire on 18th March: countermanded the order in time to stop them at the mouth of the Euphrates: but then omitted to send on the transport with their baggage and followers from Bushire. It was left to Jacob to pass the necessary order. In vain the care he h 1 himself bestowed on making the arrangements for the transport of the Scinde Horse as complete as possible; all had been 'wantonly and uselessly modified' by Outram. 'The Corps,' Jacob noted in his journal, 'has been broken to pieces and its strength paralysed for no good purpose whatever.'381

The presence of John Jacob, though a little overpowering at the council table, was a great relief to Outram, who could sail for Mohammarah with full confidence that his base would not only be secure, but administered with perfect efficiency, while he had been apprehensive of the outcome in Stalker's hands.

The attack on Mohammerah was almost entirely a naval action; the Persian batteries along the Shatt-el-Arab were engaged by armed steamers and sloops of war of the Indian Navy until the small steamers with boats and transports in tow were able to run the gauntlet without appreciable loss. By half past one the troops were landed and formed on the palm-covered bank of the river above the enemy's position, and ordered to advance. The Persians did not wait but after exploding their

principal magazine fled, abandoning their tents, baggage, stores, and sixteen guns.

Pursuit could not be effective owing to lack of cavalry, but Malcolm Green with the detachment of Scinde Horse did all that was possible to

overcome the deficiency.

It was low water in the estuary when the transport touched at the landing place, which made disembarkation difficult; but by throwing hay bales and mud into the shallow water a platform was made and Green got forty-five men with their horses ashore within half an hour. Jacob described his subsequent proceedings in a letter to his old friend Colonel Edward Green in Bombay. Malcolm Green followed up the retreating army for eleven miles, forming his forty-five men into single rank so as to make the Persians believe that he was the advance party of a large cavalry force. Outram recalled him on the 26th but allowed him to advance again on the following day to gain information of the route of the Persian retreat.

Outram's next step was to send an armed flotilla with a detachment of three hundred British infantry up the Karun river to Ahwaz, under the command of Captain Rennie of the Indian Navy. Malcolm Green accompanied the force, which reached Ahwaz, some hundred miles up the Karun, in three days' sailing. Finding a Persian force posted on the right bank, Rennie ordered the troops to disembark and attack the town under cover of fire from the ships' guns. The Persian army, though some six thousand strong in infantry, with five guns, besides numerous Bakhtiari horsemen, retreated precipitately.

It appeared subsequently that the Shah, to ensure his army fighting to the last, had actually ordered the hill tribes to close the passes against its retreat. The official British commentary on the campaign expresses regret that Great Britain should on such occasions ever lack a sufficiency of 'the magnificent and incomparable cavalry' which she possessed in

abundance.

Jacob writing to Outram on 3rd April, immediately on receipt of his dispatch, anticipates this criticism: 'I wish that you had sent Malcolm Green on with the 300 men of the Scinde Horse, which are, or ought to be, with you, in company with the steamers of the Karoon; I think he would have done wonderfully good service. The men are so perfectly trustworthy and I have such absolute confidence in Green's prudence as well as boldness, that I am convinced he would have taken all the Persian guns and perhaps the Shahzada's carriage also.'382

At about the same time we find Jacob recommending annexation of the province of Kurdistan; its strategic value in the event of another war with Russia was great, the Arab inhabitants would welcome British

rule, and Britain had the rights of conquest over an aggressor enemy. Outram had written to his friend immediately after the fall of Mohammarah suggesting troop movements to suit various contingencies and inviting Jacob's opinion on all. 'I have no wish, however,' Outram adds, 'to rob you of the credit of defeating the Persian Commander-in-Chief; do not scruple, therefore, to tell me if you would rather I staid here till you have polished him off. I should of course enjoy being with you on such an occasion, but I know you would do at least as well without

Jacob had, in fact, only just sufficient force to secure the base and was unable to take the offensive. On 20th March he had proceeded on a reconnaissance with a squadron of the 3rd Cavalry, accompanied by Henry Green, Pelly and other officers to Chagudak, some fourteen miles towards the Persian position. Only a few of the enemy's horsemen were seen, but retired as soon as approached. The Persian Commanderin-Chief continued to maintain a confident attitude at the head of 17,000 or 18,000 men with 25 or 30 guns, strongly posted at Nanark in the mouth of the Haft Mullah pass. Jacob in reply to Outram's questions reported that he was not strong enough to move out to attack, as after leaving one regiment to defend the entrenched camp he could only muster 1500 infantry.

He therefore asked Outram to join him with as many men as could be spared from the Karun line; arrangements should be made to hold all the ground up to the hills after the enemy was beaten at Nanark, and reinforcements would be required. But the most vital requirement was to develop the base at Bushire. Jacob was convinced that troops could be safely kept there during the hot weather if properly housed; but for this, carpenters, tools, smiths and all kinds of supplies would have to be sent from India before the monsoon set in. All the transports that could be spared should be sent for this, and to bring back a substantial stock of coal, shortage of which was hampering the constant movement of

troops between Bushire and Mohammerah. 383

Meanwhile Jacob was doing his best to organize the base with the means at his disposal; several hours' heavy rain on the night of 7th April served to emphasize the urgency. Other incidents of the next few weeks evoked some characteristic letters in his informal vein. He writes to Outram, 'You should invest me in your absence with all the powers you yourself possess over subordinates and country folk. A case of robbery will come before you officially as an instance in point. Had I the powers which I used to exercise in Sind occasionally, I would have had the man hanged on the spot where the robbery was committed. Our dear friend Charley Napier used to entrust me with such powers to

the fullest extent—"All the powers I myself possess"—and it is the only plan to manage things comfortably to all parties. Speedy justice is always the tenderest mercy in the end."

Outram replied, regretting his oversight in not formally investing Jacob with his powers; but he thought that serious complications might have resulted from hanging the robber. His Judge Advocate General had confirmed his opinion, that hanging the culprit would have been illegal.

Jacob replied cheerfully, 'A legal opinion on such matters is not worth a button—"Inter armis [sic] leges silent"—a General commanding an army in the field in an enemy's country is supreme and can order

military executions on his sole authority.... '384

But while the next moves in the campaign were being planned in Persia, negotiations for putting an end to the war had been proceeding in Europe and at the end of March peace was signed at Paris. Persia was to withdraw from Herat, the Kandahar territories and Baluchistan, and to receive a British Mission in Teheran. The news reached Jacob on 10th April; a beautiful lunar rainbow occurred opportunely, he notes in his journal. Next, a missive arrived in Bushire from the Persian Commander-in-Chief addressed to Sir James Outram which Jacob under his newly confirmed authority opened and answered.

'You mention the evils of war. No injury can come to the English from the continuance of the war with Persia, which His Majesty the

Shah, under the influence of foolish advisors, has provoked.

'But when the English Government shall have been satisfied and may be pleased to give orders to that effect, there will be peace.' Meanwhile he desired the bashi to make his meaning clear and express it in terms proper to a plenipotentiary, when it would be forwarded to Sir James Outram.

Outram told his friend, and also Lord Clarendon, that this reply was

exactly w' at he would have wished him to send.

A few days later a letter from the Shuja-ul-Mulk to an Indian dignitary, living on a British pension near Bushire was delivered to Jacob by mistake and revealed that the Persian commander was intent on obtaining exact information of the strength of the Bushire garrison, doubtless in case of a renewal of hostilities. Jacob sent on this missive with a covering letter, '... we have not found the Persian soldiers very formidable in war. They have, probably out of pure mercy and good will, kept pretty well out of our reach; but be it peace or be it war, if the Persian Commander-in-Chief, or the brave and truthful Shooja-ool-moolk, presuming on our forbearance move nearer our camp, and their people cause any annoyance to our servants and unarmed followers ... I shall order my cavalry to attack the offenders and cause them to be

punished: for if it be war they are enemies, and if it be peace they are robbers.' Of this Outram wrote, 'Your letter to the Nawab . . . is admirable and very characteristic of John Jacob. Kemball is so delighted with it that he has begged me to let him send a copy of it to his locum

tenens at Baghdad.'385

Outram's own political business could not be disposed of in this offhand fashion. He had as yet only a most indefinite message regarding the conclusion of peace. Obviously no forward movement could now be made, and he was anxious to withdraw from Mohammarah itself in view of its reputed insalubrity; but too precipitate evacuation of the place might well encourage the Persians to spin out negotiations and so require at least the threat of a renewal of hostilities to secure their compliance with the terms. When his instructions arrived he found that he was left with less discretionary power than he had hoped. The ratifications of the treaty were to be executed before the expiry of three months after the signing of peace, which would fall on 4th June; and the troops were not to be withdrawn from Persian territory until the stipulations regarding Herat and Afghanistan and the reception of a British Mission at Teheran had been carried into full effect. Outram thought that he would be compelled after all to leave the 2nd Division at or near Mohammerah, and sent a steamer to recall the Scinde Horse which he had dispatched a few days earlier to Bushire.

The transport came into Bushire roads on 23rd April accompanied by another ship bringing orders for its return to Mohammerah, and explanatory letters to Jacob. He complied with the order, merely pointing out that the constant movement of his corps to and fro by sea was ruining the horses and breaking the hearts of his officers. He was convinced that Persia would gladly accept the terms of peace, and that it would be unnecessary to leave any troops at Mohammerah; while only Indian oldiers, with the exception of some artillery, would be required to hold Bushire or Kharak till the terms were ratified. Outram had outlined some tentative proposals for the reorganization of the expeditionary force by which Jacob's command, should he not wish to return to the Sind frontier, would be reduced to a brigade of cavalry. He replies, 'As for myself, I would consent to serve as a private soldier if you wished it, and I felt that by so doing I could be advancing good work, but you can hardly, I think, be serious in proposing to leave me here under command of General Havelock, to look after some sowars at Halilah Bay or elsewhere. A decent Russuldar or poor Tommy T. would do for that business well enough. . . . The political business indeed is the only thing I could wisely be required to remain for at all.

frontier command, where I was organizing a whole people, for any appointment whatever: and I told Government so, officially, when they asked me to act for Frere. I did, however, take the Commissionership because I thought it my duty to do so at Frere's request, and not to stand

in the way of my Lieutenants on the border.

'I again left Sind at your request, solely because you wished it and thought I could be of valuable aid to you here. The whole line of policy we were to work on was, as you know, directly opposed to my views; and nothing would have induced me to take part in this expedition at all except the reasons above mentioned. I have found that I have not been able to be of any use to you, and I would now gladly return to India and get to work again in my old place, or anywhere else where I could have room to live and to grow. From what I have heard since I last wrote to you, (from very many persons whom I can rely on) I should feel that serving under General H. at all was moral DEATH. . . . 'Jacob took occasion to admonish his friend not to be disturbed by newspaper criticisms of his proceedings, which he had thought of answering publicly until dissuaded by Pelly: 'It is what we ARE, not what is said of us, that is alone worth thinking of.'386

He noticed with apprehension that Outram had decided to build huts for the 2nd Division at 'the nearest point to Mohammerah beyond the influence of malaria'. Frank as ever he writes, 'I am quite certain that if you do as you now propose you will make a most shocking mess of it. . . . We know what the Deltas of large rivers are all over the world ... the loss by sickness in one season would probably be fifty times greater than any we could suffer in retaking the place if necessary. . . . I know what I am writing: I have never advised you wrong and I have never yet failed in anything entrusted to me; although these contradictions and uncertainties of action are enough to disorder the firmest will.' He again recommended Bushire and Kharak as the only eligible spots for stationing troops: 'Let all know at once that they are to remain here, and that everything will be done that man can do to make them comfortable.' He had already communicated his own estimate for the force required for the occupation; all the rest ought to be sent back to India. If it was necessary still to show the flag at Mohammarah, two warships could be stationed there; if the crews became sickly, the ships could seave alternately on cruises for health.

Outram was back in Bushire on the last day of April, after inspecting the island of Kharak; and on 2nd May instructions arrived enabling him to use his discretion. So he adopted Jacob's plan, greatly relieved at being able to send back to India the whole of the European troops except for some artillery; for the problem of preserving their health without

adequate protection from the notoriously debilitating climate had

caused him much anxiety.387

There was another reason for thankfulness that they could thus be released for service elsewhere; for Lord Elphinstone's letters of the first week of April conveyed ominous intelligence from the other side of India. The 19th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry had mutinied at Barrackpur and was disbanded by General Hearsey. In a letter to the Governor of 27th April Outram recalled how he had urged upon Lord Dalhousie the necessity of reforming the defective organization of the Bengal Army, but had been told that change of the system of promotion was deprecated by all senior Bengal officers as a 'dangerous innovation'. In spice of the prognostications of the 'Bombay Officer' and a few others, the orthodox authorities could point out that the mutinies of 1844 and 1849 had been suppressed by a judicious mixture of severity and lenience, and seem to have supposed that the same specific would now also answer.

But in 1857 there was more behind. An odd incident in Oudh attracted attention all over India; some new freemasonry was at work but to what end? Towards the end of February, officials of Fatehgarh had been puzzled by the arrival from every police post of little cakes about two inches in diameter. One village watchman from Cawnpore had ordered another to make and bake twelve such chapattis and send two each to the watchmen of the five nearest villages, with a message that they should do likewise. So the little cakes swept over district after district; the European officers inquired in vain, for the watchmen who were the instruments of distribution could not or would not afford a

clue to the meaning of 'so strange an effort'.

By the end of April there were signs that a wave of mutiny would follow the flood of cakes; Henry Lawrence felt it at Lucknow; the 3rd Bengal Cavalry at Meerut refused to accept the new cartridges soon to become notorious. The Governor-General asked Outram to send back the European troops at his discretion; he was able to reply that he had anticipated his wishes, General Jacob having expressed his willingness to remain in command if so desired. 'General Jacob's presence here is of more importance than the retention of a whole regiment of Europeans, for where he is there never can be any want of confidence.' To Lord Elphinstone he wrote, 'With General Jacob here, we can have no anxiety for the future, and my only wish now is that he were vested with supreme control, conscious as I am how much better fitted for it he is than myself.'388

On 17th May the evocuation of Mohammerah was complete and Outram went up to Baghdad for consultation with Mr. Murray, who

was to proceed to Teheran as Ambassador and head of the British Mission. Jacob meanwhile was mainly occupied in arranging for transport of the troops returning to India and providing accommodation for those who were to remain. Characteristically he sent copies of letters to and from Outram to his old friend Colonel Edward Green in Bombay, and of his own side of the correspondence to England, to be printed for private circulation. He wrote also to Frere, who had just returned to Sind, and his reply is revealing: 'I was very sorry to read of your difference with Outram. Without ever rating him as highly as you did, I have a great personal regard for him and thought he would have performed this present service as well as any man I know, yourself excepted. I was not prepared for the utter prostration of his mind, and of the effects which I most regret, one is, quarrelling with his best and most disinterested friend.'

When we read what Outram was writing of Jacob at about the same time; to Lord Clarendon; the President of the Board of Control; the Chairman of the East India Company; and the Governor-General; it is impossible not to regret that Jacob should have taken occasion to reveal his shortcomings, even though the exposure was only to friends. For Outram, with that generosity peculiarly his own, was lavish in praise of Jacob's devotion and self sacrifice, and amply acknowledged his own indebtedness to him. 389

At the beginning of June Jacob received a friendly letter from Nasir Khan of Kelat; his affairs were prospering and he asked for news. In reply Jacob expressed his hope soon to return to his 'old home on the Sinde Frontier'—meanwhile sending the Khan as 'a trifling token of

friendly remembrance' some bottles of attar of roses.

The fury of the storm in India was now increasing day by day, and just after Outram returned to Bushire a message from the Governor-General arrived, that he wished Outram and Jacob to come back to India immediately; 'we want all our best men here'. Outram thought it most impolitic to remove Jacob, to whom he was on the point of handing over his command and his political powers, when it was possible that the Shah, on hearing of the peril of the British in India, might break the treaty. He decided to touch at Karachi and ascertain from Frere whether Jacob was urgently required in Sind; if so, it would be necessary to withdraw altogether from Bushire and take the whole of the force to Karachi, leaving a garrison sufficient, with warships, to hold the island of Kharak.³⁹⁰

So Outram sailed away, soon to gain fresh renown in Oudh, while John Jacob remained at his post of duty with no prospect of distinction and not even that scope for his talents that could bring him satisfaction.

The force under his command now mustered 5500 men of all Arms, only 200 being Europeans. He looked assiduously to the welfare of the troops and established cordial relations with the Persian authorities. But time

soon hung heavily on his hands.

His meetings with old friends during the brief campaign had been fewer than had at first seemed probable. His cousin George Le Grand Jacob, commanding the Light Battalion, had been at Mohammerah and had been one of the first to return to India. Nor had he seen much of Curtis, his predecessor as commandant of the Scinde Horse (and still only a major!); but his old Adjutant J. A. Collier was with him as Assistant Adjutant General, and among comrades in arms of the Sind war he renewed acquaintance with George Hutt of the artillery, Pope the former Collector of Sukkur, and Younghusband, Brigade Major at Hyderabad in his time. George Malcolm had brought one of the last reinforcements to Persia—a detachment of the Southern Mahratta Horse, which he now commanded—and was among the first to leave; he and his men were doing excellent service in crushing an insurrection in the Deccan.

Mail after mail now brought tidings of fresh disasters in India, and Jacob wrote, 'I have long foreseen what is now occurring and long ago pointed out that the worst effects of the system prevailing in our Native army were degradation of the European mind and destruction of those powers by which we command the Asiatics. For twenty years past, the Europeans connected with Bengal have been sedulously occupied in concealing faults instead of trying to remedy them. The causes of the defects were never fairly investigated, while, for discussing them, I was threatened with expulsion from the service. The only remedy proposed or attempted was to add more European bodies to the Indian Army,

instead of cultivating European brains.

But it was no time, he said, for recrimination, or blaming individuals, or saying 'I always said so'. He had no apprehension regarding the ultimate results of the outbreak. If the English in India would only retain confidence, the reconquest could be achieved with the forces there available. He was certain that the troops under his own command—all Indian, but Bombay men—would do their duty as loyally as any Europeans. And it was a grievous disappointment for him that they should be detained in Persia when the superior military power gained from acting together could be applied where most needed in India. He longed to be at work himself.

Looking beyond the reconquest, the re-establishment of British rule would require an imperial effort of all England and India; an effort proceeding from 'a very different order of mind from that formed in

our Indian, especially our Bengal, school. What we require are men of power, firmness and insight: possessing causality, original thought, perception of general law, and able to stand alone. . . . The difficulties now encountering us are of our own creation. India, and the people of India, offer us none—positively none whatever. They aid us at every town, and cry aloud, "Govern us. We are satisfied to have your rule, and are most willing to follow if you lead." What, practically, has been our reply?—"No; we will not govern; we will sink ourselves to your level of moral power, and we will all govern together." In fact, we first destroy all our own power of Government—by making our officers contemptible, by making them degraded in their own eyes, by stopping the whole moral growth; and then we suppose, or pretend to suppose, that by so doing we have rendered the natives of India capable of self-government."

Bartle Frere, at Karachi, was one of the few officers in high positions in India who at this time maintained the standards demanded by Jacob. He denuded the Province of troops in order to aid John Lawrence in the Panjab, though there was difficulty in moving them; for the old steamers of the Indus Flotilla were in the Persian Gulf and the new ones, which he had fully expected to find in commission on his return, had not been fitted out owing to obstinacy in the Bombay dockyard. Moreover Jacob, Frere wrote a little later, 'thought the whole flotilla contrary to the laws of nature and was for abolishing it root and branch: so he took no interest in the matter, which is one of the few points on which I do not agree with him.'

In a letter from Lord Elphinstone dated 23rd July Jacob was informed that the Bombay Government required him for the command of a field force to operate in the Deccan, the quarter in the Bombay Presidency in which danger was chiefly apprehended. The troops of the Nizam of Hyderabad were suspect, and it was thought that the Deccani and Konkani Muslims might make common cause with them if they mutinied. Elphinstone, in Frere's view, while deserving great credit had been paralysed by lack of a commander who knew how to manage Indian troops, and by the drain upon the Bombay Army by timid persons elsewhere.

From Calcutta Outram wrote enthusiastically to Jacob, that he had urged the Governor-General to give him command of the proposed Army of Central India, which would be the highest command in India after the Eastern Army led by the Commander-in-Chief in person. Outram's own part in the campaign, he said, would be 'very secondary'. 392

The Scinde Horse were embarked for India on 29th July: just before

the transports sailed orders came for them to proceed to Bombay instead of Karachi. Malcolm Green remained with a detachment at Bushire for some time longer. The return of the corps had been anxiously awaited in Sind ever since June, when the Sind Cossid wrote, 'at any time the return of this splendid Corps would have been hailed with delight, but never more so than at the present critical juncture when the presence of every loyal soldier adds to the feeling of public security.' It was disappointing when the transports merely touched at Karachi en route for Bombay, but Frere made himself responsible for retaining a detachment of about 100 men. Shortly after the 1st Scinde Horse had left Jacobabad en route for Persia, the 6th regiment of Bengal Irregular Cavalry was sent down from Multan to strengthen the frontier garrison. They proved instead a source of weakness; with the outbreak of the Mutiny their disaffection became obvious and the Panjab authorities refused to recall them. We read in the Sind Cossid that there was 'a fearful panic' at Shikarpur in the middle of June, owing to a rumour that this regiment was in a state of mutiny. Merewether had urged that the 1st Scinde Horse should be sent to him as quickly as possible on arrival from Persia; for he now had to face the additional prospect of trouble in Kelat.

On 2nd June Nasir Khan had died suddenly at little more than thirty years of age. He was succeeded by his half-brother Mir Khudadad Khan who wrote some weeks later to Jacob at Bushire to express his desire for his friendship and kindness which had been so valued by Nasir Khan. Jacob sent a suitable reply and in a letter to his old friend Mullah Ahmed, the Khan's wazir, says, 'I shall always look upon my attempts to benefit the State of Kelat as the best deeds of my life. . . . I had confidently hoped to have been able now to have returned to my place on the border (where indeed I wished to have ended my life) and to have again met there yourself and all my old friends, but . . . it has pleased God that I should have to proceed from Persia to the Deccan on duty. God knows if I shall ever see Baloochistan again, but whether present or absent believe that my heart is with your people.'393

Jacob was in fact delayed at Bushire by the slow progress in Teheran of negotiations for giving effect to the terms of peace. As late as 29th August a message reached him from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe that Her Majesty's Government did not think that Bushire should yet be evacuated, but he had already informed the Persian authorities that he was about to give up the place, 'so that we could not now change our proceedings without a renewal of hostilities on our part, and something very like breach of faith.'

Friends in India kept him informed of current events. On 27th

August Frere wrote to him of affairs in the area in which it was intended that he should command. There seemed to have been 'shameful mismanagement' at Nasirabad and Kolhapur; but Jacob's cousin George Le Grand had done much good in the south, and as soon as Lord Elphinstone, who had kept his head admirably, had John Jacob for his right hand, he would be able to act aggressively. 'You will be able to enlighten them in Bombay on many points connected with Sind. I hope they are convinced that 160 effective European bayonets, which is all we have between the sea and Multan, is not quite enough as a permanent strength for the Force in this part of our Indian Frontier.' As Jacob himself was not to return to Sind, Frere had directed another officer to raise a regiment of Indian infantry on his principles.394

The infection of mutiny at length, in the beginning of September 1857, broke out among the troops in Sind. At Hyderabad men of the 5th Company Golandaz had prepared to seize the fort, but their subadar major reported their disaffection in time for their officers to

anticipate and disarm them.

A plot in Merewether's old regiment, the 21st Bombay Native Infantry then at Karachi, and containing a high proportion of men from Oudh, was similarly foiled; they had intended to rise, obtain the cooperation of another regiment and the Moslems of the town, kill all who opposed them and march to Delhi (then about to be re-taken by the British.) But two loyal Indian officers communicated the mutineers' intention in the nick of time: the regiment was paraded in the middle of the night under the muzzles of the European artillery, with the other Indian infantry standing by. Twenty-one men of the 21st were absent; it was found that they had made for Las Bela State, where the Jam had been disaffected ever since the elevation of Khudadad Khan to the throne of Kelat, to which he considered he had a claim. Captain Marston with a party of his police pursued and brought these men of the 21st to action; the survivors together with the rest of the mutineers were duly tried by court martial and the ringleaders executed.395

The danger in Upper Sind was far greater, for there were no European troops within two hundred miles, there was a disloyal Bengal regiment:

and there was a plot with some method about it.

In June the old freebooter Darya Khan, chief of the Jakhrani tribe and ex-jamadar of Jacob's Baluch Guides, began intriguing with Dil Murad Khan Khoso, a Baluch zemindar of the Frontier District who had joined him and the other Kachhi marauders in 1844 and was captured with them by Sir Charles Napier in the Hill Campaign. He had been pardoned and in 1847 Jacob had employed him and some of his men as Guides, but dismissed him on finding that he was in correspondence with

the trans-border raiders. These two old comrades in ill-doing had made some progress with attempts to engage other Baluch tribes in their plans when Merewether, who was aware of their intrigues, arrested Dil Murad ostensibly on the ground that he was in arrears with payment of his land revenue. It was some time before Darya Khan made up his mind to persevere with the plot; its execution was designed to coincide with a rising of other Baluch tribes in the Panjab. He seems to have counted too on being joined by the 6th Bengal Irregular Cavalry. The men of this regiment, on the approach of the festival of Moharram at the beginning of September, began to make preparations to celebrate it in the usual noisy fashion, whereupon Merewether drew attention to Jacob's prohibition. Some of the Bengal troopers went to a rissaldar of the Scinde Horse in the hope of finding that the order was resented by the Muslim soldiers of the corps, but were told 'It is the order, and in my opinion a very good one: but at any rate it is the order and must be obeyed.' And it was obeyed.

Darya Khan was still confident, persuading himself that the tribes in the southern Panjab really intended to rise, and counting on those of the Sind border, from whom he had been unable to obtain any undertaking, to join the others. He knew that a mutiny was being planned in the garrison at Shikarpur and appears to have arranged with the leaders

there to strike simultaneously with them.

Merewether was well aware of Darya Khan's approaches to the other Baluch chiefs, as were his Indian officers and many of the rank and file of the Scinde Horse; but the chief proceeded with his plans in complete ignorance that they were known. He held a meeting of his tribesmen near Janidero and directed them to assemble at Jacobabad on the evening of 20th September and on the following morning attack the European officers when they were all together as usual in the orderly room. Darya Khan himself went into Jacobabad on the afternoon of the 20th and was promptly arrested without the slightest disturbance taking place.

It was natural to assume that with the failure of the plot at Jacobabad there would be no mutiny at Shikarpur; the police were aware of some seditious discussions among the troops on the 21st. But three days later, at midnight, some of the Golandaz seized four artillery guns and started firing wildly among the barracks. After a confused encounter with the loyal majority of the troops, aided by the police, the few mutineers fled

and all danger of insurrection in Sind was at an end. 396

Frere, who had played a conspicuous part in the successful handling of the Karachi affair, wrote that few but Oudh men had been implicated in the Sind mutinies, and no very far-reaching plot had been unearthed. He by no means disbelieved that the underlying discontent had a deeper

origin and that it was fanned by agents from Teheran and perhaps from farther north and west.

As to the causes of the Mutiny in general, there were many men in Bengal who adopted the simple and convenient conclusion, which has sometimes been ascribed, erroneously, to Sir John Lawrence, that nothing underlay the rising but the resentment produced by the notorious greased cartridges. This in fact was only the immediate cause of the outbreak at Meerut, and such a view ignored significant but unexplained incidents of an earlier date, like the chapatti signal, which was presumably sent out by some secret organization among petty officials in the civil departments and perhaps other elements in the population of Oudh. The extinction of that kingdom, which had resulted in hardship for many classes of its inhabitants, following Dalhousie's previous annexations and his reforms in law and administration generally, had given rise to widespread apprehension that soon no good old custom would be respected by the British rulers; while the Bengal sepoys were more than ever jealous of the slightest innovation that could infringe their close corporation of caste.

Jacob's writings on the native troops, copies of which were eagerly sought for in Britain and India, had exposed to the roots the characteristic indiscipline of the Bengal Army. But in his view the mutinies among the troops were much more than the reaction of pampered soldiers to weak government, while the various coincident grounds for discontent were no more than the immediate predisposing causes of the convulsions of 1857, the whole being kindled from a much deeper source.

The influence on his mind of Anacalypsis, to which Jacob refers as 'that wonderful mine of truth and ancient learning', appears at intervals in his journal for the year 1857. We find him giving an exhaustive interpretation of the esoteric meaning of symbols inscribed on an ancient silver cup shown to him by an officer serving with the field force in Persia. And in Anacalypsis Jacob believed that he had found the key to the disturbances in India, the epicentre of which was in Oudh. The Hindus in general believed that there had been nine Avatars or incarnations of Vishnu, who usually appeared thus on earth to avenge some oppression. It was expected that a tenth Avatar would appear in Oudh, born of a pure virgin, who would destroy all tyranny and establish virtuous happiness without any distinctions of caste or even of religion. Jacob's thesis was that a similar cyclar system was the real foundation of every faith in the East; with every solar cycle a conqueror or Messiah was to appear on earth. According to the esoteric doctrines of Islam, he declares, Mahomed was the tenth Avatar, and 1260 years after his

appearance Armageddon, followed by a millennium, was expected to take place. This, according to Jacob, was expected not only in the Islamic world but by the Tsar of Russia, an initiate in these mysteries, whose attempt to exploit the opportunity for his own ends was foiled in the Crimea. Nevertheless, the swell of mystic expectation had to pass over the whole of the East. Had the Bengal Army been in a sound state the wave might not have disturbed India; but the European officers having no healthy authority over the sepoys, the latter became initiated in these mystic doctrines. In conclusion Jacob says he cannot enter fully into the causes of the Indian outbreak—'they must be hidden from the uninitiated. They can, indeed, be fully known only to those who (as I have done) have laboured earnestly and diligently to master the secret

mysteries on which they have depended.'

The reader of today, aware of such cults as the British Israelites, who number distinguished soldiers among their adherents, may not be so astonished by this strange document as were the contemporaries of John Jacob, to whom he was the personification of common sense, who scorned accepted authorities if they would not stand the tests of reason and experience. It is impossible not to agree with the comments of a reviewer of his published works, who wrote in the following year, 'We should like to know who at Jacobabad initiated General Jacob. What are we to say to this? Does it indicate the Nemesis of intellectual selfconfidence? The apostle of Government by natural forces, who thinks that if only no concealment is permitted, and the principle of admitting the free exercise of reason and common-sense under the eyes of the public be allowed, all evil must disappear—he, of all men, is the initiated and earnest and diligent student of mysteries which produce such fruit as the Bengal Mutiny, and can only tell us . . . that this particular fruit of these secret doctrines could not have occurred if only our rulers would have organized the Native Army as he advised. We wish for the sake of his own due influence that he had never written this note, and that, when written, his Editor had possessed more discretion than to publish

Certainly one notices with regret that catching at coincidences, disregard of opposing evidence, and jumping to conclusions characteristic of enthusiasts beguiled by the fascination of cabbalist and other mysticism—so foreign to the regular processes of Jacob's well-balanced mind. Yet it has to be admitted that certain manifestations of the Indian Mutiny can be best, if not only, explained as the effect of some such wave of mystical aspiration as he believed to derive from the esoteric doctrines of several creeds.

At nearly the same time Jacob decided to give to the world the

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statement of his personal religious beliefs and theory of evolution contained in the Letters to a Lady. Some of the privately printed copies having fallen into hostile hands, he had been assailed in private and public correspondence. This he seems to have ignored, till he was charged by a well-known divine and author in the Bombay Presidency with having forced the pamphlet into circulation in order to spread his pernicious doctrines without being subjected to public criticism. He at once set forth to publish the letters with a 'Prefatory Apology', appending an impressive list of the works—among them Anacalypsis—on which he based his estimate of Christian doctrine. In answer to the accusation that he had tried to undermine religion and morality and corrupt youth he declared, 'I have endeavoured to impress on all whom it was my duty to instruct, the grand and simple truth, that real nobility of mind consists in being and doing good and right for good and right's sake only.' 398

At the end of September, a few days after dispatching this letter, Jacob was informed that a Persian officer was en route to Bushire to take charge of the place, and he gave orders for embarkation. In his final dispatch to Lord Clarendon Jacob acknowledges the cordial conduct of the Persian authorities and the friendliness of the people, who seemed

to regret the departure of their late enemies.

A week's voyage brought him to Karachi on 9th October. On the following day letters arrived from Lord Elphinstone. The Moharram festival had passed off quietly; on the other hand Frere's reports of the danger on the Sind Frontier, the critical condition of Kelat, the disaffection of the Jam of Las Bela and the closure of all communications between Sind and Multan gave great cause for anxiety. It was still uncertain whether there yet might not be a general insurrection in the Panjab. Lord Elphinstone therefore desired Jacob to remain in Sind and resume his command and political duties on the frontier. Frere recommended his friend to proceed first to Bombay to consult with the Governor, so after landing his horses and kit and writing to Merewether to send camels down to Karachi, Jacob re-embarked. On the brief voyage he wrote a paper on the reorganization of the armies of India, sitting up the whole of one night to write a copy to be sent to England for printing.

In Bombay Jacob stayed with his old friend Colonel Edward Green. Nearly twenty years had passed since he had last seen the Presidency town and it afforded at least one new experience: after interviews with Lord Elphinstone he made his first trip by railway on the short line recently built. To eyes that had looked so long on the dreary landscapes of coastal Persia and Sind the Konkan country, fresh from the monsoon, was delightfully soothing. After a week in Bombay, with further

consultations with the Governor, Jacob embarked for Sind—to leave it no more. 399

The troops released from Persia were already doing good work in Central India and two months later Sir Hugh Rose was to assume the command, for which Jacob had been selected, of what had then become the Central India Field Force.

The Persian campaign had been almost entirely forgotten in the desperate crisis in India. Outram, having himself received the most flattering recognition of his services, exerted himself on behalf of those who had contributed to his success. The first orders issued by the Government of India by no means satisfied him. After mentioning errors and omissions in respect of a number of officers, Outram had written of his successor in command to Lord Canning, on 5th July.

He presumed that Jacob's services were to be acknowledged in a separate dispatch, as he had performed 'the most important duty of the whole campaign'—the maintenance of the base at Bushire, in face of a numerically superior force; thus relieving his Commander-in-Chief's anxiety and inspiring confidence in the troops, after the suicides of their general and naval commander. Jacob had then denied himself the prospect of earning distinction at Mohammerah; and again, he could have claimed to return to India, as he wished to do, under Lord Canning's telegraphic message, but readily agreed to remain; 'and your Lordship is aware that I was enabled to send back all the European troops solely under the confidence inspired among the native troops that remained, by General Jacob's presence.' To no other officer, again, could the final evacuation have been entrusted when news of the outbreak in India might have encouraged the Persians to renew hostilities against so small a force. Outram felt sure that the Governor-General would deem Jacob's services deserving of a gazette to himself.400

To us, who have been behind the scenes in this brief campaign, it is evident that Outram's obligations to his friend also included much good advice and moral support. But how little had been at stake in Persia compared with the responsibilities which they were now to undertake apart, Outram in Oudh and John Jacob in his old post on the Sind

frontier.

CHAPTER XIX

The Last Year on the Frontier

On 4th November 1857 Jacob, accompanied by Henry Green and Pelly, set out on the march up the country to Jacobabad by the familiar route

through the hills.

Pelly was engaged in giving the final touches to the selections from his chief's writings, which he was editing for publication under the title The Views and Opinions of General Jacob, and dates his preface from the camp at Pokhran. Jacob himself had just written an introduction to his own Letters to a Lady and given directions for it to be published: a revised edition—the fourth—of Rifle Practice was to be issued, and also a recension of his Tracts on the Native Army of India complete, together with his plan for its reorganization and the startling note on the causes of the rebellion. At one camp Jacob interviewed some young officers, aspirants for service with the Scinde Horse, in anticipation of orders for raising a third regiment which had actually been passed on 12th November.

Part of this journey was made in company with Frere who was proceeding on his regular cold weather tour, together with his wife. The internal tranquillity of Sind which allowed the Commissioner and other civil officers thus to tour as usual with no more than the normal escort must seem marvellous when the condition at the time of most other Indian provinces is called to mind. The danger to Frere's and Jacob's charge was from without, not from within, and all North-West India was threatened thereby though Frere, ever imperturbable, could write on his way to the frontier, 'matters seem to be quieting down in Kelat. The Jam of Beila professes to be very penitent for his late misconduct. I have pointed out to his messengers that when the Khan pardons him I will listen to his excuses. . . . '401 The significance of this will be apparent when we have taken a backward glance at affairs in Kelat

subsequent to the death of Mir Nasir Khan. His successor was his half brother Khudadad Khan, who was only eighteen years of age and had been brought up obscurely in the zenana. The Khanate had suffered another great misfortune by the death in August 1857 of the Wazir Mullah Ahmed, Jacob's old friend and pupil. In the following month the tribal chieftains had gathered in Kelat to do homage to their new suzerain, but the Jam of Las Bela, being disaffected, headed a clique which pressed their grievances on the Khan in such a truculent manner that he, on the advice of Darogha Gul Mahomed, expelled the remonstrants by force of arms from the garden near the capital where they had encamped. Retiring to a short distance they addressed petitions for redress to the British authorities—a proof of the extent of Jacob's influence in Baluchistan-while at the same time assembling their followers to enforce the Khan's attention to their claims.

The situation at Jacobabad in this same month of September 1857 was most critical, with the 6th Bengal Irregular Cavalry thoroughly disloyal and the single regiment of Scinde Horse then on the frontier ready to repress the first symptom of overt mutiny; with the Shikarpur garrison simmering in rear and Darya Khan's intrigues all around. Yet Merewether had not hesitated to send his most experienced lieutenant,

G. W. Macauley, to Kelat.

The principal advisor of the Khan at this time was a Hindu, of whom Bartle Frere wrote, 'A Jewish Prime Minister could scarcely have been more obnoxious to the Barons of Robert the Bruce, than was the Hindoo Wuzeer to the haughty, ignorant and bigoted chiefs of Beloochistan: and it was difficult to understand that even the love of money and power should have so far blinded the old man Gungaram to the danger that he ran . . . the only explanation was that he looked for support from some other quarter.' This was doubtless from Britain's late enemy Persia, through the restless intriguer Azad Khan, Chief of Kharan, a province formerly owning the suzerainty of Kelat; he was able from his geographical position to identify himself with the interests of Herat, Persia or Baluchistan according as might seem expedient at any time.

Gangaram set out to thwart all that Macauley did, and took occasion to remark in his and the Khan's presence that the British would do well to reduce their own dominions to order before trying to teach other rulers how to govern. Nevertheless Macauley persuaded the young Khan to attend to public business, and soon won the confidence of those sardars who had the good of the Khanate at heart. Only the presence of

the British officer had prevented civil war. 402

Such was the situation when Jacob returned to the frontier on 30th November. Only 350 Scinde Horsemen of all ranks could be present on

parade at Jacobabad two days later. The 6th Bengal Cavalry were relegated to Kashmor and on 7th December Henry Green was sent to relieve Macauley at the Khan's court, then at Gandava his winter headquarters. Green's first reports confirmed Macauley's opinion that unless the obnoxious minister were dismissed, genuine grievances redressed, and Kelat governed more in accordance with tradition and custom, the tribal chiefs would rebel against the Khan. Frere now arrived at Jacobabad and as proposed by Jacob invited the Khan to visit the place, which he had expressed a desire to see, and there confer with the Commissioner and the Political Superintendent. The Khan accepted, and on 29th December they went to meet him. The rendezvous was Shahpur, the scene of Jacob's brisk action in 1845. Then, the country for many miles around had been under the scourge of the predatory tribes of hill and plain; now flocks and herds were grazing peacefully in the stubble of wide spreading cultivation, and the tribal chieftains, though nursing grievances against their suzerain, were peaceably assembled and prepared to submit them to the British officers. The steady element among them were indeed urgent that Major Green should remain with the young Khan to save the country from the mischief of evil counsellors. Even Darogha Gul Mahomed, who after his master Mehrab Khan had been killed in the storming of Kelat said that the sight of an Englishman always 'made blood come out at his eyes', had besought Macauley to look after the interests of Khudadad Khan.

The whole assembly now moved to Jacobabad. There were formal Durbars, but the all important issue of the unpopular Wazir Gangaram was discussed with Khudadad Khan alone. The young Khan did his best to retain the crafty old man, who had ingratiated himself by assiduously ministering to his pleasures: Frere and Jacob had to make it clear that they could not recognize or receive as chief minister of the State a man universally hated, whose presence was regarded by the sardars as an insult. Under such pressure, the Khan at last consented to dismiss Gangaram and in his place appointed Shaghasi Wali Mahomed, who had commanded Nasir Khan's levies on the Persian frontier during the war. The choice gave general satisfaction; but most of the sardars nursed individual grievances which they were determined to force on the Khan's notice when he was no longer surrounded by British officers. Green was well aware of these causes of friction and gave his cue to Jacob, who made a speech to the assembled chiefs in the presence of the Khan and the Commissioner.

So, that February day in 1858, Jacob got to his feet on the dais in the great Durbar Hall which he had built on to his house, in front of the seated ranks of the sardars of Baluchistan—huge turbans over bearded

faces, long ringlets falling on the shoulders of embroidered coats and poshteens: on his right hand the little dark-faced Khan fidgeting on his chair and beyond him again the tall spare form of Bartle Frere. Immediately behind sat Henry Green and the few other officers of the Scinde Horse who were not on duty elsewhere—on thorns lest their commander's stammer should get the better of him. In English recitation his tongue was loosened; but might not the impediment trip him in extempore Hindustani? They were soon at ease, as he who had not 'passed' in any language, launched into fluent remonstrance and exhortation: the sardars, if they wished to see their country flourishing and their sovereign respected, should co-operate for the general good, instead of pressing their individual claims, and indulging their petty jealousies and differences at so critical a time. Frere writes, 'They were evidently touched and pleased with the heartiness and manliness of the address, professed a sincere wish to be guided by the advice so frankly given, and a thorough reliance on the good will of the British Govern-

The meeting concluded with the customary parade of the Scinde Horse. It could not be a big affair, for the greater part of the First Regiment were still serving in Rajputana, and the frontier outposts needed more than ever to be kept at full strength. Still, it was sufficiently known in Baluchistan that the power of Jacob's Corps did not depend on mere numbers; and the Khan and his nobles left 'apparently much pleased with their visit, and in better humour with each other than

when they arrived.'403

From Henry Green's reports Jacob was satisfied that the recent rebellion of the sardars had been aimed to replace Khudadad Khan by Azad Khan, the chief of Kharan and father-in-law of the late Khan. As we have seen, this chieftain had lately been acting in the Persian interest, but he was now in even closer relations with the Sardars of Kandahar. There was still a strong feeling among many of the Kelat chiefs that he would make a better Khan than Mir Khudadad, and nothing but the personal influence of Green had saved the latter. The ferment was extending beyond those tribes which were immediately concerned with the Khan; the Bugti chief, Ghulam Murtaza Khan, now entered into an alliance with his hereditary rivals the Marris; lawless individuals from the Panjab and Sind were joining them-some even of the Jakhranis had begun to send their families and cattle towards the hills under various pretences. The danger of renewed rebellion in Kelat, perhaps with the intervention of Persia or Kandahar, and involving the whole frontier in disorder, was more imminent than ever before. Jacob had in 1847 given peace to the distracted border with a single regiment,

but in 1858 far more was at stake—the prosperity which he had himself created there and the tranquillity of Sind, which enabled support to be given to the Panjab and Rajputana. Sufficient physical force must, he urged, be forthcoming if events took an adverse turn; 800 sabres of the Scinde Horse were not enough; 'they might be overwhelmed by mere brute numbers, if the moral influences which have hitherto kept these multitudes in subjection were withdrawn, or even temporarily forgotten in the excitement of internal revolution or foreign invasion.'404

Frere had denuded his province of Regular troops while European reinforcements were passing through, but only in the expectation that the 1st Regiment Scinde Horse would soon return to the frontier. Meanwhile he expressed his 'deliberate opinion that no reinforcements confined to this province can afford more than comparative security, and that our position can never be a really safe one, until we adopt the measure which has been already repeatedly urged by General Jacob, of occupying Quetta as an outpost . . . effectually securing the key of our whole frontier south of Ghuznee, and enabling us to check and flank any force which might threaten the northern part of the Panjab by the route of the Khyber.'

Frere pointed out that if Azad Khan achieved his ambition, the throne of Kelat, the Bolan pass would be sealed against the British while remaining available to unfriendly powers in Central Asia and the West, and ultimately to Russia. He explained that he had been an unwilling convert to Jacob's Quetta policy. Amongst other objections he had considered the move unnecessary, as it would be possible to take up th's advanced position whenever impending danger made it necessary to do

so in self-defence.

But the history of Herat and Kandahar showed how unscrupulous neighbours, appearing in the guise of friends, might act in regard to Quetta. A little later Frere wrote, 'My immediate apprehension is, not that we may see a Russian General above the Bolan, but simply that if we go to sleep and neglect to secure Quetta, we may any day—when Dost Mahomed dies or the next triennial Afghan revolution comes round—hear that Quetta has been seized by some adventurer, who may or may not be a friend of ours, but who will certainly make the best, for his own profit, of his prize.

'We must either interfere in force, or keep up such a force in the vile climate of Upper Sind as shall avert all risks of our new neighbours

plundering Cutchee and menacing Shikarpur and the Indus.'

Lord Elphinstone was not unsympathetic; he had almost been won over by Jacob's arguments in the autumn of 1856, but, Frere writes, 'he still seems to consider our hands are too full for it just now. This seems

to me as though a man, with a deep and rapid river in his front, were to abstain from seizing the only bridge across it till the enemy on the other side ceased to threaten him.' Calcutta too was obdurate. Having neglected the opportunity which the Persian war had afforded, the Supreme Government could now say that 'they did not consider it expedient to pass a judgment on the isolated question of the formation of a cantonment at Quetta.'405 In expectation of such a decision Frere had recommended as an alternative a measure 'which affords the next best chance of security'—the formation of a field force of all Arms to be stationed at Jacobabad under the Political Superintendent as suggested by Jacob in April 1855. It was now proposed that the force should consist of the Brigade of Scinde Horse-three regiments-a mountain battery of artillery, and two regiments of infantry organized on the silladar principle and armed with the rifle which Jacob himself had invented and perfected. Jacob was prepared to postpone raising the artillery if he could have the infantry, and in warmly recommending the scheme to Lord Elphinstone Frere observed, 'As for the arms of such Silladar infantry—if the orders of the Home Government are very imperative the men might be armed with fusils, pending a reference to England; but it seems to me that the arguments against giving them rifles are equally valid against anything but sticks and stones . . . they are to be on the frontier at a place and a season where Europeans cannot be permanently posted, and they may well have to meet well-armed men. Some months ago I sent you Major Lumsden's account of Ghulam Hyder's Candahar Rifles, who were in Major L's opinion quite equal in armament, skill and drill to any Corps in our service. Against such men our troops must be armed with something better than an old pattern musket. Moreover, our great Indian difficulty is financial; and if by giving a man a good rifle you can make him equal to two men with bad muskets, it is clearly the more economical course to give him the rifle.'

Such arguments were not easily admitted by the conservative pundits in the military departments of the Governments of Bombay and India. Jacob had been reduced almost to desperation by the delays which prevented him embodying the third regiment of Scinde Horse. He had given in the names of the officers to be seconded for this in October 1857, with a memorandum covering every detail, and the Government had issued orders for raising the regiment; yet six months later the officers had not been gazetted, so no practical effect could be produced; while in response to his requests that his first regiment should be sent back to the frontier, the Bombay Government replied that all appeared to be quiet there and Jacob's force ought to 'amount to 1200 sabres of

Scinde Horse'—three hundred of these in fact existing only on paper. Moreover it took Jacob three months' correspondence, with the support of Frere and the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army, to induce the Government to allow the specially sanctioned Forge establishment of his regiments to continue, instead of assimilating it with that of the Poona Irregular Horse. While this had still not been conceded Jacob writes to Frere, 'Let Government cease to allow their Military Secretary to treat me like a returned convict . . . without freedom of action and without the confidence of Government, I can do little good, and all

effort is vain and heart-breaking.'406

Jacob's personal opponents were active at this time. He had given fresh provocation by his note on the causes of the Mutiny, and the publication of his Letters to a Lady aroused a storm in which his brothers seem to have joined, denouncing his agnostic doctrines both in public and private letters. In addition, he was disgusted by the lack of policy apparent in the supreme direction of affairs, which was directly responsible for their deterioration in the first few months of 1858. The incessant howl for more blood raised by editors and merchants in safe sea ports, and the indiscriminate severity still meted out by soldiers in the field was painfully inconsistent with the almost equally pernicious pronouncements of Herbert Edwardes and his like, that it was England's duty to convert the Indian people to Christianity, for the Mutiny was clearly God's judgment on India's rulers for allowing non-Christian principles to influence their administration.

While confusion of thought and purpose thus prolonged the chaos in Central India and Oudh, John Jacob was straining every nerve, with no resources but his own moral power and that of two or three subalterns and nine hundred troopers, to ward off the lowering threat of a general

insurrection of the tribes on and beyond his frontier.

At this moment, a violent personal attack was launched on him in a pamphlet published in Calcutta—A letter to Brigadier General John Jacob, C.B. appearing over the name 'Lucilius', which for sheer malice and

ineptitude deserves a high place in a Dunciad of the times.

The argument is that Jacob's military pamphlets—lately re-issued—were the fruit of a morbid vanity and craving for publicity. 'What, were you afraid that your dearly, too dearly, won notoriety was in danger of being obscured? Why! you had had your say, had blown your trumpet, both words and blasts had attracted at least sufficient attention to you and the Scinde Horse! Were you afraid that in the overwhelming agony of England for her sons and daughters, you might be temporarily forgotten, that her piercing cry of misery would drown the tones of your jubilant songs of self glorification?'

The Bombay Times, commenting on this farrago at the same time as reviewing Jacob's Views and Opinions, observed that he was distinguished as a writer rather for coarse strength than extreme courteousness: but the state of the Bengal Army had been a subject requiring the

plainest speaking.407

Personal slights thus added to the irritation John Jacob felt at the general misconception and misdirection of public affairs. We find him writing to his brother Philip on 17th March, 'You good people in England have the strangest ideas with regard to India's wants and administration. By far the greatest danger now existing in India is European violence. If the attempt to govern this great Empire by muscular force—by English carcasses instead of by English brains—which is now being so madly and so universally recommended by England, be actually made, the Empire is lost-and the exhausting struggle to retain it by such means will end in the downfall of our own country. . . . The proposing to introduce the religion of England "by law established" into India with an army of Bishops and priests in order to add to our ruling power is absolute madness. . . . We have seen enough of such things in Ireland -and it is quite certain that we can never reign securely in India while we adopt or profess any State religion whatever. Our subjects have forty different faiths-how then can we rule justly when we assume the truth of any one doctrine and adopt it as law?

'Let us strive to cultivate, to develop, to rule by, those attributes of human nature which all men alike acknowledge to be excellent—which all men feel to lead upwards and onwards, and we shall reign over these poor Asiatics with infinitely greater security and more power than if we had in India the whole grand army of Napoleon to do his bidding.

'I have worked with such forces and know their irresistible power. I would hold India to England as the Earth is held to the Sun. Our rulers are now acting as wisely as would the man who should attempt to

secure the planet in its orbit by a chain cable!

'I wish much that I could find rest to write to you at length or at least a little less hastily on these matters. . . . But it is impossible! The business I strive to get through daily would be enough to overwhelm fifty brains instead of one, I seldom get above three hours' sleep in the twenty four and the work will kill me at last, which I shall be glad of, for I have proved and established principles and built foundations on which others will be able to work without being oppressed by the load of odium and foul abuse, and universal opposition, which has been heaped on me. . . .

'You have strange ideas of my position here. I was appointed by the Govt. of Bombay not to the Comd. of a Brigade exactly but to command a Field Force of many Brigades in Central India—but having been

detained in Persia, before I could join the said Comd. affairs became in that state on the N.W. frontier that Govt. requested me to return here instead, and this was assuredly the wisest course to have adopted, for by reason of long experience and local knowledge this is my natural field of action.

'I am now occupying the most important, delicate, and difficult post in all India—without exception. And I trust that my labors will be of more value than if I were successfully engaged in destroying all the "Pandies" in existence. All real danger from mutineers long ago ceased, the only danger now is from our own follies and excesses, from the total want of grasp and scope of intellect displayed by those in power; and from the total want of discrimination between the innocent and the guilty, friend and foe, on the part of subordinates.'408

But there were compensations for the sorely tried John Jacob. The conduct of the 1st Scinde Horse on service under the command of his subalterns was proving to the hilt all that he had claimed for his organization. Briggs had just brought two squadrons back to Jacobabad after eighteen hundred miles of marching and fighting, while Malcolm

Green was still in the field with one squadron.

The regiment had disembarked near Bombay, wholly unprovided with baggage cattle, for these had been assembled for them in Karachi in the expectation that they would land there. Over one hundred of the troop horses also had died on the sea voyages, and the monsoon being at its height they lost many more after landing. Yet in little over a month the men had equipped themselves again and the regiment was ready for any service. A detachment was ordered to relieve the Southern Maratha Horse—George Malcolm's corps—at Satara while Briggs took the remainder to join the field force engaged in restoring order northward of Nasik. The three squadrons had again been assembled on Malcolm Green's arrival from Persia, with orders to return with them to Sind but allowing full discretion as to the route; he was to do as much good as possible in the disturbed areas near which he might pass. The first such duty was to co-operate in the seige of Awah in Rajputana. Here the regiment was actively employed till the beginning of February 1858.

While Briggs took the main body across the desert to Sind, Green with one squadron complied with a requisition by General Roberts, whom we last saw in Sind in 1843, and was engaged at the capture of Kotah. Thereafter he marched through the districts west of Delhi. The homes of many of the Scinde Horsemen were in or near this area, which was notoriously disaffected. The men were freely given leave to visit their families and friends. The rule at the time was to open all sepoys'

correspondence, but no censorship was imposed on the letters of the men of the Scinde Horse. They, however, often handed to Green letters inciting them to mutiny, which were read out amid derision in the orderly room.⁴⁰⁹

There had been a reign of terror in these districts after the storming of Delhi. The Governor-General had been prevailed upon to appoint special commissioners, each vested with full powers of life and death, to supplement the labours of the military commission which was sitting to try all persons accused of rebellion; and not a few individuals took these powers on themselves with no authority whatsoever. In Delhi itself the place of execution became a popular lounge for some officers. On one occasion a batch of ten or a dozen men were brought before the Commission. There was no direct evidence against them, but it was remarked that they looked like soldiers, or as if they had at one time borne arms; and that was enough. They were soon all hanging from the gallows.' One at least of the relatives of Jacob's men, resident in the

district, was among such victims.

The loyalty of the Scinde Horsemen was put to an even severer trial. After orders for raising three extra troops for the corps were received in March 1857, Merewether had sent a party of a few Indian officers, N.C.O.'s and men to the Delhi districts for recruiting. They had made some progress with the work when mutineers from Meerut arrived at Delhi. The rissaldar commanding the recruiting party at once offered his services to the Collector of the Gurgaon District where he then was, and patrolled the camp; but the district was speedily submerged in the general disorder, and the rissaldar ordered his men to retire to their villages till further orders. Two of the party were seized by mutineers, but escaped with the loss of one carbine. In August orders reached the rissaldar to return to Jacobabad, and after many adventures he arrived there on 17th September, in time to give the lie to the story spread by the 6th Bengal Irregulars that he and his party had joined the mutineers. After the recapture of Delhi a British force accompanied by civil officers came to 're-establish authority' in the Gurgaon district. One of the Scinde Horse troopers, by name Ahmed Ali, who had remained in his village as ordered by the rissaldar, was denounced to the officers and summarily hanged by them as a rebel or deserter, though he had produced certificates from his commandant and from Hodson at Delhi, and begged that reference should be made to them. His arms and horse were confiscated and his house given over to plunder.

The fate of this loyal soldier and the similar execution a little later of the rissaldar's uncle, who had risked his life forwarding Government letters while the rebels were supreme, had become known in the corps

before Green led his squadron through these same districts; the dragonnades were then over and the remainder of the recruiting party had long

since made their way back to Jacobabad.

Under all this provocation, and taunts from the Bengal Cavalry that they had become Christians, the corps of Scinde Horse remained uniformly staunch. 'Some Bengalee friends of mine,' says Jacob, 'have been spreading a story of Sind Horsemen going over to the enemy at Delhi': the only foundation for this was that 'a fellow who was formerly a Native officer in the Sind Irr. Horse and who was allowed to resign the service some two years ago to save him from being dismissed for lying did I believe join the mutineers at Delhi and wear the Sind Irregular Horse uniform.' Some of the 'cast' carbines of the corps, too, were found in mutineers' hands, giving rise to similar imputations; but there were none of the double-barrelled type with which the Scinde Horsemen had been exclusively armed for three years past. 410

When in accordance with orders Briggs prepared to take two squadrons of the 1st Regiment back to the frontier from Rajputana, Brigadier-General George Lawrence made an urgent requisition for some Irregular Horse for his further operations. Jacob and Frere, who was then at Jacobabad, agreed that some aid must be given and it was improvised by Jacob from the Baluch Guides attached to the Scinde Horse. A hundred and twenty-five of them were placed under Macauley's command and fellow tribes nen were recruited to bring the number up to five hundred. Early in March Macauley led this levy across the desert from Rohri. We can picture the meeting of Jacob's two lieutenants and their men at the carved stone city of Jaisalmir; the one at the head of the 'Indian Ironsides' in uniforms faded by sun and rain but still as neat and soldier-like as if they were going on parade at Jacobabad, the other leading a rough column of dirty white-robed tribesmen, girt about with matchlocks and their paraphernalia, tulwars slung in their embroidered baldrics of Lahri, and mounted on their hardy little mares. Yet many of these men who thus met, differing in appearance as much as if they had come from opposite ends of the earth, were old comrades in arms. Among Jacob's Guides were not a few who had fought and bled by the side of the Scinde Horsemen-men like Yaru Khoso, who had faced overwhelming odds with Durgasingh. Under Jacob's frontier system every man of his corps served in a regular rotation at every outpost, to which the Guides were permanently attached, and in ten years of association they had come to value each other's qualities and were on terms of easy familiarity if not of friendship.

Macauley joined General Roberts at Nasirabad twenty-six days after

leaving the frontier. The Baluch Horse were employed on picket, patrol and other duties throughout the siege of Kotah and the subsequent pursuit of the rebels. Macauley was invested with full powers over these wild tribesmen, and by incessant vigilance succeeded in keeping them in good order all the time they were employed. When the rebels were cleared out of Rajputana he marched the Levy back to Jacobabad and disbanded it. During the existence of the Baluch Horse, nearly nine months, they had marched 2500 miles. 411

Long before these additional proofs of the excellence in practice of Jacob's principles could become known his name was on the lips of every military man in India, and of all in England interested in Indian affairs. His writings were eagerly bought and read. The prophet who had foretold the disaster had prescribed the remedy; the one had come to pass and he was still alive to promote the other. A pronouncement on the needs of India by the 'Bombay Officer' must now command

respectful attention.

John Jacob's scheme for reorganizing India's civil and military administration had been written and dispatched to England for publication immediately after his return from Persia. In India it was widely circulated among the most prominent civil and military officers. Jacob's 'preliminary observations' in this pamphlet form a worthy pendent to the powerful criticisms he had set forth seven years before.

Tracing the root cause of the rottenness of the Bengal Army in the curtailment of the regimental officers' power over men taught to look

beyond them he says,

The Sepoy has been taught to despise his English Officers and to consider them his natural enemies, and the English Officers have consequently become, to a certain extent, unworthy of his respect.

Without due exercise the strongest natural powers fade and disappear. Slavery unfits men for freedom, and the power of commanding

comes with the exercise of command.

The Natives of India are quite incapable of self Government. They do not in the least understand what it means. They cannot conceive that a subject can have any rights whatever not dependent on the favour of the sovereign. They expect their sovereign to govern them absolutely and according to his own superior knowledge and ability, not according to their instructions.

But the British in India had not acted as Orientals expect their sovereigns to act: but had rather shown a distrust of their right to govern. Though foreign conquerors, we were constantly 'proclaiming

to the Natives of India that they are our equals: that we rule only as their representatives, and by their sufferance', and on this theory were based regulations and the 'Articles of War'. These latter were appropriate for British soldiers who surrendered part of their rights as free citizens on enlisting: but such pre-existing equality with his officer did not exist with respect to the Indian soldier. 'In his ordinary state, before enlisting as a soldier, he must either be a despot himself, or be subject to despotic rule.

'It is indeed, only because the European Officer is a superior being by

nature to the Asiatic that we hold India at all.'

Yet under the existing system of government, the obedience of the sepoy (of Bengal) was regarded as 'a great and somewhat unexpected favour'. So ingrained was this attitude that few officers could escape its influence in considering how the army ought to be reorganized.

The essence of Jacob's plan was for all the European officers of the Indian Armies to be placed in one general or 'unemployed' list in which they would rise by seniority. While unemployed they would receive rates of pay which would allow them the means of living respectably and of pursuing those studies and occupations which might qualify them for public employment. Every active appointment would carry separate pay, which the incumbent would draw in addition to his unemployed pay. Under such a system a few years' experiment would disclose what every officer was fit for and enable him to be employed to greatest advantage. Any who on fair trial appeared totally useless would be retired on full or half pay (a feature of the plan was that full unemployed pay could be drawn as pension after 30 years' service) but Jacob thought that in the variety of work required to be performed in India this would rarely be requisite. He says,

Under a system by which every man must feel that his standing and advancement in the service and in society depended wholly on his own industry, acquirement and cultivated natural powers, the greatest possible amount of mental power and moral growth must be developed. And while the numbers of Europeans in the public service in India might even ultimately be much reduced, their commanding power would be very greatly—almost infinitely—increased.

Where cases of abuse of power occur, as occur they must and will, let them be dealt with individually. Avoid, as much as possible making general regulations, which destroy all healthy mental development. Avoid striving too much after outward uniformity... let men apply their powers as they find best adapted to

produce the desired effect, making them strictly responsible for results.

He anticipated the difficulty of finding properly qualified officers for the higher commands:

The school will soon form such officers, and nothing else will do so.

Other features of the scheme were, the Queen to be proclaimed Empress of India: the armies of the several Indian Presidencies to be styled the Royal armies of India: a distinct and separate Civil Service to be prospectively abolished: all candidates for the Indian Service to be educated at a military college in England, where the course of instruction would include mechanical and physical science, and political economy: 'also riding, rifle-practice and hardy exercises'. Thereafter all appointments in all departments would be filled by selection from the 'Unemployed List'.

Jacob prescribed for the army all the features of his own regimental organization: commanders were to have complete authority in enlisting, discharging, promoting and reducing all Indian officers and other

ranks.412

The Governor of Bombay must have read the manuscript of the pamphlet before it went to the press, for his remarks are dated 18th October 1857 while the author was still in Bombay. Lord Elphinstone was in entire agreement with Jacob on the principle of a general list with selection for all active duties. But while much greater powers than formerly could be left to selected commanding officers, he wished to

have limits and rules prescribed to control their exercise.

The most interesting, historically and biographically, of the replies acknowledging Jacob's reorganization scheme was that from Sir John Lawrence, dated 5th December 1857. He quite coincided in the principle of selecting officers for command and giving them more powers, but he thought the brigadier's assent should be necessary to all punishments of over three months' imprisonment, or when a native commissioned officer was to be dismissed. So few men could be entrusted with despotic powers and abuse of them, under a system without the check of superiors, would be liable to cause mutinies. Again, the responsibility for results, which Jacob required, generally tended to become a dead letter. Lawrence wanted all candidates for the Indian Service to be selected by competition. Though the exercise of power fitted men for its exercise, there were many who would go through life leaning on someone else; without competition such men would creep in.

Lawrence had also written on the subject to Bartle Frere, whose great services at the time of deadliest peril in the Panjab, rendered as if he were one of the Panjab's own Commissioners, he had cordially acknowledged. Frere in turn wrote to Jacob, 'I have a lot of criticism from Sir John Lawrence—very friendly to your views generally, but showing how much even men like him have to learn of the first steps in your course of reforms. . . . He is a man worth converting, and he is half converted already.'

Jacob wrote to Sir John on 14th December and four days later wrote again, sending him a copy of his Tracts on the Indian Army, together with a note. Lawrence's subsequent letters do not seem to have survived, but Jacob's 'Reply to some observations on the scheme of reorganization' which is reproduced in the Views and Opinions of General Jacob may well have been one or other of those which he sent him. Nothing among his writings is more clearly stamped with his individual genius.

Jacob claimed that the objections pointed out had already occurred to him and been carefully considered; and that viewed dispassionately

they would be found to be without real force.

Their sum total appears to me to amount to this—where there is life there is also liability to disease. But, while admitting this to be self-evident truth, we surely need not conclude therefore that in order to prevent disease it would be well to allow no life.

The stock of power which in the case in question—the Indian administration—we have to apply to the work before us is the total amount of the moral and intellectual faculties of the English gentle-

men in the Service.

Our system has crushed the life out of the minds of our officers, and destroyed individual power; and now it is said that we cannot change this system because individual force of character is wanting, and we can find no living men fit to exercise the powers with which it is proposed to entrust them. This is exactly equivalent to saying that slaves are unfit for freedom, and therefore slavery must continue. . . . The existing slaves are individuals only, who will soon disappear from the scene; while the action of the proposed remedy is perpetual. Establish freedom, and men will become worthy of being free. . . . Let it never be forgotten, that the power of being commanded is essentially the same as the power of commanding . . . a living and powerful force, which contributes greatly to the controlling power of a living HEAD, but which has no existence under blind and dead mechanical regulation.

We have few men able to command, and no succession of commanders,

because we strive to command by crushing the individual power of those under us.

He claimed that his organization would create a tendency to cultivate moral power and mental energy thus adding continually to the total amount of administrative forces available; and also tend to such adjustments as would make the best possible use of individuals' particular powers.

We are always inclined to over-government—it is the greatest evil in India. . . . We should rather confine our attention to removing obstacles to natural development, and to the action of natural law.

We should expect to meet with all manner of absurdities and extravagancies and disorders AT FIRST, under the system which I propose. A very great number of men trained and habitually formed under the old system would probably not be able to work under the new; as their unfitness became apparent they should be removed elsewhere, or got rid of altogether.

Gradually things would become better and better, until the best possible condition of affairs had been arrived at; when mighty energies under perfect control would everywhere appear. . . .

The principles advocated by me appear to be natural laws: I cannot conceive that they could fail of success when fairly acted on.

I have applied them myself for fifteen years together, on every occasion, and at every opportunity: they have never failed of complete success, although in every instance almost all men were against me; and those supposed to be the ablest authorities looked on my proceedings as little short of madness—'Utopian non-sense'.418

Meanwhile Lewis Pelly's compendium of selections from Jacob's writings had been published in England. The book attracted much attention and was eagerly bought up. Mountstuart Elphinstone, who had retired from the Governorship of Bombay thirty years before had been inquiring for it in vain among the booksellers when at the beginning of April 1858 he was opportunely presented with a complimentary copy of the second edition. In deference to the opinion of even the most friendly critics, that the Note on the causes of the Indian outbreak impaired the due influence of Jacob's doctrines on other subjects, Pelly omitted it from the new edition; but other defects in the book, less in the material selected than in the manner of its presentation, were not remedied.

Removed as they were from their context, many of Jacob's pronouncements were liable to be misunderstood, and even on occasion contradict each other.

A critic writing in the Bombay Review blamed Pelly for defective selection and arrangement, the result of undiscriminating hero-worship. As to Jacob himself, his 'wisdom of habitual reference to principle' was admirable, and his conviction of the power of universal, natural law, and the unity and supremacy of truth compelled sympathy: but he tended to exaggerate the force of truth and despise the practical objections founded on the force of untruth. The reviewer found a good deal to criticize in Jacob's application of political economy, and in his proposals for reorganization of the army noticed again the 'error that assumes not only the tendency of a given law, but that its effects are certain'. Why should the admission of common sense, and the operation of public opinion where there is no concealment, sweep away all evil? Why should the best man for every post become known, and suitably employed? The plan of selecting for all appointments on the ground of energy and moral excellence compelled sympathy, but was morally impossible: it would fail through the fallibility of human judgment. And it was wrong to assume that a sufficient number of men qualified to exercise the absolute power required would always be available. 'The fact is, that whilst his general conception of the spirit, aim and tendency of a proper organization of the native army is absolutely right, his exaggerated anticipation of the effects impairs the force of his testimony; and many feeling the impracticableness of much which he advocates, erroneously conclude that his general views are mistaken and unpractical.'

The reviewer not unnaturally fell foul of Jacob's pronouncements against examinations as a test of ability, pointing out that reading for an examination incidentally tested a man's industry, zeal, self-denial and

independence.

In conclusion he wrote, 'We took up this volume expecting and intending as far as honest judgment would permit, to praise. There is much to praise in General Jacob and his opinions, so much so that the writer of this, who can scarcely claim acquaintance with General Jacob, yet feels personal affection for him. No one could more justly claim for his motto 'Thorough'. These are not the times when such a man can be overlooked. There is no man in India who would be more unquestionably in his right place than he, if nominated as we trust he will be . . . one of the Commissioners to report on the proper organization of the army in India.'414

To facilitate the work of the Commission appointed to sit in England,

Lord Canning directed his Private Secretary, Colonel Durand, to address a questionnaire to 'eminent and experienced public servants' both civil and military, many of whom were still actively engaged in the field.

Jacob received a copy of the questionnaire at the end of May 1858. The heads of inquiry reflect the trends of opinion then appearing in letters to the Indian Press, with an obvious glance at the doctrines of Jacob himself. One of the most controversial topics of the day was what proportion henceforth European should bear to Native troops in the armies of India. Some senior officers advocated a mainly European army, the Native troops to be auxiliary only; and a favourite nostrum for avoiding recourse to Indian troops, with their assumed chronic propensity to disloyalty, was to recruit West African negroes. Jacob took full advantage of the opportunity—many of the questions might have been deliberately framed to incur at his hands utter demolition of the theories they contained.

He observed in his reply, dated 7th June, that it was wholly erroneous to suppose that European troops should bear any particular proportion to native troops throughout the country. Europeans would be useless at Jacobabad, but Karachi was probably the best place in India to mass a large force of European troops for imperial purposes totally irrespective of merely provincial requirements. As to holding India by an army chiefly composed of Europeans, the attempt would produce ruin; England could not supply the numbers needed, but even if she could, mere brute force could not hold the country any more than the whole

force of the Moghals could conquer the Rajputs.

'The natives "even" of Hindustan, treated as men in accordance with living principles and natural laws can be made as good, true, and faithful soldiers as any Europeans'—witness the conduct of the 2nd Scinde Horse at Jacobabad during the commandant's absence in Persia, and that of the 1st Regiment subsequently on detached duty. On the other hand Jacob recommends that all artillery in India, with the exception of units required for special service and localities, like his own proposed

Mountain Train, should be European.

His proposed distribution of the European part of the army is note-worthy, in that one quarter of the infantry strength of 40,000 and half the artillery reserve, were to be stationed at Karachi. There is a clear shift of weight to North-West India; the Imperial capital was to be at Agra and there was to be a fourth Presidency including the Panjab, Sind and Delhi. The Native Army for each Presidency was to be organized according to his own scheme. The ordinary maintenance of law and order was to be entrusted entirely to a police force organized on

the lines of that 'found to answer so well in Sind', and entirely distinct from the army. 'Some room for common sense should be found in the Audit Department'—which should be partly decentralized. No priest of any religion should be appointed, patronized or directly paid by the State.

Jacob had developed these views in a long letter replying to Sir Charles Trevelyan, who had been struck by his reorganization scheme. His answers to the details of the Durand questionnaire repeat and amplify the doctrines of his tracts on the Indian Army. The following are of interest: 'The native Indian soldier should never be associated, if possible, with any Europeans but gentlemen. He should, as far as it can possibly be managed, never see an European in any but a superior position.' He deals summarily with a popular suggestion of the day—to secure the loyalty of an Indian battalion by introducing a company or companies of Europeans: 'none but the off-scourings of Eastern society would take service under such an arrangement.' It had actually been proposed that Indian troops should be systematically trained to act in dependence on European support: Jacob's comment must be considered surprisingly restrained—'It is certain that all soldiers should be trained to habits of self-reliance as much as possible.' As to the suggestion that a troop of Europeans should be embodied in an Indian Irregular cavalry regiment, 'These questions appear to me equivalent to asking whether each Troop of Horse Artillery should not have a Lancaster Gun of 20 tons weight or so, attached.

On the other hand the idea of attaching to each European local regiment an Indian Irregular regiment, the latter to be officered from the former, would work well so long as the commanding officer of the European regiment knew how to treat Indian officers properly and took a pride in his native soldiers. But such an arrangement was not necessary for securing the efficiency of the Indian Army. 'The men of the S.I.H. always fraternise most readily with English soldiers whenever and wherever they meet each other, and they associate on terms of perfect equality. I have known a sowar knock a stout European down with his fist when the man had been insolent to him, and yet neither party made any complaint, but their comrades on both sides pronounced all fair and the men shook hands on it, and by way of proving restored friendship the English soldier handed over to the Mussulman his short clay pipe to smoke, which he did readily, and they passed it backwards and forwards from mouth to mouth without the least scruple. . . .'

The Indian officers of the Bombay Army generally were far more intelligent, useful and efficient than could be justly expected under the existing organization. Instead of abolishing the commissioned ranks of

native soldiers—one school of thought advocated this—they should be made in effect subalterns and captains, and given real command and responsibility: 'The Native officers of the S.I.H. are quite equal to any European subaltern in the performance of their ordinary duties.' In the Mutiny, Jacob's Indian officers had felt and conducted themselves, and the men had behaved, just as European officers and private soldiers would have done: 'There never has been the least symptom of a tendency to the idea of the possibility of mutiny in our own ranks.'

As to oaths and courts martial, if a soldier was base enough to rebel against his officer he would not be bound by any oath. The system of courts martial appeared to Jacob to involve 'the unspeakable absurdity of an assembly of Native Officers judging between the English Com-

mandant and the men under his command.

Jacob's doctrines on the organization, dress and equipment of cavalry soldiers have been set forth in an earlier chapter. For the infantry he recommended that all should be armed with short double-barrel smallbored rifles: as to dress, that of the London Fire Brigade was an infinitely better model than the 'ludicrously absurd' uniform of English soldiers. 'The only principle to study is the bodily comfort, protection and freedom of action of the men, without the least regard to anything but power and efficiency.' The best dress for soldiers in India would be a loose broadcloth tunic, with plenty of pockets like a shooting coat and loose cloth trousers to button round the ankle. In the hot season, white or drab-coloured clothing of the same pattern. For Indian soldiers, the headdress should be the pagri.

Jacob had his replies to the questionnaire printed for private circulation: an example followed by Frere, in whose 160-page pamphlet the name of General Jacob figures prominently. But prejudice was still sufficiently strong for Frere to say, when writing to Lord Goderich on 15th June, 'Of the causes of the Mutiny, you will find those which affected the army well set forth in the writings of General John Jacob, and if you do not quote the opinions as his, nor make any special reference to Bengal, you will find most men of real experience even in the Bengal

Army agree with him.'415

The influence of John Jacob's teaching was now extending in England. The writer of an article entitled 'First steps in a new Indian Policy' appearing in the London Homeward Mail of 4th June, was confident that there was more than sufficient strength in India to restore order, if interference from England ceased. 'Remove Lord Canning, and give Sir John Lawrence, Sir James Outram, General Jacob, Major Edwardes and Mr. Frere full powers, and even though no reinforcements of Europeans should be sent out we solemnly believe that in six months

India would be pacified from one end to the other.' And, 'men like Outram and Jacob should be given seats on a Commission to advise on

the reorganization of the Indian Army.'

On 18th June Outram was writing to Captain Eastwick at the India House that in view of his own poor health a provisional Military Member of the Governor-General's Council should be nominated in his own place. A three weeks' sea trip to some degree restored him; but on 14th July, while acknowledging the congratulations of the Chairman of the Court of Directors, he had reminded him of 'the only man in India qualified, in my opinion, to fill the post . . . and I doubt not his name will at once occur to you—General John Jacob. His ability so vastly transcends mine, and especially to grapple with the great question the reformation of the Native Army, that I feel it ought to be a matter of gratification to your Honourable Court, were I obliged by whatever cause to give place to one so much better capable than I of . . . carrying out the great object it has in view. . . . Do not allow it to be insinuated as an objection to Jacob that he may be somewhat overbearing and dictatorial. He is too sensible a man to dictate where it is only his province to advise: but he cannot at such a time be too distinct in recording his opinions, and that he will not scruple to do.' The appointment would inspire confidence and be popular both in England and India. He hoped to write at length, as requested, on the best course for reconstructing the Bengal Army: but the first and best step would be to appoint Jacob to his own seat on the council.

Outram sent Jacob copies of these letters. 'I fear you would hardly wish to come here, but the interests of the State demand that you should

be at the helm during the next few years. . . . '416

This was written in the last of the long series of letters between the two friends that has survived. Outram might be accused of courting popularity by a theatrical gesture, when he declined to supersede Havelock in the command of the troops marching to the relief of Lucknow: but here, in a transaction that never came before the public, we see his honest generous and devoted nature at its best. Jacob's reply is not extant; but we may be sure that the reversion of the appointment did not attract him, and he would probably have declined it if officially offered. He could now feel that his doctrines were making their way, the torch being carried from hand to hand, while on the frontier he was still indispensable. To the multiplicity of the regular labours of his charge was now added a new burden: on 30th June he was authorized to raise immediately two regiments of infantry on the silladar principle and armed with his rifle. They were each to muster eight hundred strong, with four European officers. 417

The raising of the new corps at such a time was a heavy task. Of his old lieutenants, Merewether was on leave in England, Henry Green at Kelat and Macauley absent on service in Rajputana. Malcolm Green did not reach Jacobabad with his squadron of the 1st Scinde Horse till 6th July, after marching in the course of operations 2400 miles, and Jacob—probably for the sake of his health—sent him at once to join his brother at Kelat. Only Briggs and Gordon were left to help the commandant to teach the junior officers recently appointed to the 3rd Scinde Horse, and those about to be appointed to the Rifles; and still the revenue had to be collected, the canals supervised, justice administered, and every movement on the border and far off in Central Asia watched and reported. So for a while we must leave John Jacob toiling through ten men's work, in which no problem was too great and no detail too small to be faithfully dealt with, to witness the victory he won in England.

On 15th July by Queen Victoria's command, a Royal Commission was set up to report on the future constitution of the Armies of India. Its terms of reference related chiefly to the manner of supplying and organizing European troops for service in India, but the Commission was also to investigate some of the other stock questions of the day: whether the Indian Army should be constituted on the Regular or Irregular basis, whether native artillery should be allowed, and whether colonial troops could to some extent take the place of Indians.

The commissioners included the Duke of Cambridge, Sir Harry Smith and Jacob's old friend Lord Melville, together with several senior officers of the Company's service. The majority of the witnesses were Company's officers from each of the three Presidencies, of all grades of field rank; but there were a few civilians and many Queen's officers with Indian experience.

The proceedings of the Commission were in the nature of a triumph for John Jacob and his system. The Scinde Horse were constantly referred to by the commissioners and witnesses alike, as a model corps, and his own name mentioned with the deference due to an acknowledged authority.

Merewether's evidence was taken relatively early, on 24th August, and made a great impression. He dwelt upon the necessity, inculcated by his chief, of developing moral power: but the commissioners sought chiefly to ascertain in detail the organization of the Scinde Horse. Sir Harry Smith's questions elicited the facts, already known to the reader, that 250 Scinde Horsemen had overthrown 4000 Afghan cavalry at the battle of Gujerat: that the regiment had been perfectly steady under artillery fire at Miani and elsewhere: that their British-made carbines had been the main instrument in the fearful destruction at Zamani: and

that the majority of the men were recruited from the very hot-bed of the rebellion, the neighbourhood of Delhi, and had remained uniformly loyal.

Colonel Burlton, a Bengal member of the Commission, cross-

questioned Merewether on the matter of caste.

'You know that a Mahomedan will not eat pork?'

'Yes.'

'Suppose you asked one of them to do it?'

'I should no more do it than I would ask an English soldier to do a

thing disgusting to him.'

'But General Jacob has stated in a pamphlet which he has published, that if you asked your men to break caste they would do so. They have never been called upon to do what they consider contrary to caste?'

'No: but if anything were necessary to be done for the good of the State, no matter what, they would be ordered to do it, and would

assuredly obey the order.'

In answer to another question Merewether said, 'I think that the very investigation of these little circumstances has led to all this mischief; that we ought never even to think about them or talk about them.' Altogether Merewether replied to 180 questions and was finally asked to furnish the commissioners with a paper explanatory of the Scinde

Horse system in full detail.418

Other Bombay officers had their turn a few days later, among them Jacob's brother officers of the Artillery, Leslie, James Sinclair and Willoughby, and John Hill of the Sappers who had served under him in Persia. The commissioners soon found that the 'Bombay Officer' had spoken for Bombay officers as a whole in his strictures on Bengal indiscipline and mismanagement. Hill bore witness to the mutinous conduct of the Bengal troops at Multan and gave examples of the indiscipline of Bengal cavalry on the line of march, and of the imbecility of Bengal native officers. Sinclair would have all Indian cavalry organized on the model of the Scinde Horse. The Bombay Regular cavalry were excellent, but their cost to the State was far greater. He alluded to Jacob's insistence that duty for his European officers should not vary between the hot and the cold season on the frontier. 'I have known that it has been Colonel Jacob's habit to say "Gentlemen, we will have a picnic today", and they have mounted saddle in the heat of the day and gone 40 or 50 miles as a patrol or to visit outposts with a Squadron or so of sowars, and this in the hottest season of the year.'

Generals Griffith and Capon of the Bombay Army strongly reinforced the opinion of their juniors on the superiority of Jacob's organization. Colonel Felix of the Royal Army, who had served mainly in Madras,

testified to the excellence of the Nizam's Irregular cavalry which, he

said, were 'exactly like the Scinde Horse'.

One of the most significant features in the evidence was that the great majority of the Bombay officers who were asked the question advocated arming the Indian troops with the most efficient weapon available—the same rifle as might be given to British soldiers. They were supported by General Alexander of the Madras Army, and General Pratt of the Queen's Service who had served mainly in Madras. This of course was contrary to Bengal opinion, led by Sir George Pollock, and lent weight to General Capon's dry observation, 'If the Bengal Native Army is to be kept up as it has been, I should say that they require a great number of Europeans in order to keep them in check, because instead of being any use, I looked upon them as detrimental; they were an enemy more than a friendly army in my opinion, from what I saw of them latterly.'

Another officer whose views on almost every point at issue coincided with Jacob's was Colonel Wilde of the Madras Army, who had been serving since 1849 in the Panjab Irregular Infantry; while Colonel Wintle of the Bengal Infantry candidly admitted the justice of almost every criticism levelled at the organization of the army to which he belonged. Sir Charles Trevelyan expounded with considerable skill, but without making due acknowledgement, Jacob's scheme for officer-

ing the armies of India from a general list. 419

As for the orthodox opposition to Jacob's doctrines, some of the opinions of distinguished officers in India, submitted to the Commission

by Durand, deserve to be cited.

Sir Henry Somerset would have no Indian officers at all: he felt 'utterly at a loss to account for so suicidal a project . . . involving . . . undue power being thrown into the hands of the Native Officers, and even placing them in command of regiments on field service.' Sir Patrick Grant, too, believed that Indian officers were useless, and a large number of European officers essential: he would not allow Indians ever to be armed with superior weapons such as the Minié rifle. The Panjab Committee led by Sir John Lawrence would never arm Indian troops with the Enfield, or any weapon equal to that in the hands of European soldiers. Even Brigadier General Coke of the Panjab Frontier Force agreed, though somewhat inconsistently declaring that he would do all in his power to give self-reliance to Indian troops. The Panjab Committee advocated with some minor modifications, 'the general gradation list for the army of each Presidency proposed by Brigadier General John Jacob, C.B.', and the scheme was among the papers forwarded to the Commission in England. Jacob's answers to the questionnaire were summarized with those of other officers by Durand.

After weighing the mass of evidence and opinion, the commissioners wrote their replies to the heads of inquiry. The Marquess of Tweeddale while dealing with the question 'Regular versus Irregular' observed, 'The success of the Scinde Horse... may be attributed to the selection of the European officers, and to a commanding officer of rare attainments for such service... I am not aware in what branch of competitive examination such qualities as those mentioned will become apparent, and without them an officer would not be likely to arrive at the high standard General Jacob has done in command of Irregular Horse.'

The findings of the Commission included a unanimous recommendation that the cavalry of the Indian Army should be organized on the Irregular principle, though the Regular regiments of the Bombay and Madras Armies should remain for the present unchanged. The infantry should be organized both on the Regular and the Irregular system, the former preponderating. The artillery should be European except at

places where bad climate rendered this impracticable.

Incidental recommendations were, that the native army should be composed of different nationalities and castes, as a general rule mixed promiscuously through each regiment; that all men of the Regular native army should be enlisted for general service; and that their uniform should be made more suitable to the climate. The Articles of War for the Native Army should be revised and the powers of commanding officers increased, while the promotion of native non-commissioned and commissioned officers should be regulated on the principle of efficiency instead of seniority.

The commissioners were impressed with the necessity of adopting some system for preventing the excessive withdrawal of officers from their regiments for staff and civil appointments, and for improving the status of the regimental officer. They could not, however, decide whether this could best be achieved by forming a Staff Corps, by seconding, or by placing the European officers of each Presidency on a General List. The question should be referred to the authorities in India. 420

The report was dated 9th March 1859: long before this an instalment of reforms had been introduced by Lord Clyde, the Commander-in-Chief in India, and were thus commented upon by the Calcutta

Atheneum, quoted in the Sind Cossid for 12th October 1858.

'Of course they will not satisfy doctrinaires of the schools of Serampore and Jacobabad, who have a profound contempt for experience, and the principles which have made Britons what they are. Nothing short of measures which will "sweep away" everything that serves to impede the exercise of the most exaggerated form of individual despotism will suit reformers of this stamp. . . . Our extreme radical

Army reformers are profound disciples of the school of Hegel.' One of the new dicta recalls Captain Trower's ideas-'The command of a Native Regiment shall not be permitted to be exercised by any officer who is not considered qualified for such a command by temper and tact, and by regard for the natives.' At any rate it was laid down that in future the principle of 'election [sic] for all Regimental Commands, European or Native, shall be strictly applied.' Lord Clyde also gave commanding officers power to dismiss or reduce to the ranks an objectionable N.C.O. But the newspaper pointed out that these reforms were one-sided and required to be balanced by acceleration in officers' promotion. This was evident from an abstract of the Indian Army Lists for 1856. The average length of service of major generals was forty-six years, and their average age sixty-four: the figures of the higher grades of general being of course proportionately greater. The lower grades, blocked by this dead weight of seniority, were in much the same condition. In the Madras Army there were as many as thirteen ensigns with eight years' service. Lord Clyde had not altered the effective list of general officers: the remedy was clearly an unattached list for all officers above a certain age or period of service. 421

With this glance at the conditions which had obtained in the armies of India from the time John Jacob entered the service, the problem which had called forth his greatest mental power, we return to him in his frontier home where he grappled with a dozen others. The strain of so much labour had at last begun to tell, and though his intellectual energy seemed unimpaired it was maintained only by his inflexible will, while his health began to break up. His temper naturally suffered; he was much irritated by his closest relatives' denunciations for his having published to the world his agnostic opinions. Philip, of the conventional and orthodox mind, administered a reproof which provoked from John a letter so revealing of his inmost self that it must be reproduced in full.

> Jacobabad 19th July 1858.

My dear Philip,

Holding the sentiments expressed in your letter which reached me to-day, you can hardly wish me to continue to correspond with you. To do so would only be unpleasant to both parties, and as useless as unpleasant. It is clear to me that you would never understand me in the least. It is as if we belonged to Ages many thousands of years apart. Wherefore I shall write to you no more.

Of all men who ever lived in the world I have been the least addicted to following the opinions of others, which you now

accuse me of blindly doing! From early manhood my whole life has been one continued battle against the authority of current opinion. I have sought for the path of truth and have found it. I am myself growing and living in it, and am tending—no matter how slowly—continually towards higher life and growth, as is every healthy particle in the Universe. A thousand years hence probably every intelligent child of ten years of age will be surprised that the truths, for holding to which I am now esteemed an outcast, could ever have been doubted.

It has however been so in every age and always will be so, I imagine. To have progressed necessarily implies being misunderstood by those who have stood still. Nothing to the mass of man-

kind appears incredible except the truth.

As to the theory of La Marck, etc. etc., which you say I have adopted, I esteem all these things to be mere puerilities, as nursery rhymes to teach babes to read—modes of explanation only useful in leading the infantile mind to improve its powers, and attain strength to grasp greater things. But—seeing infinitely beyond these forms and theories—I do not find that they trammel or impede our faculties in the least. Indeed the things are true as far as they go—they are defective but not false in the vulgar sense.

I will not enlarge on this subject for you would not understand me and would probably set all down to ignorance, as indeed the simplicity of truth always appears to orthodox science, accustomed as it is to work in the stifling atmosphere of time-honoured false-hood. Vulgar physical science is not unknown to me, as you might have been aware of!—but its teachings appear to me very different from their appearance when ludicrously distorted by being viewed

through the spectacles of the Church.

The greatest evil which ever existed on the Earth is this Church. Even in England, where the people strove to shake off the chain—which is the same now as it was in the days of Numa Pompilius, and thousands of years before his time—some seven millions are paid yearly for the teaching of falsehood and for the poisoning of the recipient brains of our women and children—in polluting, in fact, the sources of life and growth from generation to generation.

Every truth-seeker is necessarily now, towards the priests of this day, as the Scribes and Pharisees were towards Jesus, whom our priests with ludicrous and insolent mendacity pretend to follow as their teacher—the 23rd Chapter of Matthew is truly expressive of priest-craft in all ages. True religion, true science, true education, all depend on one principle—the endeavour to form our own, and

to enable others to form their own, ideas; instead of adopting those of others—to strive to grow—to be rather than to have or to know

or to appear.

You are surprised at my unspeakable folly in believing the truths which I see around me in Nature, which indeed seem to be hidden from the dwellers in Cities by the intensity of particular life going on around them, even as the blaze of day hides from us the countless worlds around us in the universe. Yet you can persuade yourself that the Almighty God-the first cause of all things-made himself into a man, and sent devils into pigs, etc. etc. Bah! I will not enter into particulars-but now bid you farewell and will trouble you no more. Truly my kingdom is not of this world.

Your affectionate brother, John Jacob. 422

Whatever the 'immortal longings' which now exercised an ever stronger hold on his soul, Jacob never relaxed for an instant his firm

grasp of practical affairs, whether great or small.

The situation in India as a whole, in the monsoon season of 1858, seemed less satisfactory than at the beginning of the year. Lord Clyde's operations in Oudh had been inconclusive, and the rebel leader Tantia

Topi moved from district to district spreading disorder.

The Panjab was now the danger centre; Frere had earlier noticed with apprehension 'the apparent determination of all the Bengal Officers who are admirers of the Seikhs to repeat in their treatment of them exactly the same errors which ruined their old army-to fancy everything depends on the raw material and to undervalue the effect of the Englishman's brains and workmanship.' He evidently refers to the conspiracy among the Malwa Sikhs of the 10th Panjab Infantry at Dera Ismail Khan, which had been detected in the nick of time. On 31st August two disarmed regiments of Bengal Infantry at Multan broke into open mutiny, attacked the British regiment and attempted to seize the guns, but were defeated with great slaughter.

The system of 'physical force, repression and bribery' still kept the Panjab quiet internally; but for its freedom from disturbance from the north-west Britain was indebted to the good faith of Amir Dost Mahomed. Under Edwardes's treaty of January 1857 the Amir had accepted a monthly subsidy of a lakh of rupees to enable him to guard his frontier against the Persians, consenting so long as this was paid to the residence at Kandahar of a mission under Major Lumsden, to observe the course of events. This arrangement had continued during the crisis

in India, and was terminated in the summer of 1858. The mission had communicated with the Panjab via Peshawar.

Jacob disapproved of this arrangement as anomalous: if an officer were to be stationed at Kandahar, he should be one of his own assistants—'The Political Agent on this frontier should be the only recognized channel between the British Indian authorities and all external adjoining countries in this direction.' But he was convinced that the time was not ripe for posting a British officer at Kandahar at all. The first step was to build up strength on the Sind frontier in support of Henry Green at Kelat, and so get the Khanate in a healthy state before looking further afield.⁴²³

Green's path during the months since we last saw him at the Jacobabad conference had been difficult indeed. The dismissal of Gangaram had been well received, but the arch-intriguers Azad Khan of Kharan and the Jam of Las Bela were still working for the destruction of the young Khan whose own chief advisor, Darogha Gul Mahomed, was disloyal to his master and hostile to the British. Gradually the majority of the feudatory chiefs, particularly those of the province of Makran, became persuaded of Green's honesty of purpose and began to co-operate; and he resolved, as soon as the external dangers could be checked, to bring them into the field under the banner of their suzerain to chastise the Marris, as Jacob had intended. Meanwhile danger arose in another form. Darogha Gul Mahomed began to sound some men of Green's escorthalf a troop of the Scinde Horse-whether they would stand by the Political Agent in the event of a rebellion, in the absence of the friendly chiefs. Gul Mahomed had at command some 500 Pathans 'commanded by a knave formerly in the Bengal Army'. Green informed the Khan in this man's presence, in open Durbar, that his pickets were ordered to shoot any man who appeared in their lines after nightfall: that Gul Mahomed was a traitor, and that he would not be admitted to the Political Agent's camp again.

In August 1858, before Green's letters reporting these developments reached him, Jacob had come to the conclusion that it was best to recall his envoy. He was himself disabled at this time by an accident to his eyes, which caused him to be shut up in a dark room and subjected to severe surgical treatment. On 23rd August he was able to write repeating his directions for Green's return. Green was not to feel disappointed with the results of his mission. He had been sent to the Khan's court chiefly for the purpose of making up for the want of physical force available to the Government. The evil nature of the Khan necessitated a rearrangement of the plan of action though the principles would remain unchanged. The advance to Quetta, which would have been the

best possible move at the time it was proposed could not now be made with advantage. Jacob could not get the required force ready in less than fifteen or eighteen months. He says, 'It is of no use making our own particular link in the chain immensely strong when all the others are weak: that is the best piece of work which is best proportioned to the whole. I shall, I am confident, succeed in getting the whole Imperial apparatus into a more healthy state before long, and meanwhile I am still more confident that the good work you have accomplished among the Chieftains of Beloochistan will stand and eventually lead to great good.' Three days later, after drily demonstrating the impracticability of some of Green's enthusiastic suggestions, he writes again, 'To judge fairly of what is best we must keep clearly in view those things at a distance as well as those in immediate contact with us, and this as regards

both time and space.'424

Jacobabad being nearly a week's journey from Kelat, the letters of Jacob and his lieutenant kept crossing, affording Green excuse for not complying with his orders until Jacob had heard all that he had to urge in favour of remaining. He was bitterly disappointed by Jacob's letter of 23rd August: 'I have been totally unable to make you understand either my position or what I have been doing. . . . I have held Beloochistan by myself alone and kept it quieter than any province in England or India. I have kept the knaves under my feet and tried to make something of the Khan-what else in God's name did you wish or expect me to do? I tell you more; that if I had not been here Khelat would have been ere now in possession of the Candaharis.' This he had achieved by moral power alone. 'You must have understood from my letters that I was howling for troops. I merely told you what my common sense pointed out.' A little later, 'Trust me for a few days longer-Please God I will not disappoint you.' In hopes of receiving an additional Government subsidy of 50,000 rupees for the Khan, which had in fact been sanctioned on 13th August, Green was now planning the campaign to reduce the Marris to their allegiance by means of the Khan's levies; and his policy was 'to smash Gool Mahomed by the Brahooees themselves'. He still fenced with Jacob's withdrawal order—'You must have often found there is an exact moment for doing everything."

On 8th September he had some good news to communicate—'The Khan's force at Panjgoor has settled everything satisfactorily. All the people who were in rebellion have made their salaams to his chiefs, and paid two years' revenue—last year's and this—this force is now free for Cutchee.' Henry Green was now in that state of tense exaltation which comes to a man who has overcome odds by the unaided resources of his own force of character, and sees the goal almost within his grasp. He

chafed under the calm reasoning of Jacob and Frere, who was also in correspondence with him: 'I know exactly how far I could carry moral force with these people and exactly when to stop where physical force would have been required.' Jacob replied, 'I have more than once . . . reported that I considered your influence in Beloochistan to constitute a force as valuable as an army of ten thousand soldiers . . . but . . . you can hardly imagine how tremulous all the authorities in India have been and are still . . . it is certain that disorder in Upper Sind would have been the signal for a rebellion in the Punjab. Latterly I have, to tell you the truth, thought that those diabolical scoundrels, Gool Mahomed and Co. would be trying to get rid of you by poison or assassination in some way, and that I had no right to subject you to the risk of such a fate: I would far rather lose my own life than do so.' He enclosed a letter which showed he had good ground for such fears: 'This made me more anxious to withdraw you from Khelat. The tone of your late letters has grieved me.' Green now felt that he had been accorded full discretion to remain at his post, and wrote more cheerfully. Jacob had mentioned the difficulty he experienced in obtaining suitable recruits for his Rifle regiments, and seems to have been prepared to enlist men from Baluchistan. Green did not think that Brahuis would make good soldiers, though when he spoke to them they said, 'If Jacob Saheb would come here, every man in the country would kill a goat for joy.'425 A comet appeared at this time which, Green remarked, was supposed to forbode destruction to the Marri tribe 'over whose country it appeared to go, luckily.' A few days later and disaster did indeed overtake the Marris, though not at the hands of the Khan's punitive force, which was not yet ready. Their old rivals the Bugtis seized an opportunity, while the Marris were occupied with a threat of attack by the Khetran tribe, to make a descent in great force on Chambari nearly seventy miles within their border, where the Marris' cattle had been collected for safety. Led by their chief Ghulam Murtaza Khan the Bugtis killed a large number of Marris with little loss to themselves and carried off an immense booty, their triumphant return being witnessed by a patrol of the Scinde Horse near Shahpur. The waole transaction took place far within the hills and constituted no threat to the peace of British territory, but Frere promptly pointed out the moral. The complete success of Jacob's frontier system had given rise to the belief that the character of the tribes beyond it had softened. But their seeming weakness lay only in their want of union and combination; under a single powerful and directing intelligence they might be very dangerous. It is not by setting one tribe against another like this,' says Frere, 'that General Jacob has secured peace wherever his authority is fully established. Unfortunately for the great

work of civilization that he has in hand, his influence over the Boogtees is not direct and absolute, while the Murrees have for years past been able to defy all legal influence and external authority whatsoever.' Yet Jacob believed that with Green at Kelat he would be able eventually to tame all the hill tribes.426

At the moment Green's greatest anxiety was lest the Sardar Fateh Mahomed of Kandahar, who had recently been threatened by Dost Mahomed for his rebellious behaviour, might join hands with Herat, and thereafter with Persia. Green observed that his task was like unwinding a skein of the thinnest silk: the slightest violence and it would break, and the end might be lost. 'Had you not been at Jacobabad,' he wrote to Jacob, 'I could have done nothing.' Though still looking over his shoulder to the north, he was occupied in organizing the Khan's levies for the expedition against the Marris; many of the numerous tribes to be brought together were antagonistic through ancient blood-feuds, and the young Khan was to be got 'into his war-paint'. Yet another difficulty was that 'The Chiefs and people seem to think that I and the Khan should divide the throne equally.

The Musa Khel Pathans, north of the Marri country, agreed to close the passes against their old enemies as soon as the Khan appeared in Kachhi: but throughout October Green was still striving to bring the Jam of Las Bela, who was 'at the bottom of all the villainy in Beloo-

chistan' into the Khan's camp with his feudal quota. 427

Jacob spent the greater part of the same month inspecting the irrigation of his district. The inundation had been exceptionally favourable, and wherever he went he saw prosperity and peace. To the young officers whom he took on tour to teach them their duty he seemed in good health and excellent spirits; but he himself knew that it was the last time he would see the land he had redeemed from barbarism. He had begun to resort to stimulating foods and stomachics to prolong mental exertion, and the inevitable recoil was at hand. Lewis Pelly, his old assistant, had just returned from leave in England where he had tried to win support for Jacob's scheme for occupying Quetta. He seems to have had some premonition that Jacob's end was near and hastened up the country by forced marches, reaching him at his camp on the very day that he was taken ill. There followed a terrible week; Jacob refused to give in or call a doctor but persisted with his work. He could not eat, and sleep forsook him altogether now, though he would lie for a while on his bed in utter exhaustion; the greater part of the time he was still at his desk.

On 28th November he rode into Jacobabad for the last time—a march of twenty miles. As he dismounted he murmured to Pelly, 'Five minutes

more and I should have fallen off.' He stood while the Indian officers of the Scinde Horse saluted him and then staggered slowly to his room. He still refused to see the doctors, though now too weak to leave his bed. On the second day he told Pelly, who was in constant attendance on him, that he was going to die and was glad of it, and that his friends must be reconciled to it. 'There is but a spark left,' he would say, 'and if you give me medicine that will be put out: it cannot last much longer.' But his release was not yet; forty-eight hours slowly passed while he was racked by continuous spasms which the doctors could not conquer.

One anxiety remained, but was not prolonged. Pelly had ordered relays of horses to be sent out on each stage of the route to Gandava, while Henry and Malcolm Green were on the march with the Khan down the Mulla pass from Kelat. As they came out of the pass an orderly rode up with a letter from Pelly; Henry Green at once mounted and stopping only to change horses covered the eighty miles into Jacobabad in a few hours. He found his friend on the point of death; Jacob could just recognize him, and said, 'Now you have come, all will

go well.'428

There were still battles to be fought, but he would leave strong hands for the task. And as the shadows began to draw in, his tired mind could pass to the battles he had won. His rifle—the recruits for his new regiments were beginning to make fair practice. And he felt sure now that his regimental system would come into its own. What a struggle it had been, against Bengal prejudices! Even Dalhousie had been against him. Yet, 'Time will show the justice of my views'—that had come true. They had threatened him with deprivation of his commission, but he had not turned back. Then the Napiers. It was a public duty to fight that rancorous, ignorant, prejudiced Sir William. And poor old Charley. What a pity that he deceived himself so-what a fine soldier he was! 'All the powers I myself possess.' That was a sharp little affair at Shahpur. Charley understood the value of discipline. Miani was won by discipline. The Baluchis fought well there. They fought well in the Bugti hills too. You soon learn how to use a sword if you tackle those fellows. What a crash was that, when 'Bags' came down at full gallop on the sheet rock -what were we chasing? Perhaps those Bugtis who had just tried to carry off the camels in Marow-or was it the big boar that took that terrible line over the black hills near 'Nagar? The scene was changing. Was not that 'Old Staff' Ritherden-trying to make him confess to a share in Pottinger's escapade with the shell? or that big corporal who was always bullying the small cadets—but he had beaten him in the end. No, it was John Wall, enraged about his haystack, with those boys of

Woolavington whom he, John Jacob the Warrior, had drilled. He would take the part of Bruce or Wallace. But now he was going home. Here was the vicarage. He would see his father. All the family would be there. See, on the parlour door that old birthday play-bill is still pinned—the Warrior—

Let all rejoice! this mighty day gave birth
To one whose fame shall spread through all the earth
And bursting through each opposition shed
Its blooming honours on his glorious head.

And as he put forth his hand to open the door, and enter amid the light and laughter, Pelly sitting watchful by his pillow in the darkened room signed to Henry Green that it was time. And Green admitted those who stood in waiting; they filed softly in and stood about the bed. There were the British officers of the Scinde Horse and a few of the Rifles. They gazed on their dying chief in mournful silence; but this was beyond the power of the Indian officers, to whom he had been so long the patriarch of the clan. There could be seen grey-bearded veterans, covered with Orders and medals, and bearing the honourable scars of many a fight, with tears pouring down their faces, choking and sobbing in the agony of their grief. A few Baluch chiefs who were in Jacobabad hoping to see Jacob were also called in by Green, and were scarcely less moved.

The coma ended: the last struggle was short, and at midnight on

5th December 1858 John Jacob breathed his last.

The funeral was fixed for 4.30 in the afternoon of the 6th. The grave-yard lies on the opposite side of Jacobabad from the Great House and the cortège passed through the streets of his town, lined by an innumerable multitude. For the grievous news had spread rapidly through the neighbourhood. All that day the roads leading to Jacobabad were thronged with Baluch horsemen and country folk, hastening in to pay their last respects to the man that they deemed more than mortal. 'Every man, woman and child in the place and for miles around came to see the procession, and the din and noise caused by the women tearing their hair and the men crying was indescribable.' More than ten thousand gathered round the little graveyard. In deference to Jacob's known feelings there was no military pomp, not even a volley fired over the grave. None of his older officers—Henry Green, Briggs, Macauley and Gordon—could trust himself to read the Burial Service and the duty was undertaken by Captain King, the new brigade major,

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THE LAST YEAR ON THE FRONTIER

who was destined some years later to be laid by John Jacob's side. The grave was covered by a huge slab. No head-stone displaying the conventional eulogies, hopes and regrets is there; but carved on the slab his name, his rank and corps, and the dates of his birth and death—the simplicity of the grave of a soldier on the field of battle. 429

CHAPTER XX

Epilogue

On 8th December 1858 the ensign on Government House Karachi, and those of every vessel in the harbour, were to be seen flying at half-mast. Throughout the Province of Sind a day of mourning was being observed by order of Bartle Frere. Of the occasion for this public lamentation the *Homeward Mail* wrote a few days later, 'It is not that an army has been defeated. It is not that mutiny has broken out. It is not an incursion of the wild tribes from beyond the frontier. It is that a man is no more. . . .

Frere issued his proclamation immediately on receiving the news, and wrote to Green lamenting the untimely loss of 'the bravest and noblest of our friends'. A few days later having heard again from Green he wrote, 'You may rely on it that it shall not be my fault if anything is altered in what he proposed or wished. It has been my study for years past to assist, as far as I could, in getting him room to work—and to keep off as far as I could all that could impede or interrupt him. . . . He was a great teacher not only in his own profession, but in mine and many others, to whom the best and wisest of us ought to listen with respectful attention. There are not many for whom I have this feeling—and I cannot tell what a blank it makes in my world, and to feel that the only man in India whose simple opinion, without knowing his reasons, could make me doubt the soundness of any opinion of my own, is gone.'430

Henry Green had at once decided that his chief's death did not justify suspension of the impending operations against the Marris, and so rejoined the Khan's camp, confident that the frontier would be secure 'in the experienced hands of Captain Briggs'. The motley lashkar of Kelat tribesmen under their chiefs, nominally commanded by their suzerain, was accompanied by Green with a squadron of the Scinde

Horse. They passed through the Bugti country to Kahan where the fort was destroyed and three columns sent out in different directions. These inflicted some loss on parties of armed Marris and rounded up about a thousand head of cattle—largely stolen property. One of the guns captured from Clibborn's force in 1840 was found and sent to Jacobabad. The Khan's forces then advanced northwards in two columns by separate routes, reuniting at Mamand; the Marris made no stand and their chief Nur Mahomed sought for terms. The force however pushed on, again by separate routes, destroying the forts till the chief and his men, reduced to extremity on the confines of their country, surrendered unconditionally, acknowledged the sovereignty of the Khan, and offered hostages for their future good behaviour.

Green wished to make some more drastic example, being convinced that the tribe would otherwise speedily resume its plundering habits, but acquiesced in the wishes of the Khan on the understanding that he would be held responsible for any depredations by the tribe in British territory. Khudadad Khan took the Marri chief and other sardars as

hostages, and the force evacuated the hills.

This expedition demonstrated that the Marris and their country were less formidable in fact than in reputation, as even such an unstable ruler as Khudadad Khan had thus succeeded in exerting his authority with the support of a British officer. It justified the opinion long held by Jacob and Frere that the British Government had 'enormously overrated the value of the difficult country to the west of the Indus as a defence to India against an army of Central Asian tribes directed by European intelligence and energy.'

Green observed, 'The death of the late General Jacob added much to the difficulties of the undertaking. For fifteen years he had ruled these people, his name only was known, feared and respected such as no other ever has been, or ever will be: the enormous influence he exercised over these barbarians was even unknown to himself nor could I have believed that any one man could, unseen, exert such influence, unless eighteen months of the most intimate acquaintance with all these border tribes, from Makran to the furthest recesses of the Murree hills, had rendered

the fact beyond doubt.'431

Meanwhile in the Press posthumous tributes redoubled. Jacob's bold and successful practice of economic theory and political philosophy, his dogmatism in controversy—offset by the charm of his personal converse—and other traits of character, were set forth in a 'personal appreciation' in which also his resemblance in many points to his old chief, Sir Charles Napier, was pointed out. The Bombay Gazette, exclaiming 'A Prince hath fallen this day in Israel', traced his whole career, laying

particular stress on his prophecies of the Mutiny, and on his plan for the permanent defence of the north-west frontier, 'the only policy exhibiting anything of the grasp of a statesman, "looking before and after",

that has yet been propounded either in India or England.'

The Indian Press was echoed in all the principal journals of England. The Globe observed, 'Since the death of Sir Henry Lawrence no man has been taken from us who could be so ill spared.' By The Times in a leader on 5th January 1859, which dealt at length with his military system, Jacob was ranked second only to Outram for 'that natural and inherent superiority of power which . . . gives Englishmen the dominion over India.' The Daily Telegraph dwelt on the neglect that 'this incomparable Captain and Administrator, a Murat in the saddle, a Lawrence in the tent' had suffered: 'We shall assuredly convert to our own benefit the wisdom of General Jacob; but will a monument, a panegyric, an acknowledgement after death redeem us from the penalties of ingratitude?' The writer touched upon the wide scope of Jacob's achievement, ending with a reference to his rifle: 'with what obstacles had the unwearied General to contend, before the "cold shade" left him at liberty to promote its use in the Army.

We may close the list of tributes with that which appeared in the Spectator. His regiments were 'the nucleus of a new social order and progress.... He was one of those rarest spirits who love work—good, true and noble work-for its own sake; who could and did refuse opportunities of distinction in order to cling to a post of which the world of newspapers knew little, but which he felt was the proper field of his own labours. . . . This death is a great loss, an irreparable loss to the empire. It is a loss for which those who knew what Jacob was can see no consolation, unless this, that Jacob dead may be listened to . . . if it be so, his best friends will pronounce him, as he would himself, felix opportunitate mortis . . . for him, longer life could hardly have added more to his achievements, than that noisy fame which he held

so cheap.'432

On 14th April 1859, votes of thanks to the Government and the troops in India were moved in both Houses of Parliament. In the Commons Lord Stanley alluded to two men by whom the tranquillity of the province of Sind had been secured. One was Frere: 'The other, unhappily, cannot now be reached by the thanks of this House, or by any expression of national gratitude. But it is not right that the name and memory of General Jacob should pass away without receiving some passing recognition of a genius so rare, and a character so exalted. . . . General Jacob maintained peace on the wildest frontier of India and created a flourishing settlement out of a desert. Upon this settlement he

laid out such private means as he had acquired, and he has died at the age of forty-five worn out with exhaustion from excessive labour, having given all he had, even his life, to the service of the State.'

Shortly before this, at the instance of Kinglake, the historian of the war in the Crimea and Member for Bridgwater, Lord Stanley had obtained pensions of £150 a year for each of Jacob's sisters, to whose support John had contributed so long, 'in consideration of the eminent and distinguished services of Brigadier General John Jacob, C.B.'

Under his will, Jacob had left his entire property to his senior lieutenant and adopted son, William Merewether. The splendid library, which Henry Green supposed to have cost some thirty thousand rupees, was sold under Merewether's directions before his return to the frontier. Among much else we must regret the disappearance of the 'very large edition' of the Bible annotated by John Jacob. In the course of time most of his private papers and correspondence came back into the family. 433

In considering John Jacob's personality and character it is necessary to bear in mind the influence of the impediment in his speech. This stutter throughout his life he was unable to master and it was a constant struggle not to let its effect on him become apparent. To one of his subalterns he wrote, 'I do not mind mentioning to you that it is impossible for language to express, or for anyone to imagine who has not felt it, the crushing effect which my defective speech has on me. No amount of bodily deformity could equal or approach this curse. Were the bond unloosed, I sometimes feel I could force my way to anything; as it is, I frequently wish I could hide myself in the earth.'

The possibility that he might be turned out of his command, at various times between 1850 and 1855, was the more formidable in that he would be cast among strangers. He had written, 'I would certainly not leave the S.I.H. under any circumstances, if I could help it: I am not indeed fit for much save some such post.' Yet as we have seen he repeatedly and deliberately risked this by uncompromising advocacy of the causes nearest his heart; and when the transfer to Karachi, and thence to Persia, came at length, he found a more extensive and varied society less exacting than he had supposed; moreover he was never completely severed from the Scinde Horse and some few of the old circle of Jacobabad.

From this disability and its inhibitions must have sprung many of the distinguishing peculiarities—some of them contradictory—of his personality. He was habitually reserved, but aggressively self-assertive: acrimonious and intolerant, but warm-hearted, generous and hospitable: almost inhuman in his utter devotion to efficiency and duty, but

no enemy to fun in season, and a lover of manly sport of every kind. The reviewer of his Views and Opinions ably discussed some traits in his public character as it appeared in his career and writings. He was a self-educated man: that is to say, he had supplemented an ordinary education with much solitary reading: 'the latter does not supply the place of personal communion and oral discussion with men of equal intellectual power, but a different turn of mind'; we may interpose, that there can be little doubt that Jacob gained much from his correspondence and converse with Bartle Frere. The results, observed the reviewer, were a tendency to dogmatic assertion characteristic of strong self-educated minds, and to regard as new whatever he had found out for himself; to assume that it was known and felt by no one else, and that for want of this insight failure had occurred. The reviewer felt sympathy with him in his reference to universal laws, the essence of faith. It was in his too confident assertion of knowledge, not his firm declaration of faith, that Jacob's error lay, and this could be ascribed to

Those long solitary years on the frontier tended also to limit and distort his outlook. Sind was the focus of India: the Bolan was the only important overland trade route: there were no young officers in the armies of India equal to his own subalterns. It was all very natural—and very provoking to many living outside his particular world.

Many men before and after John Jacob have stood up against odds as champions of the Truth—that which a man troweth—in one or other matter on which they have felt called to testify. But few have equalled him for plain speaking. A disposition to compromise, a decent reticence, reluctance to give offence or to 'call a spade a spade'—characteristics bred by the British social code—have times without number detracted from the force of the pronouncements of our statesmen and reformers.

In John Jacob we find an exactly opposite attitude. Not only will he tell the truth as he sees it, but far from diplomatic understatement he will drive it home with brutal force, exaggerating rather than abating a jot. It seems that on occasion he deliberately resorted to over-emphasis, to startle and compel a hearing. Thus, referring to his views on Indian language examinations, 'Sir John Malcolm told them long ago the substance of all that I have set forth, but he told it in quiet language and was not attended to in the least. I spoke boldly and loudly and the attention of the authorities has been forced to the matters in question.' In rare instances too, in the warmth of advocacy or controversy, Jacob omitted, perhaps consciously, actual facts within his knowledge which might militate against the over-riding truth of his argument as a whole. Many of the prominent figures of this period employed publicity in

one or other form to further their aims and interests. In England, Lord Palmerston was conspicuously successful in his manipulation of the Press. Sir Charles Napier could make use of the literary skill and reputation of his historian brother. Outram's method was to cultivate a wide circle of 'friends and admirers' including some with influence in the Press. Jacob fought in person and alone, by his letters to the Press and by pamphlets, some of which were first circulated among prominent people 'for private and confidential use'.

While the technique of uncompromising vigour of expression certainly succeeded always in obtaining a hearing for his statements, it was a double-edged weapon; not only as making his opponents inveterate against him, but in alienating many men open to conviction whose support for his objects would have been valuable. By making enemies unnecessarily he endangered the future of his most cherished projects and achievements. Thus his depreciation of Panjab frontier methods left a heritage of resentment which may have contributed to the ultimate

undermining of his own system.

It was characteristic of him to write, 'I care little for man's approbation. Every word I have written is absolute truth and that is the reason why it TELLS.' Truth in his eyes was one and indivisible. Unlike many who have been cogent preachers, but felt themselves obliged to compromise somewhat with the existing order of things, and the way of the world, Jacob was faithful in deeds to his words. 'Himself believing in Universal Law,' says Pelly, 'the General has dared to apply its principles to the business immediately in hand, presuming that what was true for the whole could not but prove true for the particulars of the whole.' Thus philosophy and action were in John Jacob reciprocal. Having ascertained to his own satisfaction natural law through study and reasoning he would regulate his own work accordingly, and finding it succeed inferred a universal applicability; or he might proceed empirically, deducing principles from the lessons of his practice. At least, few men can have come nearer to Plato's ideal that philosophers should be rulers and rulers philosophers. Few who have taken natural law as their guide have been more practical in their handling of each day's labour.

He writes, 'I would untiringly inculcate the maxim: Be. Be yourself: and all the attributes and effects which nature has attached to that condition of existence must necessarily attend and follow you. Our rank in the universe depends on our real nature—on what we are, not on what we seem, or others think us to be.'434 In dealing with the common business of life, this ideal was the well-educated English gentleman, sublimated by such self-development, in the advocacy of which Jacob

seems to have anticipated the protagonists of auto-suggestion of our

own age.

It is a relief to glance at the traits which prove John Jacob no more than human. He wrote often and sincerely of his contempt for honours and rank, the common objects of a soldier's ambition; but we have seen him importune the authorities for fulfilment of the promise of the Order of the Bath, and apply for his promotion to the rank of lieutenant colonel; and he remonstrated with the Bombay Government for delay in reproducing in the Gazette the 'mention' which Outram had accorded to him for his services in Persia. Public credit where credit was due, and honour as distinct from Honours, he prized—the labourer was worthy of his hire. And he was not above jealousy of credit given to others, independent of himself, for work done in his own field of action, the frontier. It was a close preserve in which he would not allow that others could achieve anything.

We discern at times an attitude altogether inconsistent with his ideal of moral being, almost a persecution-complex, in his sensitiveness to obloquy, which after all he considered to proceed from a herd of Pharisees, Sadducees and Philistines. His being 'oppressed by the load of odium and foul abuse, and universal opposition' reads strangely after his own excellent advice to Outram: 'I would wish to see every Government and every public man live down calumny and falsehood . . . if you wince under criticism or censure, the chastisement will be thought to be merited . . . let those who will, rail on!' The thought arises, 'Physician, heal thyself!'—but more regrettable is the fact that in dwelling on his martyrdom 'standing alone' he ignores the consistent support and championship of all that he stood for, by Outram, Frere and others.

Jacob had one most unusual excuse for his dogmatic self confidence; and this was the complete and often astonishing success that he achieved in everything he undertook to which he was allowed to apply his full resources. Actually, there are instances in which the success was largely due to the fortuitous absence of the 'forces of Un-Truth'. He was certainly hasty, as the Bombay reviewer pointed out, in his assertion of the laws of political economy. Jacob's faith in the virtue of free trade was such that he once declared that he would be prepared to pay five hundred rupees per pound for grass for his horses rather than interfere with market prices. Because in his own sphere the factors of transport, distribution and competition worked out in accordance with classical theory, he concluded that unfaltering reliance on the maxim 'demand creates supply' would answer in all circumstances. He could not have conceived that any conditions whatsoever would justify a planned economy, with price-control or restrictions on trading.

A man ahead of his time in so much, John Jacob was thus an orthodox political economist of the Manchester School, some distance behind the best contemporary thought. He was also, inevitably, a 'perfectibilian'. We have seen his complete conviction of the excellence of the English gentleman, the English peasantry, English institutions-exemplifying the infinite capacity of man for steady self-development. This was well enough: but Jacob next seeks to invest the Sindhi peasant with the qualities of the Economic Man. The idea can hardly fail to amuse anyone who has served in the Province; it was noticed, with respect to Jacob's prohibition of forced labour, by a writer (most favourable to the order itself) in the Sind Cossid. He observed, 'A moral Government implies a moral nature in the people to be governed, as well as in the Governors. . . . No man knows better than the Commissioner that as long as the Sindee has a price in his possession for the purchase of a little grain, or a little

bhang, he will not work.'435

In his revenue policy too Jacob fell into the same error. The laisser faire principles under which the material greatness of Britain was increasing by leaps and bounds were sufficient, he felt sure, to achieve the development of the province and people of Sind, if the Government provided roads, canals, and bridges over the canals. 'Leave the people alone and let them grow'; do not 'nip the expansive energy of the people'; 'Depend on it, the people understand their own interests better than you do.' He thus voices the orthodox philosophy of the Victorian era. What of a people who refused to grow without artificial stimulation: who were devoid of expansive energy: and who obstinately failed to understand their true interests? The Baluchis of the frontier, generally speaking, were not such; but in the province as a whole centuries spent as 'the under dog' had left an all but indelible mark on the peasantry and small zemindars, while most of the great landowners, if not sunk in dolce far niente, would sacrifice anything for field sports.

Jacob's own revenue arrangements, which provided for the necessary fallows and scope for extension of agriculture up to saturation point by levying the annual tax on one-third of the total holding (where two years' fallow to one year's cultivation of the same ground was required) were eminently suited to the Frontier District, where there was a vast quantity of good virgin land, excellent facilities for irrigation and a vigorous people. The success of the system there was so evident and the underlying theory so attractive that on the completion of the Survey of the province it was adopted generally, under what was termed the Diffused Rate Settlement, in 1864-65. It was sanctioned for ten years and, on the whole, was a failure. Zemindars hit on the dodge of cultivating

the whole of one such 'Survey Number' year after year till the soil was exhausted, then relinquishing it and taking up other land, so that two or three years' prospective revenue was lost. There seems little doubt that with minor adjustments and closer supervision the system could have been made successful. But apart from more intelligent administration its due working demanded some degree of education

among the people.436 The references to this most important subject in Jacob's writings are for the most part indirect. Under Sir Charles Wood's dispatch of July 1854, education in India was to be based on the modern vernacular languages, the scheme providing grants-in-aid to approved institutions already existing and to others started by private or official enterprise. Jacob seems to have partaken in the expectation that 'enlightened selfinterest' would carry on the torch; he was opposed to making any stipulation with those who qualified as teachers or engineers from the Normal schools that they would only accept employment under Government, believing that such men returning to the district from which they came would become centres of practical instruction.437 The fallacy in practice of this supposition is a matter of common experience, at least in Sind. Young men taken from the villages for higher education do not return thither to 'spread the light' but cling to the cities and towns, generally despising their original environment.

Jacob's views on the ultimate effect of spreading education in India are noteworthy. 'To attempt to keep the natives of India or the native soldier of the Indian Army in darkness and ignorance, in the hope of increasing our power over them, will be as contemptible and base as it would be unwise and useless. The better example we set them, the more we make them feel the value of truth and honesty, the more we can raise their moral and intellectual powers, the firmer we must stand as their rulers.' He thus differed from those of his distinguished predecessors and contemporaries who contemplated a time when India could be conscientiously left by Britain to rule herself. He was convinced of the moral superiority of the British over the Indian races, and equally convinced that the latter accepted the fact and would acquiesce in the rule of English gentlemen. Left to themselves the Indians would not establish freedom, but only set up new tyrants. In his natural state the Indian must 'either be a despot himself or be subject to despotic rule.' And the events of the Mutiny only reinforced his opinion.

To those who would ascribe this attitude to mere racial prejudice it must be pointed out that John Jacob was the foremost practical exponent of 'Indianization' of his time. He repeatedly declared that no European subalterns could perform the duties of his Indian officers better than they

did. And not only did his rissaldars command squadrons in battle, under the eye of the commandant or his lieutenants, but they were left in charge of isolated posts in the face of a watchful and bold enemy for weeks at a stretch, with no means of 'reference to Headquarters' in an emergency. He once wrote, 'I would give a year's life to be able to show my Native officers to the Governor-General.'438

In 1846 the Scinde Horse, officered by three Europeans, was out-

standing in the three armies of India for efficiency in all respects.

In 1946 the overall proportion of British to Indian officers in Indian infantry and cavalry regiments was, so far as I have been able to ascertain, actually higher than under Jacob's organization. In making the comparison it is proper to equate Jacob's rissaldars and jemadars not with the ranks so named in 1946 but with the Indian majors, captains and lieutenants—they performed equally responsible duties in quarters, in outposts and in battle.

There is no inconsistency between Jacob's theory and his practice in this matter. He held that the Indian character, under European control and guidance, was capable of far-reaching development. But to this development he seems, in his own mind, to have set a bound: nor apparently did he contemplate a time when such control and guidance would be unnecessary, at least in the army—in which the Indians were 'the bones and muscles of the whole frame, of which the Europeans are the brains and nerves'. Such a limitation modifies his general perfectibilian outlook.

We may at this point consider the validity of claims advanced on behalf of other men to have foreseen the great Sepoy Mutiny, and to have uttered warnings which, had they been heeded, would have averted it.

In dealing with the local Panjab mutinies of 1849-50 Sir Charles Napier became convinced that an extensive disloyal combination existed among the Brahman sepoys, and made an example of the 66th Bengal Native Infantry, disbanding it and transferring its number to a Gurkha 'local' corps, which he took into the line: and he suggested to Lord Dalhousie that more Gurkha battalions should be formed to 'neutralise any combination among the Sepoys'. Jacob points out, 'This measure may be wise, but the Goorkas would soon be as bad soldiers as the Hindoos of the Bengal Army, if treated in the same way.' He says moreover, 'Sir C. Napier HELD FORMERLY OPINIONS VERY SIMILAR TO THOSE PUBLISHED BY THE "BOMBAY OFFICER", as I know well, having held numerous conversations with him on these subjects.'439

If this is accepted, Napier's proceedings as Commander-in-Chief in

India show that these opinions had no deep root. Contrary views expressed by senior officers of the Bengal Army, probably aided by personal dislike of John Jacob, overbore him; and we find Napier a careful upholder of caste prejudices among the sepoys and a vindicator of the system of promotion by seniority, in two of the last general orders he issued as Commander-in-Chief.

Sir Henry Lawrence's writings on the armies of India were contributed, mostly anonymously, to the Calcutta Review. The first of these articles, appearing on October 1844, dealt with defects in the existing organization of the Bengal Army. Lawrence suggested partial selection for promotion above the rank of naik (corporal), the widening of recruitment, the extension of the Irregular system and the formation of a limited number of infantry regiments officered by Indians. Ten years later, when Jacob's pamphlets had cut much deeper, he expresses his 'entire concurrence with Major Jacob, that it is quality and not quantity we want in officers', and that promotion by seniority must be abolished.

His last and most important article appeared in 1856. He now uttered a grave warning. 'Of late years the wheels of Government have been moving very fast—many native prejudices have been shocked... the faster the vessel glides, the more the need of... watching the weather, the rocks and the shoals.' He recapitulated and developed his own previous recommendations. John Jacob's name is usually first on Lawrence's list of men to be considered as models—the type of officer on whom reliance could be placed in a great calamity: the right man for his own proposed 'Inspector of Cavalry'. We read too, 'Let Jacob's scheme be tried with European soldiers as with native horsemen, with rifle and with cannon... we heartily wish he were the Lord Panmure of India.'

Henry Lawrence thus anticipated Jacob in pointing out publicly some of the predisposing causes of mutiny among Indian troops, and some necessary remedies. His insight was great, as is evident from the list of his recommendations at the end of his final article; but he does not seem to have been clear in his own mind how the main problem was to be solved. 'Some system must be devised: by having the whole Army in one general list, or by having Regiments of two, three or four Battalions, or by striking off inefficients, and by admitting the transfer of officers from one Corps to another to secure the Command of Regiments to those, between the ages of thirty and fifty, who have at least not given proofs of incompetency.'440

It was on the basis of John Jacob's principles and system that the armies of India were reorganized after the Mutiny. It has been the fashion to state that the model was the Panjab Frontier Force: the latter being

founded on the nucleus of the Guide Corps. Not only had the organization of the Scinde Horse been perfected before the Guides were raised in 1846 but, as we have seen, Henry Daly on being appointed to raise the 1st Frontier Force Cavalry adopted that organization in practically every detail, having had the advantage of serving alongside Jacob's men all through the Second Sikh War.

The entire cavalry of the Indian Army with the exception of the Madras regiments were placed on the silladar system and remained so until some years after the Great War of 1914–18. It may be recalled that Jacob himself had pointed out, when war against Persia was impending in 1856, that 'the organization which gives the Silidar Cavalry great advantage by land is the worst for transport by ship.' The Mesopotamian and other overseas campaigns in the First World War nearly dislocated the system. Old officers of the Indian cavalry whose service extends from before that period until some years after 1921, when their regiments were brought under the 'regular' system, are best qualified to pronounce how well the silladar organization was adapted for

operations in India and upon her frontiers.

Jacob always set great store by his regimental transport arrangements, which were on the silladar principle. From the time of the Crimean War when Sir Charles Napier's sons-in-law organized the Land Transport Train, it was held axiomatic that an entirely distinct corps must be maintained for the supply and transport of the material and baggage of an army. Yet it became equally evident, in the highly mobile warfare of 1939-45, that this system was wholly inadequate for the field. We have witnessed a return to Jacob's practice—each unit, infantry as well as armoured, being equipped with its own transport so as to be able to move far and fast at a moment's notice, and to be as self-contained and independent of the 'regular' transport as possible. Mechanization rendered this feasible, and the maintenance by the individual officer and man of his own transport, which was a feature of Jacob's system. has necessarily disappeared. The essence of his organization-independence and mobility of every unit at all times—has in its turn become axiomatic. As Jacob wrote to Henry Green in another connexion. Details vary with the times and circumstances: true principles are always the same, however the form of their application may change.'

It was appropriate that when in 1938—all but a century after the formation of the Scinde Horse—it was decided to mechanize gradually the cavalry of the Indian Army, the Scinde Horse was chosen to inaugurate the process. In acknowledging Sir Robert Cassels' letter informing him of the order, Lieutenant Colonel Brian Mahon, the then commandant, most justly remarked, 'I believe that General John Jacob,

whose mind was considerably in advance of the age in which he lived, would have welcomed the news that his old Regiment had been selected first for mechanization.'441

There can have been very few officers of the Indian Army with long regimental experience who had not a strong predilection for some particular race as 'the best of all' Indian soldiers. Jacob was no exception: first, by far, he placed the Hindustani Muslim—'there cannot be better Eastern soldiers than these men make when properly treated. They have scarcely more prejudices of religion, etc., than any Englishman. . . . They are the most faithful and trustworthy of any men in India; they are, in fact, more like gentlemen than any other class of Indians.' In spite of this conviction and though he had full powers to fill his ranks as he thought best, Jacob never aimed at making the Scinde Horse a single-class corps. His over-riding principle was that for the raw material little was required but thews and sinews, and a tractable disposition: the soldier was made by the regimental system. A handful of Mahrattas, and rather more Rajputs from the neighbourhood of Delhi, remained a valuable Hindu element in the Scinde Horse. Jacob would not enlist very low caste men, not because of their caste as such but because he had found that 'when a proper discipline and a proper soldierly pride exist, the men of high caste give less trouble about their caste than the low caste men.' Lord Roberts held the same opinion and acted on it.

It was sad to find the insidious caste-spirit allowed latterly to creep back, even in a Bombay regiment. For some years prior to the Second World War difficulty was experienced in keeping the 5th Mahratta Light Infantry up to strength on account of the caste-exclusiveness of the serving Viceroy-Commissioned officers and sepoys, who did not wish to have men of the 'inferior' Mahratta castes, such as Kolis and Shimpis, in their ranks. This goes to bear out Jacob's observation, for the Mahratta though excellent as a soldier is not of high caste.

The breaking of another caste barrier among the European officers of the Indian Armies—the old furlough system of which only the well-to-do could avail themselves—was largely due to Jacob's advocacy of a 'Sabbatical year': the principle of which was the basis of the modern 'leave on average pay' which effected all his objects.

To turn from details to fundamentals: the Indian Armies were reorganized after the Mutiny on the basis of Jacob's scheme of a general gradation list—the army of each Presidency having its cavalry and infantry officers in an 'unemployed' list known as a 'Staff Corps'.

At the same time the principle of having fewer but selected British officers with Indian regiments was adopted, though the average number was fixed at seven or eight instead of Jacob's three or four. This system

continued in force for over thirty years, when the old regimental system was reintroduced. After 1880 the average number of critish officers in a corps had also been increased. It would thus appear that after an

extended trial Jacob's system proved a failure.

The main reason for the return to the old system seems to have been the high incidence of casualties among British officers—probably on account of the white sun-helmets which identified them to enemy marksmen—in the Second Afghan War and frontier-campaigns. But of course Jacob's plan contemplated a degree of discipline in the ranks, and of self-reliance among the Indian officers, which would remain unaffected by the loss of their British officers. It so happened, indeed, that not one of the European officers of the Scinde Horse was ever disabled in action in Jacob's time. But had it been otherwise, everything that we know of his best Indian officers—men like Sheikh Abdul Nabi or Mohbat Khan—shows that they would not have been wanting if called to the command of their regiment on the field of battle, without a single European officer present.

Jacoh's recommendation that his regimental system should be extended to the armies of India as a whole had been criticized during his lifetime mainly on the ground that in practice the principle of selection for command on merit alone would be impaired by allowing the claims of subordinates-probably the most senior among them-to succeed to the command in due course: while the alternative, of importing a newly selected officer would inevitably weaken the chain of command. Jacob had anticipated this objection: the school would form the officers and nothing else would do so. Every properly selected commanding officer would so train his subordinates that they would be as perfectly fit to succeed him in command, as if the process of general selection had been applied afresh. This in fact occurred in practice in the Scinde Horse. In 1862 the cavalry brigade of the Sind Frontier Force was commanded in chief by Major Merewether, with Macauley, Malcolm Green and Briggs commandants respectively of the First, Second and Third Regiments of Scinde Horse.

That Jacob's system should not eventually have succeeded when applied to the army as a whole seems to me to have been due largely to lack of faith in it among the higher authorities, and consequently a partial and hesitant effort to apply his principles. As he himself observed in regard to natural laws, 'There always seems to be a difficulty in applying them to particular occasions. Men seem to want firmness and faith to follow out . . . principles which their reason tells them to be true. But a very little perseverance would resolve all do bts.' It must be admitted that once again his mistake was in counting too much on the

presumed tendency of mankind towards perfectibility. The outcome justified the not unfriendly observation of his critic, that without a Special Providence in the person of General Jacob' in control, human

weakness would defeat his scheme.

The General Unemployed List served one purpose well, in gradually eliminating without hardship large numbers of inefficient officers. Perhaps the best commentary on its working in this respect is to be found in 'Aliph Cheem's' verses; 'The General Duty Cove'. His Major Biffin was emphatically not one of those officers whom Jacob contemplates as pursuing, while unattached, 'those studies and occupations which may qualify them for public employment'; but acquiesced in the degrading position of 'a scarlet-coated sham' till by the passage of time he could qualify for a bonus and retire.

Though it was decided in the 1890s to revert to the regimental system for officering the Indian Army, the importation of commanding officers had, at least during the present century, become quite as common as in

the operation of the general gradation list.

It may be interesting to examine the list of British and Indian officers of the Scinde Horse as it stood on 1st April 1938. The regiment was not

then 'Indianized' or mechanized.

The commandart, second-in-command, three squadron commanders, and sixteen squadron officers were all British. Many of them were seconded on various duties and the number actually present with the regiment was eight-more than double the strength of Jacob's day. There were twenty-two Indian (Viceroy-Commissioned) officers, two of them serving with another cavalry regiment. The duties of these rissaldars and jemadars were of course far less responsible than those of the men holding the same ranks under John Jacob. 442 At this time the policy of complete 'Indianization' of a few selected regiments-which Henry Lawrence had recommended in 1844—was just arriving at the point when the last British officer, the commandant, was about to

It remains to record that Jacob's name was commemorated in the Indian Army by a unique distinction. A unit of each arm was named after him:—Jacob's Horse, Jacob's Rifles, and Jacob's Mountain Battery.

For ten years after his death Jacob's system on the Sind frontier and in Kelat was brilliantly administered by his lieutenants. Merewether left Sind in 1862 and a few years later as Resident in Aden successfully applied his principles to reduce to order the Arab tribes who had harassed the Protectorate. On the frontier he had left, cultivation had begun to extend beyond the old line of posts, and his successor Henry Green advanced them on the average fifteen miles nearer the hills. The friendly attitude of the Bugti tribe may be gauged by the fact that they welcomed a tour through their country by the Bombay Commander-in-Chief, Sir Robert Napier, in the cold weather of 1866-67. In Kelat Malcolm Green could not transform Khudadad Khan into a model ruler, and disaffected chieftains twice rebelled, but the Khan reestablished his authority without armed assistance. The whole of Baluchistan enjoyed profound peace for some years before Sir Henry

Green retired from the service in May 1868.

Under the Panjab frontier system little progress had been made towards taming the Baluch tribes beyond the border, the main reason being that the tribes living within British territory were still not prevented from retaliatory raiding beyond it. Bartle Frere, on being appointed to Lord Canning's council, had urged him to have Jacob's principles applied to the Panjab line. Sir George Clerk, then Governor of Bombay for the second time, agreed with him. He would not allow that the Pathan tribes of the Peshawar region, where he had formerly served, were any more formidable than the Baluchis whom Merewether and Green kept so firmly in hand. 'It seems to me,' he wrote to Frere at Calcutta, 'that before long it may fall to this Government to save you some three quarters of a million per annum which is now wasted in cockering up the so-called Punjaub system.'443

In the event, so far from one of Jacob's men being placed in charge of the Panjab frontier, a Panjab officer was appointed to supersede them at Kelat. How this occurred can here be explained only in bare outline.

About the time that Sir Robert Napier and Green were touring the Bugti hills an outlaw of that tribe at the head of a band of Marris and other Baluch tribesmen raided Harrand in the Dera Ghazi Khan District, where Robert Sandeman was Deputy Commissioner. The plunderers were pursued and a number of them captured. Sandeman applied to Green to obtain compensation from the Khan of Kelat for the damage done. Green replied that this would be vain as the tribes though nominally subjects of the Khan were not amenable to his control, and in fact he suffered more from their depredations than the British Government. In similar circumstances, he said, he would not complain to the Khan because of the want of activity of his outpost officers. This snub may be held to have changed the history of Baluchistan. Sandeman, having prisoners in his hands, was able to obtain the submission of their chiefs, and took some Marris into Government service.

The conduct of British relations with Kelat presented two main problems: the inveterate tendency of certain tribal sardars to rebel against their suzerain the Khan, and the constant predatory raids on his territory made by the Marri tribe. Sir William Merewether, now

Commissioner in Sind, was hampered in dealing with these problems, with which he was perfectly conversant, by the conduct of his subordinates on the one hand, and on the other by lack of support from the

Supreme Government.

On the retirement of Sir Henry Green, before Merewether had returned to Sind, Colonel Phayre, a senior Bombay officer with no experience of Baluchistan since 1841, was appointed Political Superintendent on the Sind Frontier, over the heads of Macauley and other experienced officers of Jacob's school. He strongly sympathized with Sandeman's attitude of dealing direct with the Kelat tribal chiefs and encouraging their aspirations towards independence of the Khan's authority. The opposition of Phayre and Sandeman to Merewether's policy, amounting at times to flagrant insubordination, was countenanced by the Government of India; this state of affairs being a mere episode in the chronic antagonism between Calcutta and Bombay. The Supreme Government generally adopted the views of the Lieutenant Governor of the Panjab who had no responsibility for Kelat and little knowledge of its needs; high policy tended to be decided with a view solely to the security of a portion of the Panjab border.

Before Phayre could be removed, in 1872, the Khan had become utterly disgusted by the countenance given by him and Sandeman to the sardars who had rebelled and taken refuge with the Marris. The latter showed themselves adepts in playing off one British authority against another, and Sandeman confessed that his own influence would not serve to induce the Marri chief to disgorge the plunder his men had obtained from Afghan merchants in the Bolan. Merewether, in face of complaints from the Amir of Afghanistan, had to demand compensation for them from the Khan. The latter, goaded beyond endurance, insulted Captain Harrison the British Resident at his court last of Jacob's subalterns—and refused to give redress for offences committed by his Brahui subjects in Lower Sind. Merewether withdrew Harrison and suggested that the Khan should be deposed, and that a

punitive expedition should be sent against the Marris.

The Government of India rejected these proposals in favour of Sandeman's proposal to pay a friendly visit to the Marri chief. Merewether made a further effort on behalf of his own policy in a personal interview with Lord Northbrook at Calcutta, but failed to convince him. Sandeman's plan was to be tried, though for this purpose he was to remain in

subordination to the Commissioner in Sind.

It is necessary at this point to take a backward glance at developments in Central Asia. As foretold by Jacob, Russia had quietly advanced in Turkestan, and in 1862 took Tashkent. In 1866 Green and Frere

brought forward again the plan of occupying Quetta. Circumstances were exceptionally favourable, but Sir John Lawrence was Viceroy: a peremptory negative was the answer. While in Europe Russia blandly disclaimed any interest in Afghanistan, Kaufmann, the aggressive Governor of Turkestan, entered into direct correspondence with the Amir Sher Ali.

In 1874 Disraeli became Prime Minister and Sir Bartle Frere, now a member of the India Council, again urged the Quetta plan. His 'Forward Policy' now included also the posting of British agents at Herat and Kandahar, with a view to making up for the loss of prestige consequent upon the 'masterly inactivity' policy. Had the 'Political Commissioner on the Frontier of India' been established at Quetta as and when proposed by Jacob, or even ten years later, his continuous influence would surely have been a sufficient safeguard against that of Russia. Jacob had been opposed to the posting of British officers in Afghanistan, his policy anticipating that of Lord Mayo—'by the arrangements I have proposed, we should place between us and the enemy several wild and warlike nations devoted to our service'. Two steps were now to be taken hastily instead of one deliberately.

Frere had persuaded Lord Salisbury to adopt the 'Forward Policy' almost at the moment when Lord Northbrook was rejecting the proposals of Jacob's men, who after years of frustration had been driven to resign even the aim of occupying Quetta—the place where Sandeman

himself had said he hoped to be 'some day'.

After an initial failure, Sandeman's mediation succeeded; but his master stroke lay not in the details of his settlement, but in his persuading the Government of India to take the necessary measures to uphold it; which aid, always previously withheld, was the one requisite for a lasting solution of the Kelat problem.

Lord Lytton, the new Viceroy, decided to adopt Sandeman as his Agent in Baluchistan and it fell to Sir William Merewether, thus superseded, to make the arrangements for a Durbar at Jacobabad, at which on 8th December 1876 a new treaty with Kelat was signed in John

Jacob's house.

Twenty years had passed since Merewether as acting Political Super-intendent had recommended the occupation of Quetta on Nasir Khan's own request. The whole of Jacob's plan—the establishment of a Political Commissioner in Baluchistan, the laying of a railway to the foot of the Bolan, the protection of the Pass and of Kachhi by extension of the Levy system—all this was now to be carried out by the man who had worked to undermine Jacob's system and supplant the men trained by him.

So the seniormost and juniormost of John Jacob's lieutenants retired

almost together, Sir William Merewether to a seat on the Secretary of State's council, by which perhaps it was sought to compensate him for the treatment he had received, and Harrison into obscurity without any recognition of his sterling work as Political Agent at Kelat in times of

unexampled difficulty.444

Of the rest of Jacob's men, Sir George Malcolm commanded a division in the Abyssinian campaign, and Sir Lewis Pelly distinguished himself as Resident in the Persian Gulf. Malcolm Green was compelled to retire prematurely owing to ill health, and Macauley resigned when thereafter the Kelat appointment was kept in abeyance by Sir Henry Green and Colonel Phayre was imported to fill the post of Political Superintendent. Briggs and Dickinson both served with distinction in Abyssinia. The last survivor of the gallant band was Sir Henry Green, who lived on till 1913. Towards the end of his life he wrote of Jacob, 'I have seen and mixed with many that are called great men, in late years, but I have not yet come across one who taken all round could come up to him . . . whenever I have had anything difficult to accomplish I have always first thought what Jacob would have done in a like case. . . . '

Two kinds of reputation are left by Englishmen in India: a name that stands high in the estimation of their successors and of historians, and that which lives on for generations in the songs and stories of the illiterate peasantry. If a man's name remains for a century cherished in the traditions of the country people and equally firm in the educated esteem of his own countrymen, he has achieved eminence shared by few indeed. The best known example is John Nicholson; and if after a hundred years John Jacob's name is better known in Sind and Baluchistan than in England, he would not have had it otherwise. These two were the men, and no others, who were cited by the author of From Sepoy to Subadar, a Hindu native officer of the Bengal Army, who wrote in 1862, 'General Nicolsain Sahib was considered by some as an avatar, and there are those who still mourn his removal from the world. General Jacum was looked upon as next to Mahomed by many of the Hill tribes: but I am told he is dead also.' The old subadar adds, of the good commanding officer and his men, 'If he understands them, can enter into their feelings and has obtained their confidence, which is not to be done in one day, or one year: and above all, if he has power, and possesses justice—they will do anything, go anywhere, and his will is law."445

The impact of such unique personalities as Nicholson and Jacob may be appreciated in some degree from the false as well as the true legends that survive them. Of Jacob, as fantastic stuff is to be found in cold print issued in England as in the folk-tales and ballads of the frontier. I quote from the Life of Sir Richard Burton by Thomas Wright: 'The Acting Commissioner of the time was General Jacob of the Scinde Horse, who wore a helmet of silver and a sabretache studded with diamonds. This however was not from pride or love of display, but because he held it policy in those who have to deal with Hindus not to neglect show and splendour. . . . As Jacob stuttered one of his correspondents thought that his name was J.J.J.J.Jacob, and terribly offended the testy General by writing it so. A brave and self-confident but rancorous old man, Jacob by his senseless regulations brought the Indian Army to the verge of ruin. This peccadillo was passed over, but a more serious offence, his inability to play whist, was remembered against him by his brother

officers right to the day of his death.'446

The opportunity fell to me to take by the hand and converse with not a few who saw and heard John Jacob. The severe climate of Upper Sind seems conducive to longevity among those born and bred there. The independent personal reminiscences of nonagenarian and centenarian Baluchis, banias and others whom I sought out twenty-five years ago all bore testimony to the justice, humanity, eccentricity and marvellous talents of Jekam Sahib Bahadur. In the Baluch ballad known as Kehar Mehar we see him pardon and reward a bold freebooter who fought till all his comrades were slain. His own skill and prowess in arms, in the saddle and as a swimmer are recalled in many anecdotes. The Jakhranis proudly tell of his defeat in a match on horseback by their own sardar Dad Mahomed, a jemadar in his Baluch Guides. The sardar owned a celebrated mare, and Jacob challenged him over a six mile course round Jacobabad, himself mounted on his favourite 'Messenger'. The Baluch, a light weight, kept about a length behind all the way, and made no genuine effort to overhaul Jacob on the run-in, confessing when taken to task that he had felt it disrespectful to beat his commandant. Jacob insisted on the race being re-run a day or two later, threatening Dad Mahomed with the direst consequences if he did not try his utmost; with the result that though he got all he knew out of 'Messenger' he was beaten fairly comfortably.

We are shown him solemnly imposing a fine upon himself and handing the proceeds to certain urchins of Jacobabad, his constant attendants on his morning rides round his town, for neglecting their warnings and getting himself and his horse bogged in a half empty canal; and again conducting his office work out in the blazing sun of the hot weather for as many hours as he had forgetfully kept some women petitioners wait-

ing there while he was enjoying himself in his workshop.

Many instances of Jacob's humanity and generosity to the poor are fondly cherished. An aged couple who had lost their only son and breadwinner are settled on a piece of land and regularly visited by him during

the remainder of their days: a selfish son who had deserted his helpless parents is sought out and put under such discipline that he becomes a model of filial piety: a starving family of nomad Brahuis who had huddled together at nightfall under the rain of a bitter January to take, as they thought, their last sleep awake miraculously in what appears to be a palace, covered with warm rugs before a huge fire, and are sent on their way rejoicing with food in their bellies and money in their hands. It is firmly believed that the alterations and additions made to his own house and his great public works were undertaken solely to provide employment for the poor.

To the evil-doer he was relentless: great and small were alike to him: even the beard of an offending Baluch was not immune from his wrath. Above all, the dishonest official found short shrift: the order to such was to leave the district within twelve hours. And—what will never be forgotten—there was no 'rasai' in his time, or for many years afterwards. Not a man in Government service but paid cash for everything he

required from the country people.

His foibles are often recounted. He was as orthodox as the strictest Muslim in his dislike of dogs; and like some monarchs of ancient time he gave a splendid burial to his favourite horse. For his pigeons he built a lordly cote in his garden; but there was consternation in the town when he descended in all the terrors of his anger on a party enjoying the popular diversion of cock-fighting. Every man was put under arrest, taken to his compound and given twenty lashes; and the owners of the cocks were made to pummel and scratch each other till they were covered with blood like the birds, and then paraded through the town with beat of drum, informing the people that all promoters of fights between animals would thenceforth be treated likewise. To the inquiry of Baluchis, invariably made from bachelor officers, why he did not marry, he would reply gravely, 'What if I should die, and my widow marry again? Can I tolerate the thought of people saying, "The Madam of Jekam Saheb Bahadur has taken another husband"?'

Once and once only, according to Baluch tradition, was John Jacob foiled, and that by a Holy Man. The Pir of the Marris and Bugtis, Syed Inayat Shah, had misbehaved, had been pardoned, and then had failed to pay his respects to Bartle Frere when he encamped at Shahpur. There are several versions of the story: one relates that the arm of the orderly told by Jacob to strike the Syed became paralyzed when raised. Jacob recognized a superior power and released the Syed, whereupon, we are

assured, the orderly regained the use of his arm. 447

Nevertheless, John Jacob was destined posthumously to become a 'Pir' himself. The comet which on its appearance had been supposed in

Kelat to bode disaster to the Marri tribe was soon afterwards universally recognized on the Sind frontier as having portended the passing away of the wondrous being who had created a new order in the land. If canonization after death depends on the abiding faith of succeeding generations of the living, his place in a hagiology that knows no creed is assured. As he lay dying the Baluch chiefs, mindful of their own custom, supposed that he would wish to be laid to rest in his own land: but let his seal be sent to them and they would obey it. A few days after his death Henry Green wrote, 'The Belooch say that they are glad now that as his time is come he did remain among them and is buried there, as his spirit will now be always with them.'448 And soon it was noticed that by night a little lamp was burning at the head of his tomb. The practice was still kept up when I first visited Jacobabad in 1929, but seems later to have been discontinued by prohibition, if I am rightly informed, of the local Executive Engineer whose charge included the maintenance of the Christian cemetery: he objected to the mess of oil left on the tomb. I can bear faithful witness to the sequel. On a visit to the place in 1940, after a long interval, I found that efflorescent salt, the bane of land and buildings in Sind, had gained a devastating hold on Jacobabad. The cemetery was in a deplorable state of neglect and the salt had eaten away much even of the great slab under which John Jacob lies buried. Only at the head, where the lamps of the votaries had burned for seventy years and more, the oil-soaked stone had resisted the onslaught and remained smooth and square as when it was laid.*

The tomb still figures in a ceremony of intercession, when the spirit of Jacob the 'Wali', the spiritual father of his people, is invoked to restore health to an ailing child. A garland of leaves is attached about the slab, left there for the night, and on the morrow removed and wound round the body of the sufferer. The fulfilment of other prayers is sought in similar fashion; Hindus as well as Muslims observe the ritual at need. As for others, a 'pilgrimage' to Jacob's tomb became almost de rigueur for visitors of all races; and every Viceroy and Governor who camped at Jacobabad in my own recollection paid this mark of respect.

As the founder had foreseen, Upper Sind Frontier settled down into a prosperous civil District, though even a century after his coming to Khangarh it retained a distinct individuality. In 1880 the post of Political Superintendent was reduced to that of Deputy Commissioner, and the military command of the frontier separated. In 1906 the Scinde Horse were transferred from Jacobabad, their headquarters for sixty years; and at Kashmor, their last camp in Upper Sind on their route to the

^{*} See preface to the Second Edition. ** The author's great-uncle, Colonel E.W. Trevor of the Bombay Staff Corps, was the first Deputy Commissioner.

Panjab, Lieutenant Colonel Sherard and other officers penned some valedictory verses on the painful occasion, which were long to be seen in the visitors' book of the inspection bungalow. The only lines that rise above doggerel ran thus:

So up, ye youngsters. Fill a glass
To former worthies, days of yore.
John Jacob's name where'er ye pass
Keep safe and fresh in memory's store

A slave to duty he, in brief,
Was just as judge though firm, I ween:
More able ruler, honest Chief,
More gallant soldier ne'er was seen.

Mention has been made of the ruinous effect of efflorescent salt in Jacobabad itself—due to waterlogging of the low-lying ground from excessive irrigation. The most notable victim of this development was the Residency, as Jacob's house came to be called. Many expedients to stave off delapidation were applied in vain and in 1946 the building was demolished. It is noteworthy that the magnificent clock constructed by Jacob himself, having a deep well for its weights, was left undisturbed and the new house was erected round it. A long line of those who, in the phrase current on the Sind frontier, have 'sat in Jacob's chair', working in his office and sleeping in the room in which he died, learned with regret that the old house, already much reduced from its original size, could not be saved.

The earlier house at Hyderabad, long known and marked on the survey maps as 'Jacob's castle', eventually fell into the hands of a Hindu subordinate official; efforts made by the present writer and others to induce him not to destroy but to adapt it for his use failed, and in 1943 it was levelled to the ground.*

Still, the memory of such a man as John Jacob did not require bricks and mortar for its preservation. Exegit monumentum aere perennius. To reign in men's minds, he said himself, is the only safe and secure reign after all. His old comrade of Addiscombe days, Lord Napier of Magdala remarked many years after his death, 'Even now the name of Jacob works a miracle—it makes service on the Sind frontier popular.'

It does not appear to me probable that John Jacob would have added to his fame or increased the obligations of posterity had his life been prolonged or wider scope granted for his talents, save in the post he had proposed as Political Commissioner on the frontier of India, at Quetta.

★ See illustration at p. 107.



THE RESIDENCY, JACOBABAD
The inscription reads, 'In this house lived and died
General John Jacob, Political Superintendent and
Commandant, Frontier of Upper Sind, 1847-58.'
The author standing beneath was at the time (1935)
Deputy Commissioner, Upper Sind Frontier.

EPILOGUE

He remains essentially Jacob of Jacobabad. But in his actual achievement I believe, as Lewis Pelly believed, that few men have attained so closely to the noble ideal pronounced by Carlyle:

Here is an earnest truth speaking man; no theoriser, sentimentaliser, but a practical man of work and endeavour, man of sufferance and endurance. The thing that he speaks is not a hearsay, but a thing that he has himself known, and by experience become assured of. . . . His grand excellency is that he is genuine. As his primary faculty, the foundation of all others, is intellect, depth and force of vision, so his primary virtue is justice, the courage to be just . . . he lives, as he counsels and commands, not in the Reputable, the Plausible, the Half; but resolutely in the Whole, the Good, the True.

Oxford 29th June 1959

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

John Jacob's Writings

OF Jacob's private correspondence, holograph letters written to him by Sir James Outram, Lord Melville, Sir Bartle Frere, Lord Canning and other distinguished contemporaries are preserved in the India Office Library (MSS Eur. E. 208). With these are a few of Jacob's replies, but

the great bulk of his own letters are in private hands.

Much of his official and demi-official correspondence is contained in the 'Pre-Mutiny Records of the Commissioner in Sind' and the MS Selections from the Records of the Commissioner in Sind, which now form part of the Pakistan Government Archives at Karachi. A substantial portion of these, belonging to the years 1842-55, were printed by him in the Record Book of the Scinde Irregular Horse (see under 'Printed Works' below). Copies of these and later official reports, etc., are doubtless available in the East India Company files in the India Office Library, and some were published during his lifetime in the 'Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government' (New Series).

Printed Works

These fall into two groups: publications, and works printed for private circulation only. Some first appeared in the latter form and were reissued as publications: some originally issued without author's or printer's name, but were acknowledged in later editions: some appeared. first under one title and later under another: with some the text of the first version was modified or added to later: some were published simultaneously in London and Bombay.

It is not claimed, therefore, that the subjoined list is exhaustive, or

correct in every detail.

A. Published Works

- Remarks by a Bombay officer on a pamphlet on 'The Deficiency of European Officers in the Army of India, by one of themselves', published by James Madden, London, 1849. Published (?Smith Elder & Co.), London, 1850.
- 2. The present condition of the Bengal Native Army considered with a view to its improvement. Published, London, 1851. (Reprinted, with corrections, under the title A few remarks on the Bengal Army and Furlough Regulations, with a view to their improvement, by a Bombay officer.)
- 3. Memoir of the First Campaign in the Hills North of Cutchee under Major Billamore: by one of the surviving subalterns. W. H. Allen & Co., London, 1852.
- 4. (a) Remarks on the Native Troops of the Indian Army, and (b) Notes on certain passages in Sir C. Napier's posthumous work on the defects of the Indian Government, with (c) Some account of the Scinde Camel Baggage Corps. By Major John Jacob, C.B. Times Press, Bombay, 1854. Note: (a), at least, also published in London, 1854 (?Smith Elder & Co.)
- Notes on Sir W. Napier's work Sir Charles Napier's Administration of Scinde, together with correspondence relating to the North West Frontier of Scinde. By Major John Jacob, C.B. Privately printed, 1852. Published, London, 1854 (? Smith Elder & Co.)
- On the Causes of the Defects existing in our Army and in our Military Arrangements. (Nominally a letter to the Editor of The Times.) By Major John Jacob, C.B. Published Smith Elder & Co., London, 1855.
- 7. Rifle Practice. By Major John Jacob, C.B. Published Smith Elder & Co., London, 1853.
- 8. Observations on a scheme for the Organization of the Indian Army. Bombay, 1857; republished London, 1858.
- 9. Tracts on the Native Army of India, its organization and discipline. By Brigadier-General John Jacob, C.B. (Nos. 1, 4a, and 6 collected and republished, with notes by the Author, Smith Elder & Co., London, 1857.)
- 92. Tracts, etc. (Nos. 1, 2, 4a, 6, extracts from 4b and 5, and 8, collected and republished, Smith Elder & Co., London, 1858.)
- 10. Letters to a Lady on the Progress of Being in the Universe. By John Jacob. Published, John Chapman, London, 1858.
- 11. The Views and Opinions of General Jacob. Collected and edited by Captain Lewis Pelly. Published, Smith Taylor & Co., Bombay, 1858: Smith Elder & Co., London, 1858.
- B. Works printed for Private Circulation
- 1. Remarks on an Article in the Calcutta Review, March 1846, entitled Hints on Irregular Cavalry. Privately printed in India, 1847.
- 1a. Papers on Silidar Cavalry. ? Privately printed in India, 1848.

APPENDIX A

- 2. The Record Book of the Scinde Irregular Horse. Printed by Smith Elder & Co., London, 'for private and confidential regimental use only'. Vol. I, 1853, Vol. II, 1855. (Republished by the Victoria Press, Sukkur, Sind, 1902-3.)
- 3. Papers regarding the first campaign against the Predatory Tribes of Cutchee in 1839-40, and affairs of the Scinde Frontier. Major Billamore's surviving subaltern versus Sir William Napier. Printed by Smith Elder & Co., London, April 1853.
- 4. Letters on the Persian War and on the Frontier Arrangements of our Indian Empire. Printed for private and confidential use only, by Smith Elder & Co., London, 1857.
- 5. Replies to Questions regarding the Reorganization of the Indian Army. Printed (? by Smith Elder & Co., London), 1858.

APPENDIX B

John Jacob's Frontier System, the 'Sandeman System', and the 'Forward Policy

A. Jacob's Frontier System

As has been shown in Chapters XII and XIV, Jacob himself drew attention to the differences between his system and that pursued in the

adjoining Panjab District of Dera Ghazi Khan.

Jacob frequently described his system and methods in official correspondence, but it is sufficient for my present purpose to refer to three of his letters, reproduced in The Record Book of the Scinde Irregular Horse, viz:

(1) Jacob to Captain French, for the information of the Governor of Bombay, 4th December 1847. (S.I.H. Records, Vol. I, pp. 131-3.)

(2) Jacob to Sir H. M. Eliot, for the information of Lord Dalhousie and the Government of India, 7th August 1850. (Ibid., pp. 328-31.) (3) Jacob to the Commissioner in Sind, Memorandum dated 9th

August 1854. (S.I.H. Records, Vol. II, pp. 187-8.)

The first sentence of the Memorandum last mentioned begins with the words, 'Entirely offensive measures on the part of the troops', and this phrase isolated from its context has been taken to give a misleading colour to Jacob's methods by most authors who have had occasion to allude to them. Thus T. H. Thornton when setting out to describe the Sind system states (Sir Robert Sandeman, p. 31), 'for the preservation of peace upon the border, the Sind authorities depended more upon military measures of protection and repression than upon conciliatory treatment of the tribes': he adds a footnote, 'General Jacob's mode of dealing with the Bugtis is thus described' and proceeds to quote a passage from a report by Sir William Merewether to the Governor of Bombay, dated 17th June 1870, describing the action at Zamani and the

events which preceded it. Thornton closes his quotation at this point: but a few lines further on in this report Merewether records how the Bugti prisoners were allowed to return to their hills, and ends the paragraph with the words, 'Some of the best men were taken into Govern-

ment employ to act as scouts and guides.'

Thornton, having omitted any reference to this feature of Jacob's policy, again dubs the Sind frontier system as 'uncompromising militarism' (op. cit., p. 40), and Mr. C. C. Davies, writing many years later, states that 'it can be roughly described as an uncompromising repression of outrages by a strong military force' (Cambridge History of India, Vol. VI, p. 448, following his own monograph 'The Problem of the North West Frontier 1890-1908, with a survey of policy since 1849' -C.U.P., 1932.)

In describing the Panjab system, Thornton states (op. cit., p. 17), it was clear, from the first, that it would be impossible to organize the defence of the Panjab frontier on a purely military basis . . . accordingly, from the very first the system of border defence maintained by the Punjab Government was not purely military, but partly military, partly

political and conciliatory.'

The implied contrast with the Sind frontier methods is totally misleading: it would seem to be based on the fact that on the Panjab frontier the military control was exercised by officers of the Panjab Frontier Force, the political and administrative business being managed by the Deputy Commissioners of the frontier Districts, whereas in Sind Jacob and his successors united in their own hands all military and political authority on and beyond the frontier with administrative responsibility for the Upper Sind Frontier District. (Cf. J. Martineau, Sir Bartle Frere, Vol. I, pp. 165-6.)

But though Jacob was Commandant of the frontier as well as Political Superintendent, it was his political authority that he regarded as essential: thus in a letter to Colonel Shaw, dated 16th October 1847, after he had been deprived of his political powers, he writes, 'under the new arrangements (whereby the Collector of Shikarpoor is to be the medium of communication with the frontier tribes whether within or without the British Territory, all discretionary power resting with him) I can hold command of this frontier neither with credit and satisfaction to myself nor with benefit to the public service.' (S.I.H. Records, Vol. I, p. 123.)

To Captain French he wrote, on 4th December 1847, after outlining the organization he required—in particular full powers for himself as Political Agent—'with these arrangements I would withdraw the post altogether from Shahpoor and afford protection to the Khyherees by moral influence, which in general on this frontier I have found more

powerful than any physical force, and by keeping some of them in our

pay.

Jacob did withdraw his post from Shahpur (which was in Kelat territory) and the Khyheris were supported in their villages in its neighbourhood—some forty miles beyond the British frontier—by 'moral influence'.

To describe a system which operated thus as 'uncompromising

militarism' is a gross perversion of the truth.

It has been repeated by a succession of writers, and in consequence seems to have become accepted as a fact, that Jacob's frontier methods could not have been successfully applied on the Panjab frontier (i.e., the frontier of Dera Ghazi Khan District). This is stated by, e.g., Mr. C.C. Davies who observes incidentally, 'Indeed, it was extremely unfortunate for the British that the Sikhs had been their immediate predecessors in the Panjab, for Sikh frontier administration had been of the loosest type. They possessed but little influence in the trans-Indus tracts, and what little authority they had was confined to the plains. Even here they were obeyed only in the immediate vicinity of their forts which studded the country . . . hence on the Panjab frontier the British succeeded to a heritage of anarchy, for the Sikhs had waged eternal war against the border tribes and even against the inhabitants of the so-called settled districts.' (Cambridge History of India, Vol. VI, p. 449.) Yet if we substitute for Sikhs, 'the Mirs', and for Panjab, 'Upper Sind', these remarks apply almost exactly to the state of the Upper Sind frontier before Jacob took charge.

However the main factor alleged to have made the problem of guarding the Dera Jat frontier in the Panjab much more difficult than that of guarding the frontier of Upper Sind was their geographical difference, which is thus stated in the first Panjab Administration Report: 'The great difficulty of the west and the north-western frontier is the immediate proximity of warlike tribes to our villages. In Sind, a desert thirty miles broad lies in front and altogether separates the inhabited tracts from the haunts of the Belooch robbers, whereas in the Derajat, the plain, or 'Mehra' stretching the whole length is peopled on both edges; the lands on one side being irrigated by the mountain streams, and on the other by the Indus, while its centre interposes a great waste, and thus the western or advanced villages are isolated and disconnected from those behind, and have no barrier between them and the hills. . . .' (First Panjab Administration Report, Lahore 1854, para. 152, pp. 45-6.) This is elaborated by Thornton (op. cit., pp. 15-16).

Jacob's observation on this part of the Panjab Administration Report, in his letter of 28th July 1854, is as follows: 'With regard to the proximity

of the hills, the fact is that this is a very great advantage. The mountaineers, the very best of them, are contemptible in the plain; but when, to reach them, the cavalry has to make a weary march of 50 or 60 miles through a desert, constant toil and exposure are, indeed, necessary to success.' (S.I.H. Records, Vol. II, p. 185.) Again, in his Memorandum dated 9th August 1854, he remarks, 'The observation of the Punjaub Commissioners about the posts being close to the hills, is curious. When our frontier was in a disturbed state, I had my posts close to the hills, esteeming this arrangement to be an advantage. Since quiet has been established, I have withdrawn them, save as respects some Belooche Guides.' (Ibid., p. 188.)

If it is thought that Jacob's words are of no weight in comparison with those of the Lawrences and their successors, in regard at least to the circumstances of the Panjab frontier, the following are facts: in the year 1847, after the invasion of the Sind frontier in force by the Bugti tribe Jacob had his strongest outpost at Shahpur, close under the Bugti hills, and it was from this post that Merewether intercepted the Bugti 'lashkar' approximately 700 strong and destroyed it at Zamani. Again, it is noteworthy that after the year 1861, when the Bugti tribe owing to internal dissensions became temporarily disorganized, and members of the Kalpar and Masuri clans once more began to raid the Sind border, Sir Henry Green advanced the chain of posts into the skirts of the hills in order to protect the new cultivated areas which, owing to Jacob's irrigation improvements, had in places spread far beyond the British frontier. This fact supports the remarks Jacob made in his letter and memorandum quoted above. (Vide Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India, Vol. III, p. 98; and cf. Cambridge History of India, Vol. VI, p. 453: 'Under the Sind system, military posts had been pushed far into the neighbouring hills, with the result that the Panjab boundary was in the rear of the Sind posts.')

It is represented, as another feature making protection of the Dera Ghazi Khan frontier more difficult than that of Upper Sind, that along the former Baluch tribes occupy both sides of the administrative boundary while 'in Sind this was not allowed'. (T. H. Thornton, op. cit., p. 15, and Cambridge History of India, loc. cit.) This statement again is incorrect. In Jacob's time the Burdis (a tribe at first predatory in its habits), the Khosas, Jamalis and Jatcis were all in occupation of lands both in Kachhi (Kelat) and within the Sind frontier: and since Sir Charles Napier had settled the Jakhranis and part of the Dombki tribe in Upper Sind, these too were to be found on both sides of the border. (Vide Sketch of States and Tribes connected with the Frontier of Upper Scinde, etc., S.I.H. Records, Vol. II, pp. 216–13.) So far from 'not allowing'

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such ambilateral occupation, Jacob permitted part of the formerly predatory section of the Dombkis planted by Napier in Sind, to return as they wished to their former homes across the border, though a large number remained in Upper Sind. Again, he readily granted lands in the Frontier District, rendered cultivable by his development of irrigation, to Bugtis and other trans-border Baluchis. This was an outstanding feature of his land-grants connected with the Begari canal extension of 1856.

T. H. Thornton states (op. cit., p. 31) in pursuance of his comparison of the Sind and Panjab frontier systems, 'In Sind . . . the military force at the disposal of the authorities was much larger in proportion to the extent of the frontier to be guarded.' This was so after Jacob's death, though the Sind Frontier Force of all Arms at Jacobabad was designed for Imperial as well as for local defence. For Jacob's own time we require to consider the statements of the Panjab Board of Administration and of Jacob himself on the strength of the forces posted for the protection of the frontiers of the Dera Jat (Dera Ghazi Khan District) and of Upper Sind respectively, which have been summarized in Chapter XII.

Jacob's letter dated 28th July 1854 (S.I.H. Records Vol. II, pp. 184-5) was communicated by the Government of India to John Lawrence, who wrote a rejoinder in the following year. This together with Jacob's letter and a letter from Bartle Frere to Lord Elphinstone (No. 215, dated 28th May 1855) were published by the desire of the Court of Directors, appearing as an Addendum to the Report on the General Administration of the Punjab Territories, from 1854-55 to 1855-56 inclusive (Selections from the Records of the Government of India, Foreign

Dept., No. XVIII, Lahore, 1858).

In this letter, No. 755, dated 8th October 1855, John Lawrence took the opportunity of disclaiming any intention of detracting 'from the well-merited reputation of Major Jacob'; he also reiterated the view that the defence of the Sind frontier was facilitated by the strip of desert

intervening between it and the hill country.

He proceeds to observe (para. 5), 'In Major Jacob's remarks on the statements in the Board's Report there appear to the Chief Commissioner some points which deserve notice. (6) 'The Board did not state, as that officer seems to think, that 400 cavalry and 800 infantry guarded the 300 miles of the southern Derajat, but that 800 men in all guarded the 300 miles of the southern Derajat. This would make a great difference in the calculation, and would give less than 3 men per mile, and as half that number are infantry, the cost would be about 36 rupees, and not 80 rupees per mile.' (Loc. cit., p. xxiv.)

The passage in the earlier Panjab Administration Report quoted by Jacob in his letter of 28th July 1854 reads in the original exactly as he states, viz: 'Aided by 400 Infantry, the Cavalry detachment in all 800 strong (of which the troopers receive only 20 rupees per mensem) almost entirely hold and protect the Derajat Frontier line 300 (three hundred) miles long.' [General Report of the Administration of the Panjab Proper for the years 1849-50 and 1850-51, being the two first years after annexation (Lahore, 1854), p. 40, para. 133.]

Thus John Lawrence supports his rejoinder to Jacob's strictures by misquotation of his own previous official Report then extant in printperversion the more flagrant in that it had been correctly quoted by

Jacob in his letter under reference.

For ascertaining the facts, it is desirable to refer to the Board's account of their posts in this Report (for the years 1849-50 and 1850-51) occurring in paragraphs 147-8 (p. 44). There were 24 posts in 300 miles, 'garrisoned by parties of from 20 to 50 men, of which 8 should be infantry and the rest cavalry'. These posts were strengthened by four old established forts, the garrisons of which are not specified.

As to supports for the Derajat frontier line, it is stated in the same Report (para. 157, at p. 48) that there were 2300 men of the Panjab Frontier Force at Dera Ghazi Khan and Asni (Infantry 1016, Cavalry

1168 and Artillery 116, with 8 guns.)

Jacob was strictly correct in asserting that the only 'support' to his line of frontier posts was his reserve at headquarters at Jacobabad. Not only were there no cavalry at Sukkur and Shikarpur, as supposed by the Panjab Board, but the troops there (infantry and a detachment of Golandaz artillery) were not within the Frontier Command, which was made separate in 1848, and moreover were never once required to act in support of the Scinde Horse, in Jacob's time or afterwards.

Other details of the Panjab (Derajat) frontier arrangements appear in the Administrative Reports for 1849-50, 1850-51, para. 155 (p. 47); ibid., for 1851-52 and 1852-53 (Selections from the Records of the Government of India, Foreign Dept., No. VI, Calcutta 1854), paras. 51, 110, and Appendix I (pp. 16, 33, and 223); ibid., for the years 1854-55 and 1855-56 (Selections etc., No. XVIII, Lahore 1858), paras. 26, 40, 158, 166 (pp. 17, 85, 92-4); ibid., for the year 1856-57 and 1857-58 (Lahore 1858), paras. 92-3 (pp. 49-50).

A close examination of the subject will reveal that the fundamental difference between the two systems of frontier protection was in the spirit informing each. Mobility and anticipation do not constitute

'uncompromising militarism'.

In 1854 Jacob wrote, 'I should have considered our proceedings a

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failure, had it been necessary to continue to use violent measures. Having by the use of force made ourselves feared and respected, we were able to apply better means, and to appeal to higher motives than fear. This I had in view from the very first.' And turning back to 1847 we read, 'I have not the least shadow of a doubt as to my ability to keep this frontier in perfect peace and quietness without in future being compelled ever to resort to actual violence'. (S.I.H. Records, Vol. II, p. 188; ibid., Vol. I, p. 132.)

B. The 'Sandeman System'

It may be felt that some facts should be adduced to substantiate my assertion in the text (Chapter XX), that Robert Sandeman, after 1876, carried out 'the whole of Jacob's plan'. This would hardly be inferred from the life of Sir Robert Sandeman by T. H. Thornton, who does not even mention that the occupation of Quetta and establishment there of a 'Political Commissioner on the Frontier of India' had been proposed, with provision made for all the ancillary arrangements, by John Jacob

twenty years earlier. (Cf. op. cit., pp. 58-9, 318.)

Again, although Sandeman himself never claimed (vide the statement of Mr. H. S. Barnes quoted in ibid., p. 305) to have invented the tribal service system, it would certainly be inferred otherwise from this work that he was the first to introduce it as a means of controlling the Baluch tribes on the British border. Sandeman took horsemen of the Marri tribe into Government service in the year 1867, after the Harrand raid and this is said to have been 'the small commencement of the great system of "tribal service" which forms an important feature in the so-called "Sandemanian" method of frontier management.' (Op. cit., pp. 33-4.) This method had been adopted in the very first year that the British came into contact with predatory Baluch tribes, viz., early in 1839, when Lieut. W. J. Eastwick, Acting Political Agent in Upper Sind, employed Burdis, Khosas and Jatois on various duties. (Vide Account of events connected with the Administration of affairs by the Political authorities in Upper Sindh and Cutchee, from July 1839 to July 1841, by Lieut. T. Postans (Times Press, Bombay, 1845), p. 6 (para. 8); and Dry Leaves from Young Egypt by 'An Ex-Political' [E. B. Eastwick] (James Madden, London, 1849), pp. 45-6, 48-9.)

John Jacob, on being appointed Assistant Political Agent for Eastern Kachhi, early in 1842, retained as regular guides the Dombkis and Jakhranis who had been attached to Amiel's 'Baluch Levy'. When he was posted to command of the British frontier of Upper Sind, in January 1847, Jacob again took into pay the relapsed Jakhranis, and some Dombkis, retaining also a number of Chandias and Khosas; in

1852 he engaged a number of the predatory Kalpar Bugtis. The Baluch Guides were, in fact, the most important and characteristic feature of Jacob's system of frontier management: he wrote on 12th May 1848 that their establishment sometimes enabled him 'to employ to advantage and to withdraw from evil courses, the most restless spirits and most determined freebooters in the country . . . who constitute, in regard to our disorderly neighbours, my feelers, my eyes and my ears.' (S.I.H. Records, Vol. I, p. 167.)

Jacob did not give 'levy service' to the Marris. Their territory was remote from his border, his view was that this tribe required to be taught the lesson of the superiority of British power before they could be taken into favour, and, as their depredations were concentrated on Kachhi, it was for the Khan of Kelat to give them employment, if

thought fit.

The first proposal to take Marri tribesmen into British pay was made by Sir Henry Green in 1866, as part of his general plan for the regeneration of Baluchistan. Two hundred Marri horsemen were to be em-

ployed for the policing of Kachhi.

Green's plan which included also the posting of a detachment of the Scinde Frontier Force at Quetta, and the subsidizing for levy police service of the tribes of the Bolan Pass, was recommended by Sir Bartle Frere, as Governor of Bombay, but rejected by the Government of India. (Vide Summary of affairs of the Government of India in the Foreign Department, from 1864 to 1869, by J. Talboys Wheeler, Calcutta 1868 (sic.), pp. 371-4.)

Thus the arrangement made by Sandeman on his border was that which Sir Henry Green had proposed but had not been allowed to carry out, for the area under his political control, in the previous year.

Another feature of Sandeman's management of the Baluch tribes to which attention has been drawn is thus stated: 'Sandeman never withheld allowances because of offences committed by individual members of a tribe. He always demanded that the actual offenders should be brought to justice, that the guilty alone should be punished.'

(Cambridge History of India, Vol. VI, p. 455.)

This had been Jacob's policy in his dealings with the Bugtis at the time when the whole tribe had been declared outlaws by Sir Charles Napier, and were ordered to be captured or killed when they came near the frontier. Jacob wrote on 25th August 1847, 'I would never interfere with any of these people so long as they remained quiet, peaceable and well-behaved, but in the case of the slightest misconduct would treat them with the greatest severity. Indiscriminate persecution of whole tribes only does harm and makes men desperate, although

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they perfectly appreciate just punishment.' And, in the later summary of his proceedings, 'The strictest justice always acted on, and no success, or want of success, or any other circumstance whatever being allowed to influence the terms offered to, or the treatment of offenders, whether whole tribes or individuals.' (S.I.H. Records, Vol. I, pp. 107-8: ibid., vol. II, p. 187.)

In conclusion it seems desirable to examine the Kelat treaty of 1876, under which Robert Sandeman was appointed Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, with reference to that negotiated by John

Jacob in 1854.

The object of the 1876 treaty, as stated in its preamble, was to renew that of 1854 and to supplement it by 'certain additional provisions calculated to draw closer the bonds of friendship and amity between the two Governments.' The important supplementary provisions were that a British Agent should be accredited to reside permanently at the Court of Kelat (Art. 4); that this Agent should use his good offices to settle any dispute between the Khan and the Kelat sardars calculated to disturb the peace of the country (Art. 5); and that the British Government should be at liberty, by arrangement with the Khan, to construct in Kelat territory such lines of telegraph or railway as might be beneficial to the interests of the two Governments (Art. 7).

These three developments were implicit in Jacob's letter to Lord Canning dated 28th July 1856, with attached Memorandum. It is difficult to imagine Jacob's 'Political Commissioner on the Frontier of India, to be appointed with full powers, civil and military, over all departments, &c. to have his head-quarters at Quetta' not becoming the regular mediator, with the full consent of the British Government and the Khan, in all serious disputes between the latter and his sardars. Indeed, in his subsequent letter to Lord Canning of 1st November 1856 he remarks 'such civil Government as we already exert in Cutchee through the Political Superintendent on the Frontier we should continue to exert, but it would not be at all necessary or advisable to assume in these respects greater power either in nature or extent than we now virtually possess or exercise'.

It may be recalled that Henry Green, when Political Agent at Kelat, alluded in a letter to Jacob to one of his difficulties; 'the Chiefs and people seem to think that I and the Khan should divide the throne equally, but I have told the Khan I want to place the power I have

gained over his people in his hands."

In both of the letters to Lord Canning above mentioned, Jacob repeats one item of the plan he had sketched in that of 30th June 1856: to connect the foot of the Bolan Pass with Sind by a railway.

(Letters on the Persian War etc., pp. 5, 7-19, 32-45. Corres. J.J./H.G.,

Green to Jacob, 23rd September 1858.)

It is astonishing that T. H. Thornton, who was acting Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the year 1877, states that while the Treaty of 1854 is between the British Government and Khan alone, in the Treaty of 1876 the Sirdars are mentioned with the Khan

as parties'. (Sir Robert Sandeman, p. 93.)

The Kelat sardars were not parties to the treaty of 1876, which like its predecessor was made between the representative of the British Government and the Khan of Kelat. Apart from the provisions under Art. 5, for the British Agent's mediation in disputes between the Khan and his sardars, the latter are only mentioned in Art. 3, by which the Khan 'binds himself, his heirs and successors, and sardars, to observe taithfully the provisions of Article 3 of the Treaty of 1854', namely, 'to oppose to the utmost all the enemies of the British Government, in all cases to act in subordinate co-operation with that Government, and to enter into no negotiation with other states without its consent, the usual friendly correspondence with neighbours being continued as before'. Thus so far from the sardars being parties to the treaty, the Khan made himself responsible for their due observance of the treaty, as well as his own. (Vide A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads relating to India and the neighbouring Countries, compiled by C. U. Aitchison (Calcutta, 1909), Vol. XI, p. 215, Treaty No. CV.)

C. 'The Forward Policy'

After the evacuation of Afghanistan by the British armies in 1842, there was a complete suspension of diplomatic relations between that

country and British India for more than a decade.

A recommendation that the British Government should again intervene in Afghanistan as the best means of protecting India from the menace of a Russian advance in Central Asia was made by the French traveller Ferrier, in a letter to Mr. Kerr, Consul at Rhodes, dated 12th November 1851. He had made a journey through Herat, Kandahar, Kabul, Bactria and Baluchistan in 1845, and informed Colonel Shiel and Major Rawlinson of the prevailing conditions in these countries. Herat was liable to be made the pivot of a base of operations against the Indus, and there would be no difficulty in an advance thence by the Helmand and Arghandab. Ferrier supposed that the first step of the English would be to take up strong positions at Kabul and Ghazni, but suggested that another force should advance from Shikarpur.

It would be dangerous, he thought, to allow the Russians to advance

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quietly as far as Kandahar, but the best step to prevent this was not to march in that direction, but to come to an understanding with the Khans of Merv and Khiva, both favourable to the British; they would disturb the Russian communications, while Dost Mahomed Khan of Kabul and Kohandil Khan of Kandahar opposed the advance.

Ferrier said that he himself would prefer to see the British extend civilization into Central Asia rather than Russia 'with the knout and a deplorable political system, with nothing of civilization or humanity'. Moreover, he declared that the enemies of the British above the passes were only the sardars, chiefs and mullahs; 'the shepherds and culti-

vators regret you'.

It was at very nearly the same time that Jacob and Frere were prepared to seize an opportunity of entering upon friendly relations with Kohandil Khan of Kandahar, and were sharply rebuked by Lord Dalhousie, the Court of Directors later concurring in the attitude of the Governor-General. (Sind Selections No. 116, correspondence ending with letter of Government of Bombay to Commr. in Sind, dated

3rd April 1852: Cf. J. Martineau, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 483-4.)

Dalhousie abandoned his policy of complete indifference to the course of events in Afghanistan after the Persians occupied Herat in 1853. A remonstrance from Britain induced them to withdraw, but the step recommended by Jacob and Frere, of setting British relations with Kelat on a firm basis was also taken, and during the Russian War Dalhousie proceeded, in spite of the reluctance of John Lawrence, to establish friendly relations with Dost Mahomed of Kabul. The treaty of 30th March 1855 provided for perpetual peace and friendship between the two countries, and mutual non-interference; Dost Mahomed engaging to be the friend of the friends and enemy of the enemies of the East India Company. (Bosworth Smith, Vol. I, pp. 449-61.)

It is unnecessary to recapitulate Jacob's proposals to take advantage of the provisions of his treaty with Kelat, by occupying Quetta, 'as a peaceful arrangement necessary for our fixed repose . . . settling for ever the question of the invasion of India by Russia'. The appearance of his letters to Lord Canning on this subject in print, in 1857, inaugurated the controversy between the 'Forward Policy' and the 'Masterly Inactivity' schools of British Indian statesmen, which continued intermittently for some twenty-five years. It may be followed conveniently in the Cambridge History of India, Vol. VI, pp. 456-60. Martineau, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 236-42, 481-99. Bosworth Smith, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 284, 418-19, 436-7, 524, 570-87, 592, 622-50. Thornton, op. cit., pp. 297-301, 333-41. Reference may also be made to

APPENDIX B

J. Talboys Wheeler Summary of the Affairs of the Government of India in the Foreign Department from 1864 to 1869, pp. 13-115, 371-4.

It is to be noted that Jacob, the generally accepted founder of the 'Forward Policy', did not advocate an advance beyond Quetta, 'a position the mere possession of which would . . . give us, by moral influence, a full control over Afghanistan'. To Henry Green indeed he wrote, 'Ultimately Herat might become an English fortress, but this move would not be required for many years, and long before it had become advisable to make it, all Afghanistan would be devoted to us. . . . But this is looking forward to the time when Russia, having been shut out from her long cherished schemes towards Constantinople, shall have again matured her preparations for advance in a new direction, and have poured her whole strength on our Indian Frontier. At present all that is required to be done to ensure the certainty of success and security is shown in my letters to the Governor General which have been shown to you.' (Letters on the Persian War, etc., pp. 15, 30-1.)

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- 5. Service Army List, Bombay, Vol. 4, No. 363. (Hereafter referred to as 'History of Services'.)

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- 7. Sir John Malcolm, The Government of India (John Murray, 1833), Appendix A., p. 33, para. 87.
- 8. Sir Thomas Seaton, From Cadet to Colonel (Hurst & Blackett, 1866), Vol. I, p. 86.
- 9. Sir John Malcolm, op. cit., Appendix E., p. 233
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- 11. Sir John Malcolm, The Political History of India (John Murray, 1811), p. 515. The Government of India, Appendix E., p. 188.
- 12. Sir J. W. Kaye, Lives of Indian Officers (Life of Sir Charles Metcalfe).

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- 13. This chapter is based mainly on the Jacob Papers.
- 14. Brig.-Gen. John Jacob, Replies to Questions regarding the Reorganization of the Indian Army. (Printed 'for private use only', 1858.)
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CHAPTER IV

16. The Bibliography for the origins of the First Afghan War and the occu-

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(Times Press, Bombay, 1843).

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- 29. D.L.Y.E., p. 58. Baluchistan (Sibi) Gazetteer, pp. 287-8.
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- 61. Jacob Papers; John Jacob to Rev. S. L. Jacob, 8th February 1842.
- 62. Sind File, Pol. 277; Jacob to Capt. French, Assistant Political Agent, Sibi, 27th February 1842.
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- 67. B.B. 1843, No. 379, Enclosure No. 6. Corres. J.O./J.J., Outram to Jacob, 22nd July 1842.
- 68. Corres. J.O./J.J., Jacob to Outram, 25th August 1842.
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- 71. Corres. J.O./J.J., Outram to Jacob, 30th October 1842.
- 72. Goldsmid, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 292.
- 73. Selections from the Records of the Commissioner in Sind (MSS.) (hereafter referred to as 'Sind Selections') File 96, No. 11; Political Agent in Sind and Baluchistan (J. Outram) to Lieut. Jacob, commanding S.I.H., 9th November 1842. S.I.H. Records, Vol. I, p. 7.
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- 77. Ibid., p. 223.
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- 87. S.B.B. 1844, No. 178.
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- 89. Jacob Papers, loc. cit.
- 90. B.B. 1843, No. 471 (enclosure 3).
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- 97. Enclosures to secret letters from India, 1843, Encl. 1 in No. 197.
- 98. S.B.B. 1844, Nos. 68, 72, 74, 75.
- 99. Jacob Papers; John Jacob to Rev. S. L. Jacob, 23rd February 1843.
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CHAPTER IX

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- 102. S.I.H. Records, Vol. I, p. 11.
- 103. Jacob Papers; John Jacob to Rev. S. L. Jacob, 23rd February 1843.
- 104. S.I.H. Records, Vol. I, p. 19.
- 105. C. G. Thadani, The Mirs of Sind [in Sindhi]. (Moti Press, Hyderabad Sind, 1938.)
- 106. S.B.B. 1844, No. 82. J. Outram, Commentary, etc., pp. 448-50.
- 107. B.B. 1843, No. 473. S.B.B. 1844, Nos. 72, 102. J. Outram, Commentary, etc., pp. 376-7.
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- 113. S.I.H. Records, Vol. I, pp. 15, 28.
- 114. The Homeward Mail, 4th January 1859.
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- 117. Ibid., p. 32. John Jacob, Notes on Admin., Note to p. 43.
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- 122. S.I.H. Records, Vol. I, p. 37.
- 123. Ibid., p. 39.
- 124. Ibid., pp. 40-1.
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- 126. John Jacob, Notes on Admin., Note to p. 13.

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- 128. W. Napier, The Conquest of Scinde (T. & W. Boone, London, 1845. 2nd edition), pp. 514-19. J. Outram, Commentary, etc., p. 437. John Jacob, Notes on Admin., 3rd Note to p. 333. John Jacob, Notes on Sir C. Napier's Posthumous Work, Note to p. 78.
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CHAPTER XI

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- 178. S.I.H. Records, Vol. I, p. 329; report by Major John Jacob to Sir H. M. Eliot on his frontier methods, dated 7th August 1850.
- 179. Sind File, Pol. 245; Lieut. of Police, Shikarpur, to Captain of Police in Sind, 7th July 1847. John Jacob, Notes on Admin., Note to p. 333.
- 180. Sind File, Pol. 245; Major John Jacob to the Officer Commanding at Shikarpur, 23rd April 1847.
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- 182. S.I.H. Records, Vol. I, pp. 167-9.
- 183. Naval and Military Gazette, 1st July 1854.
- 184. Bombay Times, 9th October 1847.

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- 185. S.I.H. Vol. I, pp. 120-4. Sind File, Pol. 218; Asst. Adj. Gen. to Lt.-Col. Shaw, commanding in Upper Sind, 10th October 1847 (communicated to Jacob, 15th October 1847).
- 186. Corres. J.O./J.J., Outram to J. P. Willoughby, 29th October 1847.
- 187. S.I.H. Records, Vol. I, p. 128. Sind File, Pol. 219; Collector of Shikarpur to Government of Sind, 3rd and 15th November 1847.
- 188. Corres. J.O./J.J., Outram to Capt. French, 28th December 1847.
- 189. Ibid., Outram to Jacob, 27th December 1847.
- 190. S.I.H. Records, Vol. I, pp. 131-3.
- 191. Ibid., p. 349; Brig.-Gen. Manson to the Adjutant-General of the Army, 6th May 1851.
- 192. Ibid., pp. 133-9.
- 193. Ibid., pp. 141-2.
- 194. S.I.H. Records, Vol. I, pp. 145-7. (The original of this report, together with the sketch map referred to, is in Sind File, Pol. 292.)
- 195. Private correspondence of Colonel the Honourable Henry Dundas (afterwards Lord Melville) and John Jacob (hereafter referred to as Corres. H.D./J.J.), Dundas to Jacob, 29th February 1848.
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- 199. S.I.H. Records, Vol. I, pp. 328-31; Report by Major John Jacob to Sir H. M. Eliot on his frontier methods, 7th August 1850.
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- 201. S.I.H. Records, Vol. I, p. 192.
- 202. Ibid., pp. 197-8, 273-4, 279. Corres. H.D./J.J., Dundas to Jacob, 30th September, 13th and 31st October, 4th November 1848.
- 203. Corres. H.D./J.J., Jacob to Dundas, 6th November 1848. S.I.H. Records, Vol. I, pp. 277-81, 283-4. Corres. J.O./J.J., Jacob to Outram, 5th December 1848; Outram to Jacob, 10th January 1849.
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- 205. S.I.H. Records, Vol. I, pp. 294-5.
- 206. Ibid., pp. 309-13. Sind File, Pol. 220; Government of Bombay to Commissioner in Sind, No. 2787, 28th June 1849.
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- 208. S.I.H. Records, Vol. II, pp. 46, 49.
- 209. S.I.H. Records, Vol. II, pp. 12-13, 44, 51, 199.
- 210. Ibid., pp. 44-5, 53-4, 61-2.
- 211. Ibid., pp. 103-4, 130, 137-8, 179-80.
- 212. General Report upon the Administration of the Punjaub proper for the years 1849-50 and 1850-1, etc. (Lahore, 1854), p. 40. S.I.H. Records, Vol. II, pp. 184-5: Selections from the Records of the Government of India (Foreign Department) No. XVIII (Lahore 1858), Addendum, p. xxiii; R. Temple, Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of the Panjab, to G. P. Edmondstone, Secretary to the Government of India, 8th October 1855.
- 213. S.I.H. Records, Vol. II, pp. 187-9.
- 214. Ibid., pp. 189, 228.
- 215. Ibid., pp. 229, 241-4, 249. Selections from the Records of the Government of India (Foreign Department) No. XVIII; General Report on the Administration of the Punjaub Territories, from 1854-5 to 1855-6 inclusive, p. 17, para. 26.

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- 216. John Buchan, Oliver Cromwell (Hodder & Stoughton, 1934), p. 167.
- 217. (John Jacob), 'Remarks on an Article in the "Calcutta Review" for March 1846 entitled "Hints on Irregular Cavalry".' (Privately printed). The

Views and Opinions of General Jacob, ed. Captain Lewis Pelly; and edn. (Smith Elder & Co., London, 1858) (hereafter referred to as V. & O.), pp. 135-64, esp. p. 138.

It is interesting to compare Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck's state-

ment of the objects of the Indian soldier's loyalty, a century later:

Those who have served for many years with Indian troops, as I have done, have always recognized that the loyalty of our men was really to the officers of the regiment or unit, and that although there may have been some abstract sentiments of loyalty and patriotism to the Government and to the King, the men's allegiance for all practical purposes was focused on the regiment, and particularly on the regimental officers, on whom they depended for their welfare, advancement and future prospects.

'In these officers their faith and trust were almost childlike, as events have proved time and time again. It is true to say that in almost every case of serious discontent or indiscipline, and there have been remarkably few of them, which has occurred in the past fifty years, the cause could be traced to indifferent officers and bad man-management.'—From the Memorandum by Sir Claude Auchinleck, Commander-in-Chief in India, on the first 'I.N.A.' trial, circulated in February 1946; quoted in Auchinleck by John Connell (Cassell & Co., 1959).

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- 219. Jacob, V. & O., p. 139.
- 220. Ibid., pp. 151 (footnote), 152.
- 221. Ibid., pp. 149, 153, 160.
- 222. S.I.H. Records, Vol. I, p. 148.
- 223. S.I.H. Records, Vol. II, p. 175, Inspection Report by Brigadier W. Cavaye, 11th March 1854. J. Martineau, Life of Sir Bartle Frere (John Murray 1895), Vol. I, pp. 141-2.
- 224. S.I.H. Records, Vol. I, p. 189. John Jacob, Tracts on the Native Army of India, etc. (reprinted by Smith, Elder & Co., London, 1858), p. 75.
- 225. W. Napier, The Conquest of Scinde, pp. 319-20. Jacob Papers; John Jacob to Philip Jacob, 10th August 1845.
- 226. Major Herbert Edwardes, A Year on the Punjaub Frontier (Richard Bentley, London, 1851), Vol. II, p. 678. E. J. Thackwell, Narrative of the Second Sikh War (Richard Bentley, 1851—2nd edition), pp. 240-1.
- 227. S.I.H. Records, Vol. I, pp. 202, 204; (Notification [Foreign Department] of the Governor-General of India, 17th January 1849; General Order by the same, 24th January 1849). E. J. Thackwell, op. cit., pp. 55-7, 136, 180-1.
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- 229. Ibid., pp. 196-7.

- 230. Cf. E. J. Thackwell, op. cit., p. 57.
- 231. Ibid., pp. 223-4.
- 232. S.I.H. Records, Vol. I, pp. 296, 303; letters from Lieut. G. Malcolm and Lieut. W. L. Merewether to John Jacob, dated 22nd February and March 1849.
- 233. E. J. Thackwell, op. cit., p. 224.
- 234. S.I.H. Records, Vol. I, pp. 233, 239-40; Dispatch from the Commander-in-Chief in India to the Governor-General of India, 26th February 1849; Report from Brigadier J. B. Hearsey to the Asst. Adjt.-Gen., Cavalry Division, 23rd February 1849.
- 235. S.I.H. Records, Vol. I, p. 304; Brigadier-Gen. H. Dundas to G. Malcolm. 16th March 1849.
- 236. Ibid., pp. 299-300; Lieut. H. Green to John Jacob, 1st March 1849.
- 237. Ibid., loc. cit., p. 298; Lieut. G. Malcolm to John Jacob, 26th February 1849.
- 238. Ibid., pp. 303, 305-8; Merewether to Jacob, March 1849; letters exchanged between G. Malcolm, Capt. Pratt, Asst. Adjut.-Gen., Cavalry Division, and Capt. J. Campbell, 9th Lancers.
- 239. E. J. Thack 'l, op. cit., pp. 235-6. Letter in the Delhi Gazette, 28th April 1849, 'The budh Horse at Goojerat', signed 'An eye-witness of the fight'.
- 240. E. J. Thackwell, op. cit., pp. 59-60.
- 241. Ibid., p. 224 (formerly Sir Charles Napier's copy of this book, now in my possession). S.I.H. Records, Vol. I, p. 299; H. Green to John Jacob, 1st March 1849.
- 242. Corres. H.D./J.J., 23rd March 1849.
- 243. S.I.H. Records, Vol. I, p. 303; Merewether to Jacob, March 1849.
- 244. Major H. Daly, Memoirs of General Sir Henry Dermont Daly (John Murray, 1905), pp. 62, 66, plates at pp. 72, 118, and Appendix C (p. 369).
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- 246. Ibid., pp. 334-6.
- 247. Ibid., pp. 339-41.
- 248. Ibid., pp. 344-5.
- 249. Ibid., pp. 345-9.
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- 251. Ibid., pp. 354-5. Jacob Papers, John Jacob to Philip Jacob, 3rd February 1852. This 'battle' was won in the end; vide Sind File, Pol. 282, Govt. of Bombay to Commander in Sind, No. 3718, 2nd September 1859, conveying sanction of Govt. of India to restoration of the ranks of rissaldar major and kote duffadar major to the 1st and 2nd Scinde Horse.
- 252. S.I.H. Records, Vol II, pp. 80-2, 87-9.
- 253. Ibid., pp. 89-91, 97, 105-6, 109.

- 254. Ibid., pp. 97-8; H. B. E. Frere, Commissioner in Sind to Lord Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay, No. 469, 14th December 1857, para. 10. (In Sir Henry Green's compilation.) Cf. Lieut.-Col. N. L. Beamish, On the uses and application of Cavalry in War, etc. (T. & W. Boone, London, 1855), p. vii, para. 7.
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- 257. Ibid., pp. 102-3.
- 258. Ibid., p. 104.
- 259. The Times, 26th March 1855; letter signed 'Jacob Omnium', quoting Capt. Hartmann, 15th Hussars.
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- 261. V. & O., pp. 448-9.
- 262. Jacob Papers; John Jacob to Philip Jacob, 4th April 1854. S.I.H. Records, Vol. II, p. 182.
- 263. Bombay Quarterly Review, July 1855. Colburn's United Service Journal, 1855, Part III (December 1855), p. 546. Lt.-Col. N. L. Beamish, On the uses and application of Cavalry in War, etc. (T. & W. Boone, London, 1855), pp. 160-1, Appendix F, p. 429, Appendix H, p. 437. The Times; letters from 'Jacob Omnium' and others, 20th, 23rd, 24th, 26th March, 10th April, 7th and 20th June, 24th August 1855. Calcutta Review, June 1856. The Bengal Cavalry by Col. Broome.

CHAPTER XIV

- 264. Corres. J.O./J.J.; Outram to Jacob, 2nd February, 14th April, 17th July, 18th August 1847, 2nd February 1848.
- 265. Bombay Times, 25th October 1851; signed letter from John Jacob to the
- 266. Corres. J.O./J.J., 28th April 1848.
- 267. Bombay Times, loc. cit.
- 268. Corres. J.O./J.J., Outram to Jacob, 16th June 1849 (postscript). But see letter from Lord Fitzroy Somerset to Sir Charles Napier, reproduced by the latter in his letter in the Bombay Gazette, 7th February 1852. It would appear that at the time when fulfilment of the pledge to Jacob fell due, the number of Companionships of the Bath already held by Officers of the Company's Service was much in excess of the limit prescribed for them. This must have been largely due to awards for the Gwalior and Sutlei campaigns—the former fought nearly a year and the latter two years after the war in Sind. The objection would probably have been waived, had Napier exerted himself. Vide also Bombay Gazette, 2nd March 1852.

- 269. Sind File, Pol. 334; Governor of Bombay to Commissioner in Sind, No. 49, 25th February 1850. Parliamentary Papers, 1852-3, lxxvii, Affairs of Ali Murad, etc.
- 270. Corres. J.O./J.J., Outram to Jacob, 16th March, 2nd April, 17th May 1850; Jacob to Outram, 28th May 1850.
- 271. S.I.H. Records, Vol. I, pp. 326-8, 336. Corres. J.O./J.J., Outram to Jacob, 29th December 1850. Jacob Papers; John Jacob to Philip Jacob, 21st December 1850.
- 272. John Jacob, Tracts on the Native Army of India, etc. (Smith, Elder & Co., London, 1858) (reprinting Remarks by a Bombay Officer, etc., originally published in 1850). Jacob Papers, John Jacob to Philip Jacob, 15th April 1852.
- 273. The present condition of the Bengal Native Army considered with a view to its improvement (London, 1851). Issued anonymously and without the publisher's name. Sir Charles Napier wrote on his copy of the pamphlet, now in my possession, 'By that rascal Major Jacob'. Reprinted in 'Tracts', etc. (vide preceding note) under the title, A Few Remarks on the Bengal Army and Furlough Regulations, with a view to their improvement by 'A Bombay Officer'.
- 274. John Mawson (compiler) Records of the Indian Command of General Sir Charles James Napier, etc. (R. C. Lepage & Co., Calcutta, 1851), pp. 230-42; Farewell Address, dated 9th December 1850.
- 275. Ibid., pp. 200-1.
- 276. A. F. Scott (ed.), Scinde in the 'Forties, p. 155. Correspondence between Bartle Frere and John Jacob (hereafter referred to as 'Corres. B.F./J.J.'); Frere to Jacob, 30th September 1851. Bombay Times, 22nd October 1851 (Editorial and correspondence); ibid., 8th November 1851 (correspondence).
- 277. Telegraph and Courier, Bombay, 25th September 1851. Bombay Times, 22nd and 25th October, 15th November 1851. Bombay Gazette, 9th January, 4th, 7th, 9th February, 2nd March 1852. Napier, Life, Vol. IV, pp. 339, 341, 343, 345. Mawson, op. cit., pp. 186-9 (General Court Martial on Lieut. E. B. Latchford, Ensign T. W. White, Lieur G. S. Smith); pp. 197-9 (General Court Martial on Ensign C. T. Seale). Cf., pp. 175-6 (remarks by II. E. the Commander-in-Chief on the General Court Martial on Lieut. H. Rose).
- 278. Napier, Life, Vol. IV, pp. 346-7. Parliamentary Papers, 1852-3, lxxvii, Affairs of Ali Murad, etc.
- 279. Corres. J.O./J.J., Outram to Jacob, 19th January 1853.
- 280. Memoir of the First Campaign, etc., Naval and Military Gazette, November and December 1852: 'Papers relating to tl First Campaign', etc. Corres. J.O./J.J., loc. cit.

- 281. Sir C. Napier, Defects, Civil and Military of the Indian Government (Charles Westerton, London, 1853), pp. 235, 237-40. John Jacob, Notes on Sir C. Napier's Posthumous Work, pp. 14-15, 17-19, 30-1.
- 282. The Times, December 26th 1853. S.I.H. Records, Vol. II, pp. 162-3.
- 283. Jacob Papers, John Jacob to Philip Jacob, 2nd March 1854; F. F. Courtenay to John Jacob, 9th February 1854. S.I.H. Records, Vol. II, pp. 163-4, 177. In one of his Notes on Sir Charles Napier's Administration of Scinde, Jacob had disparaged Younghusband's raid on the Bugtis in July 1847 (Jacob, Notes on Admin., note to p. 333).
- 284. S.I.H. Records, Vol. II, p. 178. Jacob Papers, John Jacob to Philip Jacob, 4th April 1854.
- 285. S.I.H. Records, Vol. II, pp. 166, 180-1, 235-7, 248-9. J. G. A. Baird, Private letters of the Marquess of Dalhousie (Blackwood, 1910), p. 302. Jacob Papers, Marquess of Dalhousie to Major John Jacob, 31st May 1854.
- 286. S.I.H. Records, Vol. II, pp. 164-5, 175, 181. Lord Frederick Fitzclarence was organizing a 'Chobham Camp' at Poona.
- 287. Sir C. Napier, Defects Civil and Military of the Indian Government, pp. 326-45. John Jacob, Notes on Sir C. Napier's Posthumous Work, etc., notes to pp. 76, 78, 358.
- 288. Jacob Papers, Memorandum sent to Sir H. Lawrence at his request (1854).

 Neval and Military Gazette, 1st July 1854.
- 289. Naval and Military Gazette, 26th August 1854 (letter from Major McMurdo to the Editor.)
- 290. S.I.H. Records, Vol. II, pp. 221-2, 226, 246. Sind Selections, File 150 No. 3.
- 291. S.I.H. Records, Vol. II, pp.273-4-
- 292. On the causes of the Defects, etc., reprinted in Tracts on the Native Army of India, etc., p. 90.
- 293. Jacob Papers, John Jacob to Philip Jacob, 3rd February 1852.
- on Major John Jacob, C.B., of the Bombay Artillery, Commandant of the Scinde Irregular Horse, etc., etc., which appeared in that Journal on the 7th July 1855,' by 'A Scinde Horseman' (printed for private circulation by Smith Elder & Co., London: Smith Taylor & Co., Bombay, 1855).

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- 295. S.I.H. Records, Vol. I, p. 132.
- 296. S.I.H. Records, Vol. II, pp. 67, 156-7.
- 297. Corres. H.D./J.J., Dundas to Jacob, 28th August 1848. Sir H. Green, A Short Memoir of the Services of Colonel Malcolm Green, etc.
- 298. S.I.H. Records, Vol. II, pp. 78-9.

- 299. Ibid., pp. 3, 76.
- 300. Jacob Papers, Notes sent to Sir Henry Lawrence at his request, on Outram's suggestion; cf. Corres. J.O./J.J., Outram to Jacob, 12th May 1854.
- 301. J. Martineau, Life of Sir Bartle Frere, Vol. I, pp. 83-4, 129, 161-2. Corres. B.F./J.J., 19th March 1851. S.I.H. Records, Vol. II, pp. 2-4 (Commissioner in Sind to Governor of Bombay, No. 1065, 10th June 1851).
- 302. Corres. B.F./J.J., 15th April, 24th June 1851. S.I.H. Records, Vol. II, loc. cit., and pp. 15-18.
- 303. J. Martineau, op. cit., p. 92. S.I.H. Records, Vol. II, pp. 22-3, 42.
- 304. S.I.H. Records, Vol. II, pp. 42-3, 47, 56, 83 (footnote), 85, 116-21, 125-6, 130-1, 132, 140-1, 143-4, 159-60. Corres. B.F./J.J., Frere to Jacob, 14th September 1853.
- 305. Jacob Papers, John Jacob to Philip Jacob, 17th March, 31st August 1851. Corres. J.O./J.J., Outram to Jacob, 18th December 1851, 18th January, 8th February, 1852. Goldsmid, James Outram, Vol. II, pp. 66-7.
- 306. Parliamentary Papers, 1852-53, lxxvii. S.I.H. Records, Vol. II, pp. 31-41. Corres. B.F./J.J., Frere to Jacob, 25th December 1851, 1st January 1852; Captain Stanley to Jacob, 1st and 11th January 1852. John Jacob, Notes on Sir C. Napier's Posthumous Work, Memorandum attached to Note to p. 78. Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, Third Series, Vol. CXXII, paras. 1241-55 (Speech by Viscount Jocelyn in the House of Commons, 23rd June 1852). Ibid., paras. 1273-5 (Speech by Mr. Baillie, 24th June 1852).
- 307. Corres. B.F./J.J., Frere to Jacob, 13th, 16th, 20th and 21st February 1852.
- 308. S.I.H. Records, Vol. II, pp. 44-5, 53-4, 60-2: Jacob Papers, John Jacob to Philip Jacob, 15th April 1852. Corres. B.F./J.J., Frere to Jacob, 10th May 1852, Jacob to Frere, 15th May 1852 (quoted in Innes Shand, op. cit., pp. 172-3).
- 309. S.I.H. Records, Vol. II, p. 65. J. Martineau, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 160-1. Corres. B.F./J.J., Frere to Jacob, 2nd July, 6th August (two letters) 1852.
- 310. Corres. B.F./J.J., Frere to Jacob, 23rd July, 29th August 1852; Jacob to Frere, 11th September 1852 (quoted by Innes Shand, op. cit., pp. 176-9). Jacob Papers, John Jacob to Philip Jacob, 23rd August 1852.
- 311. Jacob Papers, John Jacob to I lilip Jacob, 12th October 1852. S.I.H. Records, Vol. II (Bombay Postal Notice dated 10th November 1852, opposite p. 68).
- 312. J. Martineau, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 141 (footnote),
- 313. Corres. B.F./J.J., Frere to Jacob, 10th and 27th November, 22nd December 1852. S.I.H. Records, Vol. II, pp. 75-6.
- 314. Corres. B.F./J.J., Frere to Jacob, 3rd January, 28th March, 10th August, 20th September 1853. Cf. letter quoted in Innes Shand, op. cit., pp. 191-2.
- 315. S.I.H. Records, Vol. II, pp. 91, 106-7, 121-2, 138-40, 275. Corres. B.F./J.J., Frere to Jacob, 30th June 1853, 26th November 1855.

- 316. S.I.H. Records, Vol. II, pp. 107, 158-9. Corres. B.F./J.J., Frere to Jacob, 28th February, 19th May, 30th June 1853.
- 317. S.I.H. Records, Vol. II, pp. 51-2, 82-3, 85, 98-9, 120, 154-8, 176-7, 227-8, 274. Corres. B.F./J.J., Frere to Jacob, 24th February 1852, 21st April, 19th May, 11th July, 10th September, 23rd November, 31st December 1853. Corres. J.O./J.J., Outram to Jacob, 26th November 1853, 27th September 1854.
- 318. Sind File, Pol. 220, Pol. Superintendent to Commissioner in Sind, 19th May, 24th June 1849. Sind Selections, File 116(1), Commissioner in Sind to Pol. Supt., 17th December 1851, 5th January 1852; Govt. of Bombay to Commissioner in Sind, 13th March 1852, Pol. Supt. to the Khan of Kelat (in Persian), 17th November 1852. S.I.H. Records, Vol. II, pp. 69-71, 76-8, 80, 84-5.

319. S.I.H. Records, Vol. II, pp. 93-5. Corres. B.F./J.J., Frere to Jacob, 22nd December 1852, 15th March, 10th August, 20th September 1853.

320. S.I.H. Records, Vol. II, pp. 129-30, 137, 142-3, 151, 165-7, 212. Corres. B.F./J.J., 31st December 1853: Corres. J.O./J.J., Lord Dalhousie to Outram, 7th November 1853; Memorandum by Outram for Lord Dalhousie; Outram to Jacob, 12th December 18 ...

321. S.I.H. Records, Vol. II, pp. 166-7, 212-16. Jacob Papers, Lord Dalhousie to Jacob, 31st May 1854; F. F. Courtenay to Jacob (same date); John Jacob to Philip Jacob, 12th June 1854. Corres. J.O./J.J., Outram to Jacob, 26th July

322. S.I.H. Records, Vol. II, pp. 195-220, 232, 240-1.

323. Godfrey Higgins, Anacalypsis (Longman Green & Longman, London, 1836), Preface.

324. John Jacob, Letters to a Lady on the Progress of Being in the Universe (John

Chapman, London, 1858).

- 325. Corres. B.F./J.J., Frere to Jacob, 12th September 1854. Sind Selections, File 179 (2), Pol. Supt. to Commissioner in Sind, 21st April 1855; Commissioner in Sind to Pol. Supt., 19th January 1856; Acting Pol. Supt. to Acting Commissioner in Sind, 13th March 1856; Govt. of Bombay to Acting Commissioner in Sind, 2nd May 1856; Acting Commissioner in Sind to Govt. of Bombay, 10th May 1856; Govt. of Bombay to Acting Commissioner in Sind, 10th June 1856; Dispatch from Court of Directors to Govt. of Bombay, 17th June 1857.
- 326. S.I.H. Records, Vol. II, pp. 242, 255-6. Sind Selections, File 179(1), Pol. Supt. to Commissioner in Sind, July 1855; Commissioner in Sind to Govt. of Bombay, October 1855; Sind File, Gen. 299, Govt. of Bombay, Resolution No. 590, 17th March 1856, No. 3585, 29th December 1856.
- 327. Corres. B.F./J.J., Frere to Jacob, 8th February, 7th April, 17th August 1855. Corres. J.O./J.J., Outram to Jacob, 27th September 1854, 6th July 1855. Sir W. W. Hunter, The Marquess of Dalhousie (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1890), pp. 218-19. S.I.H. Records, Vol. II, pp. 268-71.

- 328. S.I.H. Records, Vol. II, pp. 231-2, 246-8, 261-3, 275-9, 281-2. Corres. B.F./J.J., Frere to Jacob, March 1855, 2nd June 1855. Corres. J.O./J.J., Outram to Jacob, 6th July 1855.
- 329. S.I.H. Records, Vol. II, pp. 267-8. Corres. B.F./J.J., Frere to Jacob, 26th November 1855. J. Martineau, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 170. Corres. J.O./J.J., Outram to Jacob, 7th October 1855: Sind Cossid newspaper (Karachi), March 1856.

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- 330. S.I.H. Records, Vol. II, pp. 167-70. Jacob, V. & O., pp. 239-40, and Fig. 1 on Plate facing p. 274; ibid., pp. 249-50.
- 331. S.I.H. Records, loc. cit. Sir John Fortescue, History of the British Army (Macmillan, London, 1927), Vol. XII, p. 561.
- 332. S.I.H. Records, loc. cit., and pp. 186, 193-4. Jacob, V. & O., pp. 248-52.
- 333. Jacob, V. & O., pp. 237-8. S.I.H. Records, Vol. II, pp. 234-5.
- 334. Colburn's United Service Magazine, August 1856, pp. 505-6. Jacob, V. & O., p. 263. Sir H. Green, Memoir of the Services of Colonel Malcolm Green, etc.
- 335. Corres. J.O./J.J., F. F. Courtenay to Outram, quoted in letter Outram to Jacob, 6th July 1855. Corres. B.F./J.J., Frere to Jacob, 9th May 1855.
- 336. John Jacob, Rifle Practice (Smith Elder & Co., London, 1855). Jacob, V. & O., pp. 238-9.
- 337. Corres. B.F./J.J., Frere to Jacob, 25th April 1856. Jacob, V. & O., pp. 269-72 (Adjutant-General of the Army to Secretary to Government Military Dept., Bombay, 16th April 1856).
- 338. Colburn's United Service Magazine, August 1856, pp. 511-12. Sind Cossid (Karachi), 20th May, 1st and 22nd July, 1st, 12th, 26th August, 25th November 1856. Bombay Quarterly Review, Vol. IV, July 1856 (Article 'Rifle Musketry', written by Bartle Frere). Bombay Gazette, 1st September 1856. Calcutta Review, Vol. 27 (1856), Army Reform (written by Sir Henry Lawrence), pp. 96-7, 140-1. Jacob, V. & O., pp. 273-5.
- 339. Sind File, Pol. 315, Secretary to Government of Bombay to Adjutant-General of the Army, 11th November 1856. Lieut.-General Sir James Outram's Persian Campaign, etc. (printed for private circulation only, Smith Elder & Co., London, 1860), p. 36. Jacob, V. & O., pp. 259-62.
- 340. Colburn's United Service Magazine, December 1856 (letter signed 'An Indian Artilleryman); ibid., January 1857, pp. 71-5 (Article entitled 'Rifle and Artillery Improvements in India' by an Officer of the Royal Artillery—J.W.F.).
- 341. Ibid., February 1857, pp. 110-2 (General correspondence, 'etter signed 'La Longue Carabine'); p. 113, 'Col. Jacob's Improved Rifle and Projectile'; p. 107, Remarks by J.W.F. Ibid., April 1857, pp. 489-500.

- 342. Ibid., February 1857, pp. 273-4 (letter signed James Lawrence); ibid., August 1857 (letter signed John Jacob, dated from Bushire, 13th April 1857 and second letter signed James Lawrence).
- 343. J. Martineau, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 229 (letter from Frere to Lord Elphinstone, 22nd February 1858). The first Battalion was raised on 30th June 1858 and first designated 1st Balooch Rifles; this title was altered to 1st Jacob's Rifles three months later. [Sir Patrick Cadell, History of the Bombay Army (Longman's Green & Co., London, 1938), p. 218, footnote.]
- 344. The progress of experiments with small arms immediately prior to the adoption of the Enfield-Minié Rifle for the British Army can be conveniently followed in articles and correspondence appearing in The Military Review, edited by Capt. N. S. Shrapnel (London) during the years 1852-3. For an indication how well known Jacob's rifle and rifle shells were in the late '50s, see W. H. Russell, My Mutiny Diary, ed. Michael Edwardes (Cassell, 1957), p. 43.

CHAPTER XVII

- 345. Jacob Papers, Lord Dalhousie to Jacob, 22nd March 1856; John Jacob to Philip Jacob, 20th April 1856.
- 346. Sind File, Pol. 296, Acting Pol. Supt. to Acting Commr. in Sind, 10th March 1856. Sind Cossid, 7th March 1856. Corres. B.F./J.J., Frere to Jacob, 25th April 1856.
- 347. Sind File, Rev. Dept. 351 (Progress Report of Public Works in Sind,
- 348. Sind Selections, File 32 (3), Report by Commr. in Sind to Govt. of Bombay, March 1854. Selections from the Records of the Bombay Govt., New Series, No. LXIX, Canal Irrigation in Sind, with suggestions for its improvement, by Lieut. J. G. Fife (1861). Sind Selections, File 29 (Mithrao Canal); File 24 (6) (Indus-Karachi Canal). Selections (Bombay) New Series No. XLII, Enlargement of the Bigaree Canal in Upper Sind (1857), Acting Pol. Supt. to Acting Commr. in Sind, 21st October 1856; Acting Commr. in Sind to Govt. of Bombay; Bombay Govt. Resolution P.W.D. No. 473, 17th February 1857. Jacob, V. & (pp. 80-3.
- 349. Sind Selections, File 32 (2) & (3), Reports by the Superintending Engineer in Sind (Col. H. B. Turner) dated 29th April 1853, 13th July 1854; Deputy Collector Hala to Collector of Hyderabad, 31st October 1854.
- 350. S.I.H. Records, Vol. II, pp. 252-4. Sind Selections, File 186 (1), Superintending Engineer to Commr. in Sind, No. 884, 21st April 1855 and letters from Revenue Officers; Commr. in Sind to Collr. of Shikarpur, No. 3586, 13th November 1855.
- 351. Ibid., Acting Commr. in Sind to Govt. of Bombay, No. 171 P.W.D., 9th April 1856.

- 352. Jacob Papers, John Jacob to Philip Jacob, 20th April 1856. Sind File, Judicial, 298. (Order of Sir Charles Napier, 6th August 1846.). Sind Selections, File 186(1), Govt. of Bombay to Acting Commr. in Sind, 22nd May 1856. Sind Cossid, 13th May 1856. Bombay Times, 21st May 1856. Jacob, V. & O., pp. 21-6.
- 353. Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government, No. XVIII New Series; Official Correspondence relative to the Introduction of a rough Survey and Revenue Settlement in the Province of Sind (Bombay, 1855), pp. 3-7, 9-23. Ibid. (in continuation of No. XVIII, Bombay, 1859), pp. 8-9.
- 354. Ibid., pp. 12-21. Jacob, V. & O., pp. 57-71, 73-5. Jacob Papers, Capt. W. J. Eastwick to John Jacob, 25th May 1857.
- 355. Jacob, V. & O., pp. 83-4. Sind Cossid, 23rd May 1856.
- 356. J. Martineau, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 93-7. Sind Cossid, 23rd April, —July, 22nd August 1856. Jacob, V. & O., pp. 40-1. Sind Selections, File 24 (6). Sind File, Gen. 304, Acting Commr. in Sind to Govt. of Bombay, 18th July 1856. Sind File, Gen. 327, contract dated 26th December 1855.
- 357. Sind File, Gen. 327, Acting Commr. in Sind to Superintending Engineer in Sind, 6th March 1857. Sind File Rev. 350, Acting Commr. in Sind to Govt. of Bombay, 10th November 1856; Govt. Resolution, P.W.D., dated 3rd December 1856 to Commr. in Sind; Commr. in Sind to Govt. of Bombay, 7th July 1856; Govt. of Bombay to Commr. in Sind, 27th July 1857; Agent Sind Railway Co. to Commr. in Sind, 8th September 1857. Corres. B.F./J.J., Frere to Jacob, 3rd October 1856, 12th January 1857.
- 358. Corres. B.F./J.J., Frere to Jacob, 16th March, 26th June, 25th July, 24th August 1856, 12th January 1857. Sind File, Rev. 352, Acting Commr. in Sind to Govt. of Bombay, 19th March, 20th December 1856; Govt. of India to Govt. of Bombay, 31st October 1856, 20th March 1857. Jacob, V. & O., pp. 14-17.
- 359. Corres. B.F./J.J., Frere to Jacob, 25th July 1856. Acting Commr. in Sind to Govt. of Bombay, No. 183 dated 19th April 1856. Jacob, V. & O., p. 18. Sind File, Pol. 274, Acting Commr. in Sind to Govt. of Bombay, 8th August 1856. Sind File, Rev. 356, correspondence ending with Chief Sec. to Govt. of Bombay to Acting Commr. in Sind, 23rd January 1857.
- 360. Sind Selections, File 20 (1). Sind Cossid, 23rd May, July 1856. Corres. B.F./J.J., Frere to Jacob, 25th July 1856.
- 361. Sind File, Gen. 299; Commr. in Sind (Frere) to Govt. of Bombay, 15th January 1856; Acting Commr. in Sind (Jacob) to same, 20th March 1856; Adjutant-General of the Army to Sec. to Govt., Military Dept., 24th May 1856 (with enclosures); Acting Commr. in Sind to Govt. of Bombay, 27th June 1856.

- 362. Bombay Quarterly Review, Vol. V, January-April 1857, Art. 7. The Political Relations of Great Britain and India with Persia. Jacob Papers, Lord Canning to Jacob, 11th June 1856.
- 363. John Jacob, Letters on the Persian War and on the Frontier Arrangements of our Indian Empire (for private and confidential use only). (Smith Elder & Co., London, 1857), pp. 3-7. Corres. B.F./J.J., Frere to Jacob, 25th July 1856.
- 364. Sind Selections, File 145, Acting Pol. Supt. (Merewether) to Acting Commr., No. 244, 28th July 1856; Acting Commr. to Sec. to Govt. of India, No. 98, 13th August 1856.
- 365. Jacob Papers, Lord Canning to Jacob, 13th July 1856; Lord Elphinstone to Jacob, 16th July 1856. John Jacob, Letters on the Persian War, etc., pp. 7-19.
- 366. Jacob Papers, Lord Elphinstone to Jacob, 10th August 1856. John Jacob, Letters on the Persian War, etc., pp. 19-23.
- 367. Sind Selections, File 145; Secretary to Govt. of Bombay to Acting Commr. in Sind, No. 320, 28th August 1856; Acting Commr. in Sind to Secretary to Govt. of India, No. 135, 11th September 1856; Acting Pol. Supt. to Acting Commr. in Sind, No. 210, 27th September 1856.
- 368. Sind Selections, File 145; Acting Pol. Supt. to Acting Commr. in Sind, No. 244, 28th July; No. 276, 30th August; No. 290, 9th September; and 16th September 1856; Acting Commr. in Sind to Sec. to Govt. of India, No. 128, 6th September; No. 134, 11th September 1856; Secretary to Chief Commr. Panjab (Sir John Lawrence) to Acting Commr. in Sind, No. 807, 2nd October 1856. Sind Selections, File 116 (2). Acting Commr. in Sind to Sec. to Govt. of India, 15th September 1856; Sec. to Govt. of India to Acting Commr. in Sind, 23rd September 1856; Govt of India to Govt. of Bombay, No. 38, 5th September, and No. 65, 17th October 1856. Jacob Papers, Lord Canning to Jacob, 19th October 1856. R. Bosworth Smith, Life of Lord Lawrence (Smith Elder & Co., London, 5th edition 1886), Vol. I, p. 513.
- Jacob Papers, Lord Canning to Jacob, 19th October 1856. Sind Selections, File 144 (1), Govt. of Bombay to Acting Commr. in Sind, No. 426, 21st October 1856; Acting Commr. in Sind, to H.H. the Khan of Kelat, 28th October 1856. John Jacob, Letters on the Persian War, etc., pp. 26-31.
- 370. Sind Selections, File 116 (2), Acting Commr. to Govt. of Bombay, No. 215, 11th December 1856; Govt of Bombay to Acting Commr., No. 569, 24th December 1856; Govt. of India to Govt. of Bombay, No. 54, 30th January 1857. Corres. B.F./J.J., Frere to Jacob, 9th December 1856.
- 371. Sind Selections, File 116 (2), Acting Pol. Supt. to Acting Commr., No. 290, 9th September 1856; Acting Commr. to Sec. to Govt. of India, No. 134, 11th September 1856; letters from Mahomed Sadik, newswriter in Kandahar, 12th and 21st September 1856. Sind File, Pol. 296, Acting Pol. Supt. to Acting Commr. in Sind, No. 229, 3rd July 1856; Acting Commr. in Sind to Acting Pol. Supt., No. 454, 8th July, and No. 876, 5th October

- 1856; H.H. the Khan of Kelat to Acting Commr. in Sind, October 1856; Acting Commr. in Sind to the Khan of Kelat, No. 989, 32rd October 1856. Sind Selections, File 144 (1), Acting Commr. in Sind to Acting Pol. Supt., No. 1026, 28th October 1856; to Major H. Green, No. 1021, 27th October 1856.
- 372. Jacob Papers, Lord Canning to Jacob, 18th October 1856; Lord Elphinstone to Jacob, 12th November 1856. John Jacob, Letters on the Persian War, etc., pp. 32-45. Cf. Bombay Quarterly Review, Vol. V, p. 222: Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India (Calcutta, 1911), Vol. VI, p. 225.

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- 373. Sind Cossid, 28th October 1856.
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- 375. John Jacob, Letters on the Persian War, etc., pp. 45-52.
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
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